A POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF THE SACSSP'S DRAFT CODE OF ETHICS D Holscher INTRODUCTION

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Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2005:41(3)

A POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF THE SACSSP'S DRAFT CODE OF ETHICS

D Holscher

INTRODUCTION

In the course of the past few years, social work academics have begun increasingly to explore the relevance of postrnodemism for social work in South Africa, thus beginning to reconsider fundamentally some of its constituting components, including its moral, ethical and values base (Sevenhuijsen, 2003; Sewpaul & Holscher, 2004; Williams & Sewpaul, 2004). With regard to the latter, it appears that at least since Abraham Flexner' s now famous 1 9 15 assertions regarding the professional standing of social work, the profession has been at great pain to make its moral, ethical and value base, and thus its role and function in relation to broader society, explicit.

Flexner, in his paper entitled "Is Social Work a Profession?" presented at the 1915 National Conference of Charities and Corrections, defined the professions as those occupations that

" ... engage in intellectual operations involving individual responsibility, derive their material from science and learning, work this material up to a practical end, and apply it using techniques that are educationally communicable, are self-organised, and are motivated by altruism" (Popple, 1985:56 1 , author's emphasis) and found that social work at the time did not qualify as a profession.

Consequently, Loewenberg and Dulgoff (1982: 14) contend that " ... every profession which strives to achieve professional status is expected to develop a code of professional ethics". Such a code serves to translate " ... professional values into behavioural expectations" (Loewenberg & Dulgoff, 1982: 14), which is done by " ... guiding decision making, assessing competence, regulating behaviour, and providing a standard by which to evaluate the profession" (DuBois & Miley, 1999: 1 3 1). Thus, when seeking to explore the state of current thinking on ethics and morality in South African social work from a postmodern per pective, an engagement with the latest ethical document seems to be an appropriate starting point.

In March 2004 the South African Council for Social Service Professions sent out a draft document for comment, which details a proposed code of ethics for all professions registered with the council (SACSSP, 2004). This is an important development, given that the document's predecessor, the Social Services Professions Act (Department of Health and Population Development, 1978) dates back to 1978, the heydays of apartheid and South Africa' s isolation from global economic and political trends and developments. One might therefore expect that the new code would embrace, and respond to, the demands, requirements and challenges posed to the SACSSP's members by a fundamentally changed welfare context. From this flows the central question which the research presented below has sought to explore, that is: does the document succeed in doing this, and if so, to what extent?

In pursuing thi question, this article will begin by exploring the relevance of postmodernism for a debate on ethics and morality in South African welfare. Thereafter, culture, race and class are presented as important dividing lines and sources of contradiction and tension in South African society. This theoretical base will be used to inform a discussion of selected aspects of the draft code of ethics, which will be followed by a review of current debates on the role and function of ethical codes and standard setting in social work under postmodern conditions. In conclusion, a call is made on South African social workers to engage with their client systems and their professional council with a view to developing a discursive and non-essentialist Code of Ethics for welfare professionals.

Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2005:41(3) s

s

ETHICS AND MORALITY FRAMED WITHIN A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE

Ov^er t^he past d^ecades many suggestions hav^e b^een mad^e as to w^hat constitutes postmodernisrn, w^hether w^e have ent^ered a postmod^ern age or not, and if w^e have, what might b^e consid^ered its starting point(s). In their r^evi^ew of th^e concept Williams and Sewpaul (2004:555) found that it

" ... app^ears in a wide vari^ety of disciplines, and it is hard to locate both t^emporarily and historically". S^ev^eral theorists have address^ed th^e p^robl^ematic of morality and ^ethics in postmode^rnity, among them th^e sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (compa^re, for ^example, Bauman, 1 993, 1995; B^enhabib, 1 992; Foucault, 2000; Nussbaum, 200 1 ; Young, 1990). It is b^ecaus^e of Bauman's p^ersonal fascination with, and his particular conc^eptualisation of, postmod^ernism - sp^ecifically in his publication, Postmodern Ethics - that it will b^e us^ed as a basis for th^e following argum^ent.

Bauman ( 1 993:3) asserts that th^e postmodern condition is not to b^e understood in chronological terms but in t^he sens^e that mode^rn people hav^e reach^ed a stag^e of " ... self-denigration and s^elf­

dismantling ... ", with modern thoug^ht being criticised as having " ... wrapp^ed th^e mechanisms of self r^eproduction with a v^eil of illusion without which thos^e m^echanisms, being what t^hey we^re, could not [function]". Thus, it is hoped that in such a p^eriod of s^elf ^refl^ection, " ... the sources of mo^ral power which in modern ethical philosophy and political practice were ^hidden from sight, may be visible, while the reasons for their past invisibility can be bette^r understood, and that as a r^esult, the chanc^es of a mo^ralisation of social life may .. . be ^enhanced" (Bauman, 1993:3).

This proc^ess of self reflection and scrutiny, according to Bauman ( 1 993:4) r^epres^ents a " ... nov^el way of [dealing] with the great issu^es of ^ethics and the moral problems of late mod^ernity". Such issu^es and problems include, for exampl^e, " ... human rights, social justice, balance betwe^en p^eac^eful co-op^eration and p^ersonal s^elf-assertion, [and] synchronisation of individual conduct and coll^ective welfar^e" (Bauman, 1993:4). In addition, poverty may b^e r^egard^ed as on^e of th^e gravest and most pe^rvasive forms of humiliation afflicting cont^empo^rary soci^eti^es, a ground on which all oth^er fo^rms of human indignity flourish (Bauman & Tester, 2001). Social justice, human rights and pov^erty ar^{e e}xplicitly ^referr^ed to in the preambl^e and guiding principl^es of the South African Draft Code of Ethics for Social Service Prof^essions (SACSSP, 2004), in k^eeping with the central place these conc^erns occupy in d^efining social work as a p^rofession (IFSW, 2004). Finally, th^e synchronisation of individual conduct and coll^ectiv^e w^elfar^e constitutes, as has been noted above, one of the co^re purpos^es of any prof^essional cod^e of ^ethics.

How^ev^er, Bauman's ( 1993) cont^ention r^egarding the illusionary quality of some of mod^ernity's m^echanisms to ^enhance th^e morality of social life implies ^that the profession of social work n^eeds to int^errogate the suitability of th^e draft code of ethics as a tool fo^r, inter alia, promoting human tig^hts and social justic^e, for alJeviating poverty, and fo^r en^hancing the mo^rality of welfare practition^ers' conduct. Y^et Bauman and Teste^r (200 1 : 137) warn of th^e inherent difficulti^es any proc^ess of self-r^eflection and s^elf-scrutiny is imbu^ed with becaus^e " ... ^ev^en th^e wis^est among us can hardly st^ep beyond th^e world which has form^ed us, whil^e b^eing formed by ou^r thoughts and d^eeds." It is ther^efor^e important to ^realis^e that delib^erating, r^efining and s^eeking to attain moral goals cannot b^e but an inh^er^ently and ind^efinit^ely incomplet^e proc^ess of dialogue, action and

reflection. Such a process is likely to, and should, take place in r^elation to agreed-upon valu^es and principles, such as human rights and social justic^e. At th^e same time, by its very nature it is a process which is always relational and situated in specific contexts (S^evenhuijsen, 2003). As such, an ethical cod^e cannot be consider^ed an ^end in itself (Holscher & Raniga, 2005).

Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2005:41(3)

ETIDCS AND MORALITY UNDER CONDITIONS OF MODERNITY: THE FEAR OF FREEDOM TO DECIDE ON RIGHT AND WRONG

Lipovetsky (cit^ed in Bauman, 1993 :2) describ^es the gen^eral cont^ext of late mod^ernity as one which is signified, amongst other things, by the increasing 'lib^eralisation' of individuals from such ideas as s^elf-sacrific^e, accountability to morals, ideals and valu^es, and dictates from political utopias. It is claim^ed that religious and secular institutions and traditions seem in�reasingl� to be losing their ability to ensure th^e moral conduct of individuals. If such observat10ns a^re ind^eed correct, th^en this has s^erious implications for a profession which draws its 'lifeblood' from its values and ethics (Reamer, 1998:497). Reamer (1998:496) therefore stress^es that " ... social workers must be alert to emerging ethical issu^es as th^e profession enters its s^econd century. In particular, social workers should be prepared to challeng^e attempts to und^ermin^e the p^rofession' s traditional values, ^especialJy social work's enduring commitment to vuln^erable and oppr^essed p^eople".

Such assertions, of cours^e, give rise to several qu^estions. Firstly, how is the prof^ession of social work to arriv^e at a shared understanding of the natu^re of contemporary chall^eng^es and of the appropriaten^ess of possible ^responses? The impo^rtance of notions such as dialogue, action and reflection has alr^eady be^en hig^hlight^ed. But ove^r and above that, if the authority of secular institutions, id^eals and jointly h^eld valu^es has gen^erally be^en erod^ed, then this would apply to the social work profession, its traditional value base and th^e SACSSP as its statutory and main organising body in South Africa as w^ell (Drower, 199 1 ). So ^even in �s .

!�

as a shru:^ed understanding w^ere attainable by South African social workers, what ^respons1b1lit1^es would arise fo^r individual social work^ers as opposed to the profession as a coll^ective? What would be t^he implications for the relationship betwe^en these individual social wo^rk^ers a�d th� �o�th African Council of Social S^ervic^e Professions? In order to find answ^ers to such qu^estions, 1t 1s lillportant - apart from investigating these issues empirically (Holscher & Raniga, 2005) - to se^ek to unde^rstand the th^eo^retical basis for t^he abov^e claims and to ^explor^e th^eir r^el^evanc^e for th^e South African cont^ext.

Bauman ( 1993) id^entifies ^th^e ability to distinguish, and the resultant d^esi^re to know rig^ht from wrong as a d^efining characteristic of the mod^em age. This s^ets mod^ernity apart from pre-mod^ern tim^es w^here a rathe^r broad and blurr^ed sense of 'th^e right way of living' had b^een based on a holistic fe^eling of belonging and a total ^exposure to ^the surveillance and cont^rol from ^ext^end^ed family syst^ems, traditional communiti^es and religious institutions. Their hold, however, loosen^ed with the 'liberation' of individuals into 'fr^ee', 'autonomous' , 'rational' b^eings (How^e, 1994) and in the wak^e of this, the growing plurality of lifestyl^es, the s^ecula^risation of societi^es - all d^efining featur^es of modernity. In oth^er wo^rds, as societies differ^entiated, individual r^esponsibility for doing right over w^rong gr^ew, whil^e pre-modern means of ensuring that right rather than �r?ng was done waned and conceptions determining ^exactly w^hat constitut^ed right and wrong multiplied.

Y^et, while the pr^edicaments of mod^em p^eople are dramatically diff^er^ent from thos^e of p^re-mode^rn men and women, on^e notion has su^rvived this tidal chang^e in t^he way soci^eties ar^e organised, and has continued to dominat^e mod^em ^ethical thought, that is, the s^eeming n^ecessity to control.

Previously, " ... free will, if it exist^ed at all, could mean only . . . fr^eedom to choose wrong over rig^ht ... and anything that visibly deflect^ed from custom was se^en as such a breach. Being in the right, on the other hand, was not a matter of choice: it meant, on the contrary, avoiding choic^e"

(Bauman, 1993:4). Now that freedom has become one of th^e main id^eological foundations on which modern societies rest, individuals need " ... to be prevented from using their fr^eedom to do w^rong" (Bauman, 1993:5). In other words, individual fre^edom is suspect and individual action unpredictabl^e, thus individual judgement in need of being circumscribed and individual b^ehaviour in need of being controlled.

Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2005:41(3)

ETHICS AND MORALITY FRAMED WITHIN A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE

Ov^er t^he past d^ecades many suggestions hav^e b^een mad^e as to w^hat constitutes postmodernisrn, w^hether w^e have ent^ered a postmod^ern age or not, and if w^e have, what might b^e consid^ered its starting point(s). In their r^evi^ew of th^e concept Williams and Sewpaul (2004:555) found that it

" ... app^ears in a wide vari^ety of disciplines, and it is hard to locate both t^emporarily and historically". S^ev^eral theorists have address^ed th^e p^robl^ematic of morality and ^ethics in postmode^rnity, among them th^e sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (compa^re, for ^example, Bauman, 1 993, 1995; B^enhabib, 1 992; Foucault, 2000; Nussbaum, 200 1 ; Young, 1990). It is b^ecaus^e of Bauman's p^ersonal fascination with, and his particular conc^eptualisation of, postmod^ernism - sp^ecifically in his publication, Postmodern Ethics - that it will b^e us^ed as a basis for th^e following argum^ent.

Bauman ( 1 993:3) asserts that th^e postmodern condition is not to b^e understood in chronological terms but in t^he sens^e that mode^rn people hav^e reach^ed a stag^e of " ... self-denigration and s^elf­

dismantling ... ", with modern thoug^ht being criticised as having " ... wrapp^ed th^e mechanisms of self r^eproduction with a v^eil of illusion without which thos^e m^echanisms, being what t^hey we^re, could not [function]". Thus, it is hoped that in such a p^eriod of s^elf ^refl^ection, " ... the sources of mo^ral power which in modern ethical philosophy and political practice were ^hidden from sight, may be visible, while the reasons for their past invisibility can be bette^r understood, and that as a r^esult, the chanc^es of a mo^ralisation of social life may .. . be ^enhanced" (Bauman, 1993:3).

This proc^ess of self reflection and scrutiny, according to Bauman ( 1 993:4) r^epres^ents a " ... nov^el way of [dealing] with the great issu^es of ^ethics and the moral problems of late mod^ernity". Such issu^es and problems include, for exampl^e, " ... human rights, social justice, balance betwe^en p^eac^eful co-op^eration and p^ersonal s^elf-assertion, [and] synchronisation of individual conduct and coll^ective welfar^e" (Bauman, 1993:4). In addition, poverty may b^e r^egard^ed as on^e of th^e gravest and most pe^rvasive forms of humiliation afflicting cont^empo^rary soci^eti^es, a ground on which all oth^er fo^rms of human indignity flourish (Bauman & Tester, 2001). Social justice, human rights and pov^erty ar^{e e}xplicitly ^referr^ed to in the preambl^e and guiding principl^es of the South African Draft Code of Ethics for Social Service Prof^essions (SACSSP, 2004), in k^eeping with the central place these conc^erns occupy in d^efining social work as a p^rofession (IFSW, 2004). Finally, th^e synchronisation of individual conduct and coll^ectiv^e w^elfar^e constitutes, as has been noted above, one of the co^re purpos^es of any prof^essional cod^e of ^ethics.

How^ev^er, Bauman's ( 1993) cont^ention r^egarding the illusionary quality of some of mod^ernity's m^echanisms to ^enhance th^e morality of social life implies ^that the profession of social work n^eeds to int^errogate the suitability of th^e draft code of ethics as a tool fo^r, inter alia, promoting human tig^hts and social justic^e, for alJeviating poverty, and fo^r en^hancing the mo^rality of welfare practition^ers' conduct. Y^et Bauman and Teste^r (200 1 : 137) warn of th^e inherent difficulti^es any proc^ess of self-r^eflection and s^elf-scrutiny is imbu^ed with becaus^e " ... ^ev^en th^e wis^est among us can hardly st^ep beyond th^e world which has form^ed us, whil^e b^eing formed by ou^r thoughts and d^eeds." It is ther^efor^e important to ^realis^e that delib^erating, r^efining and s^eeking to attain moral goals cannot b^e but an inh^er^ently and ind^efinit^ely incomplet^e proc^ess of dialogue, action and

reflection. Such a process is likely to, and should, take place in r^elation to agreed-upon valu^es and principles, such as human rights and social justic^e. At th^e same time, by its very nature it is a process which is always relational and situated in specific contexts (S^evenhuijsen, 2003). As such, an ethical cod^e cannot be consider^ed an ^end in itself (Holscher & Raniga, 2005).

Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2005:41(3)

ETIDCS AND MORALITY UNDER CONDITIONS OF MODERNITY: THE FEAR OF FREEDOM TO DECIDE ON RIGHT AND WRONG

Lipovetsky (cit^ed in Bauman, 1993 :2) describ^es the gen^eral cont^ext of late mod^ernity as one which is signified, amongst other things, by the increasing 'lib^eralisation' of individuals from such ideas as s^elf-sacrific^e, accountability to morals, ideals and valu^es, and dictates from political utopias. It is claim^ed that religious and secular institutions and traditions seem in�reasingl� to be losing their ability to ensure th^e moral conduct of individuals. If such observat10ns a^re ind^eed correct, th^en this has s^erious implications for a profession which draws its 'lifeblood' from its values and ethics (Reamer, 1998:497). Reamer (1998:496) therefore stress^es that " ... social workers must be alert to emerging ethical issu^es as th^e profession enters its s^econd century. In particular, social workers should be prepared to challeng^e attempts to und^ermin^e the p^rofession' s traditional values, ^especialJy social work's enduring commitment to vuln^erable and oppr^essed p^eople".

Such assertions, of cours^e, give rise to several qu^estions. Firstly, how is the prof^ession of social work to arriv^e at a shared understanding of the natu^re of contemporary chall^eng^es and of the appropriaten^ess of possible ^responses? The impo^rtance of notions such as dialogue, action and reflection has alr^eady be^en hig^hlight^ed. But ove^r and above that, if the authority of secular institutions, id^eals and jointly h^eld valu^es has gen^erally be^en erod^ed, then this would apply to the social work profession, its traditional value base and th^e SACSSP as its statutory and main organising body in South Africa as w^ell (Drower, 199 1 ). So ^even in �s .

!�

as a shru:^ed understanding w^ere attainable by South African social workers, what ^respons1b1lit1^es would arise fo^r individual social work^ers as opposed to the profession as a coll^ective? What would be t^he implications for the relationship betwe^en these individual social wo^rk^ers a�d th� �o�th African Council of Social S^ervic^e Professions? In order to find answ^ers to such qu^estions, 1t 1s lillportant - apart from investigating these issues empirically (Holscher & Raniga, 2005) - to se^ek to unde^rstand the th^eo^retical basis for t^he abov^e claims and to ^explor^e th^eir r^el^evanc^e for th^e South African cont^ext.

Bauman ( 1993) id^entifies ^th^e ability to distinguish, and the resultant d^esi^re to know rig^ht from wrong as a d^efining characteristic of the mod^em age. This s^ets mod^ernity apart from pre-mod^ern tim^es w^here a rathe^r broad and blurr^ed sense of 'th^e right way of living' had b^een based on a holistic fe^eling of belonging and a total ^exposure to ^the surveillance and cont^rol from ^ext^end^ed family syst^ems, traditional communiti^es and religious institutions. Their hold, however, loosen^ed with the 'liberation' of individuals into 'fr^ee', 'autonomous' , 'rational' b^eings (How^e, 1994) and in the wak^e of this, the growing plurality of lifestyl^es, the s^ecula^risation of societi^es - all d^efining featur^es of modernity. In oth^er wo^rds, as societies differ^entiated, individual r^esponsibility for doing right over w^rong gr^ew, whil^e pre-modern means of ensuring that right rather than �r?ng was done waned and conceptions determining ^exactly w^hat constitut^ed right and wrong multiplied.

Y^et, while the pr^edicaments of mod^em p^eople are dramatically diff^er^ent from thos^e of p^re-mode^rn men and women, on^e notion has su^rvived this tidal chang^e in t^he way soci^eties ar^e organised, and has continued to dominat^e mod^em ^ethical thought, that is, the s^eeming n^ecessity to control.

Previously, " ... free will, if it exist^ed at all, could mean only . . . fr^eedom to choose wrong over rig^ht ... and anything that visibly deflect^ed from custom was se^en as such a breach. Being in the right, on the other hand, was not a matter of choice: it meant, on the contrary, avoiding choic^e"

(Bauman, 1993:4). Now that freedom has become one of th^e main id^eological foundations on which modern societies rest, individuals need " ... to be prevented from using their fr^eedom to do w^rong" (Bauman, 1993:5). In other words, individual fre^edom is suspect and individual action unpredictabl^e, thus individual judgement in need of being circumscribed and individual b^ehaviour in need of being controlled.

Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2005:41(3)

..