• Tidak ada hasil yang ditemukan

Genocide, citizenship and political identity crisis in postcolonial Africa : Rwanda as case study.

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2023

Membagikan "Genocide, citizenship and political identity crisis in postcolonial Africa : Rwanda as case study."

Copied!
110
0
0

Teks penuh

He inspired me to undertake this research as he was a victim of the genocide. The identities of Hutu and Tutsi were not only legally enforced, but they also became linked to the management of the state.

Background to the research

  • Research problems and objectives: key questions to be asked
  • Central Research Problem
  • Principal theories upon which the research project is constructed
  • Research methodology and methods
  • Study limitations
  • Key concepts utilized in the dissertation
  • Structure of dissertation

According to Des Forges (1999:6), most perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda participated in the genocide out of fear, hatred or profit. All these threats are said to have contributed to the emergence of genocide (Newbury, 1995:12).

Introduction

Pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda

Some historians claim that the Tutsis arrived in Rwanda between the 13th and 16th centuries. Magnarella states that the Germans ruled Rwanda indirectly through the Tutsi king (Mwami) and his chiefs.

The Influence of Events in Burundi

38 | Discriminate and apply genocidal ideology to maintain power with the power of the state mainly associated with ethnic groups, the Hutu in Rwanda and the Tutsi in Burundi. Again referring to the colonial era, Scherrer (2002: ix) argues that peaceful relations between Hutu and Tutsi changed with the arrival of colonial administrators. According to Scherrer (2002: ix-x) the colonialists used the European-like physical features of the Tutsi to racialize them and consider them superior to the Hutu and Twa.

Uvin says that royalty in Burundi was based on a socio-political hierarchy, with a king and a group of princes at the top of the hierarchy, a Tutsi line in the middle, Hutu at the lowest level, followed by the Twa. The government declared that all Hutus and Tutsis who felt that the Hutus were being treated unfairly were enemies of the Tutsi regime. Second, when the Tutsi-led army massacred the Hutus during the 1988 massacres, it was in retaliation for the Tutsis who had been massacred by the Hutus.

For Stavenhagen, the objective of the Hutu revolt in 1988 (to bring about equality in public services, based on merit rather than ethnicity) turned out to be meaningless. On October 21, 1993, the Tutsi-dominated army killed Ndadaye, along with the speaker and deputy speaker of the national assembly. According to Midlarsky, the killing and the arrival of refugees strengthened the Hutu extremists' ideology of power.

Post-colonial Rwanda

Hintjens asserts that "Ndadaye's assassination marked the beginning of a series of fatal events and international blunders that resulted in genocide." Genocide was the only solution to the problems being caused by Hutu-Tutsi coexistence in the Great Lakes region and especially in Rwanda. Thus, the public began to support the suggested "final solution", a genocide targeting all Tutsi and moderate Hutus.

The Arusha Accords

The RPF demanded that Rwanda be a pluralistic state if individual rights could be protected from the vagaries of government. The Tanzanian government was once again the organizer of the peace talks between the representatives of the opposition parties, the RPF and the government of Habyarimana (Olson. The RPF was the most powerful party of all the parties involved in the negotiations.

The RPF also used charismatic leaders to successfully speak on behalf of the Tutsi diaspora and Habyarimana's opponents. Scorgie (2004:68) argues that the RPF was powerful in the negotiations to the extent that they were able to exclude important parties from the negotiations, which they did in the fifth phase of the agreement. The RPF called for the exclusion of the "Coalition pour le Defense de la Republique" (CDR), the most extreme political party, from the negotiations and the broad transitional government.

Krieg (2010:13) states that although Mpungwe tried to advise the RPF and the Rwandan government to reach a compromise regarding the exclusion of the CDR from. According to Lemarchand (1995:9), forty percent of the soldiers and fifty percent of the officer corps would come from the RPF. This meant that a few of the RPF troops would be demobilized, whereas many Rwandan government troops would be demobilized.

Conclusion

The Tutsi population were seen as supporters of the RPF as well as moderate Hutus, therefore they deserved to be killed as they too were a political threat to the Hutu extremists (Lemarchand, 1995:11). While most scholars do not doubt that the RPF may have killed Habyarimana, as they appear to have been the main potential beneficiary of the peace agreement (Clapham, 1998:204). Scholars such as Spears argue that the RPF was willing to return to the battlefield if their demands could not be met, and ultimately they did not negotiate for power sharing when the option of taking full power became available after Habyarimana's death.

Introduction

  • The 1959 Social Revolution
  • The First Republic
  • The Second Republic
  • Conclusion

During this period the philosophy of the Bantu origin of the Hutu was strongly talked about and associated with the ideas of "the people". The Bahutu Manifesto claimed that the clash between the Hutu and the Tutsi was at the center of the Rwandan problem and it advocated a double liberation of the Hutu from the foreign Tutsi and "Bazungu" the European colonizers (Mamdani. In the same year)., the Belgian colonial administrators organized an overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy (Cohen, 2012:87; Destexhe, 1995:6).

Most of the houses belonging to the Tutsi were burned and hundreds of them were massacred. What exacerbated the Hutu elite's fears was the thought of these rebels joining forces with the Tutsi civilians residing in the country. However, bringing justice to the Hutu meant that the Tutsi would be discriminated against in the civil and political spheres of Rwandan society.

The second reason was that the state wanted to limit the Tutsi from participating in the country's politics (Mamdani. The ethnic momentum of the affirmative action program called for the appropriation of justice, something that disadvantaged the Tutsi and intended to unite the Hutu Northern Hutu had more access to education and employment than Hutu from the south or center of the country (Mugabe, 2007:22).

Introduction

  • Rwandese Tutsi refugees who fled to Burundi 1959 to 1973
  • Tutsi Rwandese refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1959 to 1964
  • Rwandese Tutsi refugees in Tanzania 1959 to 1973
  • Rwandese Tutsi refugees in Uganda 1959 to 1973
  • The birth in Uganda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
  • The Rwandan government’s responses to the attack and how the Hutu reacted
  • Conclusion

Many of the Tutsi refugees settled in their host countries for three decades, acquiring new knowledge, skills and political views and experiencing injustice (African Rights, 1995:24). Furthermore, the refugee leaders were closely monitored by the government and could not operate freely. Tanzania's Tutsi refugee resettlement system was the most successful of any host country.

In 1980 there was a general offer to naturalize some of the refugees and 36,000 Rwandan Tutsi refugees became Tanzanian citizens. When Amin went into exile in 1979, some of the Tutsi refugees became members of Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) (Magnarella, 2005:812). Consequently, Ugandans questioned why Tutsi refugees were receiving more authority and wealth, rather than "real" Ugandans (Kuperman, 2003:3; Magnarella, 2005:812).

On the day of the invasion, the Ugandan government proclaimed that the Tutsi refugees who had invaded Rwanda would be punished by death, giving them no incentive to return to Uganda. Nevertheless, it later emerged that the RPF invaded Rwanda with the support of the Ugandan government. Ultimately, some of the Tutsi refugees succeeded in invading Rwanda with the conditional support of the Ugandan government.

Introduction

Causes of the genocide

In August 1992, the first agreement was reached, based on the establishment of the rule of law, which was first demanded by the RPF. The RPF demanded that Rwanda be a pluralistic state where the rights of individuals could be protected against the arbitrariness of the government (Krieg. In this case, it was more likely that the Habyarimana regime would be guilty of abuse of state resources and human rights.

The RPF was the most powerful party of all the parties involved in the negotiations (Krieg, 2010:12). The RPF, aware of its military advantage over the Rwandan government, used this at the negotiating table, which in turn undermined the credibility of the RPF's commitment to peace (Traniello, 2008:38). The RPF's call for the exclusion of the Coalition pour le Defense de la Republique (CDR) from the negotiating tables contributed to the failure of the agreements.

The CDR should not have been excluded from the negotiations because they ended up joining the Akazu in the planning and execution of the 1994 genocide (McDonough, 2008:364). The Akazu and the extremists received popular support from the Hutu, while Habyarimana was increasingly interned in the Arusha peace talks (Andersen, 2000:452). Faced with the threat of the accords, the Hutu extremists believed that the only way they could retain power was through genocide (Des Forges, 1999:126).

Political Identity Crisis

Two-way Domino Effect

Conclusion

The study illustrated how history, demography, colonial, post-colonial and regional politics contributed to the occurrence of the genocide. The findings of the research indicate that the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was mainly caused by citizenship and political identity crisis.

Recommendations

The Qualitative and Quantitative Research Debate: A Question of Method OR Epistemology?” British Journal of Sociology. Genocide and the plight of children in Rwanda.” Journal of the American Medical Association. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda by Mahmood Mamdani Review Article”.

Rwanda's Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity”. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/wisint15&div12&g_sent=1&collection. Child Survival and Fertility of Refugees in Rwanda”. 2006). "Reconceptualizing the relationship between conflict and education: the case of Rwanda".

Books

Online Sources

Access http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/buily/8&div=14&g_sent=1&collection. Available at http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?page=801&handle=hein.journals%2Fjicj3&collection. Access http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/dlr108&div=25&g_sent=1&collection.

Available at http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?page=291&handle=hein.journals%2Fjrefst9&collectio.

Magazine

Working Papers

Referensi

Dokumen terkait

PLAZA LORENZO RUIZ, BINOND MANILA CITY Metropolitan Manila 1006 21500000000 OPTIMUM SECURITIES CORPORATION Omnibus Without Client Tax Identification Number Domestic 174.00 5 No..