Dams and projects in the basin in Syria

2. Introduction

4.2 Dams and projects on the TE-RB .1 Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)

4.2.4 Dams and projects in the basin in Syria

the top of government proprieties and discuss the issue seriously with the neighbours.

The government should require its equitable share while minimising harm to the transboundary rivers. The principles of IEL provide significant support for such a claim.

Simultaneously, designing internal water policy and reforming water governance inside Kurdistan and Iraq is the most fundamental step toward proper water resource management. If the KRG and the federal government cannot adopt principles of international environmental law, how can they require the neighbouring countries to do so?

and it continued uninterrupted between the years 2007 to 2010.⁵⁵⁴

Following the Arab Spring, the Syrian government was one of the countries that faced demonstrations and people called for democratic reforms. In March 2011, the demonstrations shifted to civil war.⁵⁵⁵ The government lost control of most parts of the country, millions of people migrated as refugees to neighbouring countries. During the civil war, many water infrastructure systems were destroyed.⁵⁵⁶ The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled most of the Euphrates basin at the end of 2014.⁵⁵⁷ The Syrian regime still does not have control over the whole county because most North and East parts of the country are under the control of the majority Kurdish self- administration (Rojava).⁵⁵⁸ Syrian rebel forces who started the armed conflict with the regime also gained control over the Idlib province and small areas in the North West of Syria.⁵⁵⁹

Therefore, instability and civil war did not allow the government to develop a water policy in the last decade. The main priority for the Syrian government is still to end the civil war and retake the areas that were lost during the war. As a result, water policy is not a primary and fundamental concern for the government. Syria’s land is now divided among internal and external forces. The Euphrates River serves as a border between the Syrian government in Damascus and Rojava under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).⁵⁶⁰ The following Map 3 illustrates the division of forces in Syria.

554 Kelley and others, above n 552.

555 Peter H Gleick “Water as a weapon and casualty of armed conflict: A review of recent water‐related violence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen” (2019) 6(4) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water at 2.

556 At 6.

557 Arnon Karnieli and others “Was drought really the trigger behind the syrian civil war in 2011?” (2019) 11(8) Water at 3.

558 See Stephen E Hunt “Prospects for Kurdish ecology initiatives in Syria and Turkey: Democratic confederalism and social ecology” (2019) 30(3) Capitalism Nature Socialism.

559 See CJO PHILLIPS “International actors in the Syrian conflict” (2019) Orient.

560 Oxford Analytica “Prospects for Syria in 2020” (2019)

<https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB247564/Prospects-for-Syria-in-2020>.

Map (3) location of the Euphrates River and division of forces in Syria⁵⁶¹

However, both the Syrian government and Rojava cannot neglect the importance of the Euphrates as a vital resource for the country. Syria is heavily dependent on the Euphrates for water use and agriculture because 50% of Syrian water use comes from the Euphrates. Agriculture consumes 87% of water use in Syria, it is the largest sector for the utilisation of water. Increasing demand for water from various sectors and the rapid growth of the population have put the Syrian government under enormous pressure.⁵⁶² Thus, the Syrian government has built many dams on the Euphrates River, Tabqa is the largest among them. In addition, there are about eighty-four other small and medium dams on the river. The smallest dam has a 30,000m³ storage capacity.⁵⁶³ As well as using the Euphrates River as a political weapon, Turkey has also been involved in the Syrian civil war. Turkey launched a couple of military operations inside Syria and controlled some parts of northern Syria in 2018 and 2019.⁵⁶⁴ Map 3 illustrates the areas occupied by Turkey. The two countries have also disputed control of the

561 At 2.

562 Maher Salman and Wael Mualla “Water demand management in Syria: Centralized and decentralized views”

(2008) 10(6) Water Policy at 551.

563 Al-Ansari, Ali and Knutsson, above n 448.

564 PHILLIPS, above n 559.

Euphrates River for many decades. Construction of the Ataturk Dam and decreasing rain during the late 1980s and 1990s dramatically reduced the river's water flow.⁵⁶⁵ A comparison of the average annual water flow at the Syrian border illustrates this argument. The Euphrates River was around 1,000 Cubic Meters per second (M³/s) from 1937 to 1989; but this amount reduced to around 700 m3/s from 1990 to 2010.⁵⁶⁶

As a result, the GAP project has negatively impacted the Euphrates River flow inside Syria. As well as Iraq, Syria will face significant water challenges in the coming years.

The Syrian government and Rojava can potentially work together to develop a sustainable method for managing available water in Syria. Rojava’s radical environmental change and ecological movement are promising. The self-administration in the region is working to promote environmental principles and increase public participation in all areas, including water management and enhancing women's role in society.⁵⁶⁸ This social and ecological movement is significant for applying NBS for water and IEL principles at the bottom level. This was discussed in chapter three, and will be discussed further in the last chapter.