3.3 The Value of the Liancourt Rocks
3.4.2 The 1996 LDP Manifesto
Later in 1996 FIFA announced that South Korea and Japan would co-host the 2002 World Cup – despite the two sides having campaigned individually – and along with the looming EEZ negotiations, it was clear that the relationship would have to improve. After the affair had begun to cool down, President Kim and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō met in
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Bangkok on the sidelines of an Asia-Europe Meeting and again during a bilateral summit in South Korea in June. The pair confirmed the previous undertaking between Ikeda and Ambassador Kim to separate the EEZ issue from the territorial dispute. The EEZ negotiations began in August of the same year (see below), the lower-house diet elections in September of the same year saw the rocks causing friction once more. This time it stemmed from the LDP’s inclusion of the territorial issue in its election manifesto, as well as its stance on the Yasukuni Shrine visits.
Events in the Pinnacle Islands dispute were causing ruptures within the LDP and, following a meeting on the day of the break-up of the last Diet session before the election, Murakami Masakuni, chief secretary of the House of Councillors, argued that the dispute should be included in the manifesto (Asahi Shimbun, 02/10/1996, see Chapter Four, Section 4.6).104 Days later, when the manifesto was released, not only were the Pinnacles included, but so was a sentence stating that the Liancourt rocks were “our country’s territory” and that the LDP would “continue its diplomatic efforts to work peacefully towards a solution” (LDP Lower House Election Manifesto 1996). Yamasaki Taku, LDP policy chief, declared that the Liancourt Rocks as well as the other disputes were included as they were in the news, they had become issues for the election and that the voters would like to know where the party stood (Asahi Shimbun, 02/10/1996).
Referring to the territorial disputes in a party manifesto was not standard practice, the LDP being the only party to do so in that election. An angry Korean response was assured, and street protests followed, but none-the-less Hashimoto was reelected as prime minister, and despite the severe friction of the year and growing apprehension about the
104 Taiwanese protesters had successfully landed on the Pinnacle Islands on the previous day.
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LDP’s – and more broadly Japan’s – perceived increasingly nationalistic stance on many issues, Kim immediately sent Hashimoto a warm message of congratulations following his victory (Asahi Shinbun, 21/10/1996).
The flare-up over the rocks came at a time of blossoming relations between the two states. Trade increased steadily throughout the 1990s, from US$29 billion in 1990 to US$51billion 2000 (Hook et al., 2005: 530), security relations finally began to develop after decades of mistrust (Manosevitz, 2003) and political relations were improving, too, as evinced by Kim’s phone call to Hashimoto, made despite the furore over the islands and Hashimoto’s Yasukuni Shrine visits. Indeed, Funabashi Yōichi points out that, from the beginning of the Hashimoto administration in January of 1996, “normalising relations with Korea was a top Japanese priority” (1999: 92). But the territorial disputes were increasingly becoming an issue in domestic politics, as it appeared to more nationalistic politicians that Japan was taking a soft stance not only on the Liancourt Rocks but also on the Pinnacle Islands. Hirai Takushi, chairman of Heiseikai (an opposition grouping) accused the Hashimoto administration of being “obsequious” in its handling of diplomatic issues with South Korea and China, stating that “Japan should say and do what it should say and do without hesitation” (The Japan Times, 23/01/199).
The sovereignty game provides a means of understanding the re-emergence of the territorial dispute and the manner in which it played out, despite otherwise strengthening Japan-South Korea ties. Firstly, the abrogation of the secret pact – which had maintained the status quo for decades – is determinative. Reasons for this abrogation have already been suggested, but there can be little doubt of the importance of the role of the ratification of UNCLOS. It is not a coincidence that the first major flare in the Liancourt Rocks dispute
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(and in the Pinnacle Islands dispute for that matter, see Chapter Four) came not in 1987 after the first direct elections for the presidency were held in South Korea, nor did they come in 1992 when the democratic reformer, Kim Young-sam, was elected.105 Rather, the dispute re- emerged when UNCLOS was ratified, and Seoul’s actions were calculated to take full advantage of its already advantageous position in the sovereignty game: replying to another formal protest over the ongoing construction work on the wharf in November 1996, aside from the usual rebuff of Japan’s claims and statements regarding Korean sovereignty, Seoul added that construction work was a sovereign act over its inherent territory (Kyodo, 01/11/1996). Similarly when the Korean Defense Ministry announced the military exercises around the rocks in early 1996, the reasoning was that the exercises would “display the nation’s sovereign power over the islet in the face of Japan’s claim to it”. South Korea understood and was playing the sovereignty game – more than that, it was implementing a quick and early fait accompli.
The construction of the wharf represented a major change in the territorial status quo and raised the requirement for effective political protest. This helps make sense of Ikeda’s comments, which went far beyond anything emanating from Japan for decades.106 In the face of an apparent fait accompli, the Hashimoto administration had to act. Yet, Ikeda’s comments served to further enflame the situation, without, of course, having any effect on the wharf construction. It is highly unlikely that anyone in Tokyo thought that the South Korean government would cancel the wharf, but it is important to note that prior to 1996 Japan had
105 As mentioned above, Roh argues that the “spirit” of the pact was lost with the Kim (Young-sam and Dae-jun) generation of leaders emerged in newly democratic South Korea.
There is no doubt a truth in this, but while this may be true, the dispute could still have rolled along in the background if it were not for UNCLOS and the issue of a final demarcation maritime territory pushing the sovereignty over the rocks to the fore.
106 As mentioned earlier, according to the secret pact each year Tokyo quietly issued a note verbale protesting South Korea’s control over the rocks.
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not been willing to risk damaging relations with South Korea by making serious high level protests. But with the end of the pact, and negotiations on the horizon where sovereignty over the rocks could play a major role in determining access to lucrative fisheries (and, from the Japanese perspective, enable it to implement thorough conservation measures), a harder line on the dispute would give Japan a stronger bargaining position.
Yet, as we have seen, many Diet politicians were unhappy with the “obsequious”
stance taken by the Hashimoto administration towards the dispute. This, too, is understandable when seen through the lens of the sovereignty game. South Korea was explicitly attempting a fait accompli over the islands in the most effective way possible:
direct construction of state infrastructure which would enable further effective occupation.
Japan’s protests, although at a raised level, were never going to influence the South Korean policy on the rocks, nor was that their intent: as work on the wharf continued, Hashimoto and Kim, agreed to put the dispute aside and continue to work towards better bilateral relations.
Therefore the Hashimoto administration’s protests can be understood as a form of political acquiescence in South Korea’s attempt to change the sovereignty status quo.
The government was never going to use its military capital against South Korea (even in the sense of veiled threats or warnings), but it did enjoy a certain amount of diplomatic and economic capital, which it could have expended to try to bring Seoul back to the status quo ante in a manner which would enable both sides to keep face –whether this could have been done successfully or not is an entirely different question bearing in mind the historical issues and the symbolic value of the rocks in South Korea. In the end, it used neither, and the precedent was set: South Korea could exercise sovereignty freely over the rocks themselves, while all the Japanese government would do was make diplomatic protests.
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Despite the now complete loss of sovereignty over the rocks, the incident showed how unimportant they were to Japan in-and-of-themselves: the higher-level protest was made neither because it was legally necessary nor because it was believed it would have any effect, but rather it was made in view of the upcoming EEZ negotiations.
Aside from the new precedent of the free exercise of sovereignty by Seoul over the rocks, there was a further precedential element to the events of 1996 and 1997. In 1992 China passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which explicitly referred to the ‘Diaoyu Islands’ (Pinnacle Islands) as China’s territory, and in 1995 Chinese ships were spotted in the area. China also ratified UNCLOS in 1996, and so Japan and China were also facing EEZ negotiations on the waters around these disputed islands, with even higher stakes involved, given the potential strategic rivalry between the two, and not least the confirmed submarine deposits of oil and gas (see Chapter Four). As we have seen, the claim to the Liancourt Rocks has a precedential value in terms of the Pinnacles, increasing the importance of clear protests against South Korean actions. In 1996 there was also a political precedential value: taking a soft line on the Liancourt Rocks would reflect poorly on Japan’s claims over the Pinnacle Islands and could give the impression that Japan’s territorial policy was weak.