Axiology is the recently adopted term used to cover the philosophy of values. It was introduced a century or so ago by the French philosopher Paul Lapie and derives from the Greek axios, corresponding to the Latin valere, meaning “to be strong” or “to be wor- thy.” Axiology, or value theory, represents an attempt to bring the disparate discussion of values under a sin- gle heading, covering a wide area of critical analysis and debate that includes truth, utility, goodness, beauty, right conduct, and obligation. There is a direct focus on the purported value of matters such as human life, knowledge, wisdom, freedom, love, justice, self- fulfillment, and well-being. Axiology has relevance to the field of qualitative research inasmuch as it has a direct bearing on the ethical context of research, offers an important basis for making explicit the assump- tions of different paradigms of research, and provides the foundation for understanding the process of the addition to knowledge involved in scientific inquiry.
Value Theory
Value theory is concerned with the nature of value itself as well as with the various forms that value can take, such as the aesthetic value of beauty, the ethical values of good/bad and right/wrong, and the epistemic values of truth, rationality, and justification.
The central issue of the nature of value is some- what contentious and has a long history. For example, Plato saw values as essences that are known through intuition, whereas Aristotle saw values as defined simply by human interest. Philosophers in the neo- Kantian tradition have proposed that values are objec- tive and universally valid, whereas existentialists such as Nietzsche and Sartre regard values as construc- tions, that is, the mere products of human invention.
More recently, in the cult novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,Robert Pirsig equated value with “quality,” a sort of meeting point between the human mind and the material world that resists any reduction to either subjectivity or objectivity but rep- resents a subjective–objective reality. Whatever per- spective is taken, it would seem that value is clearly not a property of the thing-in-itself, it cannot be per- ceived by the senses, and it cannot be measured sci- entifically, but somehow it arises out of our relationship with things.
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The study of values often leads to the identification of what amounts to a core value or a hierarchy of val- ues that leads toward a final value. For example, Aristotle proposed “happiness,” the Stoics stressed
“tranquility of mind,” Schopenhauer offered “renunci- ation,” Sartre proposed “authenticity,” and Taoist phi- losophy positions “flexibility” and “adaptability to context” as the final value. Furthermore, it is useful to distinguish intrinsic values from instrumental values.
Something has intrinsic value if it is worthy, or desir- able, in and for itself, whereas something is of instru- mental value if it offers a means or contributes directly to something else in turn that is intrinsically of value. Nevertheless, the recurrent problem through- out much of the study of value is that although many philosophers offer systematic accounts of what is of value, they do this without offering any proper justifi- cation or without any appeal to some claim to validity.
The study of ethics can be seen as closely related to the study of values, and an ethics that is based specif- ically on value is called axiological ethics. Here the focus is less on what should be done and more on what is worth doing and what should be avoided.
This issue of value, which has so often been taken for granted in the past, has recently been attracting much more attention within the field of qualitative research. Axiology has become recognized as a key dimension in the comparison of competing, or co- occurring, paradigms of research, and this can be help- fully placed within a discussion of the scientific method in general.
Axiology and Scientific Method The traditional positivist approach to scientific method is based on a sharp distinction between fact and value.
Facts are seen as objective truths that are out there waiting to be discovered. In contrast, values are seen as subjective, undermining the pursuit of truth, and a potential source of bias and error in research; there- fore, they are to be excluded from all inquiry. Perhaps the kindest description of this position is that it is at the very best naive. The notion of a value-free and ethi- cally neutral science is little better than a myth.
Positivist inquiry is run through with value judgments, and to the extent that these go unacknowledged this is a potentially very serious flaw. For example, tradi- tional science is based on an explicit appeal to the val- ues of truth, knowledge, objectivity, rationality, and so on. Although one could argue that these are intrinsic
values, such a claim still needs to be examined thor- oughly and repeatedly in the light of the epistemolog- ical and axiological issues that are involved.
The point is that even intrinsic values are values.
They require clarification and reflection. We engage in inquiry because we care and want to make a differ- ence. The generation of a research hypothesis, the refining of the research question, the judgment of what might be important additions to knowledge in any field of inquiry, and the choices and decisions made in research design, the selection of participants, and the interpretation of data—all of these involve value claims one way or another. Moreover, inquiry leads to knowledge, and knowledge leads to the impo- sition of some type of order or structure on the world—and this always involves issues of value.
The Human and Social Sciences The human and social sciences, in their development of a qualitative approach to inquiry, have pointed to the crucial need to deal with the ways in which people relate and give meaning to their social, cultural, and material environments. This points to the acceptance of the role played by human subjectivity, context, and (moreover) human values in the generation of knowl- edge and in the logic of inquiry.
The growing recognition of the importance of the role that values play in qualitative research is probably best illustrated through the recent work of Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln. They published a series of three chapters in the first, second, and third editions of the groundbreakingHandbook of Qualitative Researchthat set out to examine the competing paradigms being used.
In their chapter for the first edition, Guba and Lincoln distinguished among four major alternative paradigms of inquiry: positivism, postpositivism, constructivism, and critical theory. They defined a paradigm as a set of basic beliefs that represent a par- ticular worldview, which in turn leads to particular approaches to inquiry. They also proposed three fun- damental interrelated questions with respect to how paradigms might be compared: the ontological, epis- temological, and methodological questions. In their discussion, the issue of value was raised briefly with respect to differences in the epistemological posture and practical issues raised. For both the positivist and postpositivist paradigms, values are specifically excluded, whereas for constructivism and critical the- ory, values take “pride of place” and are seen as Axiology———53
“ineluctable in shaping inquiry outcomes,” according to Guba and Lincoln.
It is important to realize that an inquiry paradigm involves a set of assumptions and that all research—
indeed all scientific knowledge and inquiry—necessarily rests on assumptions. Making assumptions is not the problem, but overlooking which assumptions have been made, or taking for granted any assumptions that have been made, will inevitably lead to problems.
Because assumptions invariably encode values, the notion of paradigm becomes crucial in the relation- ship between inquiry and the study of value.
To make the best use of Guba and Lincoln’s ideas, it is perhaps most useful to see paradigms not as com- peting but rather as pluralistic in approach. This means that, rather than rejecting one worldview or paradigm in favor of another, for any field of inquiry several paradigms might be held as tenable. Indeed, such a preference for a pluralistic approach, rather than a competitive approach, is itself an example of value-in-action.
Guba and Lincoln revised their chapter for the sec- ond and third editions of theHandbook and specifi- cally highlighted the issue of axiology as a critically important addition. They took up some criticisms of their original chapter that had been raised by John Heron and Peter Reason. One crucial revision involved an expansion of the three fundamental ques- tions by which different paradigms can be compared to include a fourth question—the axiological ques- tion. Guba and Lincoln acknowledged that the issue of value had become much larger than they had first con- ceived. There was clearly the need to recognize the concern with what is of value, and what is worthwhile, as one of the foundational philosophical dimensions of what constitutes a paradigm.
By raising the profile of axiology in this way, Guba and Lincoln acknowledged how values cannot simply be left under the headings of epistemology and methodology, where they become obscured and dealt with through the codes of accepted practice. Instead, they proposed that values need to be explicitly dis- cussed and critically explored in their own right.
Indeed, although axiology has come late into the frame, it could be argued that it might well need to be given some sort of priority, even over ontology and epistemology. Such an idea would be consistent with Martin Heidegger’s contrast between the “readiness- to-hand” and the “present-at-hand.” Those objects and events that are ready-to-hand constitute what is of
value to us, what matters to us, and what is of use to us. Heidegger argued that this type of knowledge has a primacy over our knowledge of the present-at-hand, that is, of the things-in-themselves. Indeed, if qualita- tive inquiry is to be closely associated with the study of the ready-to-hand, and quantitative inquiry is to be closely associated with the study of the present-at- hand, then it could be argued that it is the qualitative approach to research that should enjoy some sort of priority in scientific endeavor.
Heron and Reason’s Article
The full scope of the article published in 1997 by Heron and Reason that had such an impact on Guba and Lincoln warrants further discussion. It is in proposing an inquiry paradigm that involves a par- ticipatory worldview that the need for a more explicit axiology emerges. Heron and Reason explained that none of the inquiry paradigms con- sidered by Guba and Lincoln can account for experi- ential knowing, which they argued is the ground of our being. For example, Heron and Reason argued that “constructivist views tend to be deficient in any acknowledgement of experiential knowing; that is, knowing by acquaintance, by meeting, and by felt participation in the presence of what is there”
(p. 277). Furthermore, “to experience anything is to participate in it, and to participate is both to mould and to encounter; hence, experiential reality is always subjective–objective” (p. 278). In this argu- ment, the inescapable role of values in human expe- rience is being teased out. To know something, to experience something, always implies valuing it in some way or another.
It is precisely these views that led Heron and Reason to propose the fourth fundamental question that is necessary to fully define an inquiry paradigm.
Thus, in addition to the ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions, they added the axio- logical question, which they proposed sets out to ask what it is that is intrinsically worthwhile (i.e., what in the human condition is valuable as an end in itself?).
Posed in this way, the axiological emphasis leads to asking questions such as the following: What is the value of knowledge itself? What is the ultimate pur- pose of human inquiry? How much should inquiry pro- mote human flourishing, individual empowerment, advocacy, activism, relief from oppression and suffering, and so on?
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Toward a Transparent Axiology Clearly much more is at stake here than the simple acknowledgment of the role played by values in human affairs and the explicit role of values in quali- tative inquiry. The proposal made by Heron and Reason, and its subsequent inclusion by Guba and Lincoln, amounts to a fundamental change in the char- acterization of qualitative inquiry, the types of know- ing with which it is concerned, and the philosophical underpinnings on which it relies. Moreover, it is a major step toward establishing a more fully articu- lated transparency of values than has so far been fea- sible in human inquiry. There is space to consider just two examples here.
The Ethics of Inquiry
One of the most obvious ways in which values play a crucial role in research is in the ethics of inquiry.
However, by raising the profile of the axiological question, a more transparent ethics can emerge. First, the positivist claim that there is no place for a consid- eration of values in scientific inquiry is shown up as something of an oversight. Ethical matters are the concern of all scientific endeavor, and this must apply to all fields of research—whatever their paradigm and whatever their focus. Because ethics always rests on a consideration of values, there is simply no escape. Of course, positivists do not deny the importance of eth- ical considerations, but there is a basic contradiction, and there are significant dangers, in thinking ethically without any reference to human values.
Second, the axiological perspective offers a more useful perspective on the contrast among the ethical positions adopted by the positivist, constructivist, and participatory approaches to inquiry. The posi- tivist employs a mostly extrinsic approach to ethics, with a reliance on ethical codes, ethics committees, and the accepted standards of good practice. In con- trast, the qualitative researcher employs an intrinsic approach to ethics, one that accepts the established codes of ethically sound practice but goes farther by striving toward a transparency of values, toward a transparency of the requests and demands put on participants, and also applies a “process ethics” to the forms of knowing that the specific context of the inquiry requires. Process ethics stresses that codes of practice are only a first step that must be followed up with an open-minded vigilance to ethical matters
that might be raised at any point during the research process.
Research as a Co-Operative Inquiry
Perhaps one of the best examples of an approach to qualitative research that offers a transparency of val- ues is Heron’s own idea of co-operative inquiry, which offers an explicitly collaborative approach to research. Co-operative inquiry is critical of the idea of qualitative inquiry as being about other people and instead promotes inquiry as being with other people.
Heron pointed out that in most research methodolo- gies the roles of the researcher and subjects (i.e., participants/co-researchers) are regarded as mutually exclusive. In conventional approaches to inquiry, the researcher contributes the thinking that goes into the project, and the subjects contribute the data for the study. But in the co-operative inquiry model, both the researcher and co-researchers (participants) con- tribute equally to the design of the research and share equally in the experience. The specific issue that is being explicitly raised here is one of value—the value that is to be placed on the full participation of partici- pants in an inquiry. From this perspective, the key value in research is being with people.
In his final discussion of this approach in 1996, Heron argued that people have a moral right to engage in research decisions that claim to generate knowl- edge about them. To summarize Heron’s value posi- tion with respect to co-researchers, if this right is not respected, then
• co-researchers will bedisenfranchised in not being able to express there own preferences and values;
• they will be disempowered andoppressed by deci- sions and values that are not of their choosing;
• they will bemisrepresentedby research designs from which they have been excluded in their planning;
• they will becomeaccessoriesto the knowledge claims made about them that can be misapplied to others;
• they will bemanipulatedin the acquisition and appli- cation of the knowledge about them;
• they will bedeniedthe opportunity for increased self- and peer-generated knowledge; and
• they will be subtlyoppressed andexploited by the researcher’s ulterior motives.
If this is an example of the axiological perspective, of value-in-action, then it is to be recommended to all Axiology———55
qualitative inquirers. It offers an example of a profound concern with human values that is crucial to the way in which qualitative research is now being defined and must be considered foundational to all human and social inquiry.
David R. Hiles
See alsoAesthetics; Epistemology; Ethics; Paradigm;
Participatory Action Research (PAR); Transparency;
Value-Free Inquiry
Further Readings
Findlay, J. N. (1970).Axiological ethics.London: Macmillan.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.),Handbook of qualitative research(pp. 105–117).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic
controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences.
In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.),The SAGE
handbook of qualitative research(3rd ed., pp. 191–215).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Heidegger, M. (1962).Being and time(J. Macquarrie &
E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. (Original work published 1927)
Heron, J. (1996).Co-operative inquiry: Research into the human condition.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Heron, J., & Reason, P. (1997). A participatory inquiry paradigm.Qualitative Inquiry, 3,274–294.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Denzin, N. K. (2005). Epilogue: The eighth and ninth moments: Qualitative research in/and the fractured future. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative research(3rd ed., pp. 1115–1127). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (2000). Paradigmatic
controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences.
In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.),Handbook of qualitative research(2nd ed., pp. 163–188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Pirsig, R. M. (1974).Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance.London: Bodley Head.
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