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Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:J-a:Journal of Economic Behavior And Organization:Vol44.Issue 2.Feb2001:

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Fig. 1. Both functions are piecewise linear and make only modest departures from the ‘truth
Fig. 1. Linear equilibrium strategies for three experimental conditions.
Table 1
Fig. 2. Bids vs. reservation values for individual sellers in condition SA.
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