2. Introduction
4.2 Dams and projects on the TE-RB .1 Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)
4.2.2. I De-development at Anthropocene
The exaggeration of the socio-economic objectives of GAP has led many Turkish scholars to underestimate the real intentions of Turkey in these projects. 485 Surprisingly, some of them claim that GAP is consistent with the SDGs.486 The GAP and the Ilisu dam, in particular, is an obvious example for ignoring IRBM, EIA, and environmental and cultural damage to local people and neighbouring countries.487 Thus, the Kurdish people were strongly opposed to the GAP. Before constructing the Ilisu dam in 2006, Turkey faced remarkable pressure from local people, NGOs and
(2015) 43(2) Nationalities Papers at 248.
482 See Radha D’Souza and others Building Free Life: Dialogues with Öcalan (PM Press, 2020).
483 Joost Jongerden “Dams and politics in Turkey: utilizing water, developing conflict” (2010) 17(1) Middle East Policy at 141-142.
484 Carkoglu and Eder, above n 465, at 60.
485 See Ibrahim Yuksel “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) for irrigation and hydroelectric power in Turkey”
(2006) 24(4) Energy exploration & exploitation.
486 See Mustafa Balat “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey and regional development applications”
(2003) 21(5)at Cited Pages.
487 See Itzchak E Kornfeld Mega-Dams and Indigenous Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020).
environmental organisations. The Kurdish Human Rights Project, which is based in London, had a key role in criticising the dam and its negative environmental, cultural and social impacts of the project.488 The campaigns and criticism of the project led Germany, Switzerland and Austria to withdraw their funds to the project, but Turkey continued constructing the dam.489
In addition to the environmental damage to Southeast Turkey and Iraq downstream, the dam destroyed the 12,000 year-old city of Hasankeyf, flooding 199 villages and covering 136 km2 of the Tigris River valley with water. Hasankeyf was considered an unrivalled open museum because it presented twenty historical cultures with more than 550 monuments.490 Most of these archaeological and cultural sites are now underwater because of this dam constructed on the Tigris River. The river and the dam area are fortunate with a high biodiversity-ecosystem, but it will decline in the following years.491 The dam was completed in late 2019 and the reservoir was filled with water in March 2020.492 Even though the Turkish government was criticised and warned by the EU and UNEP for not considering the negative impacts on local people and the neighbours, they ignored these critics.493
This is not the first time Turkey has ignored local and international pressure by exploiting the language of development to construct more dams. Before completing the Keban Dam in 1974, Turkey physically displaced between 30,000 and 40,000 people, and they were forced to leave their previous social and cultural lifestyles. They received compensation, but it was not enough for them to provide for the basic needs of life.494 The Ataturk Dam, which was constructed in the 1980s, resulted in the displacement of more than 55,000 people by flooding a couple of towns and 135 villages. In the 1990s, the Birecik Dam also led to the displacement of around 30,000 people with the
488 See Ilısu Dam Campaign “Kurdish Human Rights Project, Cornerhouse” (2001) World Economy Ecology and Development, Eye on SACE Campaign and Pacific Environment Research Centre.
489 Jongerden, above n 483.
490 Boyle, above n 453, at 12.
491 At 12.
492 Save the Tigris Damming the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Structural gaps in the KRG dam construction policies (2020) at 13.
493 Jongerden, above n 483.
494 See Kerem Öktem “When Dams Are Built on Shaky Grounds: Policy Choice and Social Performance of Hydro- Project Based Development in Turkey (Dämme auf unsicherem Grund. Politische Strategien und soziale
Auswirkungen von Wasserprojekten in der Südost-Türkei)” (2002) Erdkunde.
submergence of many villages.495 In 2009, Turkey launched another project to construct eleven dams in the Hakkari and Sirnak provinces on the Iraqi-Turkish border.
These dams were not built for irrigation or producing hydropower. The main purpose of constructing these dams was to displace the local people and cut the connection between them and the PKK guerrilla fighters. Therefore, Turkey used the language of development to deceive496 the international community about the GAP's actual objectives.
As a result, the GAP cannot be considered a development project because the whole project lacks the required EIA. It has hugely negative social and cultural impacts on the people who live around TE-RB. Veli Yadirgi, in his book The Political Economy of the Kurds of Turkey, describes the Turkish policy in the Southeast as a “de-development”
instead of the development process.497 According to him, the roots of this de- development dated back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman empire ended the local Kurdish administration. The Republic of Turkey, which was established in 1923, continued on the same policy. This was a part of Turkification of the Southeast of the country, and Turkey continues this policy today.498 Thus, the Ilisu Dam is an evident example of negative social and cultural impacts.
Finally, the Ilisu Dam and other dams in the GAP significantly influence the water quality and quantity of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers inside the Syrian and Iraqi borders. According to UNDP’s report in 2013, it is expected that by 2050 the water of the two rivers will be reduced by fifty per cent.499 Other scholars believe that the share of both Iraq and Syria will be reduced even more than this as the result of the GAP.
They estimate that Iraq’s share of the two river’s water would be reduced by 80% and Syria’s share by 40%.500 According to the Iraqi parliament, the GAP considerably decreased Iraqi spring water reserves from 40 BCM in 2006 to 11 BCM in 2009. All of the dams, particularly those constructed on the Euphrates river, will create an environmental disaster for Iraq due to a shortage of water. Displacement of people in
495 Arda Bilgen “The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) revisited: The evolution of GAP over forty years”
(2018) 58 New Perspectives on Turkey 139-141.
496 Jongerden, above n 483.
497 Yadirgi, above n 188, 5.
498 At 6.
499 UNDP Drought Impact Assessment, Recovery and Mitigation Framework and Regional Project Design in Kurdistan Region (KR) (2011) at 7-10.
500 Bigas, above n 469.
the South of Iraq, salination and drainage of the marshes are expected to be significant negative impacts of GAP on Iraq.501