It is in the light of the above tasks which America‟s National Strategy enumerated for the War on Terror that the global thrust of the United States of America can be understood, the war on terror being primarily U.S. global engagement targeted at the protection of US citizens and property all around the world. This, therefore, explains the affirmation in the same U.S. National Strategy for combating terrorism that “the paradigm for combating terrorism” currently “involves the application of all elements of our national power”
(National Strategy 2006: I). With the above resolve, the U.S. expresses its intention to cooperate with other states in this “war”, but at the same time stresses its readiness to go it alone in defending its interests and citizens worldwide (National Strategy 2006: 6; Dempsey 2008: i.d).
Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was established in 2005, building on the programmes of the defunct Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). In establishing the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, the US Department of Defense took into consideration the seeming vulnerability of the entire Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa with their vast expanse of desert, the porous borders and the ancient trade routes that have been maintained across the regions. Informing this consideration is the security implications of a continued use of these tracks by transnational criminals for illicit businesses and arms trades and free passage and safe haven for terrorists (Motlagh 2004: i.d). The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative was expanded to a ten-nation programme that includes Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. The major tasks of TSCTI included the building of military capacity in intelligence and quick response, developing collaboration among the participating states and with the United States, as willing partners towards security and other stability-threatening issues as they arise in the region. The aim was to develop among the participants the capacity and the will for information sharing and collaboration in the planning and execution of operations. In this regard the TSCTI aims to strengthen
“regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the region‟s security forces, and promote democratic governance” (Wycoff 2004: i.d; Pope 2004:
i.d; www.globalsecurity.org). The major US commitment in this programme is centered on improving security capacities within the region for “detecting and deterring” terrorists through the provision of training and equipment. The regulation of financial transactions which support international and transnational terrorism, airport security and other social issues such as educational assistance, form components of the TSCTI with the Department of Treasury (DOT), Department of State (DOS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) taking responsibility, respectively. Therefore, the TSCTI is an interagency programme with a military component codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). This initiative has been funded to the tune of one hundred million US dollars ($100million) per year since 2005 and would run for an initial five years (Wycoff 2004: i.d; Dempsey 2006: 22).
The Joint Task Force (JTF) Aztec Silence was another counterterrorism programme initiated and established by the United States in 2003, primarily targeting transnational terrorism in the
“under-governed” areas of North Africa. The high point of this programme is the establishment of an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance base (station) in Sicily, which aims at detecting, tracking and intercepting the mobile satellite and technical
communication equipment employed by the terrorist groups in the region in the execution of their plans. This project aimed at sharing any such information gathered among all the partnering states for collaborative action against transnational terrorist groups (www.globalsecurity.org). The US, aims by these capacity-building initiatives, at reducing as much as practicable, its physical military involvement in Africa.
Southern and Central Africa do not feature that much in the international counterterrorism programmes. These two regions tend not to be among the high-risk areas in terrorism, according to security reports (Piombo 2007: i.d). The only counterterrorism-oriented programme meant for these two regions is the International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) established in the Botswana capital, Gaborone, and run by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This programme is focused on enhancing the “general law enforcement”
capabilities of the regional states. To achieve this, programmes were drawn for training the states‟ law enforcement and security personnel in intelligence gathering and operations, and equipping them for their counterterrorism operations (Piombo 2007: i.d).
Generally, the US Departments engage with individual countries in Africa, the AU and the sub-regional organizations in counterterrorism initiatives with the aim of building enduring human and institutional capacities. This, the US hopes, will impact further actions towards increased bilateral and regional security initiatives. The Department of State assisted financially and through the provision of expertise in the establishment of the AU‟s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, which was sited in Algiers, the Algerian capital, in 2004 (Wycoff 2004: i.d). Several conferences and workshops on terrorism and counterterrorism have been hosted by the African Union, resourced and funded by US agencies. The Department of State and the National Defense University‟s African Centre for Strategic Studies assisted the AU technically and financially in organizing many of its counterterrorism events. These programmes include the Small Arms and Light Weapons Workshop in Burkina Faso in December 2006; Counterterrorism Workshop in Algeria, January 2007; Workshop on Managing Security Resources in Africa in Malawi, September 2007; Counterterrorism Seminar in Ethiopia, November 2007; and with that in Tanzania, scheduled for April 2008 (Fields 2007: 9). The National Defense University‟s African Centre for Strategic Studies opened its first African annex in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, early in December 2006. The “Community Chapters” were later to follow in 19 other countries that include Benin Republic, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (Fields 2007: 6).