Scholars such as Hall (1980; 1982; 1996), Said (1978) and Mudimbe (1988) have argued and demonstrated that representations are discursively constructed imaginations based on already existing knowledge, and that such knowledge often serves the agenda of the producer(s) of representations. Thus, as Minh-ha (1990) argues, even the so-called objective documentary film- maker, for instance, who aims to capture reality as it is, alters the environment and the self- presentation of the film’s subjects in ways that ultimately shape the film to serve the ideologies of the film-maker. Thus, she observes that “on the one hand, truth is produced, induced, and extended according to the regime in power” (Min-ha, 1990:76). Studies in media and representation have focused on traditional media and the ways in which essentialized groups, such as Arabs or Muslims, are represented by the West (Saeed, 2007; Kabir, 2005). Based on the findings of my study, I suggest that online representations do not only reflect offline social tensions, but that they emerge out of conflicts; that the nature and intensity of the conflict determines the nature of representation and the extent of generalizations that underscore particular representations of the Other. I use the term ‘conflict’ here to broadly include intra- or intergroup discontent, disagreement and tensions, real or imagined. Most scholars of social and new media focus on self-presentation and self-performance on sites such as Facebook, as well as on the language and tools used in in such identity processes. Young (2013) suggests that individuals ‘write’ their idealized identities and existence online by manipulating profiles, personal information and other tools. Zhang, Jiang and Carrol (2010) and Marwick (2013) further suggest that beyond static profiles and personal information, identities are actively constructed and managed through different kinds of interaction on social media to produce identities based on belonging and performance. While these scholars enhance our understanding of the online practices that enable individuals to re/present and manage certain impressions of themselves, less research has been conducted about how online group identities are formed, managed and sustained. In this context, a key question is how do online representations of collective identity emerge? Is there an identifiable process through which representations emerge when media, lived experiences, and ideology are brought into alignment and worked out online?
The Online Forum itself is used by members as a mechanism for online representation of Self and Other in the sense that it is a system that has been set up for the pursuit of specific goals and interests among members. This involves processes that rest on ideas about the Southern Kaduna
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Christian Self as oppressed and the Hausa-Fulani Muslims as aggressive. Thus, viewed as a system, the online forum becomes a tool for representations. Introvigne (2005) highlights this potential of online technologies for verbal violence and terrorism. Beyond this view of the Online Forum, the place of conflicts as the source and environment for the emergence of online representation is significant. The themes discussed in Chapter five illustrate that most of the ideas about Southern Kaduna Christians and Hausa-Fulani Muslims surfaced in the context of violent conflicts, attacks on communities, political disagreements and elections, and other events with similar and varying degrees of tension. For example, the following comments emerged in response to violent attacks: “O God we need u d mst nw. our enemy want 2 wipe us out”
(Ceiphas, March 18, 2014), and “because my understanding of the issues are that this incessant attacks can only be best describe as a pogrom, genocide and clear cut brigandage” (Bako, April 9, 2014) In the narratives of oppression and genocide, Southern Kaduna are represented as victims and Hausa-Fulani as aggressive and barbaric. Similarly, the comments, “how sorrowful and painful we’v been treated without justice” (May 30, 2014) and “this impunity in Sk attacks and slavery must end” (Bala, November 17, 2013), were made in response to an online post of a list of 53 cases of conflicts and violence in Kaduna from 1981 to 2014. Most of what constitute narratives of resistance and agency in Chapter five also predominantly seek to respond to oppression and genocide. In the narratives of attraction and revulsion, the reported activities of the extremist group Boko Haram, for instance, informed some of the ideas of Muslims and Islam as violent, barbaric, suspicious and a false religion. As is evident in the following comment made by Joe “Ds has shown dat dere is mor hatred, insanity, devaluation of human life, confusion, terrorism, deceit & wanton destructn in d quran dan meet d eye” (September 22, 2013). The same context also informs the portrayal of certain features associated with Muslims by Forum members as desirable and worthy of emulation. Although the content examined in the narratives of expulsion could not be linked to any immediate violent or conflict situation, they nonetheless seem to be products of internal conflict and displeasure with Southern Kaduna use of Hausa language for communication, naming, and worship as an indication of seeming lack of freedom and the extent of Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony. Furthermore, in the representation of religion, the criticism of religion and religion for development emerged from political contestations over the place of religion in social life and political life. Thus, varying degrees and types of conflicts and displeasure inform the production of online representations of both the Self and the Other.
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Scholars such as Said (1978), Karkaba (2010), Hall (1980), and Biakolo (2006) explore representation in relation to power, knowledge regimes, language, and encounters between cultures and peoples; how individuals or groups that have access to certain knowledge and power over media, also control the representation. And, as mentioned above, scholarship on online representations focus on the individual and their efforts to present themselves in certain favorable ways to their friends (Saeed, 2007; Kabir, 2005). My study suggests that the tensions that emerge through particular kinds of offline encounters also largely shape how identities are constructed, and that, as Forehand, Reed, and Deshpande, (2002) suggest, conflicts can make certain identities salient. I do not suggest that such ethnic and religious tensions justify the representations produced, but that they offer the context for understanding them and the triggers for the emergence of such representations on the Online Forum.
The rhetorical practices through which online representations of Southern Kaduna Christians and Hausa-Fulani Muslims are produced in the Online Forum are particularly violent, at an epistemological level. Depictions of ethnic and religious identities appear to be stronger, more violent, and more unanimous when responding to posted media reports about violence or when there are strong feelings of marginalization. For example, one forum member stated that “Islam is a religion of the devil” (March 16, 2014, responding to a post about violence in Kaduna), while in another instance, responding to a report about a Boko Haram member who claimed to be in a holy war based on Qur’anic teaching, another Forum member wrote, “Ds has shown dat dere is mor hatred, insanity, devaluation of human life, confusion, terrorism, deceit & wanton destructn in d quran dan meet d eye” (September 22, 2013). Different events, however, were less likely to evoke these kinds of heavy responses. Conversations about politics, as opposed to religion, seem to produce more critical debates and disagreements among members. The attraction-revulsion dichotomy discussed in the previous chapter is a good example of where members offer criticism of religion as well as an explicit condemnation of the use of religion to divide voters when, for example, some forum members declare their preference for Muslim political candidates. When a forum member suggested that Christians should vote for members of their own religion only, it provoked responses such as, “It only shows how narrow minded you are. It is people like you that are drawing this country back (Bala, December 14, 2014); and, “I will rather vote even for an imam or Sheik than to vote the wrong candidate simply becos of religion” (Isaiah, December 14, 2014). Surely, there are positive representations and
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contestations even in conflict situations, however, the more general representations of the Other on the Online Forum are negative; if my suggestion is true, this could be because much of the conversations on the Online Forum in the period reviewed are about conflicts in different forms.
Thus, online representations of ethnic and religious identities are not fixed but situational and dependent on the intensity of the conflicts that evoke them.
Of course, these conflicts are themselves interpreted through a pre-existing lens distilled from previous conflicts or myths. Klar and Baram (2016), Bikmen (2013) and Hancock (2014) show this to be the case in their studies of how narratives of previous experiences and in-group socialization shape how new conflicts are interpreted. They show that such narratives always present the in-group as the wronged or victim, and seek ways to falsify alternative narratives.
What is significant about their suggestion is that one’s attitude or response to conflict can be changed with a change of narratives (Klar and Baram, 2016; Bikmen 2013, Hancock, 2014). This is made evident, for instance, in Bikmen’s (2013) observation that when the narrative about the Netherlands’ historical relationship to immigration changed, so too did the Dutch participants’
attitude towards the contemporary migration of Muslims into the country. Thus, when representations shift, the shift is influenced by situations and the lenses through which the situation is interpreted. This supports the findings of my study which indicate that despite participants claiming to have high levels of contact (fair amount, 12.9%, much 44.4% and very much 31.4%) and knowledge (fair amount 37%, much 31.5% and very much 8.3%) of religions other than their own, they were susceptible to inaccurate and not carefully thought out rhetoric about Islam. As I have highlighted above, forum members are more likely to be critical of themselves and more accepting of Muslims during political debates than during violent conflicts.
Akinade (2014) suggests that Christians and Muslims have lived together for long in Nigeria, but have not encountered each other, and that this accounts for intolerance. While encounter, in Akinde’s (2014) usage, would allow an inclusive space for everyone to tell their stories, whether the story is able to prevent negative representations and potential conflicts depends on the degree of conflict. Violent conflicts would likely lead to a rejection or dismissal of what is known about the Other, and non-violent or less violent conflicts may leave some room for the invocation of such stories to even counter negative representations of the Other. What can be deduced from this study as a whole is that in terms of media and self-representations Forum users are more flexible about changing and expanding articulations of themselves in less violent situations. They
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use media to contest, but more likely to further entrench ideas about the Muslim Other, and finally, forum members fail to use the transgressive potential of the online media to disrupt offline ideas about the Southern Kaduna Christian victim and the Hausa-Fulani Muslim villain.
Instead, the media platform functions as a site for further expanding and entrenching of these ideas.
Due to the erratic nature of the online conversations, and the intermittent contributions to online conversations analyzed in this study – with no definite, fixed or certain course or pattern – a clear and consistent mechanism of representation in terms of the processes involved is difficult to identify. However, apart from the identifiable narratives and language discussed in the previous chapter, a certain wrestling with the Self in terms of agency, subversion, desire for self- actualization, and action is a generally consistent character of responses by members of the Online Forum. This is visible in almost all narratives discussed in Chapter five, particularly in narratives of agency and resistance (as discussed in section 5.3.1). Forum members appear to construct Southern Kaduna Christians as passive, extremely patient, and not taking sufficient action to end their suffering. An attitude one member refers to as their “Do-nothingness” (Emly, May 12, 2013). Thus, the consistent call for members to ‘rise’, ‘wake up’ or ‘fight’ suggest a desire to change the discourse around Self as passive. An example is Jibo’s response to images about killings in a Southern Kaduna attack, “please Christians let’s not wait for anything, let’s rise” (Jibo, April 8, 2014), and concerning a similar situation, Bala wrote, “for how long shall we fold our hands n watch this barbaric act?” (March 16, 2014), and in an earlier comment on yet another occasion, Pius, another Forum user, commented that, “he who passively accepts evil is asmuch involved in it as he who helps to perpetrate it. He who accepts evil without protesting against it” (January 17, 2014). In the previous chapter I showed that members demonstrate an appetite for resistance in several other ways. They displayed a desire to own resistance and invest in the Self rather than rely on government or elders whom they represented as untrustworthy.
Moreover, as demonstrated in the narratives of agency and resistance presented in the previous chapters, the Forum members explored different possible modes of resistance including publicity and alternative media, violence especially in self-defense, secession, submission to God to fight for them, and expulsion of names and norms informed by Hausa-Fulani language and culture, as demonstrated in narratives of expulsion. Agency and self-actualization in postcolonial theory is a
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continuing question and exposure to different contexts and problems reveal very dynamic ways in which resistance is explored and understood among scholars (Mahmood, 2005; Parry, 1997).
While the criticism of the Self and exploration of agency rests on the perception among Forum members that the Southern Kaduna are not acting, I suggest that members are already engaged in action, investing in their agency and resisting by being and practicing online. In other words, agency and self-actualization is effected by Forum members through participation in the Online Forum, even if they do not view it that way themselves. Through this, Forum members can be seen as engaging in the production of a history of ideas and an online archive of content about Southern Kaduna, Hausa-Fulani, religion, and the social tensions in Kaduna. This can be viewed as action, an investment in the Self, effected because of the powerlessness and frustration they feel in light of narratives of oppression and genocide. It is also an investment in the actualization of an ideal Southern Kaduna space considering that my survey shows that 99% of members are Christians and 91.67% are of Southern Kaduna origins. Given the narratives of expulsion, the pursuit of a separate state for Southern Kaduna as part of their vision of peace, and the general representation of Hausa-Fulani as the enemy and aggressor, Forum members can also be said to be actively engaging in creating a Southern Kaduna consciousness, an imagined community that they hope to see actualized in the offline socio-political sphere.
More recent scholarship about the relationship between online and offline realities, especially in relation to religion, understand the distinction between the two spaces to be increasingly thinning, and that online practices are a microcosm, extension or serve to initiate offline ones (Campbell, 2012). In this study the majority of the online conversations are based on offline experiences and, as argued above, emerge from reports of offline conflict. Yet to what extent does what is manufactured or processed online translated back into offline social life? There is no evidence that certain discussions or appeals for action - such as those calls for violent resistance to oppression and genocide - were implemented offline.
However, Forum members are acutely aware of being online and of the affordances of the online space to more freely express oneself. Thus, a few Forum members raised questions about consistency between their online practices and the actual offline transformation that motivates their online presence and practice. James, for instance, responding to a charged political debate online, wrote “I kno some of u will nt stand eyeball-eyeball to talk wat u re sayin on forum, we
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need men wt proven integrity dat fight da rasce (December 31, 2013). James suggests that some Forum members are able to speak online but are not courageous enough to follow through offline, and this for him is an indication of lack of integrity. The online space, indeed, creates a safe space for self-expression with limited fear of immediate harm or material retaliation (Bowen, 2014). The niche of the closed group also makes it easier to speak in certain registers and express certain opinions more freely than others. However, James questions the inconsistency in portraying a certain image of oneself online and yet not being able to maintain the same image and pursue the same position offline.
To be sure, Forum members are involved in offline politics, and the Online Forum belongs to an offline non-profit organization that has been vocal in Kaduna, calling out government and engaging in protest actions against events and issues considered to undermine or violate Southern Kaduna. Their press on the ZEMDA conflict discussed in the previous chapter is an example. Yet, while Forum members commune within a closed group, they are aware that it is not entirely beyond penetration and surveillance by state authorities. This was demonstrated in the discussion on agency and resistance in chapter five, where the rhetoric of distrust was also applied by Forum members to talk about suspected traitors among them who were viewed as misdirecting their agency against their own people. For example, leaders of the Online Forum reported being arrested and questioned by the Police who possessed, to the surprise of the arrested Forum members, printed content from the online forum. While this was disturbing for members, it was also viewed as part of the ultimate goal – to influence public opinion and political decision in the state. One of the arrested leaders posted, “but we are not scared if they know what we are talking about, for that is the essence ultimately or are we going to keep talking to ourselves only? The comments and posts herein have made govt sit up on many issues advertently or inadvertently” (March 23, 2014). This quote shows an appetite to extend the concerns of Forum members beyond the online in-group conversation. It also suggests that the Forum’s content has had some actual impact on the state and politics. Scholars such as Khondker (2011) and Gerbaudo (2012) have shown how new media have been a significant tool for social activism, especially with regards to mobilization and advocacy. Moreover, such occurrence as police surveillance of the Online Forum indicates that the continuity between online and offline is not simply effected by the Forum members. This begs further investigation and discussion of the legal ramification of such forum discussions. Being a closed or private Forum with privileged