Map 1. The location of South Durban Basin
5. Results and Discussion
5.9. Implementation, enforcement and compliance with environmental regulations
2000). While on the other hand the government environmental bodies‟ fear of industrial pollution and industrial competition that it will lower local and national environmental standards.
Another major cause for poor compliance raised by Dagupta (2003) is the “race to the bottom” approach adopted by states to attract investments. Dagupta states that since states do not enjoy the freedom to lower environmental standards, they compensate for the same through lax enforcement in their bid to attract investments, and the enforcement of environmental standards remains merely on paper with industries taking advantage of the lax enforcement which results in wide variations in enforcement across states.
With regards to the extent of compliance, it said by eThekwini municipality that it is obvious that not all industries comply with environmental regulations, but it all depends on the risk of being caught and the degree of punishment, both of which are currently minor.However, specific guidelines and criteria are often available and put into place to determine compliance from noncompliance.
5.9. Implementation, enforcement and compliance with environmental regulations
When it comes to implementation of environmental management regulations, it is crucial to know that resources, styles of monitoring, enforcement and other environmental performance strategies differ across boundaries owing to the fact that protection sites with similar environmental impacts are treated differently (Jenkins, 2000).
According to Sanpath (2011) almost all South Durban Industries have a written environmental policy, and the most important aspect which is included in the environmental policy is the commitment to reduce air pollution, waste and
MTRP2011 Page 69 consumption of natural resources through compliance with environmental regulations.
According to the traditional viewpoint on the relationship between environmental protection and industrial, environmental regulation can only be met with additional investments and higher operating costs, and as a consequence, a lower economic growth rate can be expected (Jenkins, 2000).
The industrial sector‟s capability to comply with environmental regulations depends on the internal production capabilities in promoting green innovation which are:
dynamic technological, managerial and financial (Jenkins, 2000). Therefore, Jenkins (2000) argues that in order to encourage the so-called green innovation within industries, there has to be a greater design and analysis, managerial, technological and financial regulations within the industry itself.
According to Sanpath (2011), it has now been confirmed that key senior staff have resigned from the department, leaving pollution levels unchecked for at least a year, and this means that the stations used for monitoring air pollution were no longer functional since the resignation of senior staff, therefore, the absence of sufficient resources to actively monitor and detect non-compliance in all industries is challenging the drive to protect the environment.
According to Jenkins (2000) while standards with strict implementation may limit emissions of pollutants, they typically exact relatively high costs in the process by forcing industries to resort to unduly expensive means of controlling pollution and it does not end there. On the governments‟ side, standards with strict implementation impose high monitoring costs. On the other hand Coase (1960) in his landmark essay points out that pollution control situations have certain symmetry. He states that inefficient pollution control imposes costs on victims, which exceed the costs of controlling that pollution, and in other words, this means that the marginal benefits of pollution control exceed the marginal costs, and also that the existence of inefficient pollution damage therefore provides a motivation for the victims to take corrective action, even in the absence of any such incentives by the polluters. He further stipulates that such remedial action in the form of informal regulation will be
MTRP2011 Page 70 prospective wherever formal regulation leaves an opening between actual and locally preferred environmental quality.
Coase (1960) further supports his statement by arguing that the mentioned informal regulation can take many forms, including demands for compensation by community groups, social ostracism of the firm‟s employees, the threat of physical violence, boycotting the firm‟s products, and monitoring and publicizing the firm‟s emissions.
As a result, indirectly, such actions force recognition of the community‟s property rights in the local environment. This works on the premise that when formal regulatory mechanisms are absent or ineffective, communities will seek other means of translating their preferences into reality (Coase, 1960). However, one can therefore argue that even though the Coase theory was developed in the USA, but it is still applicable in the present situation. What Coase said more than 50 years ago still holds well in South Africa and South Durban Basin in particular. In effect, nothing has changed.
The compliance of industries with environmental regulations is weak, and this is as a result of the enforcement of environmental regulations by the government which is also weak. Dagupta (1999) proves that the enforcement and government‟s role is weak by arguing that the impact of merely formal inspection on enforcement draws a very weak response from industries towards compliance. He further argues that when government environmental inspectors find violations of environmental regulations, they typically threaten fines, which are small, or closure, and that this closure would be such a large burden that the unit has strong incentives to ensure that closure does not take place.
It has become increasingly obvious that it is practically impossible for the government to monitor all the activities of individual industries across the country including South Durban Basin, and according to Freund (2001) if the government is considered as a singular monitoring agency, then corruption and inefficiency are likely to creep into the system. Therefore, watchful stakeholders, including local and surrounding communities with strong and technically equipped institutional support, can play a very important role in managing the environment (Botha & Huntley, 2008).
MTRP2011 Page 71 Self-reporting is a substitute for government monitoring efforts that may reduce enforcement costs without compromising deterrence and polluters are told to report any violation of pollution standards (Jenkins, 2000). As result, the magnitude of penalty they receive will depend on whether the defilement is reported voluntarily or if government enforcement authorities discover it when no self-report has been made. This also applies if the report is late, then the penalty may be considerably strong.
Another weakness of the South African government is that the penalties for non- compliance with standards are unrelated to the compliance costs, and the prosecution and court decisions are based on compliance or non-compliance and not on the extent of compliance (Botha & Huntley, 2008). The extent of compliance has to be noted since some industries claim they comply but not to the fullest.
5.10. Actions by industries in mitigating environmental pollution in