We began this chapter by noting that compliant behavior becomes more likely either when the attractiveness of persuasion is enhanced or when the resistance to persuasion is diminished. In particular, we emphasized that focusing people on the future can greatly erode resistance to influencing agents’ demands in the present. Whereas many in the persuasion literature have emphasized making persuasive appeals more attractive (e.g., Brin˜ol, Rucker, Tormala, & Petty, this volume; Cialdini, 1993, 1994; Tormala & Petty, this volume; Wegener, Petty,
Smoak, & Fabrigar, this volume), our approach has been to consider the other half of the persuasion equation: reducing resistance (Fuegen & Brehm, this vol-ume; Knowles & Linn, chapter 1, this volvol-ume; Quinn & Wood, this volvol-ume;
Jacks & O’Brien, this volume). It seems appropriate at this point to take some stock in what our findings and theorizing say about resistance and its importance.
In general, we view resistance as a response by an individual that attempts to eliminate or reduce the impact of another’s influence attempt. Resistance is often based on motivational factors (Jacks & O’Brien, this volume), although cognitive, information-processing factors may be involved as well. Moreover, although resistance may involve conscious and controlled decisions and behav-iors, we have focused more on resistance as a spontaneous response to social influence situations. Whether it is because people instinctively wish to maintain perceptions of choice and control (e.g., Brehm, 1966; Worchel & Brehm, 1971), because they do not automatically consider future regret (Crawford et al., 2002), or because they are driven by situational heuristics such as scarcity (e.g., Cial-dini, 1993, 1994), it seems that thinking less is often linked to resisting more.
Indeed, our proposed dual-process account of reactance and compliance is based on this reasoning. There are, undoubtedly, many ways to shift people away from this more spontaneous response, and we have argued that getting them to think more about the future is especially beneficial in reducing resistance. In particular, predicting the future, imagining and explaining hypothetical future events, avoiding the consideration of an ominous future too painful to consider, capi-talizing on the planning fallacy, and considering the abstract, long-term positives of the situation focus people away from the immediate unattractiveness of com-pliance to a new decision set where comcom-pliance seems more reasonable, less costly, and easy to accept. What is true but not apparent to decision makers focused on the future is that there are many pitfalls on the road to these futures that may have been crafted by the influencing agent, which, if known to the decision maker, would make compliance far less attractive. However, like a good magician or politician, an influencing agent who focuses people away from “the action” makes acceptance more compelling and resistance less imperative.
We began this chapter by focusing on cognitive reactance as one important manifestation of resistance. We saw how the anticipation of future regret can diminish the tendency toward reactance. As we considered other compliance techniques, such as scarcity and fear appeals, and as we considered the effects on compliance of focusing on future behavior and events, it became clear that the reduction of resistance by considering the future was more general than the overcoming of cognitive reactance.
There are many different causes or bases of resistance to social influence:
resistance based on restriction of freedom or threatened loss of control; resis-tance based on the regret anticipated for compliance followed by a bad outcome;
resistance based on defensive avoidance; resistance based on aversion to change, such as the status quo bias; resistance based on a perceived potential loss of power or status as an outcome of becoming the target of a successful influence attempt. All these bases and manifestations of resistance that can be elicited by
a persuasion attempt can be weakened to increase persuasion. We believe that an increase in future as opposed to present focus can weaken all these various forms of resistance, thus increasing compliance.
As this chapter has indicated, time and its consideration is a critically im-portant aspect of many diverse social psychological phenomena. Where one is psychologically on the rubber band of time very much affects decision making, construal of events, confidence, emotions, and biases in memory and judgment (Johnson & Sherman, 1990). Now we see the possibility that, in addition, think-ing across time has importance for overcomthink-ing resistance to social influence.
Those who are savvy to these effects will find that subtle suggestions to reflect on the future or to think more deeply about down-the-road consequences will influence choices in the present. And to those readers who still remain uncon-vinced, we suggest that you consider how much regret you might feel if you later conclude that we were right all along.
AUTHOR NOTE
Preparation of this chapter was supported by Research Scientist Award K05 DA00492 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse to the first author and grant MH60645 from the National Institute of Mental Health to the third author.
REFERENCES
Anderson, C. A. (1982). Inoculation and counter-explanation: Debiasing techniques in the perse-verance of social theories. Social Cognition, 1, 126–139.
Anderson, C. A., & Sechler, E. S. (1986). Effects of explanation and counterexplanation on the development and use of social theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 24–
34.
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., Pub-lishers.
Bar-Hillel, M., & Neter, E. (1996). Why are people reluctant to exchange lottery tickets? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 2001–2014.
Bell, D. E. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 30, 961–
981.
Boninger, D. S., Gleicher, F., & Strathman, A. (1994). Counterfactual thinking: From what might have been to what may be. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 297–307.
Brannon, L. A., & Brock, T. C. (2001a). Scarcity claims elicit extreme responding to persuasive messages: Role of cognitive elaboration. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 365–
375.
Brannon, L. A., & Brock, T. C. (2001b). Limiting time for responding enhances behavior corre-sponding to the merits of compliance appeals: Refutations of heuristic-cue theory in service and consumer settings. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 10, 135–146.
Brehm, J. W. (1996). A theory of psychological reactance. New York: Academic Press.
Brehm, J. W., & Sensenig, J. (1966). Social influence as a function of attempted and implied usur-pation of choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 703–707.
Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & MacDonald, H. (1997). The role of motivated reasoning in optimistic time predictions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 238–247.
Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (1994). Exploring the “planning fallacy”: Why people under-estimate their task completion times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 366–
381.
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116–131.
Cann, A., Sherman, S. J., & Elkes, R. (1975). Effects of initial request size and timing of a second request on compliance: The foot in the door and the door in the face. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 774–782.
Carroll, J. S. (1978). The effect of imagining an event on expectations for the event: An interpre-tation in terms of the availability heuristic. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 88–
96.
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information processing within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 212–252). New York: Guilford.
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York: Guilford.
Cialdini, R. B. (1993). Influence: Science and practice (3rd ed.). New York: HarperCollins.
Cialdini, R. B. (1994). Interpersonal influence. In S. Shavitt & T. C. Brock (Eds.), Persuasion:
Psychological insights and perspectives (pp. 195–217). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focused theory of normative conduct:
Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1015–1026.
Crawford, M. T., Lewis, A. C., McConnell, A. R., & Sherman, S. J. (1998). Anticipated regret, choice, and retrospective counterfactual regret. Paper presented at the eighth biennial meeting of the Social Psychologists of Indiana, South Bend, Indiana.
Crawford, M. T., McConnell, A. R., Lewis, A. C., & Sherman, S. J. (2002). Reactance, compliance, and anticipated regret. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 56–63.
Ditto, P. H., & Jemmott, J. B., III (1989). From rarity to evaluative extremity: Effects of prevalence information on evaluations of positive and negative characteristics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 16–26.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Fiske, A. P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). The cultural matrix of social psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T., Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psy-chology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 915–981). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Freedman, J. L., & Fraser, L. C. (1966). Compliance without pressure: The foot-in-the-door technique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 195–202.
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Malone, P. S. (1990). Unbelieving the unbelievable: Some problems in the rejection of false information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 601–
613.
Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998). Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 617–638.
Gilovich, T., Kerr, M., & Medvec V. H. (1993). Effect of temporal perspective on subjective con-fidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 552–580.
Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1995). The experience of regret: What, when and why. Psycholog-ical Review, 102, 379–395.
Gleicher, F., Boninger, D. S., Strathman, A., Armor, D., Hetts, J., & Ahn, M. (1995). With an eye toward the future: The impact of counterfactual thinking on affect, attitudes, and behavior. In N. J. Roese & J. M. Olson (Eds.), What might have been: The social psychology of counterfac-tual thinking (pp. 283–304). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Greenwald, A. G., Carnot, C., Beach, R., & Young, B. (1987). Increasing voting behavior by asking people if they expect to vote. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 315–318.
Gregory, W. L., Cialdini, R. B., & Carpenter, K. M. (1982). Self-relevant scenarios as mediators of likelihood estimates and compliance: Does imagining make it so? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 89–99.
Heilman, M. E., & Toffler, B. L. (1976). Reacting to reactance: An interpersonal interpretation of the need for freedom. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 519–529.
Heller, J. F., Pallak, M. S., & Picek, J. M. (1973). The interactive effects of intent and threat on boomerang attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 273–279.
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 1–46.
Higgins, E. T., King, G. A., & Mavin, G. H. (1982). Individual construct accessibility and subjective impressions and recall. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 35–47.
Hull, C. L. (1951). Essentials of behavior. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Johnson, M. K., & Sherman, S. J. (1990). Constructing and reconstructing the past and the future in the present. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cog-nition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 482–526). New York: Guilford.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psycho-logical Review, 93, 136–153.
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y. W. (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review, 94, 211–228.
Koehler, D. J. (1991). Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 499–519.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). Motivated social cognition: Principles of the interface. In E. T. Higgins
& A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 493–520).
New York: Guilford.
Larrick, R. P., & Boles, T. L. (1995). Avoiding regret in decisions with feedback: A negotiation example. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63, 87–97.
Leventhal, H. (1970). Findings and theory in the study of fear communications. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 119–186). New York: Academic Press.
Leventhal, H., Watts, J. C., & Pagano, F. (1967). Effects of fear and instructions on how to cope with danger. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 313–321.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 5–18.
Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. (1967). Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of in-centive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 245–254.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.
Markman, K. D., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S. J., & McMullen, M. N. (1993). The mental simulation of better and worse possible worlds. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 87–109.
Markman, K. D., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S. J., & McMullen, M. N. (1995). The impact of perceived control on the imagination of better and worse possible worlds. Personality and Social Psy-chology Bulletin, 21, 588–595.
McConnell, A. R., Niedermeier, K. E., Leibold, J. M., El-Alayi, A. G., Chin, P. P., & Kuiper, N. M.
(2000). “What if I find it cheaper someplace else?”: Role of prefactual thinking and anticipated regret in consumer behavior. Psychology and Marketing, 17, 281–298.
Miller, D. T., & Taylor, B. R. (1995). Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition: How to avoid kicking yourself. In N. J. Roese & J. M. Olson (Eds.), What might have been: The social psy-chology of counterfactual thinking (pp. 305–331). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary ap-proaches. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1998). Attitude change: Multiple roles for persuasion variables. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th, ed., Vol. 1, pp. 323–390). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Petty, R. E., Wells, G. L., & Brock, T. C. (1976). Distraction can enhance or reduce yielding to propaganda: Thought disruption versus effort justification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 874–884.
Ritov, I. (1996). Probability of regret: Anticipation of uncertainty resolution in choice. Organiza-tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66, 228–236.
Roese, N. J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 805–818.
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1995). What might have been: The social psychology of counterfactual thinking. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rogers, R. (1983). Cognitive and physiological processes in fear appeals and attitude change: A revised theory of protection motivation. In J. T. Cacioppo & R. E. Petty (Eds.), Social psycho-physiology: A sourcebook (pp. 153–176). New York: Guilford.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic moti-vation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1996). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. In E. T. Higgins &
A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 433–465). New York: Guilford.
Sherman, S. J. (1980). On the self-erasing nature of errors of prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 211–221.
Sherman, S. J., Skov, R. B., Hervitz, E. F., & Stock, C. B. (1981). The effects of explaining hy-pothetical future events: From possibility to probability to actuality and beyond. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 17, 142–158.
Sherman, S. J., Zehner, K. S., Johnson, J., & Hirt, E. R. (1983). Social explanation: The role of timing, set and recall on subjective likelihood estimates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143.
Simonson, I. (1992). The influence of anticipating regret and responsibility on purchase decisions.
Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 105–118.
Snyder, M. L., & Wicklund, R. A. (1976). Prior exercise of freedom and reactance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 120–130.
Spangenberg, E. R., Sprott, D. E., Obermiller, C., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Self-prophecy as dissonance reduction. Unpublished manuscript. Washington State University.
Sprott, D. E., Fisher, R., & Spangenberg, E. R. (2001). Using the self-prophecy effect to promote socially desirable consumption: The role of normative beliefs. Unpublished manuscript. Wash-ington State University.
Sprott, D. E., Spangenberg, E. R., & Perkins, A. W. (1999). Two more self-prophecy experiments.
In L. Scott & E. Arnould (Eds.), Advances in consumer research (Vol. 25, pp. 621–626). Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.
Taylor, B. (1989). Mental stimulation and the anticipation of regret. Unpublished master’s thesis.
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., & Bonoma, T. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private ratioci-nation or public spectacle? American Psychologist, 26, 685–695.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. In N. R. Gold-berger & J. B. Verloff (Eds.), The culture and psychology reader. New York: New York Uni-versity Press.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2000). Temporal construal and time-dependent changes in preference.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 876–889.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and proba-bility. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207–232.
Tykocinski, O. E., & Pittman, T. S. (1998). The consequences of doing nothing: Inaction inertia as avoidance of anticipated counterfactual regret. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 607–616.
Wells, G. L., & Gavanski, I. (1989). Mental simulation of causality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 161–169.
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: Implications for effective public health campaigns. Health Education and Behavior, 27, 591–615.
Worchel, S., & Brehm, J. W. (1971). Direct and implied social restoration of freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 294–304.
Wright, R. A., & Brehm, S. S. (1982). Reactance as impression management: A critical review.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 608–618.
Zeelenberg, M., Beattie, J., Van der Pligt, J., & de Vries, N. (1996). Consequence of risk aversion:
Effects of expected feedback on risky decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 148–158.
175
9
Narrative Persuasion and Overcoming Resistance
Sonya Dal Cin, Mark P. Zanna, and Geoffrey T. Fong
University of Waterloo
Narratives are ubiquitous. Consider the vast numbers of people who are con-suming stories at any given time. Casual observation of rush-hour passengers on the subway in Toronto (and we imagine those in Chicago, New York, and Paris) reveals a large number of commuters reading newspapers, magazines, and novels. At the same time, commuters driving the city’s major highways are listening to the radio—hearing stories about what is happening in the world.
Children in day care and at school spend part of the day reading (or being read) stories, selected as age-appropriate and noncontroversial in their content, lest impressionable youth be led astray. Meanwhile, adults at home avidly tune in to soap operas. After school and after work, millions of people around the world switch on the television, expecting to be entertained by dramas, comedies, and
“reality” television.
This proliferation of stories is hardly surprising if one considers that stories have been with us throughout our history. Cave paintings at Lascaux (c. 17000–
15000 B.C.E.) that predate the development of literacy tell stories of hunts and animals. About 330B.C.E. Aristotle discussed the power of Greek tragedy in his Poetics (trans. 1996). Centuries later, Jesus used parables to teach morality and religion. The written versions of these oral narratives are reproduced in various versions of the Bible—the best-selling book of all time (Internet Public Library,
2002). During the Renaissance, Shakespeare wrote dramatic comedies, tragedies, and histories that still draw theater crowds to this day.
Given the popularity and diversity of narrative, it seems naı¨ve to imagine that narrative does not serve some sort of positive function. If we didn’t enjoy narratives, if they didn’t have some benefit for us, would we be inclined to watch as much television as we do? Would Hollywood films generate profits in the millions of dollars? It seems unlikely. Scholars in a variety of disciplines have investigated the nature of narrative and our relationship with it. A wide body of research indicates that narratives have an influence on their readers. (In using the terms reading, watching, and listening we intend for the reader to understand that the processes apply regardless of the media in which the nar-rative is presented and consumed.) Narnar-ratives touch our emotions (e.g., Oatley
& Gholamain, 1997), impact what we believe (Green & Brock, 2000), teach us new behaviors (see Slater, 2002, for a review), and shape our cultural identity (Jacobs, 2002). Indeed, there is little doubt in the minds of many that narratives can be persuasive. On one hand, parents read their children Aesop’s fables or Brothers Grimm fairy tales, hoping to instill morals and ethics; on the other hand, they petition school boards to ban books they feel are a bad influence.
For years, communication initiatives known as education entertainment—the systematic use of stories (on television, radio, or other media) to promote spe-cific behaviors—have been in place around the world (Slater, 2002). Even the U.S. government is in on the action—the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has identified the entertainment industry as a key player in disseminating anti-drug messages by incorporating these themes into storylines (ONDCP, 2000). Indeed, the ONDCP has negotiated with networks to allow inclusion of anti-drug storylines on popular series in lieu of providing discounted advertising slots (Forbes, 2000). Although outcome–evaluation of education en-tertainment has its limitations (Slater, 2002), research in social psychology has begun to demonstrate persuasion empirically through narrative (e.g., Strange &
Leung, 1999; Green & Brock, 2000). The psychological mechanisms of narrative persuasion are not yet well understood, but theorists from a variety of disciplines are working toward this goal (see Green, Strange, & Brock, 2002, for a review).
If narratives can be persuasive, then we might begin to consider the situations in which narrative persuasion may prove particularly useful. The goal of the current chapter is to consider the possible role of narratives in overcoming re-sistance—people’s motivated effort to defend an attitude against change. Spe-cifically, how might the use of narrative persuasion strategies work better than the use of traditional advocacy messages? Is narrative more effective than the most state-of-the-art rhetoric? Indeed, similar to our own thinking, Slater (2002) has suggested that “Use of narratives, in fact, may be one of the only strategies available for influencing the beliefs of those who are predisposed to disagree with the position espoused in the persuasive message” (p. 175). We would ex-tend this argument and suggest that narratives can be a useful strategy in chal-lenging strong attitudes, that is, attitudes that people hold quite fiercely and confidently, and that are most resistant to change (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). We
believe that narrative messages have an impact on weak attitudes, but by defi-nition, weak attitudes are not particularly difficult to change using rhetorical