The Strategic Implication of Indonesia's Military Involvement in Counter-Terrorism Implikasi Strategis Keterlibatan Militer dalam Kontra Terorisme
Mansur Juned1, Galby R. Samhudi2, Rangga A Akhli3, Mohammad Teja4
1 mansurjuned@upnvj.ac.id
Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta
2 galby.sam@gmail.com Universitas Indonesia
3 ranggaamalul@gmail.com Universitas Pertahanan
4 teja@dpr.go.id
Peneliti Pusat Penelitian Badan Keahlian Sekretariat Jenderal DPR RI
Abstract: To this date this article was issued, the government of Indonesia was working on Presidential Decree on Indonesia’s military mandate expansion on Combating Terrorism. This decree was proposed as an alternative to combat threats from growing terrorism in Indonesia and to strengthen anti-terrorism acts initiated by civil counter-terrorism institutions. This article uses literature study to observe the strategic implications of the Presidential Decree against Indonesia’s military. We try to review the deployment of military to combat terrorism, the counter-terrorism efforts from civil counter-terrorism institutions, military involvement on counter-terrorism and its implications, and its implications on Indonesia’s social sector. It was included that the government needs to expand military’s role on counter-terrorism with transparent mechanism to the public.
Keywords: Indonesian military, counter-terrorism, civil-military relations, security policy
Abstrak: Saat ini pemerintah tengah melakukan penyusunan dan pembahasan Peraturan Presiden tentang perluasan tugas TNI dalam Mengatasi Aksi Terorisme. Upaya ini merupakan alternatif untuk menghadapi ancaman terorisme di Indonesia yang terus berkembang dan memperkuat proses penanggulangan terorisme yang telah dilakukan lembaga kontra-teror sipil. Oleh karena itu, dengan menggunakan metode studi pustaka, tulisan ini akan mencoba mengungkapkan implikasi strategis dari Peraturan Presiden tersebut kepada lembaga TNI. Tulisan ini mengulas mengenai pengerahan militer dalam penanggulangan terorisme, upaya penanggulangan terorisme yang telah dilakukan lembaga kontra-teror sipil, gambaran pelibatan TNI dalam kontra-teror, implikasi perluasan pelibatan TNI dalam kontra-teror, dan implikasi dalam kehidupan sosial- kemasyarakatan Indonesia. Tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa diperlukan perluasan peran TNI dalam kontra- teror yang perlu dibarengi oleh upaya transparansi dalam pengerahan TNI.
Kata kunci: Militer Indonesia, kontra-terorisme, hubungan sipil-militer, kebijakan keamanan
Introduction
Indonesian military involvement in counter-terrorism attempts has always drummed up responses from various national actors about how the military should work with other
institutions, which has not been properly solidified. Although counter- terrorism institutions exist in Indonesia like the National Police and the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (NCTA), the government has yet to
have an effective mechanism to counter-terrorism. The Law on Criminal Act of Terrorism No. 5/2018 (Republik Indonesia, 2003), the Law on National Police No. 2/2002 (Republik Indonesia, 2002), and the Law on Indonesian Military No. 34/2004 (Republik Indonesia, 2004) are the main references for the government in the fight against terrorism. However, those laws and other sub-ordinated regulations are inadequate in fighting the threats that often appear in unpredictable forms.
The democratization process of Indonesia has put military as merely the assistance provider and last resort.
NCTA and Special Detachment 88 (SD 88, a special division under national police for counter-terrorism purposes) are usually deployed in the first place.
At the same time, military will line up if the circumstances get precarious. The existing formal arrangements leave the authority with loose legal interpretations with so many security instruments in hand. This issue added up the complexity within the government in which short-budget and egocentrism among security personnel are still around. Hence, the government should create good policies to give the military some proper strategic guidelines, especially to adjust itself as
a military body to encounter multi- dimension threats such as terrorism.
To date, the military, with the required measures, the highest authority in the country, is about to release a Presidential Regulation on military engagement in counter-terrorism this year. This Presidential Regulation administers how military forces should be deployed with other civil security- related institutions to combat terrorism.
It appears that military will have to divide its tasks to provide the country with a proper defense system from external threats while juggling other functions mandated by the law. On the other hand, legal deliberations and human rights agitations demand consistency and a strict limitation of military intervention in the civilian aspect of counter-terrorism. Hence, this paper reveals the strategic implication of military involvement in counter- terrorism regarding its main function as a military institution.
This paper is divided into five sections. First, it delivers the current argument that the military should approach terrorism as its involvement will invite consequences. Second, it explains how civil security services in Indonesia handle terrorism according to the existing laws. Third, it illustrates the specific function of counter-terrorism
developed by military. Fourth, it analyzes the government’s effort to administer military in combating terrorism along with other related bodies. Fifth, it sums up the argument of this paper.
To see the novelty of this research compared to previous researches, we conducted a literature study by finding several definitions of earlier studies that discussed the involvement of the military in counter-terrorism practices in Indonesia. Several studies examine the partiality of military participation in fight against terrorism, such as (Triskaputri, 2019, p. 61) and (Wulansari, 2017, p. 219). Meanwhile, other studies state the arguments for their impartiality to the military’s involvement in counter-terrorism, namely (Mengko, 2017, p. 193) and (Jusi, 2019, p. 49). Another study by (Ihsan, 2019, p. 54) stated the alternatives against military involvement in counter-terrorism efforts.
(Triskaputri, 2019, pp. 61–74) said that there are pros and cons to the military’s involvement in Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts. The military’s involvement indicates that acts of terrorism are already at the stage of threatening state sovereignty or are beyond the reach of the national police.
Military participation in counter- terrorism efforts is limited to fighting and arresting terrorist groups and needs to address the root causes of terror- related to political, economic, and social problems. (Wulansari, 2017, pp.
219–248) also added that before involving the military, the government needs to determine the level of terrorist threats; of how severe the threat is against sovereignty. Thus, the authorized government can issue a political decision and an appropriate security situation that involves the military to combat terrorism. This is legally regulated in the Law on Indonesian Military Article 7 paragraph (2) related to the military’s primary duties in carrying out operations. Non- Warfare Military Operations (NWMO), the tackling acts of terrorism, must be deployed based on the political decisions of the government for the operationalization of counter-terrorism.
In contrast to openness to military involvement in counter-terrorism, (Jusi, 2019, p. 49) and (Mengko, 2017, p.
193) described their impartiality to the military involvement. According to (Jusi, 2019, pp. 49–60), acts of terrorism are still in the grey area because armed civilians generally took part in it. It can affect the government’s response in dealing with terror acts as
long as terrorists are still referred to as a form of crime. It is within the national police’s scope of authority to arrest, investigate, bring to justice, as the involvement of the military is only a support. Therefore, the government needs to impose strict rules to distinguish the urgency of the involvement of the military in counter- terrorism. That is the boundaries of what must be done both at the strategic and tactical levels to avoid chaos in the
“conquest of the stage” between the national police and the military, to create an integrated action from both institutions.
(Mengko, 2017, pp. 193–204) argues that the root of terrorism lies in ideological matters and the injustice felt by a group in the economic and political sectors. This raises questions of how can the military approach answer ideological, economic, and political problems? What needs to be done by the authorities is to provide education to the public, both in efforts to deradicalize and law enforcement efforts that can improve community welfare. Military involvement must be based on national political decisions that include crucial primary considerations since history has shown how the threat has escalated and also
remains related to the civil supremacy of each democratic country.
Furthermore, (Ihsan, 2019, pp.
54–68) conveyed the importance of an effective supervisory mechanism if counter-terrorism acts were carried out by the military, both in controlling from external parties and in the performance carried out. Thus, supervision of the military’s version can ensure that counter-terrorism efforts to run according to the rules and authorities of each institution. Handling terrorism is an intelligence act hence the oversight mechanism can be assigned to an independent commission or particular agency in parliament. This also requires community involvement to avoid the government’s misuse of acts of terrorism. Military involvement in counter-terrorism efforts has both risks and potentials, especially in maximizing a country’s ability to tackle terrorism.
This article highlights the strategic implication of Presidential Regulation against TNI and their militaristic function. The objective of this article is to see the implications of the regulation against TNI's function, which is unorthodox for criminal offense like counterterrorism. We use literature study to dissect laws and Presidential Regulations against TNI on this matter.
Terrorism and Military Deployment While many parties attempt to create a shared standard meaning of terrorism, it has no precise or widely accepted definition. (A. Schmid, 2011, p. 40) suggests that designating something as terrorism is a matter of convenience, particularly from the state as a principal defining agency to contrive a reality separating itself as the right side, while demonizing other parties, be it state terrorism, non-state terrorism, or state-sponsored terrorism, as the social enemy. By doing so, the principal defining agency claims a right to justify its agenda in mobilizing resources (Herbst & Herbst, 2003).
While the principal agency is important to mobilize resources, setting up the definition of lines of operation comes next to ensure the success of counter- terrorism operations on the field done, particularly by military forces in its mission to support civilian authorities (Wille, 2012).
The actions were taken by terrorists, under specific circumstances, basically are violent and have particular objectives. (A. Schmid, 2011, p. 40) explained terrorists could perform handing out of the death list of persons to be murdered; punishment through mutilation; mass rape for the
humiliation in the opposite camp;
kidnapping for ransom or political concession; hostage; hijacking or skyjacking; the assassination of public figures; and many more. The motives of those actions are varied and dependent on the form of groups, as what has been described by (A. P. Schmid, 1988). He listed the diversity of terrorist actors into several forms, such as religious and millenarian ethnics; ethno-nationalist, separatist and irredentist groups; racist and right-wing groups; revolutionary left-wing and anarchist groups; and a lot more. Instabilities around the country such as the failure of governance, excessive suppression, government overreaction, political turmoil that cannot be taken back into the normal situation, and so on are also contributing factors to the initiation of terrorism (A. Schmid, 2011, p. 40).
Following the characteristic of terrorism that can be in any form, done by any groups, and under various conditions, it is understandable for countries to consider measures, including military deployment, to combat terrorism.
As the terrorist act might be in an extreme state of attack, military personnel will come in handy to minimize the damage and the victim from the state authority side. However,
this comes with the dilemma between criminality and warfare, especially democratic values. The use of force in democratic values has often been feared as a potential precursor to militarism within the host country. Regardless of such fear, the use of force can still be justified, particularly when it comes to self-defense (Greener, 2007, pp. 295–
318). As terrorist attacks might be a mutative form of traditional warfare (Eppright, 1997, pp. 333–344), the legitimate use of force in democratic states can also be explained by Just War Doctrine, an international regime for general military deployment (Heywood, 2014). Its ability and equipment to encounter such extreme assaults have the military prepared to mobilize for counter-terrorism missions (Sen, 1991, pp. 58–62).
However, using the military approach in counter-terrorism also comes with a price to democracy and several other aspects of the country.
Society will assume that the country is in the middle of a security crisis, like war, and, consequently, cost their liberty for the sake of national security.
In other words, the quality of democracy in procedural is jeopardized to the extent of military disposition (Satana & Demirel-Pegg, 2020, pp.
815–836). In some cases, the excessive
military arrangement has increased radicalization as the ‘collateral damage is considered dreadful causing injustice feelings around the society. Following the core objective of terrorism, eradication is to win people’s ‘hearts and minds’, military’s role in counter- terrorism should only be about the level of ‘minimum force’ to prevent the image of being an occupier (Kortweg et al., 2010).
Democratic states need to understand that military deployment to counter-terrorism is, naturally, a two- headed sword. Easily say, the governments shall formulate two approaches, namely soft power and hard power (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011) to accommodate the advantages and disadvantages of military mobilization for combating terrorism. Soft power may refer to strategies related to deradicalization, community engagement/participation, social rehabilitation, and reintegration. On the other hand, hard power refers to all offensive and defensive strategies through law enforcement, intelligence operation, and military deployment if necessary. (Freedman, 2005) argues that military strategies can be conceived in terms of two approaches termed
‘search and destroy’ and ‘hearts and minds’. Search and destroy involves
those hard power strategies that aim to dismantle terrorist networks by eliminating terrorists, their support structures, and weapons. The ‘hearts and minds’ approach uses soft power and “requires that the military gain the trust of the local people by promoting good works to leave the militants isolated, bereft of recruits and practical support”. But again, the military’s involvement in counter-terrorism requires established normative democratic frameworks. As (Crelinsten, 2006) and (Aly, 2008, pp. 20–26) put, it should be firm but never excessive, non-discriminatory, and apolitical.
In the case of Indonesia, a long history of military development has equipped itself with a wide range of network units, from Jakarta to the utmost villages around the country. In other words, besides having trained to deal with violent combats, military also has territorial-military units that can be used for intelligence purposes, community services on the society to minimize the spread of extremist ideologies, and other social works.
However, there is little training for counter-terrorism operations in those districts due to its institutional branch limitations. Hence it is only military in the dominant regions, if not in the capital alone, are ready to conduct this
kind of responsibility. Once the national government wants to adjust military for counter-terrorism works, the subject of discussion comes back once more on why military should get involved in counter-terrorism operations, to what extent it should be used, and what are the strategic implications behind its engagement with other civilian authorities in this kind of affairs.
CIVIL COUNTER-TERRORISM IN INDONESIA
According to Criminal Act of Terrorism No. 5/2018, BNPT is the main tool of the Indonesian government to develop the decision-making process and to coordinate the related decisions on counter-terrorism affairs at the national level, whether it is in the crisis period or a normal one. It is a crisis control center for all Indonesian law enforcers to decide the policy (Fahrizal, 2020). Unlike other counter-terrorism agencies, the Criminal Act of Terrorism 2018 and other related legal documents do not clearly state the source of funds for BNPT whether it is legal to receive external sources or not.
Other than BNPT, Polri also has several special divisions to encounter terrorism affairs such as Densus 88, Brigade Mobil (Mobile Brigade Corps/Brimob), and Gegana (bomb
defuser unit under Brimob). All of these Polri units are financed by the national budget as what has been regulated by National Police Act No. 2/2002. There is no particular ministerial-level office in Indonesia dealing with the specific affair of counter-terrorism but a Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. This kind of ministry is merely a coordinating- umbrella for several ministries as well as agencies including BNPT and Polri without authorities to give orders to both. In terms of the official order chart, direct orders for both only come officially from the president of Indonesia.
Both BNPT and Polri are counterparts to the Commission III in the Indonesian Parliament. At this chamber, all of the counter-terrorism affairs have been discussed altogether with other legal as well as human rights issues which have become the job division for the commission. In addition, Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament also has some overlapping parts of counter-terrorism affairs as it deals with international, security, and intelligence affairs in general.
Even though there are two key actors of counter-terrorism bodies, Indonesia is still struggling with forces management to adapt to the dynamic threats of terrorism at home. Before the
establishment of BNPT in 2010, Indonesia suffered great terrorist attacks such as the Bali bombing I (2002) and II (2005) and JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Hotel bombing (2009) are among the instances.
Afterward, the existence of BNPT could not stop Sarinah shooting and bombing (2016), Surabaya bombings (2018), Wiranto’s stubbing (2019), and a few more attacks from happening. Globally, as well as domestic terrorist affairs such as the downfall of Islamic State (IS) which turned into small terrorist hubs, Al Qaeda, Jamaah Anshar Daulah (JAD), and Abu Sayyaf, are amongst some terrorist threats that have to be encountered by the Indonesian civilian government. Hence, giving TNI a chance to combat terrorism via the enactment of Presidential Regulation can be an option. The law also needs to regulate engagement for TNI’s special joint force that has been trained for anti-terror purposes [ CITATION Aul19 \l 1033 ].
TNI AND COUNTER-TERRORISM According to TNI Act No.
34/2004, TNI has two main tasks:
warfare operation and non-warfare operation. Under that non-warfare operation, TNI is mandated to deploy counter-terrorism missions and to exterminate any possible threats threatening the survival of the country.
They have their own divisions for counter-terrorism. Satuan 81 Komando Pasukan Khusus-Penanggulangan Teror (Sat-81 Gultor, Army), Datasemen Jala Mangkara (Denjaka, Navy), Datasemen Bravo 90 (Denbravo, Air Force), Komando
Operasi Khusus Gabungan
(Koopsusgab, Joint Force) are among special forces trained for anti-terrorism threats. Not only in the time of execution, but TNI also has a significant role in intelligence gathering to prevent the act of terrorists before happening. The Strategic Intelligence Body (Badan Intelijen Strategis TNI/BAIS TNI) works under TNI that supports TNI’s main objectives. The networks TNI has from Jakarta to the outmost areas and other remote districts in the country also strengthen the stand of TNI as one of the relevant bodies to encounter terrorist threats throughout the country. The legal clause of TNI Law and the sources owned by TNI will be the legal basis for the Presidential Regulation to mobilize the military forces for anti-terrorism purposes.
With the rise of counter-terrorism global movements in the early twenty-first century, TNI did not have a chance to show off their fangs against terrorism threats in a head-to-head manner. In the case of Bali Bombing I and II, it was Polri
that played a key role in chasing the perpetrators and bring them to justice while TNI was considered an assistance provider to Polri. The minimum act of TNI is understandable as during that time, TNI was still under the reform process to clear its name after a long period of Suharto’s New Order. Besides, TNI had a military embargo from the US which consequently weakened its ability to equip its personnel to fight the latest terrorist attack. On the other hand, Polri had been supported by Australia to develop a new counter- terrorist force under Polri which was later on named Densus 88.
The Criminal Act of Terrorism No.
5/2018 authorizes TNI to take action against terrorism according to its function.
Moreover, further details on how it is mobilized will be regulated by the Presidential Regulation. As the name tag of the law stands, the term ‘Tindak Pidana’ (Criminal Act) implies that terrorist acts are treated as an act against the law which describes the general paradigm of counter-terrorism in Indonesia. It guides the security bodies, including TNI, to focus more on preventing domestic damages due to the terrorist attack. That develops the idea that it is the main obligation of public-order maintainer as well as law enforcer, in this case Polri, to take more actions against terrorism. In contrast, TNI focuses on
external threats that possibly have terrorism features and particular military actions against terrorism. That leaves the character of the anti-terrorism law in Indonesia as a criminal justice model (McCauley, 2009).
THE SHIFTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Having observed the
Presidential Regulation evolving in seven chapters and 15 articles, the first notable object is that the three terms used for counter-terrorism measures are different from that in the Criminal Act of Terrorism Law 2018. the Presidential Regulation uses ‘penangkalan’
(deterrence), ‘penindakan’
(enforcement), and ‘pemulihan’
(reversion) while the Criminal Act of Terrorism 2018 uses ‘pencegahan’
(prevention), ‘pemberantasan’
(eradication),
‘penyidikan/penuntutan/pemeriksaan’
(investigation/prosecution/inspection), and ‘pemulihan/rehabilitasi/de- radikalisasi’
(reversion/rehabilitation/de-
radicalization). The terms used in the Presidential Regulation refer to those in the TNI Law on the functions of the TNI as a state’s tool (Article 6). In other words, this Presidential Regulation drives the counter-terrorism acts which
are regulated by the Criminal Act of Terrorism 2018 to be more likely in favor of military ways implied in the TNI Act 2004. This also means there is an early sign of shifting in the counter- terrorism approach in Indonesia that moves from the criminal justice model to the war model (McCauley, 2009).
A question mark rises against the absence of details on Presidential Regulation (Article 4 [1]), which describes no particular type of intelligence would be gathered by the military officers. There are two kinds of intelligence in the eyes of TNI; one, the common information handled by BAIS and two, battle intelligence handled by Komando Utama
Operasi (Main Operation
Command/Kotama Ops). Those two have different utilities as battle intelligence is meant to be addressed with the military operation, while the common information will be used for the non-warfare operation.
However, once again, BAIS cannot act alone and should coordinate with Polri, BNPT, and Badan Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Body/BIN) (Fahrizal, 2020). This loose clause will create a divided mind of TNI while it needs to prepare its military operation for the external threats and the possible terrorist attack at home. Should the Presidential Regulation did give the details on intelligence works, TNI would only be
a handy force to Polri as well as BNPT and be able to focus on its main duty.
Moreover, territorial operation regulated within the Presidential Regulation (Article 4 [2]) implies counter insurgencies characteristics to the counter- terrorism act. Four features of territorial operation mentioned by the Presidential Regulation are similar to the four pillars of counter insurgencies mentioned by Alexander Alderson (Keaney & Rid, 2010). This is because the TNI’s historical journey is engraved in the middle of Indonesian society and had been involved greatly in the creation of the country’s basic arrangement. Thus Indonesia faces dilemma to either consistently carry out the criminal justice model or the war model. Unlike TNI, western countries’
militaries were created by their respective civilian government so they were meant to obey and serve the civilian government since the day they were established. So in the case of exercising its territorial operation, TNI needs some adjustment to make sure it wins the heart and mind of the Indonesian people and at the same time does not break any civilian regulations (Fahrizal, 2020). If it does not change, TNI will always be under their old days' shadow and its operation will not be suitable to the current state of terrorist threats.
The narration of establishing this the Presidential Regulation by the president is to create a simple procedure of operation to mobilize TNI. Consequently, this Presidential Regulation excluded the role of the parliament to decide when to use TNI for counter-terrorism, just like what the Criminal Act of Terrorism Law 2018 (Article 43 I [3]) states. However, that is against the TNI Law 2004 mandating any TNI mobilization for non- warfare operation purposes shall be based on the country’s policy (Article 7 [3]).
This means that the president shall seek parliament’s approval before rallying military forces for non-warfare operations, including counter-terrorism missions.
Besides, the Presidential Regulation also allows TNI to have external funds besides the national budget (Article 14) implying an attempt to open up more fund sources that have been strictly regulated by the TNI Law 2004. In other words, TNI will be merely under executive order without proper control by the parliament even in the funding part for counter-terrorism purposes.
The current security situation around Indonesia seems not under direct urgent terrorist crisis as the country encounters COVID-19 pandemic at the moment. Many have argued the lack of urgency to shift of TNI’s role in counter- terrorism throughout the Presidential
Regulation. The Indonesian public shows their response to the respective Presidential Regulation in the middle of 2020 just when the outbreak hit Indonesia in March 2020. Nevertheless, the Presidential Regulation draft sent to the Indonesian Parliament, especially to Commission I, was prepared to be signed by Tjahjo Kumolo who acted as an acting Minister of Law and Human Rights. He held that position in the last days of President Joko Widodo’s first term or on 30th September 2019. In other words, this Presidential Regulation is set to be a long- term policy on counter-terrorism, not released because of the escalated crisis of the ongoing situation.
What has been the concern of the Indonesian government that can be characterized as a terrorist attack nowadays is the unrest situation in West Papua. The Free West Papua Movement has been claimed as the scapegoat behind several terror attacks that disturbed West Papuans tranquillity and government projects. Even Vanuatu and some Pacific countries have shown their support internationally to the Free West Papua Movement and cry for their freedom from the Indonesian occupation. For the Indonesian government, ambushes from the Free West Papua Movement against TNI means terrorist attacks instead of regular crime. In other words, it becomes
more politically obscured when it comes to assessing a threat that is close to criminal, terrorism, and insurgency. Since the Presidential Regulation is prepared for a long-run policy, it should be completed with a threat assessment that can be the ground of mobilization (Arif, 2018).
Besides, it also will curtail the political bias and be the accountable conduct of the civilian government to the public.
Along with the threat assessment that should be in the Presidential Regulation, the government also has to answer several questions on legal contradictions raised by the experts and activists (Thea, 2020a). The great concern is on the inability of the civil court to put military personnel on trial under common criminal charges and possible human rights abuse by TNI. The greater authority to get itself involved in counter-terrorism regulated in the Presidential Regulation will give more space for TNI to go along with Polri and BNPT, or even more dominant than those two. In the negative scenario, the thick political interests exchanges surrounding TNI might cost its good image before the Indonesian public as a result of the institutional reform post 1998 Reformation Era (Thea, 2020b).
SOCIAL IMPLICATION
Military deployment on counter- terrorism has triggered criticism and
opinions in society. For those who support it, the deployment is considered as a part of the TNI’s core mandate on defending sovereignty. They consider terrorism as not only a threat to public order and security, but also national ideology and public safety. The ongoing pattern on targeting security forces, national vital objects, and foreign delegations require special operation that can only be done by the military (Imran et al., 2018, pp. 3–12).
Society also views that detaching trained military, marine, and air force can be more effective for the government to combat growing terrorism (Hui, 2013).
On the other hand, some people disagree with the decree. Some people view that the expansion will be ineffective in combatting the terrorism.
Militaristic, hard power approach in counter-terrorism can be counter- productive with the existing soft power approach.
Currently, the National Counter Terrorism Agency and civic society have tried to use soft power by initiating deradicalization approach, campaigning counter-narration against terrorism through digital media, and interfaith dialogues. The agency has also initiated Peace Media Centre (Pusat Media Damai) (Fauzi, 2021),
Cyber Peace Ambassador Initiative, and BNPT Video Festival by involving young influencers as peace agents, with counter-narration internet campaigns (Bhwana, 2019). These initiatives promote peace and tolerance with more familiar approaches among youths in order to stop the spread of radical ideologies (Alfiansyah, 2017).
The National Counter Terrorism Agency also works with Muslim clerics and preachers, who have strategic role in influencing the danger of terrorism, promoting peace, and avoiding heretic ideologies like radical terrorism that had threatened security, especially in remote areas with no access to digital media (Wijayaka, 2020). Moreover, the involvement of preachers can be a pre- emptive early detection of radical and terrorist ideologies (Ameliya, 2022).
Efforts from the national agency, Densus 88, and supporting civic society have successfully captured some of the terrorist cells. This fact debunks the idea of giving counter-terrorist mandate for the military, especially without clear task distribution, and shows that soft power approach works. Frictions between police and military that often happen also become a challenge (Hui, 2013).
Ethically speaking, most people frown upon the idea of mandating an
organization that constitutionally can use violence and destruction to eliminate threats to national security.
Some also feel unsafe when fully armed military troops deployed to neutralize terrorists in their neighborhood, that terrorists often reside in public area.
Governments may ensure the public that military deployment on combatting terrorists is effective, but it will trigger fear among society (Hughes, 2011).
Moreover, there are also growing sentiments that this decree was made as a way for the military to regain more power after Reformation, especially when public’s involvement is crucial in counter-terrorism efforts (Hui, 2013).
Rather than saving lives, military operations to combat terrorism can potentially harm citizens and cause crisis. Consequently, the crisis may destroy TNI’s reputation for hurting the national sovereignty. Cases like Golden Temple of Amristsar, India, that was occupied by armed separatist group for an independent Kalistan in 1984 have proven the latter premise. The operation was successful, though painfully took 1.000 casualties. The Beslan School of Russia in 2004 also had similar result, where 338 people were injured and 156 children were among the casualties (Hughes, 2011).
The next implication is regional instability, because citizens will directly or indirectly experience violence throughout the military operation (Hughes, 2011). This happened in Darul Islam case, where militaristic approach was used to combat terrorism had triggered the Free Aceh Movement (Imran et al., 2018, pp. 3–12).
Currently, the main challenges in counter-terrorism are to prevent creations of new terrorist cells or groups and capture the terrorist network. The militaristic, hard power approach may push civil society to cooperate with the government in fear of being considered as helping the terrorist network.
Rather than allocating budget for involving TNI in combatting terrorism with hard power approach, the government can conduct preventive efforts against the spread of radical ideologies by involving Muslim influencers and clerics. Moreover, detaching trained soldiers in counter- terrorism wouldn’t be successful without involving the civil society to fight radicalism through social media, to persuade involved citizens to detach self from terrorist network, and to stop sympathizing the radical terrorist movements.
The government needs to convince public that the expansion of TNI’s mandate on counter-terrorism efforts shall be done within civil supremacy framework and ensure the practice of Pancasila democracy system. Government also needs to ensure that this expansion won’t create post-Reformation era abuse of power situation. This can be done with threat assessment assessed by civil authority and political decision before starting an operation, and TNI cannot initiate or propose operations to civils.
Government also needs to communicate with the public that this expansion is last resort only and ad hoc. Thus, the public will know that the decree won’t potentially give TNI to abuse their main mandate and function as national instrument to defend national security.
CONCLUSION
All in all, the shift of TNI to be more involved in combats against terrorism in Indonesia is well marked by the Presidential Regulation. It will be a legal ground for TNI to work together with other civilian security authorities, such as Polri and BNPT, which are considered not
enough to tackle the issue of terrorism that often comes up with extreme violent assaults or other warfare characteristics.
There will be shifts of TNI function in consequence to the newest Presidential Regulation draft, which may cause some strategic implications to TNI as a military unit. This Presidential Regulation will guide a more militaristic approach to the effort against terrorism that can be observed from TNI intelligence gathering and territorial operation. Besides, TNI will be directed by more political motives of its operation from the executive body in encountering terrorist affairs in the long- run as the control from the house is omitted. The aftereffect will cost TNI its decent image, the possibility of human rights violation, and other law-breaking actions. To suppress the negative implication of the Presidential Regulation and to provide public responsibility, it should be completed by a threat assessment clause made by the civilian government, a transparent funding report, and a legal mechanism ensuring military personnel can be brought to justice if they are proven guilty when handling a counter- terrorism mission.
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