STUDYING RELATIONSHIPS
C. Arthur VanLear Ascan Koerner
Donna M. Allen
If we are to build a coherent science of human relationships, we must have a struc- ture within which to organize our observa- tions and knowledge claims. Robert Hinde (19 9 6) pointed out that the advance of biol- ogy as a science and evolution as a theory was facilitated by the development of the biolog- ical taxonomy. One of the major lessons of that history is the intimate linkage between the development of a typology and our the- oretical understanding of the phenomenon.
Biological organisms could have been orga- nized by size, color, diet, or habitat. Whereas some of these are useful, they are isolated and do not facilitate an integration of knowl- edge that is made possible by a typology that is based on the theory of evolution and that links the typology to a significant body of knowledge. At present, the field of personal relationships is a multiparadigmatic science, and so we have a multitude of potential typologies from which to choose. A typol- ogy may prove to be a necessary foundation on which to build a science of human rela- tionships. The selection of typologies, how- ever, may depend on the theoretical orienta- tion of the researcher. This chapter reviews
the major issues and approaches to typing personal relationships at both general and specific levels.
Types Versus Dimensions
Some scholars have argued that using multi- dimensional scales to describe relationships is superior to a typological approach (Griffin
& Bartholomew,19 9 4). The argument is that locating a relationship on a series of dimen- sional scales provides a more precise descrip- tion than a nominal categorization, which is often a simplification of several scalar mea- sures and therefore throws away informa- tion. This argument ignores the basic point of typologies.
Many typologies are a form of data reduc- tion. Just as factor analysis reduces a num- ber of scalar items to a smaller number of more general dimensions, many typolo- gies reduce scores on a set of dimensions to a nominal categorization. A good typology can improve our understanding of the phe- nomenon as well as provide useful and inter- pretable information about specific cases.
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Most of us find it difficult to form a clear con- ception of a relationship by trying to identify it as a point in multidimensional “hyper- space.” When most people think about rela- tionships, they identify them as types or kinds of relationships, not as points along a set of continuous dimensions (Haslam, 19 9 4). Typologies are useful for building the- ory; for teaching about relationships; and for clinical therapy, counseling, or relational enrichment training.
Typologies are not only convenient sim- plifications. They are more appropriate when cases are not evenly distributed in the multidimensional space but form clus- ters so that certain values on one dimen- sion are associated with specific values on other dimensions (Haslam, 19 9 9). If cases are evenly distributed across all levels of all dimensions, however, then the variation within categories of a typology may be as important as the variation between or among categories, and a dimensional approach is appropriate.
Methods for Typing Relationships The hallmark of science is that theory is supported by empirical evidence and so a typology of human relationships should be supported empirically. A detailed discussion of methods of typing is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a brief review is in order. Whereas some types are identified by the participants’ reactions to experimental conditions – Ainsworth’s strange situation (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 19 7 8) or Reiss’s (19 8 1) card-sort problem-solving procedure – or patterns of behavioral inter- action (e.g., Gottman, 19 9 3), most typolo- gies rely on analyses of participants’ self- reports. There are two general types of methods – those that help to generate types inductively and those that are used to confirm hypothesized types.
Inductive Methods
One method used to generate categories from scratch is a Q-sort method (Stephen-
son,19 5 3). “Judges” are given examples and asked to sort them into groups of similar types. Of course, different judges may use different criteria for sorting.
The most popular inductive method is to measure participants on self-reports designed to tap several dimensions (often generated by exploratory factor analysis of the items) and apply cluster analy- sis to the resulting factors to come up with the categories of the typology. Haslam (19 9 9) pointed out several limitations to this method. First, because there are many clustering algorithms, different methods can yield different results. All too often the default or most popular method is used without careful consideration of the appro- priate choices. Second, cluster analyses have been criticized for their inability to uncover actual categories in the data (Meehl,19 9 5).
Third, cluster analyses will always gener- ate categories even when the data are best represented as continuous dimensions. Of course, any typology generated by any induc- tive technique should be supported by con- firmatory analyses on additional data.
Confirmatory Methods
One can usually regenerate a previous typol- ogy by using the estimates from the prior analysis as a starting point to cluster new data. This is not strong confirmation of a typology because initializing to the previ- ous results biases the results in favor of the prior categories. This approach may, how- ever, be acceptable to type cases from a previously well-validated typology. A strong confirmatory approach should demonstrate that the proposed categories represent true discontinuities in the underlying dimensions.
Although intuitively appealing, a simple test of bimodality is not a reliable indicator of the discreteness of a categorical distinction (Haslam,19 9 9). Haslam proposed two types of methods, taxometric procedures and an admixture–commingling analysis as confir- matory approaches to support the discrete- ness of proposed typological distinctions. He used these methods to demonstrate that the Fiske (19 9 1) typology is not based on
continuous dimensions. Using a similar approach, Fossati et al. (2 0 0 3) used multi- variate normal mixture analysis for testing a single population versus a two-cluster solu- tion on the Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ). They failed to find that a categoriza- tion of secure versus insecure attachment provided a better representation of their data than the continuous dimensions of the ASQ.
A disadvantage of taxometric and admixture techniques is that they are somewhat com- plex and not well known.
Koerner and Fitzpatrick (2 0 0 2b) argued that if the dimensions of a proposed typol- ogy consistently show interaction effects in predicting important dependent variables, then a typological approach in which the dimensions are ordinalized is validated. They argued that the conformity and conversation orientation dimensions of family commu- nication consistently show such interaction effects on important dependent variables, thus supporting the typological approach to McLeod and Chaffee’s (19 7 2) family communication patterns.
Distinctions Among Relationship Typologies
The classification of relationships is funda- mental in building a science of relation- ships (Hinde, 19 9 6). Some typologies are primarily deductively derived from theory, whereas others are primarily inductively derived through empirical study. Typologies also differ in their use of common language labels (e.g., family, marriage) or the extent to which they apply to the way relational par- ticipants understand their own relationships.
Some typologies treat relationships as static categories, and others view them as passing through different types over time.
The most fundamental differences be- tween typologies are the bases of classi- fication. One reason there are so many typologies of marriage is that scholars focus on different variables. A number of scholars have attempted to identify the fundamen- tal dimensions and topoi of relationships (Burgoon & Hale, 19 8 4, 19 8 7; Foa & Foa,
19 7 4; Haslam, 19 9 5; Schutz, 19 5 8). The dimensions that are central to one author may not be to another, the key variables of one theory may be ignored by another, and even the pivotal concepts of one discipline may be less important to another discipline (Weiss, 19 9 8). We believe that typologies based on multiple dimensions that are cen- tral to multiple disciplines will have the greatest degree of general applicability.
Weiss (19 9 8) argued that a typology of relationships ought to be based on the
“determinants of relationships,” which from his attachment perspective lies in under- standings and emotions. Operating from a social cognition perspective, Fitzpatrick (19 8 8) and Haslam (19 9 4) argued that the basis of relationship types are the dif- ferences in cognitive “scripts” that peo- ple learn, develop, and attempt to apply in enacting their relationships. By men- tally representing relationships as types, people use those schemata as guides for act- ing and responding to others (Fitzpatrick, 19 8 8; Haslam,19 9 4; Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2 0 0 2a). Typologies may also be based on the structural (e.g., sexual composition) or functional (e.g., instrumental, romantic) characteristics of relationships. Other schol- ars operating from a relational pragmat- ics perspective hold that relationships are open systems that are always in the pro- cess of becoming (Bateson, 19 7 2; Fisher &
Adams, 19 9 4; Lederer & Jackson, 19 6 8; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 19 6 7). If a relationship type can be identified, it is always emergent, based on the redundancies in the patterns of interaction over time.
Typologies differ in the extent to which they are based on the matched characteris- tics of the individuals in or the nonsumma- tive properties of the relationship. At one extreme, we have relationships typed based on matching individual characteristics that predate the relationship (e.g., attachment styles, interpersonal needs). The assump- tion underlying such an approach is that the characteristics of the individuals in the system determine the nature of the system.
At the other extreme, we have relationships typed at the relational level (e.g., symmetry,
complementarity, stability) that are not divisible into individual characteristics apart from the relationship and only emerge over time. The first approach has come under fire for being too deterministic (Fisher &
Adams,19 9 4). The nonsummative approach has been criticized for not allowing for indi- vidual differences in shaping the nature of the system (Hewes,19 7 9). A third approach identifies individuals’ orientations to a par- ticular relationship, types both the part- ners, and matches them for similarity or differences to arrive at couple types (e.g., Fitzpatrick,19 8 8). To the extent that a pre- existing schema influences each person’s ori- entation, it is captured in the typology, and to the extent that a person’s orientation emerges from his or her experience in that relationship, that, too, is captured.
Beginning with Leary’s (19 5 5) affect–
control circumplex, a long line of circum- plex models has been used to type rela- tionships, including Foa and Foa (19 7 4), Kiesler (19 8 3), Olson (19 8 1,19 9 3), and oth- ers. Haslam (19 9 5) has shown that Fiske’s (19 9 1) typology, although not formulated as such, can also be fit to a circumplex pattern.
Typologies are often hierarchically orga- nized, but the basis of that organization may differ. Koerner and Fitzpatrick (2 0 0 2a) sug- gested a hierarchical organization of schema beginning with general social schema, relationship type schemas (e.g., family, friends, colleagues), and relationship-spe- cific schemas. A systems approach would consider individuals nested within dyadic relationships (e.g., marriages, siblings, mother–child), nested within larger social organizations (e.g., families, social net- works), and so on. Some typologies consider certain distinctions as more fundamental than others, such that the most fundamen- tal forms the first division and then that is further subdivided on the basis of other distinctions. Other typologies treat each category as having equal status.
Our review of relationship typologies has raised the following questions. First, does the typology represent fundamental psychological processes underlying human relationships? These may be motivations
and emotions or the cognitive struc- tures and understandings of participants within relationships (or a combination of these). Second, does the typology rep- resent social–cultural structures organiz- ing relationships? The typology may rep- resent cross-cultural variations in relation- ship forms or cross-cultural universals (i.e., archetypes or deep structures). Third, does the typology discriminate between varia- tions in the behaviors and interaction pat- terns across relationships?
General Typologies
General typologies are those classification schemes that attempt to identify the fun- damental features of the whole length and breadth of human relationships. Of course, any dimension can be dissected to form a typology, and any set of dimensions can be combined to increase the complexity. Our review is limited to those typologies that have had or promise to have a major impact on our understanding of human relation- ships. In our view, a general typology of human relationships should make distinc- tions that are fundamental or basic to human relationships. Distinctions are fundamental or basic if they apply across disciplinary boundaries. They should serve to organize relationships at a societal level, at an indi- vidual psychological level (e.g., cognitively and emotionally), and in terms of patterns of behavioral interaction. Fundamental distinc- tions are likely to provide a bridge between the sociological and psychological realities of human relationships as well as the biologi- cal imperatives responsible for their ancient evolution into a primal characteristic of our species. They should apply cross-culturally – they may either be found in all cultures or they may explain cross-cultural variation.
We begin by identifying some of the sim- ple divisions that have traditionally been made between human relationships. The title of this book, the titles of our jour- nals, and the organization of our schol- arly societies imply either implicitly or explicitly a division of relationships into
Personal Relations Social Relations
Marriage Acquaintances
Voluntary Best Friends Casual Friends
Cohabiting Couple Relational Marketing Adoptive/Foster Family
Exogenously Parent– Child Distant Relatives
Established Siblings Work Relationships
Grandparent– Child Monopoly Provider–Client
Figure6.1.Types of relationships based on volition and intimacy.
personal and social. The most obvious dimensions on which this distinction is based are intimacy, closeness, or interde- pendence, with personal relationships being closer, more intimate, and interdependent and social relationships being more super- ficial and impersonal. Argyle and Hender- son (19 8 5) found that intimacy discrimi- nated between differences in relationships based on relational rules in four coun- tries. Marwell and Hage (19 7 0) found inti- macy accounted for 5 0% of the variance across 10 0 role relationships. Many typolo- gies identify a “disengaged,” “detached,”
“independent,” or “separate” relationship type and “interdependent,” “companion- ate,” “attached,” or “enmeshed” relation- ships. Intimacy and interdependence are highly correlated and may belong to a sin- gle more abstract second-order factor such as “solidarity” or “closeness.”
Another common distinction is between voluntary (i.e., open field) relationships and those that exist because of exogenous factors (e.g., born into them, employment). Some think that there is a qualitative difference between relationships that people choose for themselves and those that are chosen for them or controlled by exogenous factors (e.g., by law, biology, or external necessity).
Figure6.1shows how these two distinctions can serve to identify certain types of rela- tionships in their prototypical form.
Similarly, Toennies (19 5 7) made a distinc- tion between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) relationships.
Gemeinschaft relationships are based on kinship, loyalty, friendship, and tradition.
Gesellschaftrelationships are based on legal contract, public opinion, rationality, and exchange. Using this distinction, Marwell and Hage (19 7 0) proposed an inductively derived empirically based typology of “role- relationships,” based on three dimensions:
(a) intimacy, (b) visibility, and (c) regulation (by society). They then posited four levels of both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft rela- tionships (i.e.,Uncontrolled, Regulated, Vis- ible, and Mixed). This typology, however, has not produced a large body of system- atic empirical study and does not necessar- ily apply across most cultures; further, it is unclear whether it has any “psychological reality” for everyday social actors in organiz- ing their own behavior.
Bateson (19 7 2) and others (Lederer &
Jackson, 19 6 8; Watzlawick et al., 19 6 7) have observed two types of mutually causal interaction sequences, which have often been suggested as the basis of a typol- ogy of relationships. Reciprocity, in which behaviors of similar function are redun- dantly exchanged, leads to enactment of a symmetrical relationship (e.g., reciproca- tion of affection leading to mutual attrac- tion). Redundant compensation, in which behaviors of maximally different functions are exchanged, leads to enactment of a complementaryrelationship (e.g., leadership–
subordination, teacher–student). A paral- lel relationship is characterized by flexible interaction such that (a) the participants
engage in both reciprocity and compensa- tion (Fisher & Adams, 19 9 4), or (b) when compensatory patterns are enacted, partici- pants do not always perform the same behav- ioral function (VanLear,19 8 5). Hinde (19 9 6) suggested that relationships are more than the patterns of behavioral exchange. They include memories, perceptions, emotions, and judgments about each other. These pat- terns of interaction have been, and will continue to be, useful in discriminating among different kinds of relationships (e.g., Williamson & Fitzpatrick,19 8 5), but a rela- tional typology should probably also include the psychological bases of relationships.
Alan Fiske (19 9 1) proposed what has become one of the most widely researched and often used general typologies of human relationships. Fiske (19 9 1, 19 9 2) made the claim that people in all cultures use just four basic “models” to organize their thinking and behavior regarding most aspects of their associations with other people. The four models arecommunal sharing (CS),author- ity ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing (MP). In a CS relation- ship, people have a feeling of equivalence and are oriented to their commonality and the common good, not their differences or individuality. Participants in a CS relation- ship constitute the “in-group” and are seen as belonging together and acting as one social actor. AR relationships are organized in a linear status hierarchy like a “chain of com- mand” in which privileges and responsibili- ties are based on relative rank. InEM relation- ships, reciprocal exchange is used to ensure equity and balance. Participants in EM rela- tionships perceive themselves as individuals who are relating with one another as equals.
Finally,MP relationshipsare concerned with socially meaningful ratios such as costs to rewards according to a distributive justice of entitlements in proportion to one’s invest- ments. Participants in MP relationships per- ceive themselves as individuals with poten- tially dissimilar valuations.
Fiske and his colleagues have explored the cross-cultural application of these four models and their role in social cognition.
When people make errors in remembering
people or interactions, the four relational models better predict the erroneous sub- stitution of other people than do personal characteristics in samples across five cultures (Fiske, 19 9 3, 19 9 5; Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 19 9 1). When people intentionally substitute a new person to do something with over an original choice, the four models best pre- dict the person substituted (Fiske & Haslam, 19 9 7). When people are asked to categorize their own relationships, or rate their simi- larity, the clusters that are obtained corre- spond to the four relational models (Haslam
& Fiske, 19 9 2). Fiske and Haslam (Fiske &
Haslam,19 9 6; Haslam,19 9 4) provided evi- dence that the four models more closely resemble how people think about their rela- tionships than the affiliation–control cir- cumplex (Kiesler, 19 8 3), Parsons’s pattern variables (Parsons & Shils, 19 5 1), Foa and Foa’s (19 7 4) resource exchange, or Clark and Mills’s (19 7 9) communal versus exchange distinction. Other species display evidence of CS and AR relationships, but MP and pos- sibly EM are patterns unique to human rela- tionships (Haslam,19 9 7) because people can calculate value.
According to Fiske (2 0 0 0), people can use different models simultaneously in dealing with different aspects of the same relation- ship or even the same interaction. Whereas this flexibility provides added complexity to the fabric of human relationships, it makes specifying the parameters of the theory dif- ficult and indicates that the four models may not be as mutually exclusive as they first appear.
Robert Weiss (19 9 8) argued that Fiske’s typology is not based on the essential deter- minants of relationship because its main dis- tinction is based on the distribution and allo- cation of resources between relationship par- ticipants – the system does not explain why people maintain communal sharing, author- ity ranking, market pricing, or equity match- ing in their relationships.1
This brings us to the theoretical tax- onomy of relationships proposed by Weiss (19 7 4, 19 9 8). Weiss’s system is based on his view of the “essential determinants” of relationships – emotion (e.g., security) and