2. Introduction
4.3 Agreements and protocols in the TE-RB
Euphrates River for many decades. Construction of the Ataturk Dam and decreasing rain during the late 1980s and 1990s dramatically reduced the river's water flow.565 A comparison of the average annual water flow at the Syrian border illustrates this argument. The Euphrates River was around 1,000 Cubic Meters per second (M3/s) from 1937 to 1989; but this amount reduced to around 700 m3/s from 1990 to 2010.566
As a result, the GAP project has negatively impacted the Euphrates River flow inside Syria. As well as Iraq, Syria will face significant water challenges in the coming years.
The Syrian government and Rojava can potentially work together to develop a sustainable method for managing available water in Syria. Rojava’s radical environmental change and ecological movement are promising. The self-administration in the region is working to promote environmental principles and increase public participation in all areas, including water management and enhancing women's role in society.568 This social and ecological movement is significant for applying NBS for water and IEL principles at the bottom level. This was discussed in chapter three, and will be discussed further in the last chapter.
Lausanne between Turkey and the Allies, Turkey promised to consult with Iraq before initiating any water projects in 1923.570 Turkey also signed its first agreement with Syria in 1926. The Good Neighbourliness Agreement mentioned that the Syrian water rights were assigned between Turkey and Syria under the French mandate. In the treaty, Turkey agreed not to change the water flow of the Euphrates or build any project on it without consultation with Syria. However, Turkey did not act according to the agreements in the following decades.571
Iraq and Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations in 1946.
According to the treaty, both countries agreed to exchange data and information between them. They agreed on sharing the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates and their tributaries. They referred the implementation of the treaty to a committee, but the committee was not established.572 With starting the construction of the Keban Dam in 1964, Turkey indirectly ignored its responsibility under the 1946 treaty. During that time, Turkey again promised both Iraq and Syria that it would discharge 350 m3/s from the Euphrates water flow to the two countries, but this amount was not sufficient for them.573 Table 4 explains the agreements and protocols chronologically among the riparian states in the basin.
Table 4 Agreements among riparian states
Year Agreement or Protocol Impact
1923 Treaty of Lausanne Turkey agreed to consulate with Iraq before any water projects
1926 Good Neighbourliness Agreement Syrian water rights were assigned between Turkey and Syria under the French mandate.
1946 Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations
Agreement to share transboundary water resources and exchange data.
570 Gruen, above n 462, at 567.
571 See Ryan Wilson “Water-shortage crisis escalating in the Tigris-Euphrates basin” (2012) Strategic Analysis Paper. Tech. Rep., Future Directions International.
572 See Ibrahim Kaya “The Euphrates-Tigris basin: An overview and opportunities for cooperation under international law” (1998) 44 Arid Lands Newsletter.
573 Yousuf, Rapantova and Younis, above n 463.
1980 The Joint Technical Committee (JTC) was created between Iraq and Turkey
The committee was very active during 1980s.
1983 Syria jointed to the JTC The committee had sixteen meetings until 1993.
1987 Syria and Turkey signed ‘Protocol on matters pertaining to economic cooperation’
They agreed on sharing 500 cubic m3/second. But have struggled to meet this because of the Kurdish issue.
1990 Iraq and Syrian bilateral agreement They agreed on sharing water of the Euphrates River.
1993 JTC had sixteen meetings The meetings were suspended.
2019 There is not an effective agreement among the three riparian countries
Absence of cooperation for water allocation.
As indicated in Table 4, several agreements and protocols were signed among the different states, but the states did not implement them because there was no real intention for cooperation. In addition, there were no regular meetings among basin states until the 1980s. This contributed to the absence of mutual understanding regarding managing the basin among the states. However, creating a committee for cooperation in the early 1980s was a significant step in the history of the basin’s management.
4.3.1 The Joint Technical Committee
In the meeting between Iraq and Turkey in Ankara, the Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation was created in 1980. Both countries agreed on solving their water issues, including transboundary issues. They reached a mutual understanding of reducing and minimising environmental harm on the two rivers. Importantly, they agreed to establish a technical committee for issues related to transboundary rivers.
According to the agreement, the committee was responsible for preparing reports and submitting them to TE-RB's governments.574 This step was significant towards cooperation, and it had international support. For example, the UN Watercourses Convention confirms the significance of this step in the management of transboundary basins. Article 24(1) states that: “Watercourse States shall, at the request of any them,
574 At 10.
enter into consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism”.575
After Turkey initiated the GAP, Iraq suggested creating a committee for negotiation regarding the allocation of water of TE-RB. The Joint Technical Committee (JTC) was created in 1980 between Iraq and Turkey, with Syria also joining the committee in 1983. The JTC was created for achieving short and long term goals. It was very active during the 1980s and held about sixteen meetings until 1993.576 The committee was successful regarding short term objectives, which were about exchanging information and updating member states regarding projects and dams on the two rivers’ basin.
However, the JTC failed to fulfil the long-term goal of drafting the final agreement for water allocation among the riparian states. 577
Despite this failure, the JTC played an active role in creating a communication bridge among the three riparian countries. The committee's role cannot be ignored because one of the issues that was discussed during the meetings was water allocation among the riparian. The main obstacle for the JTC members was a disagreement on determining the river basin system. Iraq and Syria believed the Euphrates River should be considered an international river.578 However, the Turkish views were utterly different because they believed that the term international rivers refers to rivers that create borders among the counties.579 In addition, Turkey viewed the Tigris and Euphrates basin as one basin that crosses different countries. Also, for them, sharing the sovereignty of the basin among riparian countries was not acceptable.580
The JTC meetings continued until 1993. After the sixteenth meeting in the same year, the JTC did not meet again. It is argued that the political circumstances during the end of the Cold War contributed to suspending the meetings and not reaching any
575 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art 24(1).
576 Ayșegül Kibaroğlu Building a regime for the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002) at 227.
577 Zawahri, above n 455, at 160.
578 Aysegül Kibaroglu and IH Olcay Ünver “An institutional framework for facilitating cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin” (2000) 5(2) International Negotiation at 9.
579 See Jouejati Murhaf “Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of Syria and Iraq” (1996) Reluctant Neighbour:
Turkey’s Role In the Middle East, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC.
580 Kibaroglu and Ünver, above n 578, at 9.
agreement among riparian states.581 The main reason for the failure of the JTC could be the absence of the real intention of the parties for mutual understanding and cooperation. Thus, the transboundary issue in the basin is still unsolved because there is not any agreement or water institution among the parties.