THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
2.0 TNF WORK: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
preparatory work was undertaken in terms of studies but the issue is still in abeyance within the ambit of the TNF.
In April 2003, the government announced new fuel pnce Increases In line with its obligations in NERP to 'address fuel problems ... by February, 2003'. Following this announcement, labour pulled out of the TNF as mentioned earlier demanding government rescind its decision. Government did not do so leading labour to a call for mass stayaways from 23 to 25 April, 2003 (Daily News, 29 April 2003, p. 36; The Herald 29 April 2003, p.9). This the government largely condemned as political (The Sunday Mail, 11 May 2003, p. 4; The Daily News, 10 May 2003, p.5). A subsequent meeting with a bipartite character was held between the government and business on new minimum wages, which was high on the TNF agenda for discussion within the purview of the TNF's sub-committee on minimum wages. The relationship between social partners shows traces of vulnerability and also reflects possible opportunism and hypocrisy as they tango when it is convenient to do so, and bolt out of the relationship also when expedient to do so but at the expense of the economy.
Zimbabwe has been facing multiple crises: job crisis, currency instability, rising inflation, fuel shortages, widespread labour unrest, increasing poverty against a backdrop of a shrinking economy. Given these problems, there have been expressions by many actors and social commentators that the country's current problems can be resolved through a process of social dialogue. The question is: Can social dialogue solve the current teething problems the country is facing? Can social dialogue work when social partners are polarized along political lines? According to Sambureni (2001: 96),
The effect of politics in labour comes into play given that the main political opposition in Zimbabwe, that is the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is labour backed.
Naturally, it aspires to form a government and hence cannot go for any joint approach with the sitting government to resolve economic problems.
Furthermore, what are the expectations of the key stakeholders in terms of a workable social contract? How best can it be implemented? Can government afford to go it alone?
Or can it go along with business? Alternatively, can it go with the support of multi-lateral agencies? What effect does a social contract have on the power of the executive, parliament and cabinet? What is the TNF? What legal basis does it have? Are the problems beyond a social contract? If social contracts result in compromises, can the current problems be solved by compromises and half solutions? Does Zimbabwe need partial solutions or a comprehensive package to solve its problems? Do the problems involve other stakeholders and not just business, labour and government? Do these parties represent everyone in society at large? The Consumer Council of Zimbabwe is seeking involvement in the TNF, but would that be tripartism in the strictest sense of the word? Does civic society have a role to play too? Maybe in the NECF, which the ZCTU is not party to? What is the way forward? By laying the facts bare, this research attempts to address some, but not all, of the questions and map outa way forward.
On reflection, indeed, many writers on the subject have tended to concentrate on the success stories of social dialogue where it is institutionalised such as Barbados, South Africa, Phillipines, Kenya and Zambia (ILOb, n.d) and little has been written about the status of failed social dialogue as this chapter attempts to do. Whereas a lot is known about the fruits of social dialogue, very little is known about factors militating against it.
This opens a yawning gap in the literature especially as it concerns developing countries such as Zimbabwe faced with a multiplicity of conundrums. These arise from a past colonial history, a very fresh history of the liberation struggle, flashbacks of neo- colonialism, shock therapies of neo-liberalism (structural adjustment programmes of 1990s), and the resurgence of imperialism, all viewed against a backdrop of developing institutions of governance trying to find their feet, a culture of negotiation and compromise still in its infancy if not non-existent, and the quest for self-determination and economic independence within the context of a siege economy.
Social dialogue was taking place when land reform was taking off. It was followed by the 2002 general elections. Thus, the land reform and the 2002 election results were being discussed under conditions of disagreement and contestation both locally, regionally and
constituency and therefore huge space. It is neither a failed state nor a falling state with a wide mass support and whose arms of government have embraced the slogan 'Zimbabwe will never be a colony again', as enunciated by the Minister of Information and Publicity in the Presidents's Office, Professor lonathan Moyo21. With this as background, it may be possible to have some insight into the power game as it plays itself out within the territorial boundaries of Zimbabwe.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3, I describe the research objectives, significance of the study and methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 covers the discussion and Section 6 the concluding remarks.
3.0 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES