Elvin Nyukuri
Introduction
There have been many attempts to be more specific in identifying the linkages between the environment and security. To date these efforts have focused on the integration of security definitions into the issue of environmentally caused scarcities and conflicts.1 Unfortunately, identifying the specific environmental cases that threaten a specific security issue is neither direct nor straightforward.
Not all environmental problems are security problems. In fact, most environ- mental problems are decidedly not security problems. This is not to say they are any less important or critical to national and international agendas. Security is- sues are not inherently military, economic or in this case environmental.2 Secu- rity is a response to the interplay between just such elements. Peter Gleick3 considers threats to security to include resource and environmental problems that reduce the quality of life and result in increased competition and tensions.
The former US Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, Warren Christopher, once said, ‘The environment has a profound impact on our national interests in two ways: first, environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly the health and prosperity, and jobs of American Citizens. Second, addressing natural resources issues is frequently critical to achieving political and economic stability and to pursuing our strategies goals around the world.’
Damage to shared resources can have major impacts on the stability of rela- tionships between with focus on security issues. The analysis of environmental issues must go together with the analyses of related security issues. If one begins from the environmental perspective, it is necessary to first establish the entire range of environmental issues, characterize their local consequences and then determine if there are any security issues that are impacted.
1 Shaw. B. (1996) When are Environmental issues Security issues? Woodrow Wilson Centre. Environmental Change; Security Project issue2, Spring.
2 Anders Hjort af Ornas & Krokfos Christer. (1992), Environment and International Security, PRIO 7 Research Programme on Environment and International Security, Department of Human Geography, Upsala University.
3 Dr. Peter H. Gleick is a scientist working on issues related to the environment economic development &
international security, with a focus on global freshwater challenges. http://www.pacinst.org.
This paper will focus on the Horn of Africa because sub Saharan Africa is a very large region and it is impossible to generalize about it. It will discuss se- lected characteristics of environmental patterns in the Horn of Africa, character- istics of conflict in the Horn, the major processes of environmental degradation that are taking place in the Horn, and a review of the literature on environmental sources of conflict model used by Thomas Homer developed by Thomas Homer- Dixon fits some of the situations experienced in the horn. The last section of this paper shall look at some of the findings of the ACTS project on ecological sources of conflict in the Horn and Great Lakes.
Characteristics of environments in the Horn of Africa
Environments in the greater Horn of Africa exhibit great variety within each state.
Somalia, for example, includes within its borders rich agricultural areas such as the Shabelle and Juba Valleys as well as large arid and semi arid land (ASAL) areas. The highland areas of Ethiopia and Kenya are internationally recognized for biodiversity. This variety also represents a wider range of livelihood strate- gies, each fitting into an ecological niche.
The key resource areas in this region have greater significance to livelihood systems than their size would suggest. These key areas include rivers, seasonal streams, salt licks, pockets of high precipitation such as hills and plateau as well as valley bottoms with high soil moisture content. Such areas, which comprise five to ten percent of the total land area of Africa’s savannas, form lifelines for local communities. Degradation of these areas or their conversion into other uses may have negative impacts on livelihoods across a wide area.
Great variability exists in productivity in relation to seasons and cycles. The climate is characterized by great extremes, compared to the more temperate alti- tudes. Large areas of the Horn are regularly affected by droughts and floods often in rapid succession. In the last 30 years there has been at least one major drought event per decade. There is some evidence that these cycles are becoming unstable because of global warming.
Many ecosystems and livelihood systems straddle international borders. Ex- amples of this include drainage basins and rivers such as Lake Victoria (Tanza- nia, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi) and the Barka and Gash Rivers linking the Ethiopian highlands to south-eastern Sudan. Other examples include the pas- toral migration routes of many communities such as the Maasai who regularly cross the Kenya/Tanzania Border or the Nuer who live on both sides of the Su- dan-Ethiopia border. Transboundary pastures are particularly affected by vio- lent cattle raiding and conflict.
Global climate change may be changing climatic cycles. While this has yet to be unequivocally proven, many scientists believe that the greenhouse effect is having a negative impact on climatic regimes. Evidence put forward for this theory includes rising temperatures, decreasing rainfall and the spread of desert areas.
Natural resources livelihoods are vulnerable to external shocks. Aside from global environmental changes mentioned above, African environments are also affected by changes in international markets. For example, the fall in price of livestock and the recent embargo on exports from Somalia to Arabian Peninsula may be one factor in environmental degradation in pastoral areas as herders graze more and more animals and change herd composition to compensate.
View points of the value of natural resources differ between communities and between local/national/international interests. Especially in rural settings traditional livelihood systems are part and parcel of cultural identity - the cul- tural and spiritual significance of cattle to pastoral groups is one example. Envi- ronmental features such a forest groves have great cultural, historical and /or religious significance to certain tribal or identity groups. Western/scientific meth- ods of cost benefit analysis or conservation paradigms may not take these into account.
Land tenure regimes are often contested and are a root cause of many other problems, especially in rangeland areas. Many areas are customarily subject to multiple uses, often differing seasonally by a variety of stakeholders. However, these are rarely reflected in legal regimes. Dryland zones are typically owned by the state, which holds the land in trust for the nation. In practice, land is often alienated from local communities, without compensation, for projects which do not benefit them. More widely, women often have fewer rights to land than men, especially in terms of traditional inheritance systems: while they may enjoy user rights, they may not have full ownership. The security that was embedded in some of the traditional systems often through access to communal resources, has diminished due to the erosion of these traditional systems.
Selected characteristics of conflict in the Horn
Interstate conflicts have significant overspill effects on neighbouring countries.
These typically include small arms flows, influx of refugees, and the cross-border operations of armed opposition groups. Around centres of conflict there are often extended zones of bounded instability which experience sporadic violence.
Conflicts are linked in complex and changing ways, including the need for regional alliances, arms supplies, border security agreements and other regional
political agreements. As the balance of power in one conflict shifts, another con- flict may be effected. The Sudan conflict is said to be the hub of a conflict system.
Survival in specific ecological zones demands the evolution of particular live- lihood strategies. These strategies and their accompanying cultural forms, lead to the formation of an ethnic identity. Ecological borders therefore tend to be- come ethnic and social borders and are often the scene of conflict. However, iden- tity is more fluid and constructed than is often supposed and is often manipulated.
Most of the casualties in modern warfare are civilians. Because conflict often takes ethnic overtones, and because modern African wars generally involve mi- litias and guerrillas rather than regular troops, it is all too easy for civilians to be targeted just because they belong to an enemy group. This total war effect as well as ruthless counter-insurgency strategies employed by some states leads to the destruction of homes and food stocks a well as human rights abuses.
International border zones are specifically conflict affected. These zones of friction are the most politically and economically marginalized, with weak state administrative structures focused on security concerns rather than community development. Such situations may also involve deliberate destabilizing tactics from neighbouring countries. Examples include the Ogaden region adjacent to the Ethiopian-Somalia border, Red Sea Hills region on the Sudan-Eritrea border and Eastern Equatorial Province in Southern Sudan which borders Uganda and Kenya.
Environmental stress in the Horn
Some major process of environmental degradation that are taking place in the Horn include; land degradation, deforestation, watershed degradation, water scarcity, pollution, biodiversity loss and dispossession of communities from local resources.
This typology is, however, meant to be indicative and not exhaustive.
Land degradation as discussed earlier is a problem in many areas. The term encompasses a wide range of processes. One of the most notorious and controver- sial in the Horn is desertification which can also result from the interaction of a number of processes including the increasing frequency of drought and grazing or cultivation without the appropriate management and mitigation measures.
Deforestation is another problem affecting all the countries in the Horn due to collection of firewood, charcoal burning, expansion of cultivated land for sub- sistence farming and commercial logging interests. This activity has a number of impacts such as possible adverse changes to the microclimate, loss of habitat for wild species - including medicinal plant varieties used locally to treat illness.
Watershed degradation is a key problem in many countries of the Horn. De- forestation is a major cause of the phenomenon as it results in changes to surface water flows and ground water recharge rates. Many communities have seen their local rivers dwindle while others experience flash-floods. Such watershed deg- radation also involves increased soil erosion, which increases nutrient build-ups in lakes and rivers affecting flora and fauna. Such impacts can be international.
As an example, watershed degradation in Ethiopia has led to increased siltation rates in Sudan’s Gezira irrigation scheme.
Water scarcity which is partially caused by watershed degradation is also due to the increasing number of competing claims for water for a wide variety of subsistence and commercial uses. Even if water rights can be allocated success- fully, it is very difficult to monitor and enforce water use due to lack of funds within the ministries as well as among water users. It is predicted that by 2025, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi Kenya and Ethiopia will experience water scarcity.
Eritrea, Uganda and Tanzania will be water stressed. Water availability is also a factor of water quality; which is poor and deteriorating in many areas due to siltation and biological and chemical pollution.
Pollution is a problem in some areas especially urban areas and coastal deltas.
Poorly regulated industries may contaminate water supplies or land. Slum dwellers in urban and peri-urban areas are also vulnerable to pollution, often living in river valley areas which absorb raw sewage or next to industrial areas with many associ- ated health risks. In most countries environmental impact assessment is a legal re- quirement for large industrial projects. However, regulatory bodies in the region rarely have sufficient capacity or political will to enforce these laws comprehen- sively.
Biodiversity loss is also a problem particularly in densely populated areas. Di- versity of crop and livestock varieties is a key component of food security in horn and there is a strong foundation of indigenous knowledge to manage biodiversity to best advantage. However, some of this diversity is under threat. There are many processes involved in biodiversity loss particularly the spread of monoculture agri- cultural practices, deforestation, drainage and cultivation of wetlands and coastal development and pollution. Drainage systems for example are threatening some of the world’s largest and most ecologically significant wetlands in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Sudan. Tanzania and Kenya have the greatest number of threatened and endangered plant and animal species in the Horn.
Dispossession of communities from local resources has been occurring since colonial times and continues at a rapid pace today. Dispossession occurs in a variety of ways. Legal means include the eviction of communities from their an-
cestral lands because of national interest. Semi-legal mechanisms include the sell- ing of land by local leaders to politically connected businessmen. The ambigu- ous nature of land tenure in some areas and the lack of consultation with affected communities put the legality of such transactions into question. Outright illegal means are many and they include the use of violence, bribery and intimidation to displace resident populations; and clandestine resource extraction.
Homer-Dixon model
Long before Homer-Dixon modeled the linkages between renewable resource scarcity and conflict, other scholars questioned the limitations of traditional se- curity thinking centred on the protection of state territories through defendable boundaries. Rather they suggested an expansion of security definitions to incor- porate economic and in particular environmental aspects. Ullman’s pioneering 1983 article on ‘redefining security’ challenged the state-centric understandings of security and uncovered a great concern for crossborder security threats that demanded different tools and techniques than conventional ones employed to secure state securities.4 Ullman maintained that it is useful to view security not only as a goal - implying military ones (as in removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait during the Operation Desert Storm), but also as a consequence of actions that improve the environment (such as planting trees on farms to increase the avail- ability of fuelwood on smallholder farms).
Ullman purposefully re-defined security broadly to account for a wide range of environmental threats, including natural catastrophies such as earthquakes, and re- source scarcities. Just as Homer-Dixon predicted in articles 12 years later, Ullman cautioned that conflicts over territory and resources were likely to grow and most would be in third world countries. Like Homer-Dixon, Ullman linked environmen- tal threats to the security of Northern states by anticipating that immigration pres- sures would grow in Northern countries as refugees flee the deteriorating security of third world states, caused in large part by unwanted environmental events or conditions to the relative safety and security of Northern, first world states.
Ullman was followed in his call for expanding the traditional definition of security by Mathew’s influential article on redefining security, published in the widely referenced Foreign Affairs Journal. 5 Mathew, like Ullman, cautioned that the threat posed by deteriorating environmental conditions was significant
4 Ullman, R. (1983).‘Redifining Security’ International security, 8, 129-153.
5 Mathew, J. (1989). Redefining security’. Foreign affairs, 68, 162-177
enough to pose security threats to US interests. Mathew called for a broadening of national security to encompass resource, environmental and demographic is- sues.6 To support the argument that security definitions needed to be expanded to include environmental dimensions, Mathew assessed the state of a number of environmental ills, including deforestation, loss of genetic diversity, desertification and soil erosion. These environmental problems were significant sources of grave economic and political woes in Sub-Saharan Africa whose condition she charac- terized as ‘catastrophic’. In Mathew’s view, security planning had to incorporate environmental conditions and this meant widening security planning to a re- gional level to contend with cross-border environmental problems.
Deudney and others are more cautious about incorporating environmental fac- tors into security planning. Deudney warns against treating environmental fac- tors, and more specifically environmental degradation, as a national security issue.7 Instead he contends that most of the causes of, and the solutions to, environmental problems must be located outside the domain of the traditional national security system. Dalby adds to Deudneys concerns, pointing out that although environ- mental issues may gain prominence under the rubric security research and plan- ning, security solutions may not apply to environmental problems.8
Revisiting the classic theoretical frameworks developed by Thomas Homer Dixon9, environmental scarcity is a function of three variables; namely: 1) sup- ply-induced scarcity which is caused by degradation in quality and/or quantity of the resource, 2) demand-induced scarcity caused by population growth and/
or increased per capita consumption, and 3) structural scarcity arising from un- equal distribution of resources.
Shortages in the availability of natural resources lead to the impoverishment of those most dependent upon them. Poverty prevents investments in techno- logical means to improve the efficiency of resource use or to utilize alternatives.
This has led some analysts to combine data on environmental scarcity with data on social and technological capacity of the countries affected. For example water scarcity combined with Human Development Indicators is equated with social water stress index.
6See Mathew 1989. pg 62
7 Deudney, D. (1990). ‘The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security’ Nillenium:
Journal of International Studies, 19, 461-476.
8 Dalby, S.( 1992). Ecpolitical discourse: “environmental security” and political geography. Progress in Human Geography, 16, 503-522
9 Homer –Dixon, T (1999).‘Thresholds of Turmoil: Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’. Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the new Environmental Politics. Eds. Deudney, D. H , and Mathew, R. A. Albany State University of New York Press.
Scarcity does not usually lead directly to conflict: instead, scarcity leads to negative social and economic effects which then contribute to conflict. Principal social and economic effects are thought to include;
• decrease in agricultural production
• general economic decline
• population displacement
• disruption of institutions and social relations
Resource scarcity reduces livelihood options leading to more frequent and seri- ous violations of regulations and norms of behaviour. Over time, especially if local and state responses are inappropriate or inadequate, this will result in con- flicts which are diffuse, persistent and low level.
This model does not fit some of the situations experienced in the Horn. For example
Agricultural production is declining in certain areas such as the thousands of hectares affected by salinisation due to poor irrigation management, or in areas affected by recurrent drought and water scarcity. In the 1980’s, for example, thou- sands of hectares of irrigated land in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia were aban- doned due to salinisation after only a few years of irrigation.
The shrinking pastoralist resource base in a number of countries, resulting from the sale or appropriation of key resource areas for rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, is an example of structural scarcity. Large scale mechanized and irri- gated agriculture has received significant government policy support in Sudan and Ethiopia, in particular, often at the expense of subsistence livelihoods. In the Awash valley of Ethiopia, for example, pastoralists had lost access to some 52, 000 hectares of dry and wet season grazing by 1997, due to the spread of large scale irrigation and the establishment of the Awash National Park.
Also the Horn has among the largest numbers of refugees in the world. Glo- bally 5 of the 10 countries generating the most refugees are in the Eastern Africa Region. Some observers claim that some have been displaced due to environ- mental degradation including falling land productivity as well as reduced access to land (e.g due to plot fragmentation).
Homer- Dixon model highlights only violent forms of conflict involving en- vironmental factors. However, there are multiple other non-violent contests with significant environmental underpinnings that are omitted from his analysis, even though their assessment would inform a much richer understanding of environ- ment and conflict.