CHAPTER ONE
1. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE MYSTERY OF GOD'S PATHOS FROM THE JEWISH INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES TO OUR CONTEMPORARY
1.1 GOD'S PATHOS: CRISIS, DISPUTE AND CONCORD BElWEEN ORTHODOX AND NEO-ORTHODOX IN CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT
1.1.2 Barth, Moltmann and Brunner: Modern Protestant Orthodox and neo- Orthodox Approach to God's pathos-fear, trembling and audacity
1.1.2.2 Moltmann: The voice of Change (The Troublemaker for Barth)
Moltmann appears as a kind of troublemaker for Barth. He contends that Barth has a
simplistic idea of God (cf Russell 1988: 231). Indeed, it is not clear, from Barth's writings, who and what God is and what the meaning of God's pathos is. With respect to God's pathos, Moltmann justifiably criticizes Barth for failing to develop a "sufficiently Trinitarian" thrust to God's participating in Christ's pathos on the cross (cf Russell 1988:
231). Russell (1988: 231) claims that for Moltmann, a sufficiently Trinitarian concept of the event of Christ on the cross clearly distinguishes Christ's suffering from God's suffering. He (1988: 231) proceeds to argue that Moltmann explains God's suffering with Christ in a different ontological way. There are some problems in this respect.
Moltmann falls into the trap of fear and trembling of most fundamentalists and conservatives. However, Jaeger (1977: 175) supports Moltmann when he notes: ''The Christian theologian, argues that the image of God needs to be reconstructed, according to biblical rather than philosophical notions." He proceeds by concluding that, "He [Moltmann] was, however, one of the most vocal and articulate voices expressing these concerns".
In fact, Moltmann (cf Moltmann in House 1982: 411) claims that, "the most important progress in Christian theology today is being made in overcoming the A-pathy axiom in theology". But, Moltmann has failed to contribute significantly. His error consists in his elaboration on patripassianism and theopaschitism. He contends that the old model was problematic, but he does not use the proposed new one to eradicate it. Moltmann's and Jaeger's rejection of philosophy is problematic and, on reading Moltmann carefully, we can find that Moltmann tried to embrace Kierkegaard's, Whitehead's, and Hartshorne's metaphysical presuppositions about God. Here McWilliams (1982: 38) defends
patripassianism and theopaschitism by arguing that the Father and the Son experience the crucifixion differently. The son suffers the agony of God's forsakenness, but the father suffers the grief of the loss of his Son". McWilliams's view of Moltmann's perception of God's pathos is however, also problematic. This is because the point here is not about avoiding the ancient heresies of patripassianism and theopaschitism. Moltmann failed, as Barth has failed too, because he was unable audaciously to combinelogic with not logic.
What Moltmann avoids as heresies are, indeed, not heresies. As such, Goetz's (1986:385) advice has to be taken seriously: "the age of the old dogma that God is impassible and immutable, incapable of suffering, is for many no longer tenable". Due to the claim of the theologian, the priest and the pastor pretend to bring the poor, oppressed and marginalized to Christ as a fellow sufferer in preaching the Gospel; the ancient theopaschite heresy that God suffers has, in fact, become the new orthodoxy. We, in agreement with Goetz, believe that this so-called heresy is contrary to the key-idea of God as a suffering Being20. The truth is that the future of theology in this post-modem epoch depends on the way that scholars conscientiously and, above all, audaciously handle thiskey-idea.
The contribution of Asian and above all African scholars who write in the sub-Saharan context seems to be decisive because their religious heritages are based on the philosophy of organism (cf. Whitehead 1979) and Process Theology, according to which life is seen
20 Temple (cf. Temple in House 1982: 414) describes their real concern in these terms: "We have to recognize that Aristotle'sapathetic Godwas enthroned in men's minds,and no idol has been so hard to destroy". He proceeds: "But there is a highly technical sense in which God, as Christ revealed him, is without passions;for he is Creator and supreme, and neverpassivein the sense of having things happen to himexcept with his consent; also he is constant andfreefrom gusts of feeling carrying him this way and that. ..But the termimpassiblereally meantincapableofsufferingand in this sense its predication of god is almost wholly false ... God does not leave the world to suffer while he remains at ease apart all suffering of
the world is his." .
holistically. For them, there is a relationship between divinity and humanity. The worlds of the ancestors (1' au dela) and of human beings are linked. What this means is that the suffering and joyfulness are blended or entrelassam-se21 in God's pathos. This combination of mythology (e.g. the history of god and the ancestors) and the daily search for the meaning of existence is remarkable, as Thsishiku (1980: 61-64) and, above all, Tillich (1963. vol.3: 431) note22. It is exactly this combination of mythology and daily search for the meaning of the existence that Fiddes (1993) and, particularly, Moltmann grasp from the idea of Jesus' cross.
For that reason, in spite of some failures, we have to concede that Moltmann's contribution to the understanding of God's pathos is unquestionable; it is especially important in that he links the event of the cross with the Old Testament. Indeed, Moltmann's (1975:78) view is that: "the pathos of God in the Old Testament is the presupposition for the passion of God according to the New Testament". Jaeger (1977:
175) argues that: "Moltmann considered the crucifixion of Jesus Christ to be the core element of the Christian faith, viewing the cross event as the central message of divine pathos in the Old Testament". Jaeger (1977: 175) says that, for Moltmann, the cross event revolutionized the understanding of God, for it revealed that God himself
21Itis more explicit and more profound in Portuguese ratherthanin English (to interlace).
22 See more details about Tillich's point when he writes that: "The philosophers of1Jecoming can refer to biblical statements in which repentance, toil, patience, suffering and sacrifice are attributed to God. Such expressions of the vision of a livingGodhave led to ideas which were rejected by the church, the so-called patripassionist doctrine that God as father suffered in the suffering of the Christ. But such an assertion contradicts too obviously the fundamental theological doctrine of God's impassibility.Inthe judgment of the church it would have brought Goddown to the level of the passionate and suffering gods of Greek mythology. But the rejection of patripassionism does not solve the question of the negative in the blessedness of the Divine Life. Present-day theology tries-with very few exceptions -to avoid the problem altogether, either by ignoring it or by calling it an inscrutable divine mystery. But such escape is impossible in view of the question's significance for the most existential problem of theodicy. People in " boundary- situations" will not accept to escaping into the mystery on this point ...Iftheology refuses to answer such existential questions, it has neglected its task. Theology must take the problems of philosophers of becoming seriously. Itmusttryto combine the doctrine of eternal blessedness with the negative element
experienced suffering and humiliation at Golgotha. He concludes that: ''The crucifixion revealed a God able to identify with and suffer on behalf of His people, and the cross, thus understood, revolutionized Moltmann's whole theological structure" (cf. Jaeger 1977: 175). As the cross is the great event of history (cf. Kalond in Angang et al. 1980:
24-25) 23, Moltmann emphasizes that the God of the crucified Christ was a being of profound love; this divine love was of such a kind that it could embrace all the suffering and struggles involved in human history (cf. Jaeger 1977: 176). That is why, Moltmann (cf. Moltmann in Jaeger 1977: 175) denied that he accepted the Greek idea of God's perfection:
Since Plato and Aristotle, God's perfection has been designated as 'apatheia'. God is good and cannot be the cause of evil. God is perfect and thus has no needs. God is sufficient and thus needs neither love nor hate. Nothing can befall him that would make him suffer. He knows neither wrath nor grace.
He (1992: 29) asserts that: "Our true suffering is also his suffering, our sorrow is also his sorrow, our pains are also the pains of his love" and he (1978: 25) justifies this assertion by arguing, ''wounds are healed only by wounds". Here, Moltmann agrees with Kitamori (cf. Kitamori in Mc Williams 1982: 45) who claims that: "sickness is saved by sickness"
or "only the widow can comprehend another widow" or, in others words, that He is the God who is on the side of the wronged. God is always presented as
iD;'!?
which means He is a suffering God, a fellow-victim with those who are wrongediD1i?
(cf. Tregelles23See also a profound study found in yon Werdt (yon Werdt in Feiner and Loehrer 1978. ly/6: 116-121) and yon Balthasar (yon Balthasar in Feiner and Loehrer 1978.YolIII/5: 88-94).
1950: 725i4, "the great companion-the fellow-sufferer who understands" as Whitehead
'.
(cf Whitehead in Surin 1982: 110-111) observes. We identify with Heschel because the Hebrew Scriptures never present God as perfect. We believe that the notion of God as a perfect being is not of biblical origin. It is the product not of prophetic religion but of Greek philosophy and we think that, instead of presenting God as a being of rational perfection, the scriptures focused on a deity who cared deeply for His people (cf Heschel 1966: 101). We diverge from Heschel and Moltmann because they do not have the boldness to admit that ifHe is experienced in the tautegorical sphere ~ji?, he has the capacity to be paradoxically holy as well as a harlot. This paradoxical behaviour of God expresses doubtlessly, the grandeur and the profound meaning of the incarnation (cf.
Anta Diop 1959: 150). Besides this the above-mentioned points obviously make Moltmann realistic, pragmatic and more comprehensive than Barth. Barth's approach to God's pathos is close to that of the dogmatic clergy's or the dominant class's; but Moltmann is the kinof the oppressed as Bonhoeffer (1975), Schweitzer (1964), Berdyaev (1961), Boff (1979), Gutierrez (1981), Cone (1970), Malula (1980), Kivengere (1975,1977) or Desmond Tutu (1977).
1.1.2.3 God's Pathos in Emil Brunner: The third voice
Emil Brunner (1949) intervenes in the debate as the third voice. With his neo-orthodox approach to God's pathos, he prefers to discuss the question of God's unchanging nature
24 The same nuance is observed with the word,~; (cf. Tregelles 1950: 151-152). The word ~i'i?
paradoxically means a holy person (man) as well as a temple-prostitute or~ji?(woman or harlot). The
by entering into the old dispute about the traditional attributes of the immutability or impassibility of God. Brunner (1949: 243) goes back to the early church to shape his argument. He says that: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the theological doctrine of the Divine attributes, handed on from the Early Church, has been shaped by the Platonic and neo-Platonic idea of God, and not by the biblical idea". Wondra (1964: 31), on the other hand, comments that, ''Brunner feels that the distinction between the two is that in the Bible, God is a personal subject who reveals himself, whereas the Greek approach makes him the object of thought which is attained by a process of one's own thinking". IfWondra's perception of Brunner's view is correct, then Brunner is putting forward in Christianity the idea of the Theopathetikos, the God who is the fellow-suffer andAnanke the God who is totally indifferent to human suffering. The merit of Brunner's idea is that it recognizes and attempts to solve the dilemma by adopting Kierkegaard's paradox. Brunner's comprehension of God's pathos, thus, transcends Hegel and Barth:
this interpretation confirms the effectiveness of Moltmann, as well as of the fathers of the early church. Brunner's view is very significant especially for its involvement of ethical irilplications in relation to God.
In all of his theology, Brunner sustains the idea of the unchanging nature of God. The question for debate is what Brunner means by the unchanging nature ofGod.Inresponse, Brunner says that the idea of the unchangingness of God means that God alters his behavior in accordance with the changes in human being. Here, he adopts Heschel's position of defining God's pathos as transitive action. We disagree. God's behavior has to be understood and perceived in a multi-dimensional way. God not only enters into the activity of humankind and acts but He dialogues with people, hears their prayers, loves
and judges them. We would like to emphasize that the transitive acts of divinity can never be dissociated from God's reflexive acts. We believe that the creation of human being as related in Genesis and above all God's love drama with Israel as described in Hosea can help us to perceive this. In Genesis, with the fall of Adam and Eve, God is affected and He involves Himself in the affective human drama. Therefore, in Genesis, contrary to common belief, the act of the creation of human being paradoxically brings to our attention human being's involvement in God's affective drama, even if human being is ignorant of the beginning and the end of the ongoing tragedy. Wondra (1964:32) explains Brunner's caution in rejecting God's impassibility. According to Brunner we must not swallow the modern, unchristian notion that God is part of the universal process and that He is becoming along with all of us. Brunner's caution appears ambiguous. This is said because although we cannot accept all philosophical and theological presuppositions, we would like to believe that Brunner (1934: 502) accepts them in expressing clearly the use
of the paradox of human and divine suffering on the cross:
This Passion is, however, vicarious through the personal solidarity, the close union that subsists between the One who suffers and those for whom He suffers. Only man can suffer from his connection with God, and only on this account can this sacrifice have meaning. The human element, in the deepest sense of the word, constitutes the
"material" for this sacrifice; therefore it must be suffered in a truly human way. But God Himself can only achieve this;
therefore the Person, in whom human nature truly suffers, must be the Divine Person. It is therefore wholly impossible to separate the human and the divine vicarious elements from each other. The existence of the one implies the existence of the other.
If the paradox Anthropos-Theos is one of the philosophical and theological presuppositions, accepted by Brunner, then the idea that the God of the Bible is unchangeable, holds true. But the idea that God is unchangeable in terms of faithfulness rather than impassibility becomes contradictory. In attempting to solve this, we suggest changeableness and not changeableness in the place of the idea ofunchangeableness;
Wondra prefers to support Brunner's view on God's behavior. Itis true on the one hand that God alters his behavior in response to human behaviour and on the other, this transitive change depends intrinsically on reflexive changes because God is the principia pathos. The problem that most theologians and philosophers face in grasping the principia pathos is similar to these encountered in metaphysics (cf. Whitehead 1978); the grandeur of the universe in cosmology (cf. Silk 1988 and Hawkins 1988); the mystery of DNA in biochemistry (cf. Monod 1972); the theory of quantum and relativity in physics and chemistry (cf. Planck 1922 and Niels Bohr 1948); and the incertitude of financial markets in macro-economies. Inall these fields of human endeavour, including theology, the understanding of God, the principia pathos remains an enigma, as Einstein (1935) observes. However, Eliezer Berkovitz and Heschel claim to resolve this enigma, their attempt at resolution will be demonstrated below.
1.2 THE MODERN JEWISH VIEW OF GOD'S PATHOS IN HESCHEL AND