and opportunities of engagement for West African states
Dr. Kayode Soremekun
This paper examines security issues in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This paper will: 1) attempt a brief historical overview of ECOWAS;
2) highlight trends which shape the security architecture of this sub-region. This will be followed by how it perceives the issue of security, and analyze 3) challenges and opportunities of ECOWAS within contexts of African Union activities and the global security agendas. The paper will be rounded up with a focus on best prac- tices as these relate to ECOWAS and contemporary security dynamics.
West Africa is an area of great contrasts and bewildering diversity. Precisely, a fairly accurate description of the physical location of the region of West Africa would invariably include the area lying west of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. It is the area bounded by Mauritania and Senegal on the West, and Chad and Cameroon in the East even though it has been suggested, that it should operationally include the area stretching from the Spanish Sahara to An- gola. The region has a wide range of vegetation and climate. Along the coast of the West African region there is a plain of varying width, with alternating ranges of swamps, lagoons and sandy beaches. The swampy and almost impenetrable forests and heavy rains in the Southern parts of the region gradually diminish in intensity and taken over by savannah. The savannah and tropical south are rea- sonably good for agriculture.
The region is second in size to that of North Africa, and greater than either East or Central Africa. The population of the area is larger than the total popula- tion of the East African Community countries, but less than half’ that of the EEC countries. West Africa’s food production is not only less than the continental average but it is also less than the yearly production of either East or North Af- rica. Thus the region is persistently a region that does not feed itself.1
1 Ralph Onwuka, ‘Development and Integration in West Africa’, University of Ife Press, 1982.
Meanwhile, attempts to discuss the origins of West African integration must take due cognizance of the prescience of the fifth Pan-African Congress, that was held in Manchester, England in October 1945.2 The congress recommended the establishment of a West African economic union “as a means of combating the exploitation of the economic resources of the West African territories and for ensuring the participation of the indigenous people in the industrial develop- ment of West Africa. But the ‘West Africa’ that the conferees in Manchester had in mind was “British West Africa.” This was to be expected of a predominantly English-speaking conference organized by leaders from British colonies in Af- rica, the West Indies and the United States.
The current delineation of West Africa was undertaken early in the 1960s by the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based on the premise that the most viable approach to regional integration was one that, as a first step, em- braced narrower geographical areas as opposed to an all-embracing continental organization. Accordingly, the ECA divided the African continent into four sub- regions: eastern and southern, central, northern and Western.3
Previous attempts to create ECOWAS were characterized by a measure of insularity; notably exclusively francophone regional bodies like the CEAO and the Council of the Entente. However, the 1963 Lagos Conference on Industrial Coordination in West Africa, the Liberian initiative that set up the Interim Or- ganisation for West African Economic Cooperation;4
• the ECA – FAO sponsored Bamako Conference on coordination of In- dustries that would have led to the establishment of a regional Iron and Steel Industry.
• The ECA sponsored Niamey Conference that was aimed largely at en- larging the CEAO and
• the Nigeria – Togo initiative which ultimately led to the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, which transcended linguistic boundaries.
The Nigeria – Togo initiative
Although, it was the Nigeria – Togo initiative which led to the eventual creation of ECOWAS, Nigeria was the main driving force which ultimately led to the
2 Adebayo Adedeji, ‘The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism’, in Adekeye (i) Adebayo and Ismail Rashid (ed) West Africa’s Security Challenges and (ii) Lynne, Reinner Publishers, London, 2004.
3 Ibid.
4 Ralph Onwuka, op.cit.
birth of this regional body. For obvious reasons, however, she could not go it alone. Thus, although Nigeria did most of the ground work in promoting the principle of a transcendented West African supranationality, nevertheless, it needed the confidence of all the West African States, including the French-speak- ing states to succeed. Therefore the choice of Francophone Togo as a companion in this initiative gave the attempt a broad base that was necessary for regional legitimacy. The choice of Togo was in itself very instructive, unlike the other Francophone countries, she, i.e Togo was not as thoroughly French - since her Francophone connections had been diluted by an earlier experience of German colonialism. This hybrid character of the Togolese social formation, made it easier for the country to be susceptible to the overtures from Nigeria. Of course, there were other variables – historical and psychological which made it possible for Nigeria and Togo to form the nucleus of this union.
The rapport and chemistry between Nigeria and Togo dates back many years.
Sylvanus Olympio, the Togolese Head of State had a great understanding with his Nigerian counterpart, Sir Abubakar Balewa. Meanwhile, it will be recalled that in his formative years, Olympio studied in King’s College, Lagos in Nigeria and this would also partly explain his inclination towards Nigeria. When in Janu- ary 1963, Olympio was assassinated in the first African coup d’etat, his family found in Nigeria not only a reservoir of goodwill, but also a comfortable home.
Three years after the death of Olympio, Abubakar witnessed a similar fate. The Nigerian Federal Government and its counterpart in Togo readily united in a common purpose either because the regimes were both military ones which had ousted civilian leaders who were friends or because the military regimes were consciously continuing the former friendship of Abubakar and Olympio.5
The first of the two agreements signed on November 6 1964, by the two countries removed visa requirements placed on the movements of the citizens of the two states by their respective governments. Again on May 4, 1966, Nigeria and Togo signed a Trade Agreement, which was aimed at the achievement of a maximum develop- ment of trade between the two countries through non-discriminatory practices.
In what seems to be in no way different from other bilateral trade agreements in the sub-region, the contracting states, in Article 1, agreed to grant each other
“most favoured nation” treatment in all matters affecting import and export trade.
This “most favoured nation” clause would however, not apply to advantages, concessions and exemptions that each contracting party might grant to:
5 Ibid.
• fellow member countries of a customs union;
• a free trade area of a monetary zone already established;
• a bordering country in order to facilitate trade between such country and either Contracting Party.
The two states also agreed to promote and develop trade in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in each of the states. To facilitate commercial inter- course, the contracting Parties also agreed to furnish each other on request with all necessary information concerning the needs and possibilities of supplying goods and commodities originating from their respective territories. They also contracted to grant freedom of transit of commercial goods originating in the territory of one of them and transported over the territory of the other.
The civil war in Nigeria interrupted the smooth implementation of this agree- ment.6 Although the civil war interrupted Nigeria’s active participation in inter- national affairs, the end of the war which restored the country’s territorial integrity and confidence also created for Nigeria a new and dynamic role in Africa. Nige- rian leaders desired this significant role, and establishing a West African eco- nomic community was high on their roster of expectations. To achieve this, it was necessary to establish friendly relationships with all West African states, not just with Togo. This style of Nigerian diplomacy was well articulated by J.
Herskovits when she said that, as “from 1971 and moving in ever-widening cir- cles, Gowon and his Foreign Ministry however, kept the ‘very low profile’ that African diplomats always mention. And that with little publicity, Nigeria tack- led its neighbours first: Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Togo. State visits led to long-term interest-free loans, bilateral agreements on building Nigerian-fi- nanced roads across borders, and reviving moribund efforts at economic co-op- eration through projects dealing with power, communications and transport. Dr.
Okoi Arikpo, Commissioner for External Affairs, in a lecture at the Nigerian In- stitute of International Affairs summarized these aspects of Nigeria’s West Afri- can diplomacy in the following sentences:7
Within the few years, Nigeria had concluded trade agreements with seven neigh- bouring countries in the West African sub-region, air services agreements with five, and economic co-operation agreements with another five. We have also
6 The Lessons of the Civil War Revamped Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (i) Thrust, such that, Nigeria started to pay more serious attention to her neighbours.
7 See Ralph Onwuka, op. cit.
established telecommunication links with five OAU member countries in the sub- region, and joint customs posts with three others… Cash grants of over four mil- lion naira (some 6 million US dollars) have been made available to eight member countries of the OAU, in addition to over a million naira (1.5 million US dollars) worth of grain and other foodstuffs donated to the Republic of Niger. Nigeria continues to make the facilities at her ports and airfields available to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation free of charge for the purpose of transporting relief material to the neighbouring countries (as a result of the drought that crippled a number of countries in the region.)
Herskovits, commenting on the style with which Nigeria was reaching be- yond its neighbours, said that when Nigeria worked with Togo to set in motion a West African common market, it was more than sound economics – Before 1972 there were several Nigeria – Togo meetings, designed to achieve “the evolution of an economic community in West Africa – a community which will cut cross linguistic, cultural and other barriers.” In April 1972 the Heads of State of Ni- geria and Togo decided to revive the process arrived at, in achieving a West Afri- can economic co-operation. To this end, the officials of the two countries prepared a proposal patterning the structure and scope of a possible West African commu- nity. This proposal which showed the taxonomies of the characteristics of the intended common market made it very explicit that a pragmatic approach to West African economic integration would be preferred. Then the other West Af- rican states were invited to discuss the proposal.
The decisive Lome meeting
In this first ministerial meeting since 1967 to discuss West African economic co- operation, fifteen States (this time, Guinea-Bissau was the only new addition to the regulars) assembled in Lome, Togo between December 10 and 15, 1973 to debate the Nigeria – Togo scheme for action. The governments agreed in general on necessary institutions for a community and possible areas of co-operation as well as the taxonomies and nature of various levels of integration.
The conference elected the head of the Togolese delegation as President, that of the Sierra Leone delegation as Vice-President, while the office of rapporteur went to the Ivory Coast.
Although most delegates highlighted the advantages of economic co-opera- tion, a few had some reservations on certain issues raised by the Nigeria – Togo scheme. The leader of the Mauritanian delegation, who most of the time spoke
on behalf of the CEAO states, suggested the forming of an all-embracing out- ward-looking community which would not be hampered by the existence of other sub-regional groupings. “It is necessary” he emphasized, “to draw from the Com- munity experience of some of us, shifting the positive aspect and improving on it.”. Upper Volta, a land-locked state, expressed some reservations on the ques- tion of fiscal charges, and the conditions governing the imposition and collection of the charges, draw-backs, and transit rights (granting unrestricted freedom of transit through each territory for goods proceeding to or from another member state and conditions attached to such goods in transit.) Meanwhile, Senegal, in view of its apprehension about the hegemony called Nigeria, requested that Za- ire and Cameroons be brought into the regional grouping as counter-weights.
After detailed consideration of the Nigeria – Togo proposal, the ministers adopted the basic principles of the document, and further requested that the two pioneering states prepare a draft treaty with the assistance of the ECA. Another meeting, this time of the experts from the 15 states was scheduled to be held in Accra, Ghana in early January 1974, when the draft treaty was to be discussed. A second ministerial meeting was to be convened in Niamey, Niger during the first week in March, 1974 to consider the draft treaty submitted to it by the Accra meeting. After this, it was planned that in the first half of 1975, the final phase of the formation of the West African Community, would be ratified by a meeting of the Heads of State and Government in Lagos at which the treaty would be con- sidered and signed. This particular meeting took place on May 28 1975, and thus, ECOWAS was officially born in Lagos.
At this juncture, it is apposite to dwell on the security perceptions of this body. The earlier attempts to optimize African security efforts could be located at the continental level. The initial debates on the issue were centred on Nkrumah’s idea of an African high command, which he first advanced in November 1960.
This was later presented in many Pan-African fora as a concerted plan of action for peace and security in Africa. These debates about continental defence ar- rangements went on for more than a decade before attention was directed to- wards a regional approach to the problem.
Thus, as a far as Africa is concerned, regionalism in defence terms, as distinct from continentalism, did not receive serious attention until the 1970s. From the im- mediate foregoing, it is infact possible to generalize that the establishment of an eco- nomic union by a group of states usually has defence implications which transcend territorial borders. In the case of ECOWAS, it was felt that the protection of joint services as well as industrial and economic ventures could not be left in the hands of the individual states. This was moreso because the members were too weak indi-
vidually to protect themselves. Under such circumstances, common security arrange- ments were deemed to be necessary to protect such collective ventures. It is in this sense that an economic union usually advances a state’s focus beyond its borders. In this respect, ECOWAS is not unique in having a complementary defence compo- nent. Indeed, there are many other examples in history where international economic organizations went on to develop complementary defence components.8
For instance, NATO provides the defence umbrella for the European Eco- nomic Community (EEC) even though a principal member of NATO (the United States) is not in the EEC. NATO was a product of the post-war integrative effort in Europe which had its genesis in the Marshall Plan. Also the Organisation of American States (OAS) which was basically a forum for joint economic assist- ance has a defence component, as embodied in the Lima Accord. In the then, Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact also formed the defence umbrella over the COMECON. The Arab League also has its defence component in the Arab De- fence Council. Even in the EEC’s economic association with Africa, there was the tendency by France to give it a defence backing. In January 1978, the former French President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, proposed a pact of solidarity which would include defence provisions between the EEC countries and Africa.
From the foregoing it could be said that the ECOWAS Defence Pact emanated from a general concern by its members to protect shared interests. According to Togo, one of the leading exponents of the Pact, if economic integration and coop- eration are to be meaningful then they have to be accompanied by a defence and security arrangement. Senegal also gave a similar impression in the proposals it submitted for the creation of a defence component for ECOWAS.
Threat potential within ECOWAS
As proposed by Tom Imobighe, need to add a defence component to the ECOWAS Treaty became imperative not only because ECOWAS ideals conflict with those of the powers with imperialistic interests in the region, but also because the area has been the object of previous external violations. For instance, in November 1970, the Republic of Guinea experienced an attempted invasion by Portuguese- led mercenaries. Also, in January 1977, the Republic of Benin experienced an- other mercenary assault on the region. Besides, the numerous French military interventions and the presence of French troops in and around the ECOWAS
8 See details of earlier notions of Security in ECOWAS in Tom Imobighe, (i) ECOWAS Defence Pact and Regionalism in Africa, in Ralph Onwuka and A. Sesay (ed) The Future of Regionalism in Africa, Macmillan, London, 1985.
region (to promote its imperialistic designs in the area) pose a lot of security worries for some of the ECOWAS member states.
A number of these states were worried about these threats, the more so be- cause if the high hopes of ECOWAS should materialize, the neo-colonial powers lurking around in the region would find the situation rather uncomfortable and may decide on hostile action against selected targets. In this regard, one must say that ECOWAS countries are very vulnerable since these external forces have stra- tegic information about ECOWAS States within their easy reach.
Another source of threat was posed by the then apartheid South Africa. Even though remote from the region the apartheid regime developed long-range capabil- ity which would have diminished the crippling effect of the distance between her and West Africa. Thus, South Africa could feel that the increasing prosperity of this region will lead to more positive support for the freedom fighters from the region.
She could thus see the success of ECOWAS as a big threat to her apartheid institu- tions and as a result, decide on a pre-emptive action on selected ECOWAS targets.
Nevertheless, initial attempts to effect a collective regional security arrange- ment date back to 1977, when the first indigenous institutional mechanism for conflict resolution and security management among the Francophone family of nations in the sub-region was designed and put in place. The Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Matters of Defence, (ANAD) was concluded by seven member states of ECOWAS. Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauri- tania, Niger, Senegal and Togo – all of whom are French speaking. It has been pointed out that ANAD represents a fortification of the linguistic exclusively of certain countries in West Africa, and therefore a deepening of the Francophone – Anglophone divide which European imperial rule imposed on Africa’s political landscape. It is significant to note however that, ANAD has no competence to deal with intra-state conflicts. And there is a touch of irony here, for as we shall see shortly the main security threats in the region have largely been spawned by intra-state conflicts. According to Jean Gomis, ANAD does not intervene when the internal security of a country is jeopardized by internal political ethnic, social or economic causes, even if they generate large mass casualties.9
In view of the fact that the entire landscape of West Africa’s security is wider than the territories within which ANAD operates, the sixteen member states of ECOWAS concluded an agreement on non-recourse to force by Member States
9 R. A. Akindele, ‘ECOWAS, Good Governance and Sub-Regional Security in (i) West Africa in R. A. Akindele (ed) Civil Society, good Governance and The Challenges of Regional Security in West Africa AFSTRAG and Vantage Publishers, Ibadan, 2003.