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and that its sovereignty over the rocks is therefore incomplete. Further, despite Seoul’s push for a fait accompli from 1996 on, the 1998 Fisheries Agreement did not represent any significant gains for South Korea nor did Japan lose out despite its own political acquiescence in the wharf construction. In sum, while Japan had lost the rocks through its political acquiescence in 1996, the result of the 1998 Fisheries agreement was that Japan’s maritime claim was not affected by that acquiescence, and, indeed, if anything, South Korea may have politically acquiesced in the existence of the dispute, thus improving Japan’s position.109
129 3.6.1 ‘Dokdo Stamps’
The ‘Dokdo Stamps’ issue began in 2003 with the announcement that South Korea would issue a series of stamps entitled “The Nature of Dokdo” in early 2004. This was in fact the third time that Seoul had issued ‘Dokdo stamps’, the first time being in 1954, two years after the declaration of the Rhee line, and the second being in August 2002. In 1954 Japan sought to return all post with these stamps affixed, but was blocked by Seoul’s use of the Universal Postal Union’s (UPU) rules (Ōtani, 1985 in Dobson, 2002: 24).110 Japan did, however, lodge a complaint directly to UPU regarding Seoul’s actions (Sankei Shimbun, 10/01/2004). In 2002, by contrast, the stamps were released as the football World Cup jointly hosted by Japan and South Korea came to an end, and just in advance of a trip by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō to Seoul. On that occasion neither the government nor the media picked up the issue, and no complaint was made – the story only emerged two years later, during the 2004 incident (Sankei Shimbun, 15/01/2004).
Unlike the 2002 issuance, the 2004 “The Nature of Dokdo” series did not pass off quietly. There was much internal debate in the LDP and the cabinet as to how best to deal with the issue, with then Posts Minister, Asō Tarō, coming out in favour of producing a
“Takeshima Stamp”. Koizumi balked at the idea, telling a press conference that while
“Takeshima is Japan’s territory ... it is better not to aggravate the situation” (Sankei Shimbun, 10/01/2004). Instead, the Foreign Minister, Kawaguchi Yoriko, telephoned her opposite number in Seoul, Yoon Young-kwan, asking for the stamps to be cancelled, a request which was unsurprisingly ignored. The stamps were released as planned on 16 January and sold out immediately. Kawaguchi called in the South Korean ambassador and informed him that
110 The UPU is the United Nations body responsible for international post.
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“Takeshima is Japan’s inherent territory” and that Japan could not accept Seoul’s actions (Sankei Shimbun, 17/01/2004).
While the Koizumi administration may have shied away from retaliating with
‘Takeshima Stamps’, private individuals did try to make use of a service offered by the Japan Post Office which allowed customers to submit their own photographs which form the background for stamps. Several successfully created ‘Takeshima Stamps’, which quickly increased in value, before the authorities caught on and decided to clamp down on the practice (Sankei Shimbun, 04/03/2004, 05/04/2004).111 The result was that Tonooka Teruo, a former assistant professor at Tokyo Gakugei University and prominent member of the far- right nationalist party, New Wind, actually took the Japan Post to court after he was told that, following consultation with MOFA, the Japan Post Office would not allow stamps which could cause diplomatic problems to be produced under the scheme (Asahi Shimbun, 04/03/2004, 19/11/2004). Toonoka’s case was raised in the Diet by LDP member Morioka Masahiro (Diet Minutes, 2004), who also criticised the inaction of the government and called on Asō to change the policy regarding the stamps.
In 2004 Japan acquiesced in the production of the ‘Dokdo Stamps’ – as it had done in 2002. In 1954 the possibility of refusing post which came with the stamps affixed was seriously considered; it was rejected only because it would violate the UPU treaty. Instead, a complaint was lodged with the UPU. In 2002 the stamp issue passed completely without notice. But in 2004 the media (especially the Sankei Shimbun) and domestic politicians caught hold of the issue, using it to criticise the government’s perceived soft stance on the
111 The ministry went as far to as to contact one particular businessman who was selling the stamps online in order to have him return the remainder – he told them he had already sold out.
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dispute. 112 The result was that, while the Koizumi administration was forced to act, the actions were carefully calculated, in Koizumi’s own words, “not to aggravate the situation”.
It is unlikely that the Koizumi administration could have done anything to prevent the issuance of the stamps, but it is highly significant that it refused to undertake similar measures itself and moreover that private individuals were prevented from doing so.
If, as Stanley Brunn (2000: 2 in Dobson, 2002: 24) states, “stamps are products or
‘windows’ of the state that illustrate how it wishes to be seen by its own citizens and those beyond its boundaries”, then we can conclude that, while South Korea was making its position on the Liancourt Rocks very clear, Japan’s reaction (or lack thereof) to South Korea’s ‘Dokdo Stamps’ during both 2002 and 2004 shows that the rocks themselves simply were not a high priority for Japan – certainly not considered ‘national homeland’ – and it was unwilling to jeopardise relations with South Korea in order to maintain a credible political claim. As with the construction of the wharf and the resulting precedent created by the Hashimoto administration’s political acquiescence, the Koizumi administration was cognisant of the virtual impossibility of effecting a change to South Korea’s policy, and the diplomatic risks it would run if it tried. Rather, the government had abandoned the idea of recovering the rocks and instead, as in previous years, was just doing enough politically to maintain the maritime and precedential aspects of the claim to the rocks.
112 In the one-year period after the announcement of the stamps Sankei Shimbun carried 39 articles relating to the issue, while Mainichi Shimbun carried 13 and even the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun carried only 18.
132 3.6.2 Nihon Shidokai Attempted Landing
The attempted landing by Nihon Shidokai in May of the same year (2004) conforms to this reading of the Japanese government’s attitude to the rocks. The success of seven Chinese activists in their attempts to land on the Pinnacle Islands in March of 2004 provoked right- wing groups into action (see Chapter Four, Section 4.10). Members of Nihon Shidokai announced their intention to land on the Liancourt Rocks, and left their headquarters in Takamatsu on 2 May, making their way to Shimane Prefecture. On their way they spent some time publicising their trip on the streets before departing for the rocks from Nishino Island on 6 May. However, they were intercepted by the Japanese Coast Guard, which
“warned them” of the dangers of making the trip, and they were sent back to shore.
Considering that in the days running up to the event itself they had made statements such as
“in order that it be known that Takeshima is Japan’s inherent territory, we accept the risk of capture in our landing attempt” (Yomiuri Shimbun, 07/05/2004), it is very unlikely that they turned back without offering some sort of resistance.
There is little doubt that the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) was under strict orders to make sure that under no circumstances were they to be allowed to land on the rocks. Despite their failure to get close to the rocks, the incident was widely reported in the South Korean media. When news of the planned trip reached South Korea, Seoul not only requested that Japan prevent the group from sailing but it also deployed warships, helicopters, and commandoes in the waters around the rocks – all this for a small protest boat (The Chosun Ilbo, 05/05/2004). In Japan, however, the entire episode barely registered in the media,
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whereas Korean newspapers carried both the build-up and aftermath of the incident.113 Given the symbolic aspect of the dispute and the South Korean reaction to the news of the planned landings (the deployment of warships and helicopters) if the activists had made it to the waters around the rocks the situation would have been highly unpredictable and very dangerous. Thus, the Japanese government’s decision to prevent the activists from reaching the rocks is understandable. None-the-less it is worth contrasting this stance with that of China, which actively encouraged (or at the very least acted complicity with) citizen activists in their attempts to land in 2004 (see Chapter Four, Section 4.10). Also, considering the potential for trouble, it is interesting that the incident barely featured in the Japanese media.
The reason for the low-profile nature of the incident in Japan was, once again, Japan’s position in the sovereignty game: the rocks were off the table, the government was focused on the maritime territory and the potential precedential aspects of the dispute.
This policy proved successful until 2005, as the government played down the dispute while the media for the most part did not deem it newsworthy, keeping the dispute off the agenda and away from the national consciousness. The precedent of South Korean control over the rocks may have been routinised, but that was now of little concern to Japan.
However, as the next section shows, it would be the very attempts to play down the dispute which would cause sub-state actors to unwittingly catapult it to the very centre of Japan- South Korea relations.
113 In fact only two of national dailies even carried the story, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun.
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