In the section above, I have discussed the different aspects of the research problem: the relationship between political culture and press performance; and
31
secondarily, between ownership status and press performance. This comprises the first part of Chapter One: The Introduction. In the second section of the chapter, I give a brief history of party politics in Kenya since the pre-independence period until 1991 when the single-party legislation, which turned Kenya into a de jure one-party state, was repealed. I will document and illustrate here the development, under the KANU government, of a political culture that progressively became intolerant of dissenting political views. The whole thesis consists of eight chapters.
Chapter Two deals with theoretical argumentation. Firstly, I will develop here an argument to underpin my decision to treat a society's political and ideological culture as a major determinant of the political performance of the press. Secondly, I will discuss and develop the normative theory of the public sphere and recommend its application to African media situations. In chapter Three I will give the history of the daily press in Kenya, reviewing the main issues that have dominated discussions on media politics and, the major socio-structural factors that have impacted on the performance of the press in the political process since the pre-independence era. I will go on to make and illustrate the argument that political considerations, emanating from the political culture discussed in Chapter One, have been the major sources of constraint on the press. In the end, I will illustrate how this pressure was used to deny the nascent Opposition press publicity. This will form part of the basis on which to review the findings in Chapters Six and Seven.
In Chapter Four, I will explain why I have decided to use both qualitative and quantitative approaches to content analyses. Chapter Five will deal with the research design; giving the operational definitions and then delineating the period for the empirical study. I will present and discuss the quantitative and qualitative research findings in Chapters Six and Seven respectively. The conclusion will be presented in Chapter Eight.
1.5 The Colonial and Pre-Independence Period
It is important for the purposes of this study to give a concise review of the historical development of party politics in Kenya. This is intended to show how the birth and development of a party-state gave birth to a suppressive and non-democratic political culture. The consequences of this development for the press will be the subject of Chapter Three below. The focus at this stage. however, is to show how organised political opposition to the ruling KANU government during both the Kenyatta and Moi eras was strongly suppressed.
Though there are some differences in the way the two leaders actually effected this suppression, they shared major attributes which included disapproval of multi-partyism, aversion to and harsh dealing with government critics, use of legal instruments to achieve their ends, amending of the constitution to their political convenience when need arose. All these contributed, with time, to a marked erosion of various fundamental and human freedoms, especially the freedom of association and expression. As I have already said above, I will argue in Chapter Three that the curtailment of the freedom of political expression described here, meant that the daily press was likewise under immense pressure not to play the role of the political public sphere.
The Moi era however, gives this study its temporal positioning or time frame. It is during Moi's regime that the KANU government's monopoly of Kenyan politics was brought to an end in December 1991. It is also during this era that Kenya was made a de jure one party state with an all-powerful Presidency. I will show that during this period, Parliament lost most of its functions and became an arm of KANU and the executive's rubber-stamp; amending the constitution at the executive's whim to entrench the KANU government's hold on power. The limited political space that existed during Kenyatta's era was now effectively circumscribed and political views criminalised. The early years of the 90's saw a world-wide hue and cry for democratic governance and for
33
the end of one-party and military states. This coincided with an unprecedented show of daring by a number of prominent political activists and others in positions of leadership in their criticism of Moi's regime. The demands of donor countries and international financial institutions for political transparency, accountability and good governance and their eventual tying of aid to the satisfaction of these conditionalities added the last straw that humbled the KANU government.
By illustrating the developments mentioned above, I intend to show and argue that the debate about multi-partyism was waged from two different ideological grounds. I will show that the major issue was whether or not multi-partyism as opposed to a single-party system was the desirable political system for Kenya.
This will form part of the background for the analysis in Chapter Six.
Kenya became a British 'protectorate' in 1886, when the East African Treaty was signed between Britain and Germany over the colonisation of East Africa. The Imperial British East Company (lBEAC), which was formed in 1888, was entrusted with the administration of Kenya; being given in the same year a royal charter to develop the territory, officially known as British East Africa Protectorate. The imposition of British rule was widely resisted by African peoples, provoking military retaliation from the imperial power (Ochieng, 1985:
87).
Effective administration of Kenya by the British began in 1907 with the transfer of Kenya's capital from Mombasa to the European railway town of Nairobi.
With time, a situation obtained where a white minority imposed and maintained its privileged position of domination through the manipulation of government machinery. Despite their small number, the British government gave in to settler demands in 1906 and introduced a legislative council in Kenya. It was not until 1944 that the Legislative Council was opened to the first African, Eliud Mathu, who was in actual fact a government appOintee. Mathu's appointment
was an effort to channel the budding African nationalism toward the support of the colonial administration.
The Kenya African Union, KAU, was formed in 1944 with the immediate aim of giving African support to Eliud Mathu but it also had as one of its aims the unity of Africans and advocacy of their social and economic progress. Its leadership was composed of educated Africans who strove to advance a constitutional and legal nationalism (Maloba, 1989: 185). Kenyatta became leader of KAU in 1947. In 1952, Sir Evelyn Baring declared a state of emergency in Kenya. During the Emergency period, the British government and some of the European settlers in Kenya made a determined effort to mould African political thought and to develop the confidence of the budding African intelligentsia, who had positions of relative importance within the colonial structure. They wanted to help constitute a small but rich African landed middle class that would promote Western values.
In the period 1952 to 1960, a multi-racial society, the Capricorn African Society was formed to harmonise and promote the relationship between the races. It provided a multi-racial approach to political, economic, educational and land problems of the country. The society, elitist in outlook, aimed to create a new African patriotism to which all people would give allegiance, setting aside their loyalty to the conflicting aspirations and nationalism of the different races which threatened the country.
Following the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, the first direct elections for African members of the Legislative Council were held in March 1957. By this process, the elected African leaders got the legitimacy not previously enjoyed and a platform from which to voice African grievances. For the next three years, these leaders persistently agitated for 'one man, one vote' (Ochieng, 1985:
139). Following the Lancaster House conference of 1960, the British government decided in February of that year to grant independence to Kenya
35
with a Westminster model constitution. In March 1960, the majority of the African members of the Legislative Council formed the Kenya African National Union, KANU, with James Gichuru as president, Oginga Odinga as vice-president and Tom Mboya as general secretary.
1.6 A Multi-Party Beginning at Independence
Vested European interests, through their organised groups, began to appeal to the smaller African groups to join the whites against the Kikuyu and Luo politicians. On the threshold of independence, elected members from other ethnic groups saw KANU as urban-centred, dominated by Kikuyu and Luo influence and too radical. After seeking assent from leaders of other minority groups, Muliro and Ngala launched the Kenya African Democratic Union, KADU. Whilst KANU's objective was to work for a predominantly African government, KADU hoped to form a multi-racial government together with the smaller political groupings of settlers and Asians. One of KADU's major aims was to resist a Kikuyu and Luo dominance in Kenya by pressing for a majimbo (federal) constitution (Ochieng, 1985: 151; Widner, 1992: 134).
KANU emerged victorious in the 1961 elections but refused to form a government until Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention. Ronald Ngala was persuaded to form a minority government in coalition with European and Asian members of the Council. The last Lancaster Conference of 1961 was primarily preoccupied with KADU's demand for a federal constitution (see Widner, 1992: 51; Matheson, 1992: 69). KANU once more emerged victorious in the May 1963 independence elections and in June 1963, the now free Jomo Kenyatta, who had replaced Gichuru as President of KANU, became the first Prime Minister of Kenya. Because the colonial government for its part had all along favoured a majimbo constitution, this was initially introduced on 1 June 1963 when self-rule was first accorded to Kenya (Tostensen and Scott, 1987:
96).
On December 12, 1963, Kenya became an independent African State. At this time, Kenya had three major parties, the third one being the African Peoples Party, APP. While KANU and KADU claimed support throughout the country, the APP led by Paul Ngei, had support mainly from the Akamba ethnic group. The major political divide between the two major parties, KANU and KADU, as explained above, originated in the fear of ethnic domination on the part of minority tribes. This concern found support also from the Colonial government and white settlers. However, within KANU itself, there were two contending groups separated on political-ideological grounds. According to William Ochieng (1985: 147), by early 1960's it was obvious that there were two schools of thought in Kenya with regard to her future development. One group lead by Kenyatta and Mboya and the other led by Oginga Odinga. The former was pro-West (Capitalism) and the latter pro-East (Socialism).
It was not surpriSing then that on Independence Day Jomo Kenyatta stated his commitment to a democratic African socialist state. In this new dispensation, the benefits of economic and social development were to be distributed equitably. Differential treatment based on tribe, race, belief or class would be abandoned, and every national whether black, white or brown, would be given equal opportunity to improve his lot (see Widner, 1992: 51, 54). By the end of 1965, all the members of the Opposition, after persuasion from KANU, had voluntarily crossed the floor of Parliament and joined the ruling party, making , Kenya a one-party state (Tostensen and Scott, 1987; also see Widner, 1992).
Beneath this apparent success in the direction of national unity, there emerged a glaring discrepancy between the rhetorical promises before independence and the performance of KANU later. Instead of the equity promised in the run up to independence, there evolved an exploitative relationship in the wake of independence between the haves and have-nots (Ochieng, 1985: 148).
37
The radical pro-socialist wing in KANU made demands for the above situation to be redressed. As a response to these demands, the pro-West and conservative in KANU came up with the Sessional Paper number Ten of 1965, African socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. 'Apart from its rhetorical character, this blueprint clearly had no intention of altering the
,
inherited colonial economic and social structures, and especially their law and order aspects.' The 'Left' in KANU vehemently opposed the Paper and this earned them the following response from President Kenyatta: 'It is a sad mistake to think that you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by simply crying communism ... There is no room for those who wait for things to be given for nothing. There is no room for leaders who hope to build a nation on slogans' (Ochieng, WR, 1985: 149). However, the pro-socialist wing believed that the government had failed to make a concerted effort to put the country's social and economic institutions in the hands of the African people.
In 1966, some of the more radical members of KANU led by Oginga Odinga, the vice-president, broke away and formed the Kenya People's Union, KPU, demanding more socialist measures and policies. They were deeply disillusioned with the way in which, as they perceived it, the Kenyatta government had betrayed the people after independence (Ochieng WR, 1985:
153; Widner, 1992: 58-59). KPU had a populist orientation and Luo ethnic predominance, albeit also including prominent Kikuyu leaders such as Bildad Kaggia, who became its vice-president. The defectors to KPU were compelled, as a result of a series of legislative moves on the part of the incumbent KANU government, to stand for re-election in their respective constituencies. In this 'Little General Election', a majority of the KPU group lost their parliamentary seats largely as a result of administrative harassment by the state apparatus which, in effect, intervened in favour of KANU (Tostensen and Scott, 1987: 96;
Widner, 1992: 69-70).
KPU's frustration by Kenyatta's KANU government was selective and strategically effected. Widner (1992: 69) observes that only in Western Kenya and especially Luo areas did the government at first restrain from using intimidation and harassment against the opposition, 'with the consequence that the "radicals" appeared, wrongly, to have a particular ethnic base and to have acted on narrow, sectarian interests ... The rigging of opposition in this way destroyed the KPU's national electoral appeal and provided the government with the pretext necessary to further curtail its actions.' For the next three years KANU and KPU called each other names until 1969 when KPU was banned following a disturbance in a Kisumu political rally at which President Kenyatta was pelted with stones. KPU leaders were detained without trial and once again Kenya reverted to being a one-party state (Ochieng, 1985: 154).
1.7 The Kenyatta Legacy and the Nyayo Era: The Rise of a Party-State
From the time the KPU was proscribed until June 1982, when legislation was passed to make it a de jure one-party state, Kenya remained a de facto one-party state. The 1982 legislation was passed mainly to forestall the registration by Oginga Odinga and George Anyona of an opposition political party which was to be called the Kenya African Socialist Alliance, KASA, and which was intended to have a socialist orientation (Widner, 1992: 145).
Anyona was subsequently detained and Odinga placed under house arrest after the August 1, 1982 coup attempt at toppling President Moi. Though the 1982 amendment arguably only sanctified what already existed, a de facto one-party system, it nevertheless radically changed Kenyan politics in 'legitimising' the ban on all political parties other than KANU. It effectively licensed the persecution of opposition groups by criminalising them and creating an 'underground' context (see HRW, 1991: 10-11).
39
Between 1969 and the June 1982 constitutional amendment, KANU had become moribund, ceasing to function as a party between elections, and overly sensitive to criticism. A telling example can be found 'in the mid 1970's, (when) Martin Shikuku claimed in Parliament that KANU was dead. When asked by other members of the House to substantiate his claim, the Deputy Speaker, Jean-Marie Seroney, ruled that it was not necessary to substantiate the obvious. Shortly afterwards, they were both detained' (T ostensen and Scoll, 1987: 97; Widner, 1992: 1; Weekly Review 12.01.1990: 11). According to Mazrui (1983: 288):
In reality, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was at its most vigorous when it faced competition from another party ... But when, after 1969, KANU successfully eliminated all party competitors, KANU itself began to experience a progressive process of atrophy. The dilution of elite competition through intimidation and the elimination of other parties resulted in the dilution of the vigour of the ruling party.
This was particularly so since the Kenya African national Union did not even experiment with mass mobilisation as an alternative dynamo to multi-party elite competition.
During the 1970's, one of the few politicians who dared to lock horns with the Kenyalla government was Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, popularly known as 'J M'.
This is what he had to say about the socio-economic situation obtaining at that time in the country:
A small but powerful greedy, self-seeking elite in the form of politicians, civil servants and businessmen, has steadily but surely monopolised the fruits of independence to the exclusion of the majority of people.
We do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars.
(Talking about his political predicament, he had said) My concern
about the owners of property has been misconstrued as rebellion against the government, and I have been accused of being controversial in matters affecting my brothers and sisters who happen to be less endowed with the material wealth of the world. If this is what controversy means, I do not regret the accusation (Ochieng WR, 1985: 145).
Kariuki was found murdered on Ngong Hills in March 1975. (see Widner, 1992: 76). This assassination of a popular leader further compounded in the public mind the fear of dissidence and more deeply engraved in it the culture of silence.
Observing that KANU during the Kenyatta era existed only as a loosely-knit group of politicians, Widner (1992: 3) argues, however, that 'the party had tolerated some internal criticism and debate over its platform, albeit to a gradually diminishing degree'. It is the provincial administration, not the party, she notes, that Kenyatta used as a vehicle to secure compliance with government policies and stances. According to Widner (ibid), in fact, there was a shift in government-party relations brought about by the move from a single-party system in which KANU remained a loosely organised 'debating system' with little policy system, toward a Kenya 'party-State', during Moi's tenure, in which KANU increasingly became a vehicle for the Office of the President to control political opposition.
While acknowledging the above observed difference between the two regimes, my aim at this stage is to stress that Kenyatta, like Moi later, eschewed multi-party competition and believed firmly that Kenya would thrive only if there were a single political party (Widner, 1992: 31). The Kenyatta government introduced and used various 'techniques of political intimidation, including detention laws and violence.' During the KADU opposition days, according to
41
Widner (1992: 55), 'Kenyatta said that those who were slow in recognising the virtues of the single-party system were often the same people who had been
"warming their bellies under imperialist wings" ... What mattered, he argued, was whether the party or parties established were mass parties. A one-party state with a mass base was as democratic, in his view, as a state with two mass based parties' Those who opposed Kenyatta's one-party system were as a result usually put in jailor subjected to various forms of police intimidation and general human and political rights deprivation.
When Daniel T oroitich arap Moi took over the Presidency, following Kenyatta's death in 1978, he vowed to follow in the nyayo (footsteps) of his predecessor.
Soon after, however, measures were taken to revamp the ruling party KANU with recruitment campaigns being held frequently throughout the country. In order to nip the opposition in the bud, a clearance system was effectively employed to bar candidates who did not follow nyayo (meaning did not follow Moi) from contesting for parliamentary seats. The methods used to recruit members into KANU sometime bordered on coercion (Tostensen and Scot!, 1987: 97; Widner, 1992: 1-3, 92).
Compulsory membership was introduced for all government/public employees and there were cases in which civil servants would be barred from entering their offices when they failed to produce KANU membership cards. At this time it was customary for people looking for employment to buy or carry KAN U cards in case possession of one was used as criteria for employment. State and party organs seem indeed to have merged into a one-party regime. 'KANU membership became necessary as a protection against intimidation by unruly KANU youth wingers and the police ... KANU was increasingly promoted as a mass movement and periodically restructured to increase party power' (HRW, 1991: 13-14; also see Widner, 1992: 162).