hen he arrived in the San Carlos area on 30 May, Major General Moore was intent on bringing the war smartly to an end. All British land forces now were under his command and control.
When the Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas arrived in the next few days, numbers on land would increase to around 10,000. It had been nine days since the successful amphibious landing.
Losses had been significant on land as well as at sea since then. Although the stunning victory at Goose Green had bolstered morale in the Task Force and back in London, much remained to be done. Moore hoped to bring the war to an end in the next week. Much depended, however, on how quickly he could get remaining units and supplies in position for an attack on Argentine forces concentrated around Stanley.
By this time, units were spread around East Falkland. Two units, 45 Commando and 3 Para, were completing their movements across East Falkland carrying heavy packs. On Mount Kent, 42 Commando was digging in under harsh weather. Exhausted from fighting down the isthmus, 2 Para remained around the settlement at Goose Green, where it was finally getting its first shelter since D-Day in community buildings and trying to dry out clothing. In reserve and still at San Carlos was 40 Commando. Support arms, including Commando Logistic Regiment, remained in the San Carlos, Port San Carlos and Ajax Bay areas. Helicopters needed to relocate artillery forward. LSLs also needed to continue the movement of hundreds of tons of supplies around the west side of East Falkland into Teal Inlet to strengthen the FBMA, from which Commando Logistic Regiment eventually would support the push toward Stanley. Although the build-up at Teal Inlet would take a few more days, pieces appeared to be moving into place to start an advance on Stanley soon. The main question to be answered was how. This was foremost in Moore’s mind when he arrived. His first priority was to huddle with his two brigade commanders and decide the best path forward.
Marines within 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron hurriedly set up space in a cowshed provided by a farmer at San Carlos Settlement for Thompson’s staff to brief Major General Moore. Brigadier Thompson urged the continuance of his current build-up around Teal Inlet and, from that general area, a concentrated attack on Stanley from the west. He did not see the need for a two- pronged advance, especially if that was just to get additional units into the fight. Instead, he envisioned phased combat operations to defeat Argentines, who had been establishing fighting positions over past weeks atop the half dozen mountains surrounding Stanley. Intelligence had reported that these forces had established formidable defences. Thompson knew that his units would bypass these mountains at their own peril. They had to defeat and demoralize the Argentines on the hilltops before their leaders in Stanley would ever surrender. His plan called for 45 Commando to take Two Sisters, 42 Commando to seize Mount Harriet, and 3 Para to defeat the Argentines on Mount Longdon. Once these objectives were under British control, 3 Para would seize Wireless Ridge and 45 Commando would assault Tumbledown Mountain and Mount William, with 42 Commando reverting to forward reserve. After that, he would designate a unit to seize Sapper Hill. Then units would break into the flat ground surrounding Stanley. In reserve would be 2 Para at Goose Green and 40 Commando at San Carlos, throughout fights for the mountains and for Stanley as conditions warranted. Thompson’s Brigade was just a few days away from having sufficient supplies positioned forward that he could execute this battle plan.
Moore agreed to continue the build-up of the logistics base at Teal Inlet for 3 Commando Brigade, since it was already underway and units would become vulnerable without it. This decision to focus on building up logistics in that forward area would reduce the number of available helicopters, landing craft and mexeflotes to assist the offload of supplies in the anchorage and to move any supplies to 5 Brigade units.
Once the build-up at Teal Inlet for 3 Commando Brigade was complete, however, Moore indicated that priority would shift to 5 Brigade to establish another FBMA in the vicinity of Fitzroy and Bluff Cove, 10–
15km to the north of Fitzroy depending on the route. There were simply too few transportation resources to share equally between the two brigades after the loss of Atlantic Conveyor. With Moore now in the Falklands, officials back in London seemed to temper criticism of delayed activity on the ground. As one War Cabinet minister supposedly confessed, ‘I think ministers were a bit ashamed of the way they behaved after San Carlos … We were learning from experience: we wanted a quick victory, but this time we were more ready to defer to military advice.’1 Moore gave Thompson and Wilson guidance for his anticipated two-pronged approach toward Stanley. He wanted to get 5 Brigade into the action. Thompson would continue on his northern axis and Wilson would establish a new axis from the south beyond Goose Green to Fitzroy and then onward to Stanley. When both forces were in position and ready, the battle for Stanley would begin. Moore also changed the organization. Not surprisingly, 2 Para reverted to command and control of 5 Brigade, just as Moore had indicated to Wilson during their passage south. Moore was keenly aware of the precarious position of British forces, with winter setting in and also because of the significant British losses to date. Concerns were starting to develop about the fitness and health of units who had now been operating in this harsh environment for nearly two weeks. There was no way of avoiding the reality that thousands of miles separated the Task Force from the forward operating base at
Ascension and that the Royal Navy remained very vulnerable at sea. He needed to get the war over as soon as possible but also in a methodical, sustainable fashion. That required the integration of logistics into planning and execution, just as Thompson had been working to achieve since landing. Moore’s guidance called for completion of the logistics build-up at Teal Inlet and then at Fitzroy, before the assault toward Stanley.
After the meeting, Moore confronted the painful reality of recent fighting on East Falkland. Over past days, helicopters had been extracting to Ajax Bay the bodies of paratroopers killed in the fight for Goose Green. Engineers had prepared a mass grave site for their burial that day. He and dozens of others stood solemnly above as six paratroopers carried each body bag covered by the Union Flag, one by one, down into the grave. Seventeen men were buried that day, eleven of them officers and noncommissioned officers who had died leading their men.2
Also on 30 May, Wilson boarded a helicopter for Goose Green to meet with Major Keeble to discuss options about a southern advance toward Stanley. Just off their astounding victory at Goose Green, 2 Para was tired, but its leaders also were pumped for more action. They had ideas of how to advance, as did Wilson. His plan envisioned a cross-country march by 5 Brigade units from San Carlos areas and Goose Green to Port Pleasant near Fitzroy, with 2 Para reverting to support, essentially providing flank protection from the mountains to the west for the march of the other three combat battalions to Fitzroy.
Keeble and staff were not happy with Wilson’s ideas. The plan they preferred would continue the momentum gained at Goose Green by immediately advancing toward Swan Inlet, defeating whatever enemy force was there, and then moving onward in direct fashion to Fitzroy. Lively discussion ensued. The battlefield huddle ended, however, with no decision but some hard feelings on both sides. The get- together did not get off to a start that encouraged camaraderie, when paratroopers witnessed Wilson arriving at their location wearing a red beret, the cherished symbol of the Parachute Regiment, instead of his own light infantry beret, as well as wellington boots.3 The boots, indeed, were sensible footwear for the Falklands, but no one else had them, and the paratroopers’ feet were still wet from their landing on D- Day. It was probably at this meeting that Wilson also advised Keeble that he was not remaining in command of 2 Para, higher authorities having determined that, despite Keeble’s successful leadership during the fight for Goose Green, 2 Para still deserved a higher ranking commander. That man would be Lieutenant Colonel David Chaundler, who was then en route to the South Atlantic. Wilson returned to San Carlos from his meeting at Goose Green having issued no orders and having frustrated 2 Para.
On 1 June, ships started arriving in the anchorage to unload 5 Brigade and its stores. The first was Atlantic Causeway with twenty Wessex helicopters and eight Sea Kings. Both types would be vital in continuing the forward build-up of supplies and ammunition. The next day, Canberra and Norland arrived with 5 Brigade troop units. It took twenty-four hours to offload the Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas. Once off their ships, these battalions reorganized around anchorage areas. Due to limited communications during their passage south from the United Kingdom, they knew little more than the general situation on the ground. The two Guards battalions had not received guidance about how they would be employed beyond the beachhead. The Gurkhas quickly prepared to relocate by the lone Chinook helicopter to Goose Green to relieve 2 Para in place. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Chaundler, the newly designated commander of 2 Para, arrived in the San Carlos area, even less aware of the situation at hand than the three battalions offloading from ships. Although Keeble had performed exceptionally well as acting commander following the death of H. Jones, the MoD preferred a lieutenant colonel to lead 2 Para, and Chaundler was the designated officer to replace Jones as command tours changed. In fine paratrooper tradition, he had parachuted into the South Atlantic on 1 June near the Carrier Battle Group and arrived on Fearless in the early morning of 2 June, where he met Wilson before finding a bunk for a few hours. He awoke later that morning to learn that the Brigadier had left by helicopter for Goose Green to meet with Keeble without him. Chaundler hitched a ride on another helicopter to Darwin, walked to Goose Green and arrived later that day. By then, however, Wilson had already told Keeble to execute the 2 Para plan for taking Swan Inlet. Actions were well underway.4
The paratroopers had wasted no time. They softened up the area of Swan Inlet with fire from scout helicopters, then shuttled troops forward with other helicopters. Entering the settlement, they were surprised to discover no evidence of Argentines. Locating a working telephone, a paratrooper proceeded to dial a number at Fitzroy settlement and received an answer from the daughter of the settlement manager. He asked whether there were any Argentines in the Fitzroy area and learned to everyone’s surprise that none were there. Scout helicopters returned paratroopers to Goose Green within the hour.
They quickly contacted and briefed Wilson about their discovery, seeking his approval to move to Fitzroy immediately, confident they could secure the surrounding area without a struggle and further prepare the way for the assault on Stanley. It was a bold initiative and timely, since that same morning Argentines had destroyed much of the 150-foot timber bridge connecting Darwin to Stanley over the Fitzroy Inlet to slow any British advance.
Wilson’s approval to proceed and 2 Para’s rapid advance forward set in motion a series of actions that ultimately would produce shocking consequences and significantly delay Moore’s plans for a rapid end to the war. At the time, the only Chinook helicopter operating in the Falklands was then in the process of relocating the Gurkhas and their supplies to Goose Green. Wilson hijacked without permission that Chinook to help springboard paratroopers forward to Fitzroy as quickly as possible. The single Chinook and 5 Brigade’s scout helicopters started shuttling the parachute battalion from Goose Green to Fitzroy, refuelling between sorties from drums of Argentine fuel at the Goose Green airstrip. At one point, 2 Para pressured Chinook pilots to take as many as eighty paratroopers forward in a single lift, nearly doubling
the published troop-carrying capacity of the large transport helicopter. A British Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre observation post on a nearby mountain watched the insertions, thinking at first that Argentines were moving into Fitzroy, and notified 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters, which proceeded to prepare two batteries of artillery to fire on the suspected enemy troops. Fortunately, it checked with LFFI Headquarters, learned of 2 Para’s move and cancelled the fire mission.5 Failure to keep adjacent units informed had nearly caused a friendly-fire incident. By nightfall on 2 June, most of 2 Para and its battalion headquarters were secure in areas surrounding Fitzroy. The move proved to be another coup by 2 Para. Unfortunately, it did not figure in LFFI strategy. Matters became complicated because of the difficulty of providing support to the paratroopers in their new location, support which they now needed and fully expected.
British ground forces at the time were in no position to do what logically would follow in a synchronized operation: to consolidate their foothold and prepare for future operations by moving supporting units and supplies into the Fitzroy area as well. Seizing Fitzroy was a bold undertaking to be sure, very much akin to the Paras’ success at Goose Green, but this time 2 Para had put itself close to enemy-held territory, less than 30km from Argentine forces at Stanley and closer still to those who were on mountain tops. They were over 50km from their sustainment base on the beachhead at Ajax. Now they were huddling into Fitzroy as night closed in, with only the supplies they had carried forward on their backs. The paratroopers lacked protection from supporting artillery and air defence. They had advanced far beyond the ability of 5 Brigade or the FMA to sustain them. Making matters even worse, they had outrun their radio communication capabilities and could talk to neither Wilson’s headquarters nor to any units on the beachhead. The unit had pushed itself to the very end of a weak tether and without any way of receiving supplies or reinforcement quickly.
The surprising advance by 2 Para into Fitzroy happened at a time when movement assets were straining to their limit. Ships carrying Welsh Guards, Scots Guards, Gurkhas and supplies for all of 5 Brigade were just arriving in the anchorage. Logisticians were preparing to offload those ships as quickly as possible as they worked to complete the build-up at Teal Inlet approved by Major General Moore upon his arrival.
Logistics ships, landing craft and helicopters would be needed in the anchorage and between the anchorage and Teal Inlet for several days to transport supplies and equipment. With no large cargo helicopters other than the single Chinook, transportation capabilities remained scarce to move supplies by air to Fitzroy, despite added assets unloading from Atlantic Causeway. Transportation over land was not possible. The only alternative route to bolster 2 Para now was from the San Carlos area to Fitzroy by sea.
That route extended from the anchorage in San Carlos Water all the way around Lafonia and up the east coast toward Fitzroy, a distance of 157 nautical miles, more than twice the distance from the anchorage to Teal Inlet. It would take a slow LSL sixteen hours to complete such a trip, making it impossible to complete the passage in the fourteen hours of darkness prevailing in the Falklands at the time. None of the coastline or surrounding sea over this long distance had been cleared of Argentine forces, ships or sea mines. Furthermore, it was important for ships to keep radio and radar silence so as not to give away their approach. This made it a very difficult route to navigate as there were reefs and low land that could not be seen at night. The water in Port Pleasant, the anchorage for Fitzroy, was too shallow for a frigate to escort and offer gunfire support. Unlike at Teal Inlet, where soldiers could unload a newly arrived LSL under the protection of remaining hours of darkness, those at Fitzroy would have to offload during daylight. Ships, landing craft and soldiers would be far more vulnerable. Making matters worse, the waters off Fitzroy were visible from Mount Harriet and Mount Challenger, where Argentine observation posts were located.
But 5 Brigade and others at Division Headquarters were to view 2 Para’s surprise advance from quite different perspectives. Wilson had been waiting for such an opportunity to get his soldiers forward quickly ever since he had arrived, and now saw nothing but opportunities ahead. He excitedly announced his intentions later that night at San Carlos: ‘I’m moving people forward as fast as I can with stocks of ammunition to launch what I suppose could be called the final offensive. I’ve grabbed fifty-five kilometres in this great jump forward and I want to consolidate it.’6 He commandeered a local coastal vessel named Monsoonen at Goose Green which some soon dubbed ‘Wilson’s private navy’.7 Manned by watch-keeping officers from Fearless, the vessel soon would start moving his tactical headquarters, remaining troops and supplies. Wilson issued orders to the Welsh and Scots Guards to prepare to relocate. The Welsh Guards would take over from 2 Para north of Fitzroy at Bluff Cove, establishing positions even closer to Stanley.
The Scots Guards would take over from 2 Para east of Bluff Cove, and 2 Para then would revert to Brigade reserve. Such positioning would set the stage for a brigade attack toward Stanley along a southern route.
The problem, however, was not the concept but the timing and difficulty of relocating additional ground forces and the necessary support and supplies for his entire brigade, most of which still awaited offloading in the San Carlos anchorage. The newly arrived commander of 2 Para recommended, ‘Since there was no immediate need for fighting troops, air defence and logistics should be moved before infantry battalions.’8 Others at Division Headquarters shared Chaundler’s opinion. The focus nonetheless remained on teeth rather than tail.
The advance to Fitzroy had made a shambles of plans to integrate tactics and logistics. Even though Thompson’s forces were pressuring Moore’s headquarters for movement assets to get supplies across the island for the attack on Stanley, something now had to be done soon to get supplies and protection to Fitzroy. The possibility remained that Menendez would launch a counter-attack against 2 Para. If that happened, paratroopers would be in for a tough fight without possibility of reinforcement or added sustainment. Shifting transportation assets available to push units or supplies to Fitzroy would set back