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deploy NMPs, and PCASP can only be deployed if NMPs are unavailable. There is thus a slight deviation in the published regulation from the prior resolution. Article 5 of the Law Decree further limits contractors that may be appointed as PCASP to Italian and European Union citizens and Italian security providers.239 Bevilacqua notes that the deployment of private security guards will be difficult as the conditions in the law decree will have to be met and only when a public team is unavailable, thus the “only enforceable option is that of vessel protection detachments”.240 Article 8 provides that the embarkation and disembarkation of weapons in coastal states must be “in compliance with the legislation of the states”.241 Flag states are once again placing an obligation on vessel owners to ensure compliance with coastal state laws and regulations on firearms.242
There should be diplomatic agreements between flag and coastal states on the issue of armed guards. There should be an open line of communication between states in order to regulate the private maritime security industry. This approach would streamline any permit or vetting process that needs to be undertaken by flag and/or coastal and port states and also provide for a
‘blacklist’ system should any PMSC be found to have transgressed the laws of the states concerned.
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mobile offshore drilling units.244 The regulations “were published by the Norwegian maritime Directorate on 1 July 2011”245 (less than two months after the publication of the IMO Guidelines to Flag States) pursuant to powers delegated in terms of the Ship Safety and Security Act.246 They apply to cargo ships with a gross tonnage of 500t or more which are certified for international trade.247
Section 20 states that, “armed guards may be employed following the completion of a risk assessment and following consultation with the master”.248 The Master’s role and authority is expressly confirmed, which prevents divided command on board the vessel.249 Abeyratne points out that “much responsibility devolves upon the ship’s master who should also be consulted about the drafting of the procedures regarding armed personnel on board”.250
Section 20 imposes strict obligations on vessel owners intending to deploy armed guards on their vessels. They must submit documentary proof of the competency of the PMSC selected for the security contract.251 The industry guidelines for preventative measures would mean BMP4, installation of citadels, ship hardening installations and other non-lethal defensive equipment which must be considered prior to contracting armed guards for a Norwegian flagged vessel – in other words, a risk assessment.252 Notice must be given to the owners’ insurers prior to the use
244 Amendments to Regulation of 22 June 2004 no. 972, by the insertion of Sections 17 – 25 concerning protective security measures on board ships and mobile drilling units into Act of 16 February 2007 No.9 relating to Ship Safety and Security (The Ship Safety and Security Act).
245 Amendments to Regulation of 22 June 2004 no. 972, by the insertion of Sections 17 – 25 concerning protective security measures on board ships and mobile drilling units into Act of 16 February 2007 No.9 relating to Ship Safety and Security (The Ship Safety and Security Act) - Introduction.
246 Section 39, Act of 16 February 2007 No. 09 relating to Ship Safety and Security (The Ship Safety and Security Act).
247 Ibid Section 1(b).
248 Ibid Section 20(1).
249 Ibid Section 22. See also Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law at 142.
250 Ruwantissa, Abeyratne ‘The use of armed guards on board merchant vessels’ (2012) 5 Journal of Transportation Security at 164 available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12198-012-0088-5# accessed on 13 March 2014.
251 Section 20(2), Act of 16 February 2007 No.9 relating to Ship Safety and Security (The Ship Safety and Security Act).
252 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative
& International Law at 138.
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of armed guards253 and there must be a set of procedures in place for the storage of firearms whilst on board.254
Section 24 requires armed guards to give prior warning before engaging in the use of force, namely, light and sound signals as well as warning shots with the objective of rendering a person harmless.255 The prior warning requirement should perhaps be expressly agreed in the RUF between the owners and PMSC. Mahard recommends that the “United States adopt binding RUF for PCASP modelled on Norway’s Security Regulations” as “Norway has the most comprehensive and stringent RUF for PCASP”.256
The Norwegian regulations reflect the industry norm requirements for armed guards. It is noteworthy that the requirement of prior warning before the use of force is codified as it creates an obligation on security personnel to only engage attackers as a last resort. Abeyratne comments that “the fundamental premise of the Norwegian guidelines is that, in accordance with customary international law, the use of force is restricted to cases of necessity or self- defence”.257 Dutton describes the guidelines on the use of force as “cautious in approach”.258 It is thus safe to assume that Norwegian flag state authorisation for armed guards is trustworthy as details of the PMSC need to be supplied to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate prior to permission being granted. Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities play an active role in the vessel’s “selection and employment of private contractors”.259 This could reduce the red tape for coastal states when permission is requested for the facilitation of security personnel in their territories because of the reliance on the flag state’s ability to scrutinise PMSC operating on vessels registered under its flag. Whilst the Norwegian guidelines focus primarily on flag state authorisation for armed guards, the South African authorities could implement a policy whereby
253 Section 21, Act of 16 February 2007 No.9 relating to Ship Safety and Security (The Ship Safety and Security Act).
254 Ibid Section 22(1).
255 Ibid Section 242(3)/(4).
256 Sean Patrick Mahard ‘Blackwater’s New Battlefield: Toward a Regulatory Regime in the United States for Privately Armed Contractors at Sea’ (2014) 47(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law at 337 and 368.
257 Ruwantissa Abeyratne ‘The use of armed guards on board merchant vessels’ (2012) 5 Journal of Transportation Security at 163 available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12198-012-0088-5# accessed on 13 March 2014.
258 Yvonne M. Dutton ‘Gunslingers on the high seas: A call for regulation’ (2014) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative
& International Law at 142.
259 Sean Patrick Mahard ‘Blackwater’s New Battlefield: Toward a Regulatory Regime in the United States for Privately Armed Contractors at Sea’ (2014) 47(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law at 356.
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Norwegian flagged vessels with proof of flag state authorisation could reduce red tape for vetting the PMSC, thereby ensuring efficient processing of permits. This once again highlights the potential to increase the efficiency of the permit process of PCASP in coastal states with the cooperation of flag states.