rights of use by being able to not only force African people to move homesteads but also to cull livestock.
While all property rights are regulated in some shape or form, property rights holders have reasonable levels of autonomy and decision-making power within the land that forms part of their property. This is especially around rights of use (Blomley, 2013); as such the regulation of stock numbers of Africans highlights the weakness of the property rights of Africans on SANT land. Consequently, even the resistance measures used by Africans during this period were in line with this acceptance of vulnerability at the level of the law. African people resisted Betterment Planning militarily (Kepe & Ntsebeza, 2011). If African people under the SANT had recognised property rights, be it rights of use and occupation, their resistance should also have been through the law, but this was not the case. As such, the segregation state in dealing with this resistance could justify its actions because the state was within its right as the trustee to control how the land was to be used.
Lastly, compensation under Betterment Planning. For the people who lived on scheduled land (i.e., SANT land) compensation did not include the value of the loss of land. This was the case for the people who were removed from the Tsitsikamma reserves. The government’s justification was that the land was held in trust meaning that residents were only entitled to compensation for the loss of the structures built on top of the land for example houses (Platzky
& Walker, 1985). When people are removed the compensation received is meant to include the value for the loss of surface land rights (Maledu and Others v Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Limited and Another, 2018) and so the ability of the apartheid government to move people without paying this category of compensation is evidence of the assertion that the NLTA made African people tenants on their own land (Clark & Luwaya, 2017).
second, their creation formed the key administrative mechanism used to justify the removal of African people from the South African political system (Evans, 1997; South African History Online, 2019c) while allowing the state to continue to supervise African land ownership.
Under the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act, No. 46 of 1959 the apartheid state committed to starting the process of giving the respective territorial authorities control over the land in their areas. This would be done by assigning some of the rights and powers that were conferred to the Governor-General and/or Minister of Native Affairs as trustees of the SANT (section 7, subsection 4) to the respective Bantustan governments. However, this conferment of certain rights and powers did not divest the powers of the Governor-General or Minister who still had the power to withdraw any right or authority conferred to the respective Bantustan governments because he was still the trustee of all SANT land. Again, ambiguity continued to shape African property relations because the level of decision-making power of the territorial authorities was negotiable rather well defined.
Figure 5.1: Map of Bantustan territories
(Source: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bantustan)
When some Bantustans gained independence, there was the conferment of more powers to the independent governments, but this was still subject to the supervision of the apartheid state.
For example, the state still had powers to amend the boundaries of Bantustans by mere proclamation in the Government Gazette with the only restriction being that the apartheid state had to consult with the authorities of the relevant Bantustans (Platzky & Walker, 1985). This provision was extremely helpful for the central government in Pretoria because it became a carrot stick that was used to manage the resistance of outspoken Bantustan leaders.
Importantly, when minerals were discovered, it revealed just how much power the apartheid state retained in the Bantustan system. Mineral speculation played an important feature in keeping the Bantustans under apartheid state control. The apartheid state had seen the power of mineral interests in swinging interests within white ranks and thus was aware of the need to secure power over prospective mining activities in the Bantustans. This is why the NTLA largely remained silent on the issue of minerals thus giving leverage to the apartheid government to decide at a later stage its position depending on the factors emerging when minerals were discovered in a locality. This was useful because the Bophuthathtswana and Lebowa Bantustans had the largest bulk of platinum resources in the country. From the 1960s when platinum prices rose, the industry became lucrative. Because of their history as former Transvaal reserves, there were three forms of mineral ownership that existed in these Bantustans (Capps, 2012).
First, state trust property which was land earmarked for African occupation as part of the NLA and NTLA. This land was transferred to the Bantustans governments to become state land of the respective Bantustan. As such the Bantustan governments were able to handle the negotiations of both surface leases and rent to be paid by mining companies (Capps, 2012).
The revenues derived from these lease arrangements were paid into state-land trust funds to be used for acquiring more state land for the Bantustan or the economic development of the Bantustan (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1964). This use of the revenues was previously determined by the apartheid government as part of the NTLA (section 5, subsection f). Therefore people living on trust land had no say on whether or not mining would commence and forced removals were routinely used to make way for mining activities (Levin et al., 1997).
Second, tribal-state property which referred to land that had been acquired in a variety of ways and was registered in trust in the name of a state official in trust for “a chief and his tribe”
(Capps, 2012:71). This form of mineral ownership was dominant in Bophuthatswana that gained traction in the late nineteenth century in the Transvaal due to the six native rule (Feinberg, 1993). In most cases, mineral rights were severed from the land rights under this
arrangement but in cases where these rights were not severed, the tribal authorities were entitled to negotiate with mining companies who wanted to exploit the minerals (Capps, 2012). While tribal authorities in this context should have had more agency than their counterparts on trust land, the apartheid state continued to exercise much power. Tribal authorities could negotiate directly with the mining companies, but the Minister of Native Affairs had the power to unilaterally amend these agreements (see also Chapter 4). When Bophuthatswana attained independence in 1977, the apartheid government transferred its power as trustee to Lucas Mangope as President of Bophuthatswana. This empowered Mangope to enter into unfavourable agreements with Impala Platinum (Capps, 2012; Corruption Watch, 2018).
Despite legal challenges to these agreements by the Bafokeng Tribal Authority, which disputes Mangope’s authority, these agreements remained intact throughout the apartheid years (Capps, 2012).
Third, the mineral trust property which was specific to the Lebowa Bantustan. In 1987 the Lebowa Minerals Trust Act No. 9 of 1987 was passed which created the Lebowa Minerals Trust (LMT). All mineral rights in Lebowa previously held by SADT were transferred to the LMT (Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy, 2000). As such the LMT had the authority to grant mineral leases to mining companies and to receive all revenue from these leases. Delius (1996) has documented how the LMT was an instrument that the apartheid government used to capture the Bantustan elite in Lebowa.
The granting of some degree of autonomy to the Bantustan leaders in Bophuthatswana and Lebowa was part of the apartheid government’s tactic of divide and rule. It gave impetus to Bantustan leaders to align themselves with the apartheid government in the hope of receiving and safeguarding privileges. To illustrate this, it is useful to give context on how these two Bantustans came to exercise some control over their minerals. Between 1972 and 1973, the apartheid government granted self-governing status to the Bantustans and further encouraged each Bantustan to take independence status which would supposedly give the Bantustan even more authority (South African History Online, 2019c). However, only four Bantustans, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei took this offer (Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy, 2000) while the other Bantustans rejected it, most notably Lebowa and KwaZulu (Lynd, 2021). The resistance of the remaining Bantustans prompted the apartheid state to use various tactics to co-opt their leaders. I argue that this is the context that Mangope’s autonomy over the minerals must be viewed. In addition, the resistance by KwaZulu and
Lebowa leaders against independence prompted the apartheid state to use the discretion in its powers under the SADT to create the LMT to silence the African elites in Lebowa, as Delius (1996) argues. At this point, the apartheid government had no available incentives to co-opt Kwa-Zulu elites. However, this changed in 1994 when the outgoing apartheid government created the Ingonyama Trust which will be discussed in Chapter 6.
While attention was drawn to the occurrences in Bophuthatswana and Lebowa there are a plethora of examples that can be used to show how the apartheid state continued to exert control over the Bantustans hiding under this trust arrangement but of importance are examples involving land with mineral rights. As discussed in Chapter 2, property rights are often tested when there is value to be derived from land. When the stakes are higher, the rights of each stakeholder and/group to the land in question will determine their bargaining power and thus their ability to benefit from the minerals derived from the land. Trusteeship was politically useful for the apartheid government. It enabled the apartheid government to diversify its approach for each Bantustan to co-opt traditional leaders, where necessary. For example, Mangope enjoyed favour with the apartheid government which empowered him to act unilaterally, and his regime was notable for using the military to quell resistance (South African History Online, 2019d). Centring the LMT trustees in Lebowa and Mangobe in Bophuthatswana also made the apartheid government invisible to the mounting resistance in these Bantustans because of mining (Mbeki, 1984).