Final Preparation for the Amphibious Assault
D- Day and the Struggle to Build up Logistics
he Amphibious Task Group marshalled with the Carrier Battle Group north of the Falklands on 18 May, a few days before landings were scheduled. Tensions ran high, but there was good cause for optimism despite the setbacks and frustrations of past weeks. Intelligence indicated that Argentina had not reinforced areas near the landing sites. Less than a company of Argentine soldiers were in the area of San Carlos at the time to maintain observation of the stretch of water known as Falkland Sound, which separated East and West Falkland. Although several hundred Argentines were south-east of San Carlos in the settlement at Goose Green, most still remained in positions around Stanley, the capital. The Argentines believed that the British would land closer to the capital, either to the north around Berkeley Sound or south in the area of Port Harriet. The British wanted to keep it that way, so they planned diversions early the next morning at both locations to keep Brigadier General Menendez looking in those directions while 3 Commando Brigade seized objectives around San Carlos. They also planned a diversion at Darwin, halfway down the isthmus towards Goose Green. They intended to have the beachhead secure by first light so that the build-up ashore could commence without pause. Then it only became a question of how quickly and effectively Argentina would react.
Ever since the 17 April meeting at Ascension with Admiral Fieldhouse, the Amphibious Task Force had been planning on British air superiority. It had become clear in recent days, however, that the Carrier Battle Group had not achieved control of the skies around the islands as some had anticipated. Now, intelligence warned that air attacks were likely following the landings, but that it would probably take Argentina half a day to sort out the confusion caused by diversions and to counter with fighters from the mainland. Because of this possibility, though, the British had taken steps to reduce the number of high- value targets in the area of the landings. Consequently, they were holding merchant vessels like Elk, which carried thousands of tons of ammunition for the Task Force, in the LLA at the eastern edge of the TEZ for safety. No one doubted that Argentine pilots could complicate matters. But few of the British, whether in the Task Force making final preparations to land or in the United Kingdom anxiously awaiting first reports, expected what happened in the next few days. Moreover, the Amphibious Task Force had not agreed upon steps to be taken should air strikes disrupt the logistics plan. This would produce dramatic consequences in the days ahead.
Ships supporting the landings split away from the Carrier Battle Group in the early afternoon of 20 May and headed south toward Falkland Sound in three phases, each timed to prevent unnecessary congestion in Falkland Sound and the San Carlos anchorage. The destroyer Antrim and frigate Ardent led the first group, consisting of the LPD Fearless with 40 Commando, the LPD Intrepid with 3 Para and the frigate Yarmouth. As Ardent positioned herself in the Sound to provide gunfire support to the Special Air Service diversionary raid near Darwin, Wessex helicopters from Antrim would insert marines from the Special Boat Squadron and naval gunfire observers to help eliminate an Argentine observation post at Fanning Head on East Falkland. Shortly thereafter, the LPDs escorted by Yarmouth would sail through the darkness of the Sound, presumably unnoticed by Argentines at Fanning Head or observation posts on places like Mount Rosalie on West Falkland, anchor near the entrance to San Carlos at Chanco Point and release landing craft to shuttle assault waves ashore. As this was happening, the second group consisting of Norland with 2 Para, Stromness with the bulk of 45 Commando and Canberra with 42 Commando, escorted by the frigates Brilliant and Plymouth and the auxiliary Fort Austin, would be entering the Sound; they would arrive near the LPDs just as the landing craft were ready. The last to enter Falkland Sound, about four hours after the second wave reached the beaches, would be those ships bringing in artillery, Rapier air defences and Commando Logistic Regiment with the first days of supply for the Brigade: the frigates Argonaut and Broadsword escorting five LSLs and Europic Ferry, a roll-on roll-off ship taken up from trade.
Sequencing of the three groups was carefully planned to ensure that, when daylight came, the beachhead would be secure. That being achieved, movement of fire support and supplies could commence without delay as the LSLs arrived. The overall plan hinged on ships arriving and men disembarking on time. Men from 40 Commando aboard Fearless would load straight into that LPD’s landing craft; the two lead craft would also carry either a Scorpion or Scimitar armoured vehicle in the bow to provide firepower if needed. Landing craft would depart Intrepid empty and go to Norland, where they would embark 2 Para from Norland’s side doors. Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, who had completed his detailed guide to the coasts and inlets of the Falklands during a tour with the garrison force years earlier, would guide this first wave to designated beach assault sites. Then the landing craft would return to Intrepid and Stromness to pick up 3 Para and 45 Commando respectively for the second wave, while 42 Commando waited in reserve on Canberra. H-hour would be 0230 hrs, 21 May.
Everything started out as planned. As naval gunfire and diversionary attacks fixed Argentine attention on Stanley and Darwin, marines of the Special Boat Squadron were landing to eliminate any soldiers at the Fanning Head observation post who had survived a barrage of naval gunfire. While this was
happening, though, the mist that obscured the Amphibious Task Force from observation posts on Fanning Head created directional problems for some captains navigating ships through the Sound. Norland, which was carrying 2 Para for the first wave, had even more difficulties. Her crew forgot to place marking lights on her bow and stern to guide landing craft next to the troopship. In their brief stop at Ascension, 2 Para had practised disembarking, but only during daytime. Now, in the early morning darkness of San Carlos, the lack of training was revealed. One paratrooper, for instance, fell between Norland and a landing craft while disembarking; he survived but suffered a crushed hip.1 The end result was that the disembarkation of 2 Para delayed the first wave getting to the beach. Brigadier Thompson considered altering the landing sequence at this time because of delays with 2 Para, but opted against it, fearing that disseminating changes at this stage would lead to loss of radio transmitting silence and alert the Argentines. The first wave did not land until 0430 hrs, about two hours later than scheduled. Subsequent waves were correspondingly late as a result.
Despite these delays, the amphibious landings were brilliantly successful, and by daylight the entire beachhead was secure. Commandos and paratroopers encountered only pockets of resistance, primarily from small groups of Argentines trying to break contact and withdraw. Landing craft carrying 2 Para dropped ramps on gradients short of dry land, and paratroopers waded ashore. Their boots would not dry out until a week later.2 Combat units seized objectives as planned and sustained no casualties, but Argentines succeeded in shooting down two Gazelle helicopters that were spotting locations for Rapiers, killing three of the four pilots. Ships carrying Commando Logistic Regiment and Brigade supplies started arriving in the anchorage off San Carlos on schedule at daybreak. Waters in the anchorage were calm, just right for starting the laborious task of transporting support units and supplies to beaches. It had become a beautifully clear day. The Amphibious Task Force, however, would have preferred the earlier morning fog and cloud cover.
By 0900 hrs, the LSLs Sir Geraint, Sir Tristram, Sir Lancelot, Sir Galahad, and Sir Percivale were anchored in a dispersed row on the west side of the anchorage off Ajax Bay, where the Commando Logistic Regiment detachment intended to go ashore at Red Beach, in an area selected by Hellberg and Wells-Cole, to establish a small BMA. Ewen Southby-Tailyour had provided them with valuable information about possible locations. Opposite these ships, on the east side of the inlet off Blue Beach and San Carlos Settlement, Europic Ferry, Norland, Stromness and the command-and-control LPD Fearless were anchored. The LPD Intrepid was in the north part of the anchorage near Port San Carlos and Green Beach. Canberra waited just inside the anchorage near Chanco Point. It was an impressive collection of British ships – the bright red civilian ship Europic Ferry with ‘Townsend Thoresen’ emblazoned on her side and the huge white luxury liner Canberra sharply contrasting in the morning sun with the smaller, grey amphibious ships. The shuttling of 105mm artillery guns and Rapiers commenced as planned. Soon thereafter, Clapp started moving reserve stocks on to beaches according to plan. It was anticipated by 3 Commando Brigade that it would take about two days to get what was needed immediately ashore. To move all supplies and equipment ashore to enable a breakout from beaches might take ten days or more.
The only warship inside the anchorage at this time was Plymouth. That, however, was part of a deliberate plan to defend amphibious forces as they completed their build-up on to the beachhead.
Although several ships were clustered in the San Carlos anchorage, surrounding hills made it difficult for enemy aircraft to approach the area undetected. The warships Antrim, Ardent, Argonaut, Brilliant, Broadsword and Yarmouth were all positioned west of the anchorage in Falkland Sound. Commodore Clapp had planned deliberately a defence to take advantage of the protected anchorage and the high ground, considering that the most likely avenue of approach for Argentine aircraft, particularly those coming from the mainland, would be from the west over West Falkland. Therefore, he had formed a picket line of ships in the Sound to force Argentine pilots to fly close to warships to get at the amphibious ships.
That, coupled with aggressive Harrier combat air patrols from the Carrier Battle Group, would hopefully stop penetration. As one ship’s captain explained, ‘The idea was to put a cork in the bottle and bottle up the entrance to San Carlos Water so that attacking aircraft would have to fly over us and through our anti- aircraft barrage before they could get to the bulk of the amphibious ships in San Carlos Water.’3 Additionally, Thompson’s units would provide another band of air defence with their new Rapier air defence weapons just as soon as helicopters airlifted them from ships to the high ground surrounding the anchorage. Units, including Commando Logistic Regiment, were equipped with the shoulder-fire d antiaircraft missiles called Blowpipes. All elements of the Task Force, including Harriers from the two aircraft carriers, would then combine to thwart Argentine efforts to disrupt the build-up.
The British plan had taken Menendez by surprise. In fact, his forces near Goose Green, distracted by the diversionary raid and naval gunfire, reported that they were being attacked by at least a battalion.4 Argentines had not anticipated the British would land so far away and then try to move units, supplies, and equipment across the rugged terrain of East Falkland to get at Stanley; and they thought that if the British tried it they would get bogged down and become vulnerable. The Argentine ability to quickly counter a distant landing with ground forces was limited now because British Harrier attacks in previous days had successfully destroyed some helicopters essential for moving troops. They nevertheless responded far quicker to the landings than the Task Force expected.
The first Argentine planes, armed Aeromacchi trainers from Stanley and Pucaras from Goose Green, arrived shortly after daybreak. British warships turned them back without incident. Then what seemed like an endless series of Argentine fighters arrived, following two-hour flights from the mainland, to attack ships in the Sound. Clapp’s warships and Harriers from the Carrier Battle Group teamed up to thwart most attacks, and by the morning’s end only one Argentine pilot had scored a serious hit. That was a
1,000lb bomb that struck the flight deck of Antrim but failed to detonate. Following a brief lull, Skyhawks and Daggers returned shortly after noon. Some briefly entered the anchorage area, but luckily did not attack any of the logistics ships there. It would have been difficult for them not to notice the monstrous, white-hulled Canberra exposed and vulnerable near Chanco Point. Instead, Argentine pilots continued to focus on the warships in Falkland Sound. One successfully evaded air defences and struck Argonaut. That bomb likewise failed to explode. Skyhawk pilots eventually succeeded in striking Ardent with three 500lb bombs, and this time one of them exploded.
By the day’s end, the skies around San Carlos had been wracked with fire from ships and planes, much to the distraction of ground forces trying to consolidate on the beachhead and logisticians on ships trying to get supplies ashore. Argentine pilots had flown over fifty sorties against warships in the Sound; and although Harrier patrols and ship defences stopped one out of five planes, the British simply could not down them all. When the air attacks were over, damage to the fleet was serious. Plymouth and Yarmouth were the only warships to make it through the day unscathed. Brilliant and Broadsword had sustained minor damage; Antrim and Argonaut would be out of action until unexploded bombs lodged in their structures could be disarmed and removed; and Ardent was sinking.
Clapp emphasized after the war, ‘It was not luck that the Argentine pilots attacked the warships and not the landing ships. We had lots of time to think about it and the whole approach to the landings had been a threat reduction exercise.’5 There can be no doubt that the situation would have been considerably worse had fighters tried to breach the picket line of warships in Falkland Sound and pursue logistics vessels and troop ships in the San Carlos anchorage. As it was, the British still had to rely on a lot of luck to make it through the day. Five bombs had struck warships and failed to detonate. Demolition experts worked frantically to defuse unexploded bombs. Argentine pilots, facing intense gunfire and anti-aircraft missiles from the British warship cordon, were opting for low, fast approaches when making bombing runs. They were forced to make split-second decisions due to their need to refuel after long flights from mainland Argentina. As they released bombs, they were not allowing sufficient time for them to arm.6 That undoubtedly would change once Argentina figured out what was happening. The Task Force did not want to rely on that much luck again.
Attacks on D-Day proved costly for both sides. The British lost twenty-five men, one ship, and two Gazelle helicopters. Over forty men were wounded and three other ships damaged significantly. But Clapp’s defence had worked overall. Ships and Harriers had downed nine Mirages, five Skyhawks, and three Pucaras. Events had produced a variety of frustrations and anxieties. Brigadier Thompson, trapped aboard Fearless and trying to exercise command and control over his units ashore, struggled to maintain communications and learn what was going on as his men started securing objectives. He would not get ashore himself until late in the day, since all movement assets were kept busy. Then he landed without his headquarters, as his staff continued to struggle to get themselves and their equipment ashore. Pressure had mounted on him all day to get Rapiers on land to help counter Argentine air attacks. Unloading Rapiers proved to be an excruciatingly slow process, though, because they were stored in the bottoms of ships’ holds, which meant that other equipment had to be shifted to get them out. Everyone discovered, when finally getting Rapiers off the ships, that rushing them to positions on land brought problems of a different nature. Areas had to be secure before men could get the systems in place. Complicating matters further, if men sited a Rapier wrongly, they then had to get another helicopter to relocate it. It did not matter whether the Rapier needed to be moved a few feet or a mile. Men could not move the heavy air defence systems by hand, and Rapiers routinely went on to hilltops inaccessible by vehicles. To become operable they also needed fuel to run generators. As a result, efforts to speed up the unloading of some equipment started to backfire and create more work.
Argentine air attacks now triggered efforts to reduce risks in the Amphibious Operations Area encompassing Falkland Sound and the San Carlos anchorage, and this propelled 3 Commando Brigade into an even greater rush to get equipment ashore. That afternoon, Admiral Fieldhouse expressed continuing concerns about the vulnerability of large ships like Canberra. Clapp directed Canberra, Norland and Stromness to depart the area that same evening and proceed toward the edge of the TEZ.
LSLs could remain in the anchorage, but they were to unload as much as possible as quickly as possible.
The change came as a surprise to 3 Commando Brigade, which had been hoping to keep supplies moving ashore. The build-up had barely begun. More supplies than expected remained aboard ships in the anchorage. Now, the Brigade witnessed the unravelling of its plans for building up the beachhead and sustaining the eventual breakout. Their plans had hinged on LSLs and other ships anchored offshore to form a floating sustainment base within easy reach of the beachhead. Much of Commando Logistic Regiment, according to the established plan, was to remain afloat in the LSLs. Only a small tailored detachment was destined to go ashore. This new directive allowed LSLs to remain in the anchorage to continue the offload, but the same was not true for Canberra, Norland and Stromness, which unfortunately contained not only a wide mix of units but also tons of supplies for units going ashore.
During the remainder of D-Day and into the night, as flames from Ardent in Falkland Sound served as a sombre reminder of earlier events, the Amphibious Task Force focused on getting as much to shore as possible. In the late afternoon, 42 Commando, the Brigade’s reserve force, left their rucksacks aboard Canberra and boarded landing craft for Blue Beach, where they took up defensive positions east of 3 Para at Port San Carlos. Additional landing craft and helicopters pushed supplies into the BMA at Ajax and other landing sites surrounding the anchorage. Inhabitants of San Carlos Settlement and Port San Carlos, who had welcomed combat units earlier that day, now assisted the British in getting established. Some offered the use of their few settlement buildings as headquarters operations and for quartering and caring