International Hydrological Programme
Groundwater As a Key for Adaptation to Changing Climate and Society The 20th IHP Training Course
2010/11/9 14:00‐16:30 Nagoya University
Institutional
Responses
to
Groundwater
Problems
‐
The
Cases
for
Public
Regulation
on
Groundwater
‐
Takahiro
Endo
endo@envr.tsukuba.ac.jp
Environmental
Diplomatic
Leader
Program,
Hydrological
cycle
and
water
management
◆
What
is
“Integrated
Water
Resource
Management” ?
Management
that
pays
attention
to
…...
connection
between surface
and
ground
water
/
quantity
and
quality
connection
between water
resource
and
other
resources
connection
between
water
and
other
sectoral
policies(
ex.
Energy,
agriculture)
coordination
of
various
stakeholders’interests
Mitchell 1990:1‐2, Grigg 1999:528, Babel 2005:575, Mitchel 2005:1336
The
aims
of
lecture
1,
The
nature
of
environmental
problems
2,
Theoretical
framework
to
analyze
efficient
use
of
water
resources
3,
Reasons
why
public
regulation
on
groundwater
are
necessary
3
‐
1:
Land
subsidence
3
‐
2:
A
conflict
between
surface
water
users
and
groundwater
users
1,
The
Nature
of
environmental
problems
1, Nature is valuable in itself. (Nature has an intrinsic value.) 2, Protecting nature will improve human‐being welfare. Environmental problems will decrease human‐welfare. (Nature has an instrumental value.) Eco‐system serviceQ1,
Why
do
we
need
to
protect
environment
?
(Rationale)
Supporting
・Nutrient Cycling
・Soil Formation
・Primary Production etc.
Provisioning
・Food
・Freshwater
・Wood and Fiber etc.
Regulating
・Climate Regulation
・Flood Regulation
・Disease Regulation
・Water Purification etc.
Cultural
・Aesthetic
・Spiritual
・Educational
・Recreational etc.
Q2,
How
can
we
protect
environment
?
Appropriate
use
of
natural
resources
Institution
1.
selfish
2.
Limited
altruism
3.
Limited
understanding
and
will
Human
nature
Environmental
policy
=
not
to
change
human
nature
itself,
but
to
make
the
most
of
selfish
mind
so
as
to
promote
environmental
protection.
A
problem
of
institutional
design
individual
and
group(1)
http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/product/foma/style/l04b/index.html
http://www.greekshares.com/capitalism.php http://ilgiornalieri.blogspot.com/2009/02/
mandeville‐la‐favola‐delle‐api‐vizi.html
A
tale
of
“Tragedy
of
Commons”
Rich grassland
sheep pasturage Over‐grazing
additional pasturage by other fellows
・
The
price
of
sheep
／
vegetation
／
precipitation
etc.
・
A
tool
for
understanding
of
the
basic
structure
of
environmental
problems
Sphere
where
self
‐
interest
works
in
a
positive
way.
Sphere
where
self
‐
interest
works
in
a
positive
way.
Sphere
where
self
‐
interest
works
in
a
negative
way.
Sphere
where
self
‐
interest
works
in
a
negative
way.
Cell
‐
phone
Pencil
Car
Jeans
Ice
cream
Grassland
River
Groundwater
Air
What’s
the
difference?
Individual
rationality
＝
Social
rationality
Individual
rationality
Classification
of
goods
and
services
Non
‐
rivalness
Excludability
Private
goods
・
Ice
‐
cream
・
Cloth
・
Toilet
in
private
house
Public
goods
・
national
security
・
Prevention
of
infectious
disease
・
biodiversity
Commons
・
Migrant
fish/bird
・
Grassland
・
water
・
Public
toilet
・
Cable
TV
Environmental
problem
：
accumulation
of
negative
impacts
Natural
resource
uses
without
limitation
accumulation
of
the
same
kind
of
negative
spillovers
＝
Excessive
use
of
resources Environmental
problems
Individual
A’s
use
may
produce
negative
spillovers.
・Toilet：A
dirty
toilet
makes
the
next
user
feel
bad.
・
Grassland
：
An
additional
new
sheep
decreases
grass
available
to
existing
sheep.
・
Aral
sea
：
Upstream
diversion
decreases
water
available
to
downstream
users etc.
What
should
be
done?
No self‐responsibility, “nuisance” “negative spillover effect”
If s/he uses less, the damage will disappear.
grassland
/
water
etc.
grassland
/
water
etc.
・If I stop groundwater pumping, somebody else will capture groundwater instead of me. ・If everyone except for me stops
groundwater pumping, my use will give little impact on volume of groundwater.
Even if people share a common benefit, they can not always achieve it voluntarily.
：Social Dilemma, Collective Action Problem Olson 1965, Dawes 1975
Institutional
response
★
The
rule
of
irresponsibility
must
be
changed.
the
system
that
makes
a
resource
user
realize
“negative
spill
over
effect” and
burden
the
cost.
Moral,
Custom,
Law =Institution
A
solution
for
social
dilemma
No self‐responsibility, “nuisance” “negative spillover effect”
If each one has to pay for damages to others, s/he will use less.
2,
Theoretical
framework:
groundwater
pumping
Total cost
Pumping volume
Pumping volume Marginal cost
Total benefit
Pumping volume
Groundwater pumping: private decision Total cost
Total benefit
Pumping volume Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
Pumping volume
TB TC
MC
MB
Groundwater pumping: private decision Total cost Total benefit Pumping volume Marginal cost Marginal benefit Pumping volume TB TC PMC MB v1 SMC Negative spillover V* DWL
1,
Land
subsidence
problem
due
to
excessive
groundwater
pumping
2,
A
conflict
between
surface
water
users
and
groundwater
users
3,
Environmental
services
of
Tokyo Seoul
Bangkok
Jakarta
Manila
Osaka
Taipei
3
‐
1:
Land
subsidence
1960’s ～ Present
1930’s ～
The mechanism of land subsidence
The causes of land subsidence 1, Natural compaction
2, Groundwater pumping
Osaka in 1958 Jakarta in 2009
Land subsidence recorded on a well (Koiwa, Tokyo)
Ground Level in 1938
1963 1964 1965 1967 30cm
5cm
8cm 5cm 4cm 3cm 1.5cm
4cm :
A
B
C
C B A Marginal cost Marginal benefit Pumping volume PMC MB v1 SMC V* DWL Negative spillover BenefitA’s calculation
Cost
Cost
Calculation from social viewpoint
Cost Cost
Benefit
A well‐owner does not always take account of external cost to other well‐owners.
A
B
C
C B A Marginal cost Marginal benefit Pumping volume PMC MB v1 SMC V* DWL Negative spillover BenefitA’s calculation
Cost
Cost
Calculation from social viewpoint
Cost Cost
Benefit
Tokyo Seoul
Bangkok
Jakarta
Manila
Osaka
Taipei
1960’s ～
Land
subsidence
in
Bangkok
0 10 km
NAKHON PATHOM
BANGKOK
GULF OF THAILAND PATHUM THANI
NONTHABURI
AYUTTHAYA
Land
subsidence
in
Bangkok
・
Comprehensive
survey
on
groundwater
during
1978
～
1981
Land
subsidence
was
observed
in
eastern
and
south
‐
eastern
Bangkok
Concern
for
higher
flood
risk
led
to
land
subsidence
management
policy
1977 Groundwater Act
1983 Mitigation of the GW Crisis and Land Subsidence in Bangkok
Construction of waterworks
1985 Groundwater Charge + 2004 Groundwater
Preservation Charge
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
1978 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06
実際の揚水量推計値 揚水許可量
10万㎥/日
‐60 ‐50 ‐40 ‐30 ‐20 ‐10 0
1985 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05
観測地A イ発電公社
観測地B ュラロンコン大学商業会計学部
cm
0.1M m3
Source: Department of Groundwater Resources, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment
Estimated volume of pumping
Permitted volume of pumping
Observation site 1
1977 Groundwater Act
・ Regulation on groundwater pumping in Bangkok and adjacent Provinces
・The only legal constraint against private pumping
・Permit‐based system in “Groundwater Areas”
・ New wells were prohibited where public water supply had been available
・A system of groundwater charged was admitted
Ramnarong 1999:55‐56, Das Gupta and Babel 2005:459
Ramnarong 1999:56, IGES 2006:75, Buapeng 2006:5 を基に作成
1983 Mitigation Plan
・Long term plan from 1983‐2000
・Designation of “Critical Zone”
the target area for GW pumping reduction
・Gradual reduction of pumping by MWA
Ramnarong 1999:55, 57 Buapeng 2006:5
Groundwater Areas in 1977
Construction
of
waterworks
Source: (Endo forthcoming)
MWA(Metropolitan Waterworks Authority)
: State enterprise whose function is to provide industrial and domestic water supply in Bangkok and the adjacent areas.
Sam Lae pumping station at Chap Phraya River
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
1978 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05
Estimated volume of groundwater pumping
Permitted volume of groundwater pumping
Water supply by Metropolitan Waterworks Authority
Groundwater pumping by Metropolitan Waterworks Authority
0.1M m3 /day
1985 Groundwater Charge System Source: (Endo forthcoming)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1985
90
95
2000
05
Groundwater Conservation Charge Total Groundwater Fee
0.1M㎥/day Baht/㎥
15.81
Bangkok
GW pumping in July,2004: 1290㎥ August, 2004: 2480㎥ September, 2004: 1138㎥
Bill :41718 Bahts
41718 Bahts÷ 1290 2480 1138 ㎥ ＝41718 Bahts÷4908㎥
＝8.5 Bahts/㎥ Is groundwater charge system really working?
Marginal cost Marginal benefit
Pumping volume PMC
MB
v1
SMC
Negative spillover
V* DWL
Lessons
and
recommendations
for
policy
makers
1, The necessity of government intervention
・It is hard for private company to move v1 to v* due to social dilemma.
2,
Groundwater pricing system works with conditions.
Lessons
and
recommendations
for
policy
makers
4,
Importance
of
adaptive
management
・
Areas
of
land
subsidence
move.
Therefore,
restriction
area
should
be
modified
regularly
in
accordance
with
monitoring
data.
Monitoring
is
extremely
important.
5,
Gradual
expansion
of
regulation
worked
in
both
cases.
・
If
it
is
hard
to
restrict
all
the
groundwater
pumping
at
one
time,
restriction
on
new
wells
should
be
considered
first.
6,
Preparing
alternative
sources
of
water
supply
is
the
most
effective
resolution
against
land
subsidence
problem.
・
Alternative sources of water supply includes not only
surface water, but also recycled water, desalinated water.
・
Subsidy system may be necessary for making the price of
A
Benefit
A’s calculation
Cost Diversion of a unit of water
B
C
Cost Cost CostCalculation from social viewpoint
Cost Cost Benefit Marginal cost Marginal benefit Diversion PMC MB v1 SMC Negative spillover V* DWL
An Upstream diverter does not always take account of external cost to downstream users.
The diversion may be optimal for A, but it is excessive for society as a whole.
Negative
impacts
from
upstream
A
Benefit
A’s calculation
Cost Diversion of a unit of water
B
C
Cost Cost CostCalculation from social viewpoint
Cost Cost Benefit Marginal cost Marginal benefit Diversion PMC MB v1 SMC Negative spillover V* DWL
1868
～
1896
・
Flood
control
as
a
priority
issue
・
Water
allocation
rule
with
less
importance
1896
：
The
(Old)
River
Law
・
Centralized
management
of
rivers
・
Subsidy
from
national
government
・
The
main
concern
:
Flood
control
3 1964
：
The
River
Law
・
Economic
development
after
WWII
：
The
necessity
of
water
allocation
rule
in
addition
to
flood
control
policy
4 1997
：
Amendments
on
The
River
Law
・
Environmental
factors
*
Surface
water
is
subject
to
public
regulation:
public
water
A
boundary
between
surface
and
ground
water
◆
1896/3/27
Supreme
Court
Decision
・
Right
of
use
groundwater
belongs
to
the
ownership
of
land.
・
A
landowner
can
make
free
use
of
groundwater
that
lies
below
its
land.
◆
Civil
Code
§
207
：
Subject
to
limitations
by
laws
and
ordinances,
the
ownership
of
land
extends
both
above
and
below
its
surface
Groundwater
use
based
on
land
ownership
=A
theory
of
private
water
Ogawa1998
：
313 Ogawa
2003:15
‐
16
Saijo City
・Population: 58110 (2000)
・Average precipitation 1413mm 1909~2001
・Kamo River
Catchment area:229 km2 Class‐B River)
(Saijo City 1984:505,Saijo City 2003：19
Kamo
River
:
A
losing
stream
Groundwater
with
long
history
西條誌稿本 巻の三 西条市・愛媛大作成CD‐ROM
Area
without
waterworks
A
Water
Conflict
Between
Saijo
and
Matsuyama
松山市
西条市
地下水涵養に 悪影響？
黒瀬 ム 西条工水
Matsuyama
2006 A water diversion plan for
Matsuyama city
Saijo Government opposed this plan with
anxiety that the plan may affect
groundwater recharge in Saijo Area.
Saijo Government is worried about
negative externality on groundwater.
What
is
problem?
松山市
西条市
地下水涵養に 悪影響？
黒瀬 ム 西条工水
Matsuyama
Case
1
:
Saijo
city
governmet
has
a
water
right
and
takes
water
for
various
uses
from
Kamo
River.
Hard
and
Soft
Measures
for
Conflict
Prevention
1,
The
River
Law
§
23
：
Permitted
water
right
system
Free
access
is
not
allowed.
2,
The
River
Law
§
38
‐
43
：
Water
Conciliation
A
late
comer
is
required
to
get
consent
from
concerned
river
users
and
compensate
them
for
losses
caused
by
the
planned
diversion.
3,
Dam
A
late
comer
is
usually
required
to
make
a
dam
not
to
injure
senior
water
rights.
4,
The
River
Law
§
53:
Drought
Conciliation
In
drought,
concerned
river
users
are
supposed
to
make
negotiations
to
settle
water
allocation.
B:
Late
comer
Matsuyama
A
：
Existing
water
right
holder
Saijo)
Well Groundwater users Surface water users Obligation to compensate No obligation to compensate A
Concerned
River
Users
are………
Those
who
get
permissions
on
the
River
Law
§
23
‐
29
Fishermen
Groundwater
users
outside
of
a
river
channel
are
not
included.
Groundwater
=
Private
Water
Institutional
pitfall
A
B
River
Law
:
Surface
water
user
×
Surface
Water
User
Surface
Water
User
×
Groundwater
user
Ground
water
C
D
Judicial
decisions
and
civil
code:
Groundwater
user
Implications
of
Saijo
Groundwater
Problem
City A / Country A
City B / Country B
River
basin
≠
Administrative
unit
A
horizontal
boundary
Legal
status
of
surface
water
≠
Legal
status
of
groundwater
A
vertical
boundary
Matsuyama Ehime
Saijo
Inefficient
use
of
water
50km
Groundwater management in Kumamoto
Kumamoto
city
Population
:
about
70,000
The
main
source
of
domestic
water
supply
: groundwater
1,2 3
4
A
Benefit
A’s calculation
Cost
Production of a unit of rice
Calculation from social viewpoint
Benefit
An Upstream rice farmer does not always take account of external benefit to downstream groundwater users.
The production level may be optimal for A, but it is less than optimum for society as a whole.
Positive
impacts
from
upstream
rice
fields
to
downstream
groundwater
users
A
Benefit
A’s calculation
Cost
Production of a unit of rice
Calculation from social viewpoint
Benefit
Positive
impacts
from
upstream
rice
fields
to
downstream
groundwater
users
Benefit
Benefit
Benefit
Cost
*Can B and C give a rice farmer incentive to recharge groundwater without public regulation on groundwater?
Groundwater
charge
system
in
Kumamoto
A
Production of a unit of rice
Benefit
B
C
￥
A case where there is no public regulation on groundwater
No one has incentive to pay A to increase recharge.
(“Everybody’s business is nobody’s business” situation)
X
A
Production of a unit of rice
Benefit
B
C
￥
X
Kumamoto city
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Recharge volume by cooperative farmers Recharge volume by cooperative business firms Total area of rice field used for recharge (ha/month)
Total area of rice field
used for recharge (ha/month) Total recharge volume
(×10000m3)
Year
Artificial
groundwater
Conclusion
■
Public
regulation
on
groundwater
is
necessary,
because……..
1,
private
use
of
groundwater
without
regulation
may
cause
severe
land
subsidence.
2,
it
is
difficult
to
solve
water
conflict
between
surface
water
users
and
groundwater
users.
