governance, the indiscriminate availability of arms and the prevalence of young unemployed independent militiamen. The synergy of these factors produces a Somalia that looks very vulnerable to terrorism.
occupation of Somalia” and the manner in which the decolonization process was conducted.
The fact that the population in this region is predominantly pastoralist compounds the situation, as the basic character of such a population is migration from one area to another in search of pastures and water.
The exploitation of the porous nature of these borders for illegal activities and the smuggling of banned foreign products has existed for a very long time in the region (Little 2003: 102:
Laitin and Samatar 1987: 54; International Crisis Group 2005a: 24). The failure of the Somali state and the consequent collapse of institutions of governance and law enforcement exacerbated the problem and heightened the security threat this situation poses to the region and to global security in general. The border towns inside Ethiopian and Kenyan territories grew in significance, with increased commercial activities and illegal cross-border traffic.
Markets emerged and are thriving in Kenyan border towns, where Somali livestock is sold.
Somali ports serve as transit entry ports for goods imported duty-free, such as cloths and electronics from Dubai, and then smuggled through the porous borders into Kenya (Bryden 1999: 138).
Somalia is adjudged as having one of the longest coastlines in Africa (Powell et al., 2006:11;
Little 2003:7). There existed, even before the Somali state collapse, the problem of effective control of its vast international border, by the government. In the absence of government control on the Somali side of the border and with Somali towns under warlords who are only busy collecting money from vehicular traffic, the efforts on the other side of the border hardly solve any problems. The tightening of security across the border by Kenya and Ethiopia has usually yielded very little, owing to the activities of the “Somalis” living on both sides of the border. In an interview published on 7 November 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based Peace and Conflict NGO, the Ethiopian ambassador to the US was quoted as stating that “to talk about commercial traffic in that part of the country is to talk about contraband. Contraband now means in this context weapons and explosives coming in – it is a very porous region, a 2000-kilometre border [with Somalia], very porous border and [contraband] comes in through many, many different points…” (Assefa, S. 2007: i. d).
The difficulties in policing these borders include not only the fact that the borders are very long, but also those of the very rough terrain. The long expanse is sandy and bumpy, vegetated by arid savanna shrubs and palms. This makes both ground and air patrols near
impossible. Added to this is the fact that the Kenyan and Ethiopian security forces are not well-equipped enough to face the trans-border smugglers, who use strong vehicles and are better armed, sometimes with “rocket propelled grenades and heavy machine guns” (Dexter, F. 2002: i. d). Corruption of officials across the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders with Somalia has also been revealed as a contributing factor to the porous nature of the border. The border guards, especially those on the Kenyan side, are believed to be in the habit of “cooperating with the smugglers in return for cash” (Dexter 2002: i. d).
The above scenario creates an enabling environment for possible movements of terrorist elements and arms in and out of Somalia, targeting the neighbouring states and Western interests in those states. Even though there is no consensus regarding the level of terrorist operations inside Somalia, there seems to be an agreement that it serves as a transit and shield for al Qaeda operatives in the region (International Crisis Group 2005a: 11; Menkhaus 2004:
70; Menkhaus 2005: 42-43; Dempsey 2006: 14; International Crisis Group 2006: 9;
International Crisis Group 2007: 4; Harper 2007; Quaranto 2008: 28). Somalia has been linked with terrorist attacks in the neighbouring states, in which cases al-Qaeda used the territory as a co-ordination outpost and transit route. In the 7 August 1998 terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 hotel and international airport attacks in Mombassa (Kenya), for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility, security reports confirmed the use of the Somali border for safe and shielded passage (Kagwanja 2006: 76; Otenyo 2004: 78).
At present there are fears that foreign Islamist fighters move into Somalia through its numerous porous entry ports to join forces with the Islamist fundamentalists who are fighting for the control of Somalia. The International Crisis Group (2007: 4) points out that “late 2006
… steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world (including numerous young radicals from Somali Diaspora)” was estimated to be “from several hundred to, less plausibly, several thousand”. This is in the wake of an on-going battle since December 2006 between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Transitional National Government, backed by Ethiopian forces. Kenyan officials reported making “a few arrests of fleeing combatants, apparently including a commander from an Ethiopian separatist group and an Eritrean army colonel…” (Petrou 2007: i. d). This new dimension to the Somali conflict, in the light of the international terrorist connections of the Islamic Courts, raises the fear of a relapse into
continued insurgency, imitating Afghanistan and Iraq, as it is becoming another rallying point for Islamist jihadists.