An Overview of the Intra-Islamic Debate on whether an
Infinite Series of Events in the Past is Possible
by
Bassam Zawadi
This particular question has led to a point of contention between the Islamic Atharī theological school of thought1 and the Mutakallimūn2 for approximately seven hundred years. Until now, discussions on the matter remain heated, with it being claimed that the former say ‘yes’, and the latter maintain ‘no’ to be the correct view. In reality, however, this isn’t truly the case. The mere fact that leading Atharī theologian Ibn Taymīyyah (d. 1328) was known to have adopted the “yes” position, debating the matter extensively with the Mutakallimūn, does not necessitate the agreement of all Atharīs.
There are Atharīswho answer “no” to this question as well. For instance, the prominent Atharī scholar Muḥammad Nāṣir ad-Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1999) stated that the notion of an infinite series of events in the past is something deemed to be “incomprehensible”, and that it is not religiously permissible to adopt the opinion of Ibn Taymīyyah (ShādīNo’mān, vol. 7, p. 923).
Furthermore, the renowned Atharī theologian Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī (d. 1995) said that according to Ahlus-Sunnah,3 an infinite regression of events in the past is impossible (Kāmila al-Kuwayrih, 2001, p. 183). Likewise, the famous Egyptian Atharī theologian Muḥammad Khalīl Harrās (d. 1975) was of the view that this stance adopted by Ibn Taymīyyah was not very intellectually assuring (Ibid., p. 181). There are numerous examples of other Atharī scholars and academics that take similar stances.4 One particular Atharī academic even went as far as stating that the Mutakallimūn would be rewarded for their Ijtihād5 on this matter, for it was their intention to negate something being eternal alongside God (Laṭf Allāh Khowjah, 2007, pp. 255-256). Therefore, it is not accurate to reduce the dispute to a simplistic “Atharī vs. Mutakallimūn” contention. Rather, Atharīs themselves are not unified on this subject.6 Some Atharī scholars even
1 An Islamic theological school of thought, which lopsidedly places emphasis on the authority of scripture and
tradition, though it still shuns fideism.
2 Muslim scholars of scholastic theology.
3 Those who adhere to correct Islamic orthodoxy. In this context, al-Jāmī is referring to this own Atharī theological
school
4 In one of my private conversations with Dr. Sulṭan al-‘Umayrī, who is an assistant professor teaching Islamic
theology at Umm al-Qurá university in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, he informed me that several Atharī academic peers of
his adopt the position that an infinite series of events in the past is impossible. He gave the example of Dr. ‘Abdul
Azīz al-Ḥumaydī, who is an academic peer of his who teaches theology at the same department.
5 Independent reasoning and ruling of a Muslim scholar
6 One may also argue that the Mutakallimūnthemselves are not unified on this matter either; see Ibn Taymīyyah (1991,
argue that the matter is that of the unseen realm, and thus we should not delve into it, since it only causes confusion, bringing no benefit to the questioner. As a result, they discourage the adoption of any stance on the matter (‘Abdullah b. Jibrīn, vol. 11, p. 26).
It must also be pointed out, however, that Atharīs who agree with the conclusion of the
Mutakallimūn have not necessarily adopted the same methodology.
With that said, let us explore some of the key scriptural arguments from the Qur’ān and ḥadīth literature used by both sides of the debate. We will also take a look at some of the statements of the classical Muslim scholars cited by each side, as well as the theological arguments adopted in favor for each position.
The Arguments of the “Yes Camp”:
The “yes camp”7 present the following Qur’ānic verse:
Whosoever is in the heavens and on earth begs of Him (its needs from Him). Every day He has a matter to bring forth.[55:29]
They argue that this verse demonstrates the fact that God is always active, and that if God is always active in performing new actions, then by definition He has been doing so from pre-eternity. This, by default, implies an infinite regression of events in the past.
However, the “no camp” rebut, arguing that this verse is not speaking about God’s state from pre-eternity, but is only speaking of God’s state of relations with the creation. They argue that the verse itself seems to make that point clear, since it is describing how those in the heavens and the earth call out to God. As a result, God each day is answering prayers (Ibn Jarīr at-Ṭabarī, 2001, vol. 22, pp. 212-214). Hence, they argue that there is no indication that said activity has been occurring since pre-eternity.
Another verse the “yes camp” put forth is the following:
Say, "If the sea were ink for [writing] the words of my Lord, the sea would be exhausted before the words of my Lord were exhausted, even if We brought the like of it as a supplement." [18:109]
They assert that this verse demonstrates God’s literal communication since pre-eternity. Thus, there was never a point in which God was not speaking (Abul-Hassan al-Ash’arī, p. 22). In response, the “no camp” maintains that this verse has further room for interpretation. The verse, they argue, could be speaking about both the past and future (Al-‘Izz b. ‘Abdus-Salām, 1996, vol. 2, p. 265). Hence, it could be referring to a potential infinite, rather than an actual infinite series of metaphysical events of God speaking into the past. Another opinion is that this verse is not referring to infinity of any sorts. Rather, it is just expressing that God’s creatures are unable to fathom the extent of God’s ability and very being (Abi al-Hassan al-Māwardī, Vol. 3, p. 349). In light of this possible exegesis, it is not required to understand this verse in the manner the “yes camp” demands.
Another verse presented by the “yes camp” is the following:
He does (fa’ālun) what He intends (or wills) [85:16].
Based on this verse, they argue that the nominative participle fa’ālun entails God’s constant doing,
and that He never stopsdoing (Ibrāhīm al-Breikān, 2004, p. 211). However, the “no camp” counter by noting that not a single major Qur’ānic exegetical commentator has ever alluded to the possibility of this being the linguistic implication of fa’ālun.8 In fact, some commentaries say that
fa’ālun here is simply a hyperbole used for implying many actions and not necessarily a constant or non-stop cycle of them (Burhān ud-Dīn al-Biqā’ī, 1992, vol. 21, p. 363). All commentaries have agreed on the main overriding message of this verse, namely that God is always able to do what He wills.
The last verse we will be looking at from the “yes camp” is the following:
Then is He who creates like one who does not create? So will you not be reminded? [16:17]
Based on this verse, it is argued that the act of creating is one of the attributes signifying the perfection of God. In light of this, there could not be a time in which God is not creating (Ibn Taymīyyah. 2005, vol. 18, p. 130).
The opposition in turn argues that this proof is not strong; the verse is only stating that you cannot compare the Creator to the idols that cannot create. In other words, God is asking "Is He, then, Who creates like he who does not create?" The “no camp” argue that it is not plausible to infer from this verse that God is always creating, or has always been creating.
Verses such as 67:22 and others use similar language, yet the “no camp” do not understand them to necessarily imply continuous and non-stop action. They understand them to mean that these are actions that are performed by certain persons. They argue that the continuity of the action, or even the frequency of the action, is something that needs to be clarified. They argue that the same can be said regarding the aforementioned verse in question; it could be referring to the One who has the ability to create, in comparison to the one who does not (Abi ‘Abdullah al-Qurṭubī, 2006, vol. 12, p. 308).
Let us now take a look at some of the Qur’ānic arguments presented by the “no camp”.
The
Arguments of the “No Camp”:
They “no camp” cite the following verse:
That he may know that they have conveyed the messages of their Lord; and He has encompassed whatever is with them and has enumerated all things in number. [72:28]
Their argument here is that the creation has been enumerated with a fixed number. However, if there truly were an actual infinite number of events regressing in the past, they argue that this would entail that the number of creation is in fact innumerable (‘Abdul Qāhir al-Baghdādī, p. 138).
Atharī scholar Kāmila al-Kuwayrih attempted to respond to this by noting that there is a difference between claiming that there are no boundaries and stating that there are no limits to something.
She gives the following example: between the numbers 0 and 1, there could be an infinite number of fractions, yet the numbers 0 and 1 still serve as boundaries. Similarly, she argues that in the case of creation, there are boundaries. Those boundaries are the creation point of coming into existence and its eventual point of perish (Kāmila Al-Kuwayrih, 2001, p. 101).
However, the “no camp” calls into question the coherence of this response. The argument at hand does not pertain to the limits of each creation. Rather, it is whether the genus of creation itself has limits. If the claim is that the genus of creation extends infinitely back into the past, then this would entail an actual infinite number of creations into the past according to the “no camp”. This would entail that there is no limit of regression of events in the past, and thus the “no camp” would argue that Kāmila has failed to demonstrate where the boundary lies for the genus of creation itself.
Another Qur’ānic evidence offered by the “no camp” is the following verse:
Say, [O Muhammad], "Travel through the land and observe how He began creation. Then God will produce the final creation. Indeed God, over all things, is competent." [29:20]
Based on this, they would argue that creation has a beginning, and that there is no infinite series of creations in the past. However, the “yes camp” would argue that there is a clear nuanced distinction to be made between the assertion that “an infinite series of events in the past did not happen” and the claim that“an infinite series of events in the past is impossible.” The discussion at hand is pertaining to the latter rather than the former.
Secondly, the “yes camp” rebut, maintaining that this passage is not referring to creation in its entirety, but is rather restricted in its scope and could be referring to mankind only,9 or perhaps the houses and relics that human beings see,10 or even the heavens and earth of our universe.11
Similarly, with the following verse:
Did We fail in the first creation? But they are in confusion over a new creation [50:15].
9 For instance; see the citation of ar-Rabī’ b. Anas in (Ibn 'Aṭīyah, 2002, p. 1751).
10 See Muḥammad al-Ḥussain al-Baghawī, 2002, p. 993
The “yes camp” would argue that in this particular context, it is referring to the first creation of human beings (i.e. Adam).12 The same is said for 21:104, where it could be understood to be emphasizing the fact that humanity was created naked.13
The “no camp” also appeal to the following ḥadīth, which is narrated in the following different versions: 1) “There was God and nothing else before Him”14and 2) “First of all, there was nothing but God.”15
The debate surrounding this ḥadīth is lengthy and falls outside the scope of this research.16 Instead, we may suffice with the following summary:
1) The “yes camp” holds that version 1 is the more authentic transmitted wording; while the “no camp” argues that there is no need to discard the other versions, which have authentic chains of transmission. Rather, they could be reconciled.17
2) The “yes camp” argues that this ḥadīth is referring to the first creation of our known world,18 not the genus of creation.19
3) The “yes camp” further argues that even if this ḥadīth is referring to the first creation in general, it still does not necessitate the impossibility of an infinite regression of events in the past.
After having offered a summary exposition of the scriptural case of both camps, we now proceed to the relevant statements of the classical scholars.
The Statements of Classical Scholars:
Both parties maintain their consistency and agreement with classical scholars, whose precedence grants them validation. The “no camp” presents statements from classical scholars affirming that creation in general (and not just our known universe) had a starting point. These include, but are
12 See Ibn 'Aṭīyah (2002, p. 1751)
13 See Muḥammad al-Ḥussain al-Baghawī (2002, p. 856)
14 See Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Book 97, ḥadīth no. 46. Available from: https://sunnah.com/bukhari/97/46
15 See Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Book 59, ḥadīth 2. Available from: https://sunnah.com/bukhari/59/2 Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī
reports a similar narration which says “and there was nothing with Him”
16For a defense of the “yes camp”, refer to Kāmila’s treatment of this ḥadīth in her Qidam al-‘Ālam. One may also
read the English translated treatment of this ḥadīth by Ibn Taymīyyah; see Jon Hoover (2004).
17 See Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (2001, vol. 13, p. 421)
18 See Laṭf Allāh Khowjah (2007, p. 246)
19Ibn Taymīyyah was not the only, nor the first one to come up with this interpretation. Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (2005,
not limited to, Muḥammad b. Abī Shaybah (d. 849),20 Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 855),21 ‘Uthmān b. Sa’īd ad-Dārimī (d. 894),22 Ibn Jarīr at-Ṭabarī (d. 923),23 Muḥammad b. Ḥussain al-Ajurrī (d. 970),24 ‘Ubaydullah b. Muḥammad b. Baṭah (d. 997),25 and Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064).26 They would also cite classical scholars who affirmed that God having attributes does not necessarily signify that He exerts them.27
In response, the “yes camp” claims that these statements do not demonstrate that there was a consensus amongst classical scholars,28 nor does it imply that an infinite regression of events in the past is impossible. They only demonstrate that these scholars simply did not believe that there is an infinite regression, and that it could very well be due to God’s choice.
Nevertheless, the “no camp” maintains that one could infer that these scholars believed that an infinite regress of events into the past is impossible. They appeal to the famous creation of the Qur’ān controversy that was sparked by the Mu’tazilites. One of the arguments the traditionalists used against the Mu’tazilites at the time was that they argued that the ḥadīth of the Prophet of Islam says that the first of creation was the Pen.29 And since the Qur’ān says that God says, “Be” prior to creating,30 this conclusively proves that the Speech of God is uncreated.31 This argument could have only worked if Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and others who followed him in using this argument truly did not believe in an infinite regress of events into the past.
20MuḥammadIbn Abī Shaybah (1997, p. 284)
21 Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (2002, p. 155)
22‘Uthmān b. Sa’īd ad-Dārimī (1999, p. 14) 23 Ibn Jarīr at-Ṭabarī (1967, vol. 1, p.30)
24 Muḥammad b. Ḥussain al-Ajurrī (1997, vol. 1, p. 490)
25‘Ubaydullah b. Muḥammad b. Baṭah (1994, vol. 1, p. 214)
26 Ibn Ḥazm (1997, p. 264). See Ibn Taymīyyah’s response (Ibid. pp. 303-304) to Ibn Ḥazm in his Naqd Marātib al
-Ijmā’.
27 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad at-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 933) famously said that God was the Creator even before He Created just as
He is the Resurrector before He Resurrects; see Aḥmad b. Muḥammad at-Ṭaḥāwī (1994, pp. 131-136). Also see Abul
Qāsim Ismā’īl al-Aṣbahānī (1999, vol. 1, p. 300) where something similar to at-Ṭaḥāwī’s point is argued.
28Ibnul Qayyim narrates a conversation that ‘Abdulazīz al-Kinānī (d. 854) had with a Jahmite. ‘Abdulaziz eventually
concluded the discussion by saying that God is able to create from eternity if He so pleased; see Ibnul Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, 1978, p. 155). Ibnul Qayyim later on reports how some scholars from “Ahlus-Sunnah and Ḥadīth” argued that there is nothing irrational about affirming its possibility (Ibid., page 156). This demonstrates that there is no consensus regarding the finitude of the genus of creation amongst the early classical scholars according to the “yes
camp”.
29 See Sunan Abi Dāwūd, Book 42, Ḥadīth 105. Available from https://sunnah.com/abudawud/42/105
30Qur’ān, Chapter 16, Verse 40
31 Al-Ajurrī (vol. 1, p. 510) cites Muḥammad b. Ḥussain who said that this is one of the strongest arguments that
However, the question still stands: does this serve as proof that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and others believed that an infinite regress of events in the past is impossible? The “yes camp” maintains a
simple “no”.
Secondly, the “yes camp” argue that some of these very same scholars, as well as others, have affirmed that God has been, and is, “always speaking” (lam yazal Mutakalliman).32 This in turn indicates that God is continuously speaking, and hence we have a metaphysical regression of events in the past, whereby God is continuously speaking. However, the “no camp” would in turn argue that what the scholars truly meant by their statement is that God has always had the attribute of Speech, and not that He is necessarily speaking at all times.33 In other words, God may will Himself not to speak.34 Hence, thorough research requires holistic reading and careful examination of all the writings of each particular scholar. This is necessary in order to accurately conclude that particular scholars’ stance on the matter.35
An additional response that is made to the “yes camp” is that there appears to be some sort of assumption on their part regarding how God speaks. There appears to be an assumption that God speaks in “sequence”, with words temporally and sequentially following one after the other, similar to the way human beings speak. But this appears to violate the principle that one is not supposed to delve into the modality of God’s attributes. Perhaps God speaks in an instantaneous manner, whereby all words are spoken simultaneously at one instance in a changeless mode of expression.36
Just as God is always “knowing” in a constant and unchanging manner prior to the actual events, God is similarly always “speaking” in a constant and unchanging manner. If so, then this need not result in a series of utterances with metaphysical temporal gaps between them. As a result, there would not be a metaphysical infinite regression of events. In light of this, the “yes camp” would also need to demonstrate how and why their understanding of how God speaks is correct, since the implications very much depend on it.
The “yes camp” also provide statements from scholars who argue that “action is a sign of life.” In turn, they insinuate that those scholars believed that God must have always, from eternity past,
32 See Abul-Ḥassan al-Ash’arī (1992, vol. 1, p. 121)
33Ibn Taymīyyah (2005, vol. 6, pp. 93-94) cites Abu Bakr ‘Abdul ‘Azīz as saying that there are two opinions amongst
his peers. One is that God must always be speaking, and the other opinion is that He does not necessarily have to, and that it is in accordance with His Will. ‘Ubaydullah b. Muḥammad b. Baṭah (1994, vol. 1, pp. 213-214) signifies that the intention behind the usage of this statement “always speaking” (lam yazal Mutakalliman) is to highlight that the attribute of Speech is not created.
34 Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (2002, p. 139) interlinked God’s speaking with His Will. Ibn Taymīyyah (2005, vol. 6, p. 105)
discusses whether God may be attributed with “silence”, and he concludes by saying “yes” and that this is established
in the Sunnah and by consensus of the scholars. However, Ibn Taymīyyah (1991, vol. 2, p. 89) also cites as-Sijizī (d. 1052) saying there is a dispute when it comes to attributing “silence” to God.
35 It is argued that these sayings of the scholars only explicitly make it clear that God had the Power of these attributes
and not that they are clear in stating that He has always been exerting them; see Laṭf Allāh Khowjah (2007, p. 269).
36 Ibn Khuzayma )d. 924) says that God does not speak like human beings. His Speech is “constant” without any
been “acting.”37 This would entail an infinite regression of “acts” in the past. The “no camp” rebut, arguing that these statements are not binding without a scholarly consensus. In any case, they would call into question the interpretation of these statements.38
The “no camp” ask: “Why is action a sign of life; based on what analogy is such an assertion being made?” If it is an analogy to the creation, then the “no camp” argues that one may be idle, yet still be alive due to having a soul, such as a person in a coma. Thirdly, the “no camp” argues that there is no reason to restrict the scope of “action” to actions such as creating, speaking, etc., for self-awareness, constant cognition, unchanging and non-sequential mode of speaking, etc. could all be considered “active” states, as opposed to being idle. Another question they would ask is whether the argument is rooted in definitive scriptural texts, or is open to Ijtihād. Furthermore, the “no camp” stresses that one could argue that God is both Self-Fulfilling and Perfect in His Essence, and thus does not need to “act” and exert His attributes in order to demonstrate His perfection.
Returning to the question at hand, could God have exerted His attributes from pre-eternity? The “no camp” maintains a clear “yes”, yet the implications of this answer remain unclear. Does it mean that there is then an infinite series of events, temporally sequential to one another? Not necessarily according to the “no camp”. For example, one may say that God has had the ability to Resurrect since eternity, since He is “The Resurrector”. Resurrection entails bringing someone dead back to life, and death itself entails that instance of life at any given point. Therefore, there is a “alive-dead-back to life” sequence present. This sequence necessarily entails a temporal gap prior to the act of resurrecting. In light of this, one cannot assert that this was occurring since eternity. If it were the case, then we do not, and cannot have an “infinite” regression of resurrections in the past, given that necessary temporal gap. Nevertheless, the “no camp” still affirm that God has the ability to resurrect from eternity. The same is said for the attribute of “forgiving”, which requires the “life-commit sin-repent” sequence.
Thus, the “no camp” adopt the position that God was able to exert His attributes from eternity, yet they do not affirm an infinite regression of actions in the past, since God’s actions are new and emergent, unlike His eternal attributes. They also do not claim to fully understand the modality of His actions, and hence do not state that an infinite regression, which presumes temporal gaps between them sequentially, is a necessary outcome of all of God’s actions.
Theological Arguments
Raised by the “Yes Camp”:
The most commonly used theological argument by the “yes camp” in order to bolster their position is that to deny the possibility that God has been creating from eternity is to essentially imply that there was a point in time in which God was not able to create. They argue that such a notion is blasphemous, since God’s attributes are eternal, and thus there should be no reason to presume that God was unable to create at any given stage. A second argument that provide is that the stance of the “no camp” entails the attribution of imperfection to God, with that imperfection being “idleness”.
37 See Muḥammad b. Ismā’īl al-Bukhārī (1999, p. 85) and ‘Uthmān b. Sa’īd ad-Dārimī (1999, p. 164).
38 It is argued that these sayings of the classical scholars are not explicit in stating that God has always been exerting
Once again, the “no camp” attempts to refute this, claiming that this argument makes some serious fallacious presumptions surrounding its stance. The “no camp” argues that this objection presumes that God was enduring through time before creating.39 It presumes that God “waited and waited and waited” (āl al-Shaykh, 2011, vol. 1, p. 110) beforebeing able to later ontake action and create. However, the “no camp” argues that it does not believe that God was temporal prior to creating. According to this view, there would never have “been a time” that God was not able to create. There would never have “been a time” that God was idle.40
In the view of the “no camp”, there is no “earlier” and “later” than, since these are temporal relations that would not apply to God if He were in a state of timelessness. To imagine a time before time is only a misleading fantasy of our limited imaginations. In light of this, one cannot charge the “no camp” with the belief that there is a time when God cannot create. Similarly, being idle presumes doing nothing for a certain amount of time. Once again, this is not representative of the stance of the “no camp”.
The “yes camp” would make another argument, namely that there must have been some sort of tipping point or determinant of sorts, whereby according to the “no camp”, God initiated creation at a certain junction (Ibn Taymīyyah, 1985, vol. 1, p. 65; 1991, vol. 8, p. 107). However, the “yes camp” argues that this tipping point must have always existed in eternity, and that there is no reason to believe why God would have created later than He was able to. In other words, why did God wait until approximately 14 billion years ago to create, and not sooner? The “yes camp” argues that there is no logical reason and further allege that it is more reasonable to assume that God has been creating since eternity.
The “no camp” once again points out the problematic nature of using terms such as “point”, “later”, and “sooner”. They argue that God’s decision to create was timeless and pre-eternal; it was not preceded by any time period of indecision. God could not have created any “sooner”, since there was no time prior to the creation.
Theological Arguments
Raised by the “No Camp”:
One particular objection is that the “no camp” believes that the notion that God has created from eternity implies the possibility that something other than God could be eternal. It implies that at every given point of God’s existence (i.e. eternity), the manifestation of His attributes (i.e. in this case the genus of creation) is present.41 The sheer fact that there was never a point where God was without creation existing simultaneously alongside Him entails that it is at the very
39Ibn Taymīyyah (1991, vol. 8, p. 107) argued that with all times being equal, there is no reason why God would
choose a particular time over another to create.Ibn Taymīyyah (2005, vol. 18, p. 129) says that he does not take the
position that there was a “time” in which God had no power.Also, see Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (2002, p. 140).
40Furthermore, the “no camp” would argue that God is not bound to exert His attributes. If we take the example of
God being All-Forgiving, the “no camp” would argue that God does not have to be forgiving at every single instant. For God to be forgiving an infinite number of times, there would have to be an infinite number of sinners requiring forgiveness.
41 Athari scholar Safar al-Ḥawālī (vol. 1, p. 261) commenting on the words of Ibn Abī al-‘Izz (d. 1390) said that there
least possiblethat one of His creatures could be eternal too. This is highly objectionable, since God, by the necessity of His nature, could be the only One that is eternal.
The “yes camp”, however, argues back by maintaining that this implication is invalid; their stance is that everything other than God has been created, and is hence not eternal. The process of creation itself is the only eternal thing.
In response, however, the “no camp” hold that one must either answer “yes” or “no” to the following question: “was there ever a point in which God existed without creation alongside Him?” If the answer is no, then the notion of infinite regression is negated. If the answer is yes, then the notion that something other than God creatures being eternal is, by necessity, at the very least
possible.
Another theological objection that the “no camp” has is that to say that God mustbe creating from eternity or displaying His Mercy from eternity makes Him dependent upon His creation. However, the “yes camp” would argue back noting that the statement can be phrased in a different manner. The wording “God needs creation, hence He creates” is inherently flawed, and instead, one should phrase it by saying “God’s Perfection by necessity demands that He creates, hence this is why there is creation at all times”. The “no camp” would rebut once agian, arguing that this is only a clever linguistic tactic, which does not address the substantial behind point behind the argument itself.42
Conclusion
The debate on this deeply philosophical and theological subject will not be settled anytime soon. Nevertheless, the main purpose of this paper was to bring to light, and refute, the following two misconceptions surrounding this debate:
1) All Atharīs believe that an infinite series of events in the past either happened or is possible
2) There are no scriptural and theological arguments in favor of the “no camp” position.
42For example, instead of saying, “Human beings need food”, one could rephrase this and say: “Human beings by
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