t might seem a statement of the obvious that the strategic mobility of a nation’s military begins with the ability to move a force to where it is needed. It may be less apparent that that mobility is determined by the comprehensive readiness of a nation’s transportation network, depots and ports to respond to the crisis within the time frame necessary. As these capabilities decline, or some become weaker than others, then the ability of a nation to respond is reduced generally to the readiness of the weakest component. Generating military force results from the synchronization of several activities toward a common end. It is not easy.
An overriding reminder about the Falkland Islands War is that wars sometimes occur at times and in places least expected. Since the 1960s, financial constraints had replaced a comprehensive strategy with regard to the United Kingdom’s overseas commitments. Such clearly was still the case in 1982. Not only did Britain underestimate Argentina’s resolve to take the islands by force if necessary; it appeared to miscalculate the seriousness behind rumblings in the media and elsewhere leading up to the invasion.
Fortunately, its armed forces were reasonably well prepared for deployment at the time, even though there were vast differences between the readiness of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and 5 Infantry Brigade. Had the invasion occurred later in the year, as was originally planned by the Argentine Junta, some of the Royal Navy ships which proved so valuable would have been out of the inventory. That spring, its two remaining aircraft carriers were still available and all of its amphibious ships, including logistics ships, were basically ready. Depots were filled with supplies, many configured on to pallets for specific units and periods of time. But Britain lacked troop transport capabilities, supply ships, a hospital ship and a wide variety of other support vessels to sustain a task force over long distances for several months.
Movement assets became the weakest component in deploying a force quickly. The speed with which commercial shipping companies freed up vessels, the synchronization of activities and supply chains to convert dozens of ships to meet military needs, and the responsiveness of work forces throughout the United Kingdom to get jobs done almost belie belief over thirty years later. The British military could not have deployed a credible force, let alone won the Falklands War, without industry and thousands of people working behind the scenes. Fortunately, the government had procedures in place for such eventualities.
The Queen approved the orders quickly, industry cooperated fully and the result was last-minute mobility.
The success of these efforts underscores the power of national resolve, something that is often lacking when politicians commit countries to war.
Despite its eventual ability to deploy a task force, however, the British military had no plans in place to counter a full-scale invasion of the Falklands. As a result, and given the vast distances to the South Atlantic, it is not surprising that so many in the MoD and the government remained hesitant about taking on such a challenge. Fortunately, the Royal Navy recognized the need to bridge the gap to the South Atlantic early and dispatched a handful of men to Ascension Island to set up supply operations the day after the invasion, as some support ships were already heading in that direction. Early establishment of that forward support base between the United Kingdom and the Falklands remains one of the most crucial decisions behind the eventual victory. The small island and the support personnel who arrived early to start operations there were as vital to the victory as the brave men on ships or fighting up the mountains surrounding Stanley.
It would be quite an overstatement to say that operations at Ascension went smoothly. Like many other things in the Falklands War, arrangements and operations there were ad hoc. The support unit had no visibility over what was coming into the airfield on any given day, or even over what was showing up off the island’s shores. Many times it was not clear where supplies were destined, other than for the South Atlantic generally. It just so happened that with further British ingenuity Ascension became much more than a supply base. It proved an essential training area for troops to practise landing from landing craft and helicopters, to zero their rifles and guns and for ships to prepare and sharpen damage control teams, while others degaussed Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and merchant ships to make them less susceptible to magnetic mines. It also became a launch pad for dozens of planes to extend the reach of the nation’s supply lines and for Vulcan bombers to demonstrate their ability to strike deep into the southern hemisphere. The MoD had no hope of establishing and maintaining logistics to its task force without some such place en route. Just a week after Thatcher’s decision to deploy forces, fully converted ships were leaving the shores of England as other ships were starting to arrive at Ascension to receive supplies. And although the Amphibious Task Force was still working at Ascension to reconfigure cargo on ships by 1 May, other parts of the Task Force by then were fully engaged in combat in the South Atlantic.
Deployments continued from the United Kingdom as the first troops were hitting the beaches near San Carlos. Ships were still being requisitioned and converted in May. Supplies continued to funnel into Ascension and from there on to ships headed south. Cargo planes from Ascension completed their last airdrops of supplies to the Task Force at the end of June. Even after the surrender, the small island helped the British maintain logistics momentum.
As ships were being modified in the United Kingdom and support operations were commencing at Ascension, a host of other activities began to prepare weapons systems for long voyages south and eventual battle, as well as to obtain other equipment. The Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force, for example, rushed to modify aircraft for added protection against potential corrosion during ocean travel in rough seas. The Fleet Air Arm adapted Harriers to use the latest model Sidewinder missiles received from the United States, and modified Sea King helicopters for the use of Passive Night Goggles; the Royal Air Force enabled its Vulcan bombers to handle laser-guided bombs. Procurement commenced immediately of air-to-air refuelling equipment so that Vulcans, Nimrods and C-130s could perform their missions at long distances south of Ascension. This included not only probes for the aircraft but new navigational systems, so that pilots could link up their planes with tankers to take on fuel. As some focused on such equipment issues, other staff initiated procurement of shipping containers that could withstand airdrops at sea or worked to solve a range of other challenges, like the fuel and water storage limitations at Ascension, which led eventually to the construction of a new fuel pipeline from the shore to Wideawake Airfield. All such efforts and many others behind the scenes helped to ensure the Task Force had what it needed to get to the South Atlantic with readiness to fight. When the call to arms went out, British men and women worked eighteen hour days or longer to ensure troops had what they needed. Things came together quickly and effectively, obviously the combined result of effective staff work, streamlined procedures and willing workers. The Second World War was the last time military action of any type had produced such overwhelming national unity.
The Falklands War clearly highlights the difficulty of executing an amphibious assault, still probably the most challenging of military operations. Some of the Royal Marines involved had spent most of their careers training in amphibious operations, but none of the Royal Navy or British Army had. To say that the Task Force was well prepared for such an operation would be quite an overstatement. Commodore Clapp’s small amphibious staff was newly assembled; most had to learn their jobs as they went. Prior to their deployment, the Royal Navy, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and logistics units had never had the opportunity to participate in exercises requiring large-scale logistics support over beaches in peacetime, except through simulations. Budgets simply did not allow for such costly training. Consequently, much of their operational experience was limited to fixed facilities and robust infrastructures. Although they surely had thought about the challenges of ‘going live’, their previous training provided no substitute for hands-on experience in what are commonly termed logistics-over-the-shore operations. Air attacks shredded their plans and forced a bigger buildup ashore. For the first week on land, they found themselves reacting to conditions at hand and simultaneously moving and issuing supplies as they continued struggling to build up more supplies ashore so that combat forces eventually could break away from beach areas and pursue other objectives. The net result was that frustrations developed not only for those waiting for rucksacks near the beach but all the way back to London. The services often did not understand each other’s needs.
Except for those at San Carlos trying to execute the amphibious operation while withstanding withering attacks from the air, few if any in the British military grasped the complexity of those operations.
Often regarded as the unique speciality of marines, amphibious operations are inherently joint in nature and not exclusive to any service. The navy’s role is undisputedly large, and the responsibilities of the Commander Amphibious Task Force in protecting forces and getting them and their supplies to the right places on time are complex to say the least. And yet before the Falklands War, there were few in the Royal Navy who had a full understanding of the array of challenges underlying such operations. British amphibious operations had been limited to peacetime ‘administrative landings’, with host nations providing protection and necessary facilities. Staffing and training had taken a back seat to other Navy priorities. Commodore Clapp himself had never practised such operations before taking over responsibility for the Amphibious Task Force. It is understandable why others outside San Carlos Water became anxious at times about developments. It is also quite remarkable that, with such limited training beforehand and persistent threats from the Argentine Air Force, the amphibious operation came off so successfully. Establishing logistics capability remains essential in amphibious operations before forces can pursue objectives beyond beaches. Although that capability can remain afloat, it must be responsive to the needs of the land force.
Some have concluded rightly from the Falklands War that the integration of logistics and combat operations is essential. Nations have lost wars in the past when they failed to integrate the two. Britain did not come close to that in the Falklands, thanks to some luck and to the fact that its commanders generally were focused on making sure logistics wherewithal was in place. Such was their focus both during amphibious operations and after the breakout. For example, 3 Commando Brigade units started their marches across East Falkland as logistics ships were preparing to move supplies around the west side of the island from Ajax Bay to Teal Inlet to join them. That build-up was underway by the time Major General Moore and 5 Infantry Brigade arrived at the end of May. Care was taken to get supplies and firepower in place before the battle for the mountains. Brigadier Thompson altered plans and halted forces after the first phase of attacks, to make sure that sufficient support moved forward to maintain momentum. The battle for the high ground surrounding Stanley remained effective because of both heroic fighting and well-executed plans to ensure units continued to receive the support they needed.
The costly effects of not fully integrating logistics and tactics became evident twice during the war. At Goose Green, 2 Para went into battle with less support than it needed. A few days after winning that fight, the same paratroopers seized an opportunity to advance quickly to Fitzroy and in the process discovered it would take nearly a week to get supplies and services to them. This situation was quite different to the delayed build-up after the amphibious landing and the movement of supplies by LSL to the other side of
East Falkland. On the isthmus leading to Goose Green, 3 Commando Brigade misjudged the situation and the support needed by 2 Para. When 2 Para then seized an opportunity to advance, 5 Brigade did not consider the eventual difficulty of sustaining a battalion of paratroopers once it arrived at Fitzroy. Both situations produced consequences, but neither jeopardized the outcome of the war. Had commanders like Clapp and Thompson not remained focused on integrating logistics and combat operations, however, the war might have turned out differently.
The long distance to the Falklands was another consideration for the British, especially when it came to supporting their forces. Given three weeks to get supplies by sea from the United Kingdom, and about half as long just from Ascension, they did not have the capability to make up for losses quickly by ocean shipping. Although C-130s could airdrop many things to the Task Force, these cargo planes were insufficient to replace large quantities. Consequently, Britain took steps early to protect its fragile supply chain to the South Atlantic, starting at Ascension with surveillance and continuing throughout the war as the Royal Navy moved its ships day and night around the Falklands to keep them as safe as possible. It wisely maintained many supply ships beyond the reach of Argentine pilots. Even though the British went to great lengths to protect their supply chain, they were not always successful. Although the Task Force suffered significant setbacks due to its inability to control the skies, those setbacks were not enough to cripple the force.
Some have proposed that the two aircraft carriers, HMSs Hermes and Invincible, constituted the centre of gravity of the Task Force. It is true that the British would have had a much more difficult time countering the persistent attacks by Argentine fighters without the majority of its Harriers. But such beliefs would have to consider the timing of any possible successful hit on a carrier. Once engineers and logisticians had established landing strips and refuelling ashore, the effects of the loss of a carrier would have been less. Admiral Henry Leach, the head of the Royal Navy at the time, admitted in his memoir after the war that he believed they would lose twice as many ships; yet he never wavered in his belief that the British would win.1 One can make a more compelling argument that the logistics capabilities of the Task Force constituted the centre of gravity of the campaign, at least through 1 June when the Force had built up supplies on land and started moving them forward. Prior to that, severe damage to their supplies would have either stopped or significantly delayed the British capability to generate combat power ashore. Had bombs exploded on impact when they hit the LSLs Galahad, Lancelot and Bedivere just after the landings, the British could have lost half of the logistics vessels able to approach shallow waters, hampering not only the initial build-up but also the forward positioning of supplies by those ships later on.
All of these ships were packed with supplies, equipment and, at times, men. If the Argentines had bombed the merchant ship MV Elk, they might have destroyed the majority of the Land Force’s ammunition. If they had hit ships carrying fuel, they could have grounded helicopters and more. Hits on either of the converted transports Norland or Canberra, both massive targets that dwarfed the warships in Falkland Sound, could have been catastrophic on D-Day because of the troops and supplies on board. It is not hard to imagine the difficulties such losses would have created for the Task Force.
Commanders were justifiably concerned about their lack of air superiority and the ability of the Argentines to launch Exocet missiles. The Task Force remained vulnerable to the interdiction of its supply lines for almost the entire the war. It so happened that, before the invasion, Argentine pilots had trained primarily on attacking ground targets rather than ships at sea. Making split second decisions, after flying hundreds of miles from Argentina and then avoiding British air defences when reaching the Falklands, challenged pilots even more. Years later, it now appears that these pilots often were not following the instructions of their superiors, who had told them to target transports, landing craft and logistics ships instead of warships.2 There can be little doubt that the outcome of the war might have been quite different had Argentine pilots followed those orders and more of their bombs had exploded. Fighting over long distances with little forward support, as the British did, makes a force more susceptible to interdiction.
It might surprise some to discover that supply was never a serious problem during the war, though. The British returned having learned many lessons about the quality of some supplies and scales of allocation for others, such as ammunition. And although there were instances where troops suffered in the rough weather without supplies, the Task Force had the essentials it needed throughout the war. The Argentines never seriously crippled its logistics capabilities, despite causing huge losses at times. It is true that as the war was coming to an end, the Royal Navy was running out of some ammunition. At other times during the ground war, as during the battle for Goose Green, gunners stopped firing because they had no more ammunition. By the time the Argentines surrendered in Stanley, some artillery batteries were on their last rounds as well. But plenty of ammunition remained elsewhere, and it would have reached fighting positions after a pause.
The same is generally true for the Argentine military. Although soldiers in the field often suffered from lack of food and supply, a steady flow of supplies continued from the mainland to Stanley right up to the end of the war. Navy and merchant shipping stopped supplying the Falklands after the sinking of Belgrano, but the Argentine Air Force, Navy and civilian aircraft were landing multiple times daily from the invasion until the day before the surrender, often backhauling casualties. Flights were aborted on three days in May due to crosswinds. Otherwise, brave pilots guided their planes into Stanley, avoiding British radar while under constant threat of Harrier attack. They compiled an impressive record of flying 2,356 hours to the islands. British pilots tried repeatedly to stop the flow, but they only succeeded once, when on 1 June a Harrier pilot successfully downed a C-130 with a Sidewinder missile.3 Operational-level logistics remained effective for the Argentine military despite not having ocean shipping at its disposal.