Bracketingis a beguilingly simple term grounded in a profoundly complex concept. At its core, bracketing is a scientific process where a researcher suspends or holds in abeyance his or her presuppositions, biases, assumptions, theories, or previous experiences to see and describe the essence of a specific phenomenon.
This process allows a focused researcher to observe the unfiltered phenomenon as it is at its essence, without the influence of our natural attitude—individual and societal constructions, presumptions, and assumptions.
Bracketing is conceptually located within the sci- ence and philosophy of phenomenology, developed by Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenologi- cal movement, at the turn of the 20th century. Initially a mathematician, Husserl set out to develop a scien- tific theory of philosophy where logical and reasoned inquiry could reveal the inherent essence of things.
Similar to a mathematical equation, bracketing suspends specific elements by placing them outside the brackets, thus allowing focus on the phenomenon within the parentheses. For Husserl, bracketing or epoche was a process of phenomenological reduction that could philosophically lead to the ideal description and understanding of the universal essences of the investigated phenomenon. Over the years, Husserl continued to develop the concept of bracketing from a purely philosophical ideal to a more descriptive prac- tical conceptualization, where researchers may not discover universal truths of a phenomenon, but could gain local truths or understandings. Although bracket- ing remained fundamental to Husserl’s phenomenology writing, he never provided a clear, concise definition or standard application of the concept.
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Over the proceeding century, as bracketing contin- ued to grow within the various schools of phenomeno- logical movement (descriptive, Heideggarian, Utrecht, and existential), each reconceptualized the nature and/or elements of phenomenological reduction. As the vari- ous movements within phenomenology emerged, vied with each other, and developed their own theoretical tenets, the concept of bracketing became increasingly disconnected from its traditionally philosophical roots. Although the qualitative application of bracket- ing in research expanded, the concept behind the term eroded and its meanings and applications fractured, with the result that bracketing became multifaceted.
Unfortunately, bracketing can also be seen as a form- less technique or black-box term in studies, with a general unspoken assumption that there exists a shared understanding to the term. Despite lack of uniformity and often varied application, bracketing is composed of specific standard elements. Whereas researchers from different philosophical, epistemological, or the- oretical traditions may employ bracketing based on their own standpoint and divergent meanings, the elemental components of bracketing are consistent.
Bracketing remains an efficacious scientific process across various qualitative approaches based on a researcher’s ability to effectively define and apply its elements.
Returning to the core definition, bracketing is a rig- orous process that suspends internal and external sup- positions, thereby allowing the focusing in on a specific phenomenon to understand or see it as it is. The four core elements of the process are as follows:
1. the actual brackets that the researcher places around the phenomenon;
2. the nature of the internal and external suppositions, experiences, theories, or assumptions being held in abeyance or suspended by the researcher;
3. the temporal structure in which the bracketing is applied; and
4. the reintegration of data generated from the bracket- ing process.
The methodological concept of bracketing requires researchers to explicitly operationalize and define these four elements. The first element centers on the construction of the actual parenthesis, specifically, on how solid or porous the actual brackets are. For exam- ple, does the researcher conceptualize the brackets as
able to hold or suspend all or part of internal (e.g., assumptions, beliefs, theories) and external (e.g., con- text, culture, time) suppositions that may impact, affect, or distort the phenomenon in its natural state?
Some researchers may define these brackets as hold- ing most internal and external elements, whereas oth- ers may simply want the brackets to hold only their own experiences and opinions.
The second core component of bracketing is the suppositions, assumptions, hypothesis, and/or experi- ences that are held aside by the brackets. This ele- ment consists of two parts, internal suppositions of the researcher (e.g., personal knowledge, history, cul- ture, values, theories, orientations, etc.) and external suppositions that are centered on the phenomenon (e.g., its history, definition, and larger environmental factors). Researchers need to clearly articulate any internal and/or external suppositions they are bracket- ing out.
The third central element is the researcher’s appli- cation of the bracketing process in the temporal struc- ture, that is, the start, duration, and end of bracketing.
Although for some researchers, bracketing may begin at conceptualization of the research prior to the litera- ture search, others apply bracketing to data collection (e.g., the interview process). Similarly, the duration and end point of the process may vary. Some researchers close bracketing at the end of data collection. others open and close bracketing throughout the research process, and some extend bracketing into the early phases of the data analysis.
The fourth element is the unbracketing and reinte- gration of the data derived from the bracketing process into the larger research. As in mathematical equations, once the data within the brackets have been determined, they are incorporated into the larger equa- tion. This reintegration typically occurs in the analy- sis section of the research, but it may be incorporated throughout the research process.
Bracketing may not have one universal form, but it retains a core definition that is composed of specific elements. Researchers from diverse qualitative tradi- tions and perspectives recognize and value bracketing as a fundamental methodological concept; however, the rigor of bracketing is determined by researchers’
operationalization of the central elements that com- prise this scientific concept.
Robin Edward Gearing See alsoPhenomenology; Qualitative Research, History of 64———Bracketing
Further Readings
Ashworth, P. (1996). Presuppose nothing! The suspension of assumptions in phenomenological psychological methodology.Journal of Phenomenology Psychology, 27(1), 1–25.
Gearing, R. E. (2004). Bracketing in research: A typology.
Qualitative Health Research, 14(10), 1429–1452.
Husserl, E. (1931).Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology(W. R. B. Gibson, Trans.). New York:
Humanities Press. (Original work published 1913) LeVasseur, J. J. (2003). The problem of bracketing in
phenomenology. Qualitative Health Research, 13(3), 408–420.
Spiegelberg, H. (1973). Is the reduction necessary for phenomenology? Husserl’s and Pfander’s replies.Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 4(1), 3–15.
B
RICOLAGE ANDB
RICOLEURThe French termsbricolageandbricoleurwere given their key academic sense by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and were subsequently taken up by others, including some recent writers on qualitative research in the United States.
In contemporary French usage, bricolage means, broadly speaking, do it yourself, and abricoleuris an amateur who can turn her or his hand to practical repairs of various kinds. Lévi-Strauss (1962/1966) used these concepts in his structuralist analysis of myths, portraying the production of myths as a form of brico- lage. His usage was subsequently applied to new fields and elaborated on by others, including Gérard Genette (1966, p. 145); Jacques Derrida (1970/2007);
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1972/2004, pp. 7–8);
Deena Weinstein and Michael Weinstein (1991); and Cary Nelson, Paula Treichler, and Lawrence Grossberg (1992).
Lévi-Strauss was concerned with the contrast that is often drawn between “primitive” and “civilized”
thought, but unlike some earlier views, he did not regard these as inferior and superior ways of thinking, respectively. Rather, he treated them as different modes of orientation toward the world, and he had a distinctive understanding of the value of primitive cul- tures (see Merquior, 1986, chap. 3).
For him, the character of the bricolage that pro- duces myths is somewhere between that of science and that of modern art. The central feature of myth as
bricolage is that there is a drive to produce a complete picture from whatever intellectual resources are cur- rently available. This drive contrasts with the orienta- tion of the scientist or engineer, who must accept that some things are not currently knowable or doable and who should insist on using only what are judged to be adequate intellectual resources. Furthermore, whereas bricolage focuses on surface features, on things as they appear, and seeks similarities and other relationships among these, science goes beyond surface appearances to find underlying generative structures.
Officially, at least, Lévi-Strauss did not see social science as a form of bricolage; he was explicitly wedded to a scientific version of research modeled on struc- tural linguistics. However, a number of commentators have argued that qualitative research does, or should, follow this model (see Kincheloe, 2001; Kincheloe &
Berry, 2004; Lincoln, 2001). In these terms, Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2005) portray qualitative research as involving the piecing together of diverse materials so as to produce an emergent construction that they describe as, “A complex, dense, reflexive collage-like creation that represents the researcher’s images, understandings and interpretations of the world or phenomenon under analysis” (p. 6). In qualitative- inquiry-as-bricolage, materials are juxtaposed in open-ended ways designed to provoke readers rather than to convey some closed message. More generally, what is involved is a form of inquiry involving the flexible use of diverse theoretical and methodological resources in a manner that has more in common with art and literature than with natural science, but which claims its own form of rigor. Although the argument that qualitative researchers should become bricoleurs has been influential, it is not without its critics (see Hammersley, 1999).
Martyn Hammersley
See alsoCollage; Deconstruction; Poststructuralism; Rigor in Qualitative Research; Structuralism
Further Readings
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2004).Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia(R. Hurley, M. Seem, & H.R. Lane, Trans.). London: Continuum, 2004. (Original work published 1972)
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2005).The SAGE handbook of qualitative research(3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Bricolage and Bricoleur———65
Derrida, J. (2007). Structure, sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences. In R. Macksey & E. Donato (Eds.),The structuralist controversy: The languages of criticism & the sciences of man. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1970) Genette, G. (1966). Structuralisme et critique littéraire. In
Figures(pp. 45–70).Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Hammersley, M. (1999). Not bricolage but boatbuilding:
Exploring two metaphors for thinking about ethnography.
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 28(6), 574–585.
Kincheloe, J. (2001). Describing the bricolage:
Conceptualizing a new rigor in qualitative research.
Qualitative Inquiry, 7(6), 679–692.
Kincheloe, J., & Berry, K. S. (2004).Rigour and complexity in educational research: Conceptualizing the bricolage.
Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press.
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966).La Pensée Sauvage[The Savage Mind] Paris: Librairie Plon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. (Original work published 1962)
Lincoln, Y. S. (2001). An emerging newbricoleur:
Promises and possibilities—A reaction to Joe Kincheloe’s
“Describing the bricoleur.”Qualitative Inquiry, 7(6), 693–696.
Merquior, J. G. (1986).From Prague to Paris: A critique of structuralist and post-structuralist thought.London:
Verso.
Nelson, C., Treichler, P. A., & Grossberg, L. (1992).
Introduction. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, & P. A. Treichler (Eds.),Cultural studies(pp. 1–16).New York: Routledge.
Weinstein, D., & Weinstein, M. A. (1991). Georg Simmel:
Sociological flaneur, bricoleur.Theory, Culture and Society,8, 151–168.
66———Bricolage and Bricoleur