It appears from Messenger's communication regarding the enforcement order in question that the cattle that are the subject of the current lawsuit have been seized and delivered to the judgment creditor. He would be well advised to familiarize himself with Rule 9 of the Bantu Courts of Appeal and the full range of case decisions summarized by Warnerin in his “Review” at paragraphs 467-468.
NORTH-EASTERN BANTU APPEAL COURT
BANTU LAW
The tenth beast represents the agreed value of a certain Isidwaba (kaross) delivered by the father of the parties to the mother of the defendant and reimbursed by the house of the defendant.'' The claim of the plaintiff that he is entitled to the house property ( the five cattle involved)) of the late Mayiwase fails and cannot be claimed by him.
BANTU LAW AND CUSTOM
{d) that the above relates to the plaintiff's proposed second marriage and the lobolo in respect of the plaintiff's first marriage was paid by the said late Ncwadi, out of the house property of the Ikohlo house. e)that the lobolo for the two wives of the defendant was paid by the late Ncwadi out of the house property in Ikohlohouse”. Brien argued that the claim could be read to infer that it was made with a view to specific delivery of the cattle to the plaintiff's future father-in-law in fulfillment of the grant by his father.
PROCEDURE
The lawyer in question will benefit from examining the requirements for applications for condonation of the late annotation of complaints as contained in the rules and in previously decided cases. Lewin, appearing for the respondent, pointed out that the notice of appeal did not comply with Rule 7 of the Rules of the Bantu Court of Appeal contained in Government Notice No.
COMMON LAW
Once it is established that the occasion and the communication are privileged, the burden is on the Plaintiff to establish malice on the part of the Defendant—see Blumenthal v. This assertion does not seem to me to have been necessary for the protection of the interest or the fulfillment of the duty. on which the privilege is based and was also not based on reasonable grounds.
MGIJIM1 SITHOLE
Under Bantu law in Natal, the claimant is a perpetual minor and has no standing in judicio vide section 27(2) of the Natal Bantu Code and “Principles of Native Law and the Natal Code” by Stafford & Franklin at page 59 et seq. . Although section 107 specifically refers to a customary union, a 'home' is nevertheless created by her entering into a civil marriage, see section 1 (3) (/) of the Natal Code and the notes on this by Stafford and Franklin in “ Principles of Native Law and Birth Law” on pages 185-186.
COURTS
In the circumstances of this case, only her kraal head and husband could maintain an action to recover the cattle from the defendant. While the Commissioner may well have been right in finding that the cattle in question were the progeny of an animal given to her by the plaintiff's guardian at the time of her marriage for her sustenance, he erred in allowing her to proceed with the case.
JUDGMENTS
Plaintiff conceded in her speech to this Court that she would have no power to sell, for example, these cattle and that such power was vested in her husband. The appeal should be allowed with costs, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's judgment set aside and substituted "The claim is dismissed with costs".
NOVATION
He conducted these proceedings as a Magistrate and as such had no jurisdiction under section 17 (4) of the Native Administration Act. Returning to his reasons for judgment, his reasons for including a paragraph regarding the use of the words "appellant" and. He argued that the peremptory requirement of Chiefs' Court Rule 8 that the execution of a Chief's judgment "shall be in accordance with the recognized customs and laws of the (affected) tribe" would lapse if the Chief's Court judgment was delivered. a judgment of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's Court.
The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs, and the judgment of the Commissioner for Bantu Affairs is set aside and substituted with 'The exception is dismissed with costs.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
His statement that "In any event such reasons are invariably in favor of the Court of Commissioner for Bantu Affairs". Digests of the decisions of the Bantu Courts of Appeal over the years can be found in "A Digest of S.A. Be pleased to note that the defendant hereby appeals against the decision of the Commissioner in the above case not excluding intervenors' summons".
Please note that the Defendant hereby lodges an appeal against the judgment of the Commissioner in the above matter, rejecting the interpleader summons.
REVIEW
On appeal to the Court of the Commissioner of Bantu Affairs, the following decision appears in the body of the record "Leave to appeal refused and the appeal dismissed with costs," while in the appropriate place on the cover (B.A. 253) of the record it appears. the judgment "Appeal dismissed with costs". Her proper course would be to file an appeal against the decision, supported by a request for condonation of the late note. It is not really necessary to say more on this matter as the appeal must be allowed in the light of the points of law above, but I note that the evidence does not support the judgment.
However, it was clear that the appeal must succeed and in the circumstances the grant of the late note was granted but the defendant must bear the costs of the grant application.
BANTU LAW (NATAL)
Native Civil Case Law” by H. Appeal from the Court of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. This view would be entirely correct if the action were governed by Bantu law – see page 211 of the Natal Act 2011. Native law by Stafford and Franklin, but if customary law were applied a Bantu woman could have a sue for damages for seduction. See pages 8,62 (paragraph 14) and 234 of the above-mentioned publication and the authorities cited there and also Bujela vs. Mfeka 1953 NAC
In this connection, attention is drawn to section 144 (2) of the Code which states that nothing therein shall be deemed to impair in any way the operation of section eleven of the Act.
EJECTMENT
That all persons inhabiting the said farm are subject to the owner's control and instructions for the time being in respect of all matters relating to the said farm, and are bound to obey his lawful orders or instructions. The latter, including the defendant, are themselves subject to the owner's control for the time being and must obey his lawful orders under pain relief. The plaintiff is the owner of the property for the time being notwithstanding the provisions of Section 16 of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 (Act No. 47 of 1937) and the arguments of Mr.
The trust suffered damages in the sum of R1,750 as a result of the said illegal occupation by the defendant consisting of the following:.
R To occupation for 13 years
The defendant specifically pleaded that the plaintiffs were not trustees of the Trust and had no standing in the matter. Commissioner Bantu erred in his finding that the apparent intention of the parties drafting the Trust was to the effect that all three trustees should have acted jointly in signing the Lease Agreement. Menge who appeared on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiffs in their alternative claim (which is.
3 of the "Deed of Trust" mentioned in the Commissioner's explanation of the judgment (the document itself was not before this court), i.e.
THANOSE ALLISON NGUBANE
STATUTE LAW (NATAL.) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
2) MDODILE MTHIYANE
EVIDENCE
MESSENGER OF COURT
Defendant no. filed a complaint against this verdict. 1, only for these reasons:-. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the law. The defendant in his admission denied this paragraph by putting two points in this way: a) The plaintiff's claim that he was the owner of the cattle and. The plaintiff's action is justifiable as it is based on ownership and as it has assigned an alternative value to the cattle.
The only thing that emerges clearly from this confusing and unsatisfactory testimony is that the ownership of cattle is undisputed.
ROBERT T. MAZIBUKO
No descriptions of any of the cattle mentioned in this case were offered by or elicited from either party, that even this connection between them and this suit was denied to the Court a quo and this Court. Plaintiff then asked for a copy of the liquidation and distribution account, which was duly produced. The decision decided only that particular aspect of the case, and the additional issues have not yet been decided.
The merits of the appeal were not argued in the light of the attitude of the court and no finding was made in respect of the Com-.
CENTRAL BANTU APPEAL COURT
SIMON MONNAKGOTLA AND OTHERS CATHARINA MONNAKGOTLA AND OTHERS
LAND
It is not in dispute that all members of the tribe have the right to occupy tribal lands. 38 of 1927 are to be interpreted as including procedures relating to the mode of occupation of the country. The donation of the property to the plaintiff merely confirmed the inheritance to which he was entitled according to custom.
White suggested that the condition was introduced because of the decision in Mchunu's case, supra.
MTHWALO VINCENT KHUMALO
The merits of the appeal are not important to this report and will be omitted. Brien suggested that since the question of whether the proper course had been followed in the matter of the appeal from the Chief's Court had not been raised as a ground of appeal vide supra, that Court, more motu, should take up the question in the light of the decision in the case. of Mchunu vs. However, Mchunu's case was decided about 3 years before the proviso to Chiefs' Courts' Rule 9 was added by Government Notice No.
Sub-section (5) of rule 2, supra, requires the Chief to report the setting aside of a default judgment to the Clerk of Court to be recorded.
GERTRUDE KHUMALO D.A. AND ANOTHER
1 for an order dissolving his customary union with her and the custody of the two minor children and defendant No. Although the appellant did not plead adultery as a ground for divorce, on a proper construction of the evidence it was the actual reason for the defendant's decision. desertion of the appellant, and the Commissioner for Bantu Affairs should have noted this as a fact. In the present case, the Commissioner did not grant a divorce solely on the grounds of the wife's desertion, and the court cannot say that his decision was wrong.
If the dissolution had been requested under Article 76(1) ('> and (/) of the Birth Act), his decision might have been different.
