CHAPTER ONE
1. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE MYSTERY OF GOD'S PATHOS FROM THE JEWISH INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES TO OUR CONTEMPORARY
1.2 THE MODERN JEWISH VIEW OF GOD'S PATHOS IN HESCHEL AND BERKOVITZ: DISPUTE, CRITICISM AND A NEW APPROACH
If the paradox Anthropos-Theos is one of the philosophical and theological presuppositions, accepted by Brunner, then the idea that the God of the Bible is unchangeable, holds true. But the idea that God is unchangeable in terms of faithfulness rather than impassibility becomes contradictory. In attempting to solve this, we suggest changeableness and not changeableness in the place of the idea ofunchangeableness;
Wondra prefers to support Brunner's view on God's behavior. Itis true on the one hand that God alters his behavior in response to human behaviour and on the other, this transitive change depends intrinsically on reflexive changes because God is the principia pathos. The problem that most theologians and philosophers face in grasping the principia pathos is similar to these encountered in metaphysics (cf. Whitehead 1978); the grandeur of the universe in cosmology (cf. Silk 1988 and Hawkins 1988); the mystery of DNA in biochemistry (cf. Monod 1972); the theory of quantum and relativity in physics and chemistry (cf. Planck 1922 and Niels Bohr 1948); and the incertitude of financial markets in macro-economies. Inall these fields of human endeavour, including theology, the understanding of God, the principia pathos remains an enigma, as Einstein (1935) observes. However, Eliezer Berkovitz and Heschel claim to resolve this enigma, their attempt at resolution will be demonstrated below.
1.2 THE MODERN JEWISH VIEW OF GOD'S PATHOS IN HESCHEL AND
discovered parallels that I would never have thought of My first discovery was the Jewish concept of the pathos of God with which Abraham Heschel has interpreted the message of the Shekinah, the indwelling of God in the persecuted and suffering people of God...
Jaeger (1977: 174) writes that: ''Moltmann also noted that when he did research on the Crucified God, he found that Jewish writers had already been discussing the theme of God's suffering". Indeed, when we read Moltmann we remark that he approaches his work in a fashion parallel to that of Heschel. Three points are fundamental in this parallelism: Heschel and Moltmann perceive God's pathos in the holocaust event; they bdth take the biblical text seriously; and both Heschel and Moltmann believe that faith is the element which moves God to become compassionate (cf Merkle 1985: 493 and 496).
Heschel, as a pioneer, makes seven important points (1990.vol 1: 11): God's pathos is not a passion, an unreasoned emotion, but an act formed with intention, rooted in decision and determination; God's pathos is not an attitude taken arbitrarily, but one charged with ethos; God's pathos is not a reflexive, but a transitive act; God's pathos is not seen in its psychological denotation, standing for a state of soul, but in its theological connotation, signifying God as involved in history and as intimately affected by events in history; the divine pathos is the unity of the eternal and the temporal, of meaning and mystery, of the metaphysical and the historical; the language the prophets employed to describe that God's supreme concern (God's pathos) was an anthropomorphism to end all anthropomorphisms (cf Heschel 1990.vol 2: 52); and finally, the notion of God as a perfect Being is not of biblical origin (cf HescheI1990.voI2: 54).
From these assumptions, it is possible to confirm the claim of Fritz Rothschild (cf Rothschild in Merkle 1984: 160) that ''Heschel has propounded a truly revolutionary doctrine, challenging the whole venerable tradition of Jewish and Christian metaphysical theology from Philo, Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas to Herman Cohen, Etienne Gilson and Paul Tillich". In view of the complexity of this divine pathos, Heschel's principal thesis is not simply original but, indeed, revolutionary. It is to be expected, then, that Heschel's theology of pathos would be attacked by other theologians, such as Eliezer Berkowitz (cf Merkle 1984: 151). Eliezer Berkovitz, dissatisfied with Heschel's viewpoint, decided to launch an attack on the concept of divine pathos, as Tanenzapf (1974: 279) observes. In his address to Heschel, Berkovitz's line of attack is against the use of anthropomorphism. Berkovitz (1964: 81-82) claims:
The logical deduction runs like this: According to the Bible, the greatness of god is seen in the fact that 'man is neither an abstraction to Him, nor in His judgment a generalization. God knows man, the individual human being, and judges Him as individual. 'Yet in order to realize a human being not as a generality but as a concrete fact, one must feel him, one must become aware of him emotionally'. This would make sense ifGod's pathos could be explained logically. But since what we gain by the argument must be called a mystery, why don't we call for a mystery a step sooner? Why not reason in the following manner: It is inconceivable that the Supreme Being could be passible. Therefore, there could be no such thing as divine pathos. At the same time, God realizes man as 'a concrete fact' however, in order to do that one must feel him; one must become aware ofhimemotionally.
He proceeds by arguing that:
But God is free of pathos. Ergo, God's realizing man as a concrete fact and not as an abstraction is enrapt in mystery.
We believe' our way of reasoning is much more valid than that of Heschel. For Dr. Heschel commits the unforgivable fallacy that he equates the human way of realizing a fellow man as a concrete fact with the way of God. Man's way of 'knowing' a fellow being depends on feeling and emotion.
Could not conceivably God's way be different from that of man? Surely, our mystery is much more logical than Dr.
Heschel's.
We identify two problems in Berkovitz's accusation against anthropomorphism. Firstly, there is Berkovitz's problem concerning the way that Heschel equates the human way of recognising a fellow human with God's way. Merkle (1984: 151) believes that "the theology of pathos presupposes an analogy between the divine and the human which is an alien and objectionable concept from the Jewish point of view; thus, a God of pathos is God shaped in the image of man". Berkovitz's fear is indeed understandable from his background and is also related to his philosophical, and mythological, misunderstandings.
Heschel says that he uses anthropomorphism to end all anthropomorphisms. This announcement, as Merkle suggested, puts the question of anthropomorphism In a tautegorical dimension instead of an analogical. Heschel is correct, evenifhe did not use the tautegorical hermeneutic because in the tautegorical dimension the O'T)~ELOV and its significance O'T)~aO'La transcend dogma25• Whitehead (1926: 126) correctly notes that:
"A dogma in the sense of precise statement can never be final; it can only be adequate in its adjustment of certain abstract concepts. But the estimate of the status of these concepts remains for determination". Heschel does not emphasize the use of dogma; he inaugurates a new way of re-making the philosophy, theology and religion, while
Berkovitz insists on the survival of Jewish dogma. Whitehead identifies with Heschel, as he (1926: 126) observes'·that: ''In no phase of human knowledge or belief dogma is tynable". Any dogma or axiom has to be re-interpreted in its new context, or it will become obsolete. Berkovitz's failure also with regard to anthropomorphism lies in his lack of tautegorical perception of the early religious background of the Near Eastern Ancient civilizations and especially that of sub-Saharan Afiica. This does not as Hempel observes (c£ Hempel in Fohrer 1973: 78) necessarily mean the way in which unsophisticated people try to perceive the world and life. This is, in a sense, a new theological framework. This new theological perception implies the paradoxical way of combining without dichotomizing rational and the not rational things or images.
Berkovitz, like many other scholars, misunderstand the importance of this new theological framework. Berkovitz, also, misunderstand the fact that in these contexts divinity is always shaped in the image of human beings. As Hempel (c£ Hempel in Fohrer 1973: 78) observes:
Yahweh is conceived solely as having human form. A later theology reversed the notion, seeing man in Yahweh's image (Gen. 1:26-27) while the ancient Near Eastern gods appear also or only in forms that range from the astral world to the world of plants and animals. In addition, Yahweh is conceived as possessing human features like love and hate, joy and sorrow, forgiveness and vengeance.
This was important for the unsophisticated Israelite, who needed concrete images. His God understood his all-too- human feelings and actions, because his God himself could love and hate. Unlike the Homeric gods, however, Yahweh did not incorporate any human weaknesses and failings. He could not be ridiculed like them, for he never ceased to be an exalted deity.
Even ifHempel cautiously endorses Fohrer (1973: 78-79), it is evident that Yahweh is like the Homeric gods. 'Scholars or ordinary readers have problems in accepting it because of their biblical interpretations of the poetic symbols based on false philosophical and mythological assumptions, as Berkovitz has done, depicting the true identity of God.
Unfortunately, these poetic symbols reveal nothing apart from superficiality, an escape into theodicy and a misreading of the biblical texts. But, ifthe creations of the cosmos and humankind, and, above all, the dramatic redemption of kind in Hosea, are not affective encounters between God, Human beings and the Cosmos, then, what are they?
Heschel (1996.vol 1: 4) argues that God's pathos is not a passion, an unreasoned emotion, but an essential act rooted in decision and determination. Berkovitz's reaction is very interesting: he shares Heschel's view that God's pathos is not a passion; but he disagrees with the idea that to interact with someone means to be affected by that person, and that this is true even for God. Yet he argues contradictorily, that God is personal and is concerned with human beings. In this argument, Tanenzapf (1974:281-282) perceives Berkovitz's contradiction and wonders what it means to be concerned for another, ifthe other does not affect you. He proceeds to explain:
IfI say that I care for a person, but I do not share her joys and sorrows, that I am unaffected both by the happy and sad occasions in her life, one would rightly wonder whether I am really concerned, whether I really do care for her.
Caring destroys independence and self-sufficiency; to love is to be vulnerable, to be open to and influenced by, the one loved.
According to Tanenzapf (1974: 282), Berkovitz resorted here to the Midrash to insist that God's pathos is contradictory. A similar contradiction becomes evident when he speaks about God's perfection. The notion of God as a perfect Being is not of biblical origin (cf Heschel 1996.vol 2: 54). We have already shown above that the Bible never refers to God as the perfect being and, given God's pathos, to be holy does not mean to be perfect. God's exigency in terms of ethical concerns (~'Ji?) is always linked with His concrete existence. Indeed, what we contend, with Heschel, is that Berkovitz disassociates passion from God's pathos. It is evident that
a
propos of pathos we are dealing with the question ofpassion and not passion26 and God cannot be an exception, unless we use Hegel' s model. It seems, at this point, that the fear of Heschel and Berkovitz is based on the faith of the Jews and Philo, and Maimonides' philosophical presuppositions27. What Berkovitz failed to discuss was Heschel's phrase that God's pathos is not reflexive, but transitive. We cannot imagine how he failed to approach such an important issue. Once again, however, we affirm that Heschel wrongly limited God's redemption of Humans to the transitive dimension, forgetting that reflexive, symmetric and transitive are in the whole interlaced: namely completely reciprocal. Perhaps the silence of Berkovitz on the matter is better than Heschel's argument. Silence is implicitly encouraged by the poet in Hosea:Who is wise? He will realize these things. Who is discerning? He will understand them. The ways of the LORD are right; the righteous walks in them, but the rebellious stumble in them. (Hosea 14:9)
26Not passion(the opposite to passion) differs to impassibility (negation of passion).
27Moltmannhassuggested some very interesting views that the pathos of God in the Old Testament is the presupposition for the passion of God according to the New Testament.
This lack of explications is certainly the cause of the dispute but, more, it cannot be the reason for discouragement. On the contrary, it has to move us to meditate in depth about the true meaning of metaphor, which is the real reason for misunderstanding the concept of God's pathos in philosophy, theology and religion.
In this chapter we started by discussing the pathos of God from the perspective of the most famous Jewish scholars, Philo and Maimonides, who focused on the difficulties that they faced in reconciling their Greek and Jewish philosophical and their theological backgrounds. Then we considered the way in which neo-orthodox scholars in Catholic and Protestant churches on the one hand and Jewish scholars like Berkovitz and Heschel, on the other entered into the debate. In the next chapter, we are going to face the enigmatic question of metaphor, analyzing God's pathos by the symbolic or tautegorical method and using two other symbols: Logos and Ethos.