Formet Rebellion Movement In Power:A Challenge Of Perfornance Prllfng

Formet Rebellion Movement

In

Power:

SURWANDONO DAN GRACE LESTARIANA WONOADI, Staf PengajarJurusanllmu Hubungan lnternasi0nal

Univers itas M u hammadiyah Y0gyakarta

SIJRWAND0No DAN GMCE LESTARIaNAW0NoADI// Former Rebellion lllovementin Power I

A Challenge of Pedormance Prcofino

he rise

of

political

armed-based rebellion movements to

the national political stage in

some countries has brought more

attrac-tion

to many parties. One

ol

many is

discourse

of political

management,

which elaborated by armed-based

rebel-lion movements in their effort handling

their executive roles.

MNLII

a rebellion movements in

Mindanao lead by Nur Misuari, gained

its power after

a

Final Agreement in 1996, and therefore facilitated the

for-mation ofARMM (Aunnomow Regionfor

Mindanao Muslim).In early 2006, bom

was

a rebellion

regime

in

Palestine,

HAMAS, which gained its power after

winning a general election. This regimc

also showed a very-unique government

management pattem. After series

ofpro-ce sses in Helsinki Agreement, rebellion

regime

of

GAM

(Gerakan

Aceh

Merdeka; in Indoncsia has come in lo a

new phase where more elites of

GAM

A

Challenge

Of

Perfornance

Prllfng

Suwandono &

Gncekswiarn

Wonoadi

Abstlact

Some nalion-stales are slill lacing rebellion movements that

saying lhey walked in ihe ditlerent path ol hislory ol the

slate and/or disappoinled lo lhe regime's perlormance. For this reason, am conflict, separalism, and other ellort to lorm

a new regime happened.

Giving a specilic autonomy to the rebellion movemenl to

govern rn a specilic region is a common alternalive to reduce lhe wolse impacl. lt is a kind oi recognition that they know well their needs. Sending lhe fomer rebellion move-menl to power is an attempl to aggregate therr inleresls that

nol accommodaled lor a long trme lt is hope that it will reduce the lension between lhe cenlral govemment and lhe movemenl as well as the spread of violence to be a re-gional or inlemational $sue ln some cases, however, il did

not work, even counler-productive. The new regime's performance changed from a solid, tast movinq and

Ie-sponsive opponent to be a corrupl and full ol intrigues ad-ministration

This paper aims to study management panern of gover-nance led by lhe former rebellion movement aclivisls ll is

an anempl to do theory building in conllicl managemenl. Comparing [4NLF in lhe Philrpprnes, HAI4AS in Palesline, and GAM in lndonesia will be uselul lo ful{ill lhe need.

Ke!.!vord5: Feoe'lionmovemenl, rTnguesmaragemenl. regire

JURMT HUBUNMN II.ITERMSIONAL // VOIUfiE II NO, 2 MaTEt ZOOT

won district-head officer election in

ei-ther provincial ler,'el or regency level at

the end of 2006.

A

regime

built

by Misuari in

ARMM,

supporting by

its

I\4NLF

armed-based

rebellion

movement,

along

in

their way has encountered

se-rious problems, on either internal

Mindanao interests or its interaction with

Luzon

regime. Finally,

this

situation

made

Misuari

desperate and led

him

back to his original tradition that runs

rebellion movement against the central

government

in

Manila.r

MNLF

politi-cal rival in Mindanao,

MIfd

follows this

behavior

then. Murrad Ibrahim of

MII,E

who replace Misuari's position as

ARMM

govemor after the conviction

of

Misuari

as

a

result

of

his activities in

triggering armed rebellion, do the same

thing that is

fight

Luzon regime back

with

his armed-forces.

In

addition, so

does

HAMAS

regime under Ismail

Haniyya. They got a very serious

pres-sure

from

outer

part;

massive boycott

action from US regime and its alliance

applying support embargo and currency

circulation flowing

to

Ismail

Hanilya

regime's wallet.2

Meanwhile, Israel as the true rival

of HAMAS elaborate some agreed

his-torical reasons, which gained from the

previous Palestine regime,

FHIAH,

to

resist F{AMAS. Various numbers of

boy-cott actions and armed-forces clashes

between

FAfAH

and

HAMAS

faction

frequendy happens. Abbas' proposal for

conducting an earlier election

to

melt

frozen

political

situation

in

Palestine

contradictorily has arisen a never ended

conflict. So far,

HAMAS

regime is still

capable of withstand

in

the middle

of

political

and economic

intrigue

con-ducted

by

international and regional

regimes and its competitor

in

national

level.

What do

happen

with

ex-GAM

regime in Indonesia? After the Helsinki

Agreement,

GAM

as security political

organization has relatively been frozen.

GAM's political ceremony and attribute

formally

being

prohibited to

present

amidst the public. Ibrtunately,

Indone-sian government's breakthrough in giv-ing new politic space for the local party

has provided a chance for GAM to

trans-form itself to be a political party.3 This

effort is quite effective for

GAM

to play

a political role at the local level. No more

than t/2 year after dre Helsinki

Agree-ment,

some independent candidates

who

are relatively come

from GAM

could win in district election in Aceh.

So far, SBY-JK regime is still

giv-ing positive respond toward the

victori-ous GAM-affiliated candidatcs although

the military and political elites has

re-leasedrvamingin order that drey do not

resurrect GAM considering their aim to

gov-SURWANooNo DAN 6McE LESTAnhMwoNoAot// t0{rner Rebellion MownEnt in Power I

A Challenle ol Pertormance Roofng

emment has prepared arr Aceh

Govern-ment

Act

to

construct Aceh after the

Helsinki Agreement.

Typology ol Rebellion Movemenl

We propose that several basic

char-acters support the three rebellion

move-ments that are successfully gaining their power to conduct new regimesa. The first

is rebellion movements tend to identify

themselves as armed forces. This choice

tends to be a tool in the bargaining

pro-cess toward absolute claim. In reaching

those claims, mili tary-based olganization

as an option has become a very

funda-mental need.

MNLF

design itself as an

armed forces r,"ho claim

to

have

well-organized combatants

in

amount

of

15.000. This effort is effective since

al-most for 20 years

MNLF

is still exist in

maintaining its organization dy,ramics

coping

with

the

political

and

military

pressure

by

Luzon

regime.5

Alike

MNLI

Salamat Hashim,

during

his

separation

from MNLF

faction, also

designed

MILF

as military civiliaa

move-ment.

In

fact, the armed forces belong

to MILF are larger in number. Observer

predicts that

MILF

rvill be able to

mo-bilize a civiiian military movement

al-most 40 thousand ofpersonnel, both

of

military and of combatant.6

HAMAS

also design itself as an

armed forces post Intifadhah

in

1988.

Escalation

of HAMAS

as

political

armed forces rvas so dominant in order

that

H,{$AS

become a very

consider-able factor by either Israel or its

com-petitor,

IAIAH,

who also design itself

as armed forces. Counting on this

mili-tary

powet HAMAS

is capable

of

ar-ticulating their

autonomous

political

options.T

GAM

is also an organization that

design

itself

as armed forces.

GAM

fights for Aceh freedom by doing

bar-gaining activides trough military

instru-ments.

Political option

of

GAM

is

achieve their option for independence

and always rejects autonomy option that

some Aceh political elites gradually

ac-cept

in

the context of nation-states

of

IndonesiA,s,

S e condlsl rebelJton organization also designs itselfas a political organization.

This

relates

to their

effort to develop

themselves as an embryo of a new

gov-emment. It manifests by the appearance

ofShadow Cabinet concept in rebellion

organization. Even more in some areas,

thcy have also designed their national

song proclamation draft, national

at-tributes such as flag and basic concept

about a nation

and

its

constitutions.

GAM,

MNLF

or

IIAMAS

have this

at-tributes complete with all its

interpreta-tion

as

an

element

of a

mobilization

process to gain internal, regional or even

Jt IRML HuBtAlGAtl NrEflt{ASlOllAt- // votume ll ilo. 2 Mird 2007

Thi

dly

rrlxllton organizations have

multi-faceted design of dremiilies. This

lact is very clear in HAIvIAS but not

in

MNLF

or GAM.'0 HAtrIAS is an

orga-nization

binding

with

spiritual bond.

Later on, this bond transformed into

social, economy, political, and

military

bond. As organization having exclusive

bond

with

Ikhwanul

N4usli-minin,

HAMAS

relatively,

use

manhaj

Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt. HAIVTAS

have a vcry complex charity board

in

education, medical, social and culture.

That is why

HAMAS

camrot be

identi-fied as an ordinary military movement.

HAMAS grorvs in civilian environment

not in military environment.ro

To some extent, this multi-faceted

design

of HAMAS will

give positive

contribution when this regime gets some

opporfunity to run a govemment

man-agement. Experience

in

civilian

man-agement

will

be a political

learningfor

government management,

MNLF

and

GAM

relatively look

like non-civilian

movements. Various

economic a"nd social actir.'ities, v'hich

permanendy and professionally built

in

the organization, are rare. From the

be-ginning,

GAM

and

I\{NLF

are

organi-zatiorx

built

by similarities of political

perspective

in

viewing some problems

they have . Option of military-based

or-ganization is not a part of a

metamor-phosis process but

it

is the only option

in coping with repression from dre

gov-ernment, the invader regime.

In a Iimited area, multi-faceted

re-bellion organization tends to have

im-mediary in constitudng an eflective

rc-gime compare

to

rebellion

regimen,

rvhich only based on military and

poli-tics. Transparency and accountability

of

rnuldfaceted rebellion regirne tend to be

more developed and it is not a trials and

errors action. Therefore, appreciation

of the civilians demanding an elfective

regime performance fulfi lled.

lnllastrocture ol Rebellion Movenent

In

the effort to describe the

struc-ture of rebellion organization, we use

five big variables. These variable is

irn-portant as tools measuring immediary

of one rebellion movement in entering

a new phase where itis totally in-charge

in

goveming and managing all aspects

of

a society. Handling a government in

a limited area is much more complex

than to managing rebellion regime.

Poli-t;c of scapegoat, rvhiclr is larniliar in

re-bellion movement, is very hard to

ap-ply in a govemment regime and so does

Tablc

l.

T;pologies

of

Rebellion Movement

Field of Orqonizolion GAM MNLF HAMAS

Militory

Sociol ond economy

sURurAl'I0oNo DAN GMCE tlsTARuf'lAw0N0A0l// tofirIf Rrbcllion MovrfiBnl in Power: A ClEleflge ol P€rtoflnanc! Proonng

some accomplishment of various

gov-emmentproblems are not enough to be

relied merely on commitment and

soli-darity So faq withstanding ability of re-bellion regime in coping with "colonial"

regime's pressuresrr tend

to

rely more

on solidarity power compare to other

powers.

Firstly is ideology complexion in

rebellion movement. Ideology will play

an important role to determine

poliry

options in problem solving. Ideology is

more than a scope of belief system, but

also a set of norms that will sublimate a

measured government management.

MNLF

and

GAI\{

in limited scope

de-veloped Islam-based ideology. Neve

r-theless, these developed Islam

ideolo-gies are too weak. I 2 _{HAMAS developed}

a more specific and unique structure

of

Islamic ideology.

HA\{AS

adopt Islam

belieCsystem in the structure dimension

and

rvay

of

thinking

of

mahzab

Hambali, a unique thinJ<ing structurc in

the ir politic performance.

Ideology developed by GAIVI tends

to reler to Tenku Daud Beureueh's

per-spectives

in

century of 20s. These

per-spectives then continued in application

by Hasan Di

Tiro

who claimed himself

having a religious authority in the same

way of Daud Beureueh. HoweveS in the

context of religion politic,

it

is hard to

find clear information about Hasan

Di

Tiro

competence as a religious leader

who has an authoriLy asa

mqjbhid.Hasn

Di

Tiro

is more apparendy to be a

q..rn-bolic politic

leader

than a

spiritual

leader.

MNLF is apparendy to be the same.

Religious

authority

developed by

MNLF

is also relatively weak. In

draw-ing their fight, I\{isuari tend to rely more

on

Ivloslem's

primordial

aspect

at

a

broader context. Thus, his politic

deci-sion tends to be inconsistent to lit

ongo-ing politic

demands.

In

some

limited

areas,

MNLF

ideology sometimes

ap-plies Islam Socialism that is ofKhadafi.

However, sometime

MNLF

apply

an-other ideology to achieve more support

from Middle East countries.

Secondly,leadership stmcture is a

determining variable

in

the process

of

decision-making, implementation

mechanism, and decision controlling.

Emerson (2001)

found

two kinds

of

leadership skills that very significant in

transitional regime. A leader rvith

capac-ity

to

mobilize people is important to

delelop

solidariry

However a leader

having managerial skill is more

impor-tant in post-colonial regime.

Leadership structure based on

ra-tionality consideration tends to run

de-cision-making process

in

collegial way

and bureaucratic power holds sigrrificant

role in implementation mechanism. To

some extent, rational bureaucrary

will

JUBMT HUBUNMN IUIERMSIOMJ- // Volume lltlo. 2 Maret 2007

public

serwices.r3 Neverthelcss,

in

the

context ofthe third rvorld, bureaucracy

is an acute problern. Burcaucracy is not

a

tool of

rational and elficient public

service but a nest

of

ine{Eciency, el'en

more

it

is thc root

olall

corruptions.

I-cadership structule based on

chat'-ismatic consideration tends to

put

the

decision-making process

on

elites

of

personal, political, and religious

good-ness. People believe that their dccision

is the bcst. Dccision implcmentation

process then also rely on some aspects

ofobedience in the manner

ofspiritual

and personal. Conducted burcaucracy

does not have ernphasis on fortnal as-pects, but it builds merely based on

cus-tom and trustw'orthiness.

Pcrsonallli \4isuari appcals to be a

rnerely acadcmic personage

of

a

Uni-versity and is not an absolute religious

figure.

MNLF

docs not comc as

deriva-tivc form

of

a religious tradition but as

political responsc tovnard discrimination

on Islamic group in Nlindanao. Nlisuari

gained his position of ARI\{IVI

gor,er-nol

from the application

ofrational

le-gitimary after a treaty

in

1996.

lb

role

a govcrnrnent

in

Nfindanao, I\{isrrari is

really counting on capabiliqv and

capac-ity

of

bureaucracy, rvhich morc or less

rellects Luzon bureaucracy.

We can see the same dring

in

the

regime of Lwandi Yusuf and

Muham-mad Nazar in Aceh that is definitively

get their porver through a political

pro-cess. Therefore, they have rational

le-gitimacy.

Irwandi

rnust govern

with

structure of bureaucraqi rvhich tend to

reflect character ofburcaucracy

in

In-donesia.

Whether

he Iikes

it

or

not,

L

""*andi must accept this rcality since he

cannot built his or,"n.

The lveakness of traditional regime

rclying on its rational

burcauclatic

por,r'er is on its ability of actuating and

controlting.

It

is vcry likely unlriendly

to other political options drar'r.n by the

elites. Due to its lcgal formal

rclation-ship,

it

is very likely that the ability to

control of the elites ou the mass will be

a legal

lonnal

one.

If

the elites

lail in

intelprcting

the rational hureaucratic

options, it is vcry likely that the

burcau-crzrry will boycott thc clccision made b.v

the regime.ra Distortion in bureaucracy

rvill be a very complicated and energy

r'r,asting problerns. This 'w.ill lead many

parties to disappoiDtnrcnt.

FLAI\'IAS also gained its authority

tluough a process of clection and then

HAMAS

rvill also facing some

bureau-cracy dilemma. Even morc, due to

bu-reaucracy

in

I'alestina this is applying

FAIAII

burcaucracy. Horvever, in

lim-ited

scope,

IlAi\4AS

is having a vcry unique leadership compare

to

tlut

of

GI\X,I and

MNLF;

a leadership based

on

charisma and personal

trtst.

suMANoot{o oAti GRAGE t-ESTAFtAMtv0N0rot// FolnEr R6c[bn i.tovonHrin Powor: A Cnatongr 0f Pedofimnce ftoofng

investments

in

charismatic leadership

from in-formal elites, which are master

of mind. Elites

in

the midst crowd

of

political options, bureaucracy still havs

its influence resewe through solidarity

power Differ with

GAM

and MNLF;

it

is very hard to use solidarity power post

this parties gaining their authoriry Thirdly orgarization of hierarchy

will

determine the effectiveness

of

a

decision implementation. Effectiveness

of elite's controlling structure below him

determines the hierarchy level

of

deci-sion-making.

The

higher hierarchy

of

elite, the higher is the ability to control

the structure below

him

using his

for-mal and

infiormal

logic authority

in

achieving his organization goal so that

the organization effectively conducted.

In

the context

of

MNLR

Misuari

is facing a hidden trap due to heaty clauses

which demanding some combatants to

be

military

personnel

of

Filipina.

Meanwhile,

ARMM

become a non-autonomous organization which hardly

to move since Filipina o{Ecials has not

yet

put

an

amendment

on

their

constitution to legalize their country as

a

federal-based

nation.

These

organizational traps have lead

ARMM

government

to

ineffectiveness.

Their

welfare index

is not improving

even

worst.ls

The FIAMAS regime possesses zrn

organization hierarchy, which formally

and informally is very strong. Although

Mahmud Abbas regime put

organiza-tional interference to

Hanilya

Regime

many times,

HAMAS

can be very well

in

handling tJrese situations.

HAMAS

regime is capable of doing bargaining

with

F,{IAH

regime, which tends to be

destructive towards

HAMAS

govern-ment. During time lacing bureaucratic

strikes and protests problems because

of

various intrigues,

HAMAS

regime still

possesses

autonomous

informal

re-sources which has been established to

role its governmental functions.

What is about

Irwandi

Yusuf

re-gime in Aceh?

In

a limited scope,

orga-nization problem faced quite similar to

that of Misuari

regime

in

ARMM.

There is a problem of non-autonomy

of

organization due to the form

of

the

nation

does

not refer

to

federalism.

Irwandi Yusuf has also to face trap

of

Constitution

of

Government of Aceh

*rat he has to accept taken forganted.

N-though

he

has already proposed an

amendment, the authorized regime in

Indonesia has not yet given any response

since the constitution

iself

is still very

new.

If

Irwandi regime is not capable and not having a sure vision

to

over-come some acute

problem

in

Aceh

within

100 first days, especially

post-di-saster recons truction and rehabilitation

after the earthquake and tsunami,

JUnMI HUBUNGN ll'ITEnNASloiuf // volume ll No. 2 Mnet 2007

will

be easily unstable.

Fo u rth

I

y

i

s the nctworking strength of the rebellion regime

to

measure its

bargaining capability with the

interest-opposite regime. It is important to know

networking strength ofthe rebellion

re-girne before

it

is entering its new space

of authoriry The systemic international

letworking they have the more chance

they have to survir-e against the national

and intemational intrigues.

GAN4,

in

some limitcd boundary

has

international

networking porver,

througl

the porver

of

Hasan

Di Tiro

l4ro

uscs mass media

to

expose

prob-lcms

in

Aceh. Nevertheless,

in

some

cases, Hasan Di Tiro failed in construct-ing systernic nctworking in the

interna-tional fonrm

so

that

comparison

be-hveen the nurrber cases in Aceh which

are blew up become internal affairs are

Icsscn

in

rrumbcr

to that

o[

cases

in

Papua and Timor Timur.

Besides,

international

network

assistances for GAI\,I are relatively s}rort

and not systemic. I\[any parties in Indo-nesia believe that a GANI relation

with

Libya is a tcmporary one. Even more,

OKI

as lnternational Islam

Organiza-tion

is

not on

its position

to

help the

struggle of

GAM

but

it

has rnore roles

in the effort overcorning the conflict. The same thing happens to

MNI{

the nature of international network

of

MILF'

is more personal to its elites.

It

has not found any hierarclrical

organi-zation relationship with I\{NLE

Interna-tionalizing ability of Mindanao conflict

by Misuari

in

decade

of

1970s closely

related to his ability

oflobbfng

in

nu-merous summits of Islamic Countries.

Misuari's relationship rvith Khadafi is

merely a personal relationship sharing

the rclativelv same way of perspecdvc

in

encountering problems they have.

Nevertheless, this rvay

of

perspectivc

does not make IVINLF relation r.r,ith

odrer-intemational porver beconre a systcrnic

one. tr,INLF relation

with

Libya

then

relatively u'eaker rvhen later on Libya

has a closer relationship widr US

rcgard-ing

Locker\

problem, that is Libya is

willing to pay compensation charge on

a plane, which lrijack by Ubya citizen

so drat Libya will be free from any

de-signed embargo by the US. Libya then

keep the distance of their relationship

r.vith MNLF rvhen US conducting

coop-eration witl-r thc Philippines regarding a

uar against intemational terroriss r,t'hich

is targeting tr{indanao rebellion

move-ment.

It

is

very

different

to

that of

HAMAS.

As a part of organization

of

Ikhwanul Muslinrin, HATVAS relatively

have vast

international

netrvork.

Al-though lkhwanul Muslimin is a

forbid-den organization in Egypt, actually this

organization has its influence on some

SURWANDoN0 DAN GRACELESTARUI{AWoNoA0|// Form.f Rebdlon li,lovenEntin Power: A dEllenge ol Pedomance Proofino

which is formerly not engaged in

prac-tical politics,

in

the meantime

of half

decade of 1990s tends to involved with

some massive

politic

activities.l6 The

nature ofnetwork organization

relation-ship of Ikhwanul Muslimin tends to be

hierarchical, systematic, andpermanent.

(a simple example for cases

in

Indone-sia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera as a

poli-tic party which is having relatively same

vision and mission to that of Ikhwanul

Muslimin struggle. PKS, very

enthusi-astically, concerns about Islamic prob-lem and especialJy Palcstine have to win public syrnpathy. For almost all politic

parties In Indonesia, concerning about

intemational issues relatively does not

bring a very significant result. PKS

state-ment and action

of

one-dollar

move-ment

to

help HAN{AS

government

funding in the middle of crisis it has then

is done systematically.

HAMAS are able to survive in the

middle

ol

intrigues by moving its

net-work machine to bring nelv construction

about HAMAS. HAMAS factually has

recognized

by

the

UN

as

a

terrorist

movemcnt.

On

the contrary many

Is-lamic countries know HAMAS with its

own

legal government.

Support for

HAMAS

will

be stable unless the US

did not resist by applying embargo on

money flow for HAMAS government.

Filih)17in the colnter with regimes

which are

namely as regimes

of

colonialist or imperialist, rebellion

or-ganization more frequently used

guer-rilla war tactics compare to direct con.

frontations. Organization designedtends

to be closed and mobile in nature. This

nature makcs the process

ofadministra-tive identification hard to conduct. The

latent nature of the organization pattem

tends to interfere whenever the

rebel-lion

regime must carry ou( the

mani-fested organization. Guerrilla rebellion

tactics

in

some cases have effectively

brought destruction to the colonial

re-gime, but it implicidy shorvs that the re-bellion organizations are not powerful.

Guerrilla war tactics has become a

rep-resentation that

if

we conduct a direct

attack towards the enemyJ the

probabil-ity ofwinning the war becomes relatively

small. Guerrilla war rvill save energy arrd

win the propaganda in utilizing the

con-{Iict issue. The ability to survive longer

in

the conflict

will

strengthening

bar-gaining position of the rebellion regime

against he authorized government in

concession sharing.

MNLF in

its

fight

against Luzon

regime used guerrilla war tactic more

frequendy with

is

more relatively latent

organization form. It is understandable

drat the organizational ability

ofMNLF

is relatively unable

to

counter Luzon

regime penetration. Guerrilla war done by

Nur

Misuari is a device to show its

JURNAL HUBUNGAN II.IIERNASIOML // VOIUME II NO. 2 MATCT 2O()7

Mindanao or intemational Islamrc

com-munity

in

order to gain sympathy and

support.

MNLF

effort is the othe r way

around

with that

of

NPA

(National

People

Army). a

communist

wing

in

South Filipina, which conducts a

rebel-lion

against

Luzon

regime. However,

until

this moment, has never been

in-volved

in

any

form

of

negotiation and

concession sharing. It is complicated for Misuari to design MN LF organization

become a bureaucrary in ARMM, which

is relatively

a rational

and structured

organization.

It

is possible

for

the

ap-pearing of a cultural lag. 17 _{On one side,}

they must restructure their regime

pro-fessionally. Nevertheless,

on

the

other side, their decision will not be able

followed by rational way

of

thinking.

Moreover, so does rebellion

orga-nization of

GAM,

which uses guerrilla

war

tactic frequently.

The

process

of

marginalization

of

Indonesia

govern-ment against

GAM

by

DOM

(District

of Operational

Military)

is quite

effec-tive in transforming

GAM

become

pe-ripheral movement. But to kcep the

ex-istence

of

the movement,

GAM

then

change their war tactic against

Indone-sian government using guerrillawar

tac-tic so that

GAM

are able to withstand in

a very long period and wastc the energy

of Indoncsian government. His ability

to withstand has brought him become

the actor in the agr:eement with

Indone-sian govemment. Before the negotiation,

the Indonesian govemment said for

sev-eral times that

it

was not a negotiation

between actors. Factually,

it

is true

tlat

GAM

has become the actor

in

the

se-ries

of

negotiation

until

its final

at Helsinki agreement to put the conflict

to an end.

Regime

of

_{lrwandi Jusuf} is very

likely facing a very serious problem with

the structure ofGAM organization which

recently become CAR (Committee for

Aceh Rebellion) while welcoming the

new era. Various regulations that are not

compatible

with

the goal

of CAR

re-bellion must q.'nchronized to Indonesian

basic interests. Irwandi in for some

rea-sons finally meet some dilemmas of bi-Ioyalty. Once he makes mista.ke with his

political policy, it is enough to bring him

down by either Indonesian government

or other political power in Aceh. As we

know, the couple of Irwandi and Nazar

only got 347o

ofthe

total votes. There

is about 660/o

of

swinging voter.

Intcr-estingly, there is about 3004 of vote

be-long

to

independent candidate who

came

from former

membership

of

GAM.

Meaning to say that

if

Irwandi start to leave all GAM aspiration, he

will

loose his legirimacy lrom the

organiza-tion

he brought up. Finally, similar to

MNLf;

Irwandi-Nazar rcgime will also

sensitive to cultural lag syndrome.

de-suRwANooNo DAN GSACE [TSTAF|AMW0N0AD|// F0.nEr Rebelhon l4oryement in Powrr: A Challenge ol PedofiErEe Prooing

veloped

a

technique

and

method

of

rebel, which based on open-direct

con-frontation. After gaining its authorities,

they tends to be able

to

take political

option, which are

not

dilemmatic for

FAfAH

regime, nevertheless it is

dilem-matic for

IR-IAH

regime, which is still

inseparable

lrom political

faction

in

Palestina. Reluctance of FIAMAS to

fol-low International policy platform

of

FATAH regime, which tend to be

ac-commodative toward Israel has escalate

dre clash benveen TIAMAS and

FKIAH.

IIAMAS

stricdy set the Israel as an

ag-gressor. In the contrary

FKIAH

consider

Israel as inseparable partner. Although

FIAMAS get a big pressure from many

parties, they are unable to shift

HAMAS

regime's policy paradigm torvard Israel. At this moment, HAMAS regime is still

exists although surrounds

by

political

contractions, which apparently distracts

the performance

of

the regime.

lnlrigues and Managemenl lnkigues

In its transformation process from

rebellion regime to authority regime, a

very sigrrificant pattem is the absence

of

approval

lrom

conflicting

parties.

Filipina govemment in some cases

fac-ing dilemmatic relationship whether to

rejecting or accepting

ARMM.

GAM

in

Indonesia, Xanana Gusmoau in

Timor

Leste, and FIAI\IAS regime in Palestina

face this kind of situation. Psychology

partition finally

transformed

to

be an

unfriendly

politic

policy.

HAMAS

re-gime takes very massive pressure from

FAfAH

regime supported by Israel, US, and British. Several political and

eco-nomic intrigues are released to

under-mine FIAMAS regime's legitimary

MNLF

regime also talies some

dil-emmatic realities. Since economic crisis

hit

the South East Asia, the financial

ability of

Luzon regime

to

meet its

promises

in

the Final Agreement then

becomes weak. Indirectly, that inability

influences the durability oIthat regime.

Luzon regime releases intrigues so swift

so that more conflicts are arisen. Even

more, disharmonious relationship

be-tween IVINLF and

MILF

is politically

Table 2. Infrastructure of Rebellion Organization

Variables GAM MNLF HAMAS

Syiah

ldeoloqy L,nclear lJnclear Clear Clear

Leadership of Elite Rational Rational Ralional and Charismatic

Charismatic

Organization Tighdy structured

Tighdy structured

Loosely slruclured Loosely slructured Netr orlinq Centripetial Centripetal Centrifuga! Centrifuqal Techniques and

M6thods

JURML HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONI,L // VOIUNE II NO, 2 MAlfr ZOOT

usell

for Luzon regime to ask the

le-gitimacy of

MNLF

regime in

ARMI\{.

MILF

then appear to be dialogue

part-ner since

it

is considerably more

legiti-mate on thc eyes of Mindanao people.

The most dargerous intrigue is one,

which built by the international power.

Intemational regime whish is not friendly

to rebellion regime is the most

signifi-cant

lactor

to

bring

rebellion regimc

doun. The

rising of Islamic regime in

Iran post Islarnic Rer,'olution

in

1979 has

brought the wave of intrigues from the

both regional and international power.

Iran

in

some cases has become a

com-mon enemy

for

intemational

commu-nity which then

it

influenced the

pro-cess of achievement of the national

in-terests.

Ifthe

rebellion regime failed

in

fulfilling dre national interests, it is hope

that its government

will

loose its

legiti-mary

and its own citizen

will

bring

it

down at the end.

Howeveq the experience

of

rebel-lion regime in Iran that later on becomes

the ruling regime is appropriate to be a

model of horv a rebellion regime could

have its role as an authorized regime,

rvhich manages dre intrigues very well.

At least ttrere are three instruments used

by

Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in

managing intigues.

Firstly is

using

solidarity

maker

power that used effectively in the

mean-time of rebellion regime.

Many

rebel-lion regimes becomc failed authoritative

regime because

ofthe

lack of ability

in

issue-management. However, a thing to

remember is that power s)ndrome of dre

elite must be limited. Abbas' regime and

Misuari's regime then failed to run their

regimes because of comrption violation

amongst their

poor

society.

HAMAS'

regime very closely indicated by a

cor-ruption case, but later on this issue was

not proper to trusted since it was only a

procedure-related problem.

In the middle of war and embargo

trap,

Klromeini's regime was able to

develop a massive simple way

of

life,

imitating the elites. The slowing down

economic situation, which was because

of

the lack of foreign investment later

on,

solved

with

promoting higher

hardworking

spirit to find

alternative partners. Patron-client relationship

be-tween elites and the mass gradually built

in purpose ofbringing both prychology

and political proximity.

Secondlsihe developed an open and

moderate political system. Khomeini

in

the political tradition of Shiite has the

highest position, marja'i taklid. It means

Khomeini

can overtake the authority

and

run

Shiite political model rigidly.

However, Khomeini

just

applies

mod-erate political policy by follorving

coun-SURWANDoNoDANGMCEIfSTARIAMWoNoAo|/i FoflrE R€belionMovsmntinpowor: A Chalen0e ol PefoflndEe Proofng

try and in constructing the constitution.

Besides, Khomeini take Sunni's politi-cal

tradition

about Maslakhah which

never be known in the Shiite's political

tradition. This option of

moderate

policy strengthens Iran regime's

legiti-macy in tlre crorvd ofpolitical intrigues.

As

a

result, royalist

party who

is pro

Shah Reza did not take su{Iicient

sup-port although this laction posses its

ap-proval

to

be involved

in

the political

system in Iran. Communist Party

oflran

(Tudeh Party) still flourishes in Iran, but

also has no support.

Thirdly

wlttch is also unique is by

developing political economy system in

accordance

with

the

tradition

in

the

meantime of rebellion regime.

Nowa-days,

Iran

is a regime without foreign

debt and become a sterile country lrom

the external pressures. This consisterrcy,

in some cases, has been able to create a

slrong system and encounter many

in-trigues. trINLF and

FAfAII

regimes

con-siderably have lost its vital 6lan to

oper-ate their developed values.

FIAMAS is a rebellion regime that

copy many intrigues management tech-niques developed

by Iran.

Whether

HAI{,{S will

come

to

a

winner

or

a

looser, the history will telJ.

GAM

regime

through Irwandi Yusuf and

M.

Nazar

also tell to the history whether this

re-gime will succeed in managing intrigues or defeated by the intrigues.

Conclusion

A

weakness

in

managing conflict

and intrigues is the most common threat

for

tic

former rebellion movement in power. Charismatic leadership is

some-what important. By the wali it is not the

one and only single

factor.

Character

ar]d infrastructure

of

the former

rebel-lion movement in power will induce its

ability to

cope

with

conflict

manage-ment.

A

multifaceted rebellion

move-ment will be more capable

in

counter-ingintrigues. This ability will better

de-velop

on

rebellion organization

sup-ported with established organization

in-frastructure.

Therefore this paper

develop a

theory of regime management of

post-colonial regime

from

Donald K.

Emmerson based on capacity of policy

maker broaden to the capability of the

organization.

Erdnote

I Intervicw with Harimil E. Hasan, new

chair-man oI the l,INLn on 6 October 2004 in Cotabato

City: N,INLF IUj. Gen. AMul Sahrin, Messag€ ro rhe

Ba ngsa Moro National Pcople's Congres, 2 3 Decem-ber 2003, Davao Ciry repinted in The Bangsanont

Panugpatan, 2 (l),30,21. Sce also Oquist, P (2002,

Octobcr 23) 23 in SantosJr., S.N.

2 TIe late* case catrsinga commotion is

accrrsa-tion to HAtr{AS spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri, on

bnnging a Rp 7.5 billion intcmational aid. Nlass mcdia blew up an issue that HAMAS elites are corrupt.

3 See UU Pemerintahan Aceh

JUnMf,HUBUNGAN INTEnMSOMI- // Volume lltlo.2 Maret ZO07

5 For further reading on MNI-F and MILF as

armed-forces porve4 see Garcia (2004).

6 For a brief reading on HAMAS profile, see

Ridho, A. (1996).

7 S*n4R. (2004) Policy Sudies 3

8 Rido, op.a?

9 ibid

I0HA}IAS calls Israeli "colonial regime" and so

do GAM to lndonesia and I\INLF to Luzon regme.

especially under Marcos.

l l ILs homepage does not explain about Islamic ideology but its way of thinking is very sirnilar with Ikh$'anul Muslimin and Hambali. See also Azra, A.

(l ss7).

l2 Weber, M.(1947) & Toha, M. (2003).

I 3 HAMAS expcrience \4?s very clear. The

bu-reaucfttts are on strike becaus€ ofthree months

delin-qu€nt _Payments.

14 See N{alapit, HJL., Clemente, Tina S-, &

Yunzal, Crisrina (2003), retriwed September I 5, 2005

from \r'wvchronicpo\€rty.org

15 IlJrwanul N{uslimin broaden its influence to

Slria, Q.atar, Al8iers, Palestine, and some East Asiar

Countries, including Indonesia.

16 See Surwandono, (2006), _{Jebakan Politik}

terhadap IIAMAS, Repubilra (fanuari 25, 2006)

l7 lt adop$ Oghbum lerminology in comparing

material and immaterial culmre. DAFIAR EUJUXAI{

Emenon, D K. ed. (200l), Indonesia Berond Soehatto,

Nqaa Ekatoni,I[zqaralal Tiazs4Gramedia Pustaka Utama dan The Asia Foundation, JuLutt"

Garcia, Ed. (2004, March) Building Zones of Peace

in Situations of Armed Conflict: l,earning

Lessons from Comparatire Experiences, paper

Azra, A. (19J7) Peryoklarl Politik dan Penikinn Dahm

.klan Jakarta,

Paramadina

rlll

Pemerintahan Aceh rahun 2006

in Intemational Studies Association Annual Qnfaarc,Monoual

Hunter, S.T (1988) Islamic Revivalism: Unity and

Dircrsiry Hunter, ST. ed. (29a$, The Poliics

of Islamic Retivalism, Bloominton and Indianapolis, Indiana University

Jabia It{.A. (l 995) nlez ben tukJama'a tul ltuslimin,

Jakarta, Cema Insani Press

Malapit, HJL., Clemente, TS & Yunzal, C. (2003,

February 2B), Does \4olent Conllict Make Chronic Povcrty More Likely, The Mindanao

Experience, 28 Febnrary 2C03, paperin 'Staying

ftxE d1n 1;cPot'aEadlhEbSnartPdLy'totn held at thc Univenity oI N{anchest€r, 7 to 9

April

2003 relrieved

from

wwruchmnicpoverty.org

Oquist, P (2002, Octob er 23) Mindanao and Bqond:

ComptingPolhier, Irl,tractul PoTcc lrrat:6 and Hn@1Sa)nity

Republika Q006, Ap;l 15)

Ridho, A- ed. (1996), Pa,/csona Nasibmu Kini,Jalartz, SIDIK

Santos.Jr, S.S. ed (2003) Ewlution of The Armed

C,a licton TheMonFntt

Sukma, R. (2004) Security Operations in Aceh:

Goals, Consequences and Lessons, Pol/cy

5ard6 3, th€ East-Wcst Center Washington

Surwandono, (2006) _{Jebakan Politik} T€rhadap

Hama-s, R ep u b IiI a, 26January 2006

Tolra,I{. (2000)-ErIlaka Oryaniaa, Korzsep Dasar dan tt plikzcin _{n, JakzIta} R^iav,an