So where does this leave us as regards the problem of the criterion that we started with? One thing that is certain is that the criteria for knowledge are far from obvi- ous, and this calls into question the idea that we could determine such criteria with- out making reference to actual cases of knowledge. This conclusion is, however, double-edged in that if it really is the case that knowledge is such a complicated notion, then how can it be that we are able to identify cases of knowledge correctly even while lacking a prior grasp of what the criteria for knowledge are? Right from the start of the epistemological project, then, we are faced with a deep and seem- ingly intractable puzzle, one that appears to undermine our prospects for making any progress in this area.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
• One of the central tasks in epistemology is to offer a definition of knowledge. The problem of the criterion, however, shows us that this task is in fact very difficult, if not impossible.
• Here, in a nutshell, is the problem of the criterion. Suppose we begin the task of defining knowledge by pointing to cases in which we have knowledge and trying to identify what is common to each case. The problem with this suggestion is that it assumes that we can already identify cases of knowledge, and thus that we already know what the marks, or criteria, of knowledge are. Alternatively, we might begin the task of defining knowledge by simply reflecting on the nature of knowledge and determine its essence that way. That is, through reflection we might determine what the criteria for knowledge are. The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it is difficult to see how we could possibly identify the criteria for knowledge without first being able to identify particular cases of knowledge. It seems, then, that either one must assume that one has (at least some of) the knowledge that one thinks one has, or else one must assume that one knows, independently of considering any particular instance of knowledge, what the criteria for knowledge are. Neither assumption is particularly plausible.
• We next considered a very influential theory of knowledge known as the classical (or tripartite) account of knowledge. According to this proposal, knowledge is to be understood as justified true belief, where a justification for one’s belief consists of good reasons for thinking that the belief in question is true.
• Despite the surface plausibility of the classical account of knowledge, we also saw that it was untenable. This was illustrated by appeal to Gettier cases, which are
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cases in which one forms a true justified belief and yet lacks knowledge because the truth of one’s belief is largely a matter of luck. (The example we gave of this was that of someone forming a true belief about what the time is by looking at a stopped clock which just so happens to be displaying the right time.)
• There is no easy answer to the Gettier cases; no simple way of supplementing the tripartite account of knowledge so that it can deal with these cases. Instead, a rad- ically new way of understanding knowledge is required, one that demands greater co-operation on the part of the world than simply that the belief in question be true.
STUDY QUESTIONS
1 Check that you understand the problem of the criterion. In order to get clear in your own mind exactly what the problem is, try to formulate this problem in your own words – have a go at offering a definition of knowledge without appeal- ing either to instances of knowledge or to the presupposition that you already know what the criteria for knowledge are.
2 Explain in your own words the distinction between methodism and particular- ism. For each position, offer one reason in favour of the view and one against.
3 What is the classical account of knowledge? How does the classical account of knowledge explain why a lucky true belief doesn’t count as knowledge?
4 What is a Gettier case, and what do such cases show? Try to formulate a Gettier case of your own.
5 In what way might it be said that the problem with Gettier cases is that they involve a justified true belief which is based on a false presupposition? Explain, with an example, why one cannot straightforwardly deal with the Gettier cases by advancing a theory of knowledge which demands justified true belief that does not rest on any false presuppositions.
INTRODUCTORY FURTHER READING
Hetherington, Stephen (2010) ‘The Gettier Problem’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard (eds), Ch. 12, pp. 119–30 (London:
Routledge). A very useful survey of the main issues raised by Gettier-style examples.
Shope, Robert K. (2002) ‘Conditions and Analyses of Knowing’, Oxford Handbook to Epistemology, P. K. Moser (ed.), pp. 25–70 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
A comprehensive treatment of the problem posed by Gettier cases and the vari- ous contemporary responses to that problem in the literature. The discussion that starts on p. 29 is most relevant to this chapter. Note that as this chapter develops, it becomes increasingly more demanding.
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defining knowledge 29
ADVANCED FURTHER READING
Chisholm, Roderick (1973) The Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press). This is the classic discussion of the problem of the criterion of (relatively) recent times.
Shope, Robert K. (1983) The Analysis of Knowing a Decade of Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A comprehensive survey of the initial wave of responses that were offered to the Gettier cases. Not for beginners.
Steup, Mathias, Turri, John & Sosa, Ernest (eds) (2013) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd edn, Oxford: Wiley). This edited collection contains a useful debate (§7) between Duncan Pritchard and Stephen Hetherington on whether knowledge is incompatible with luckily true belief.
Zagzebski, Linda (1999) ‘What Is Knowledge?’, Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds), pp. 92–116 (Oxford: Blackwell). A very thorough over- view of the issues surrounding the project of defining knowledge, especially in the light of the Gettier cases.
FREE INTERNET RESOURCES
Feldman, Fred & Feldman, Richard (2019) ‘Roderick Chisholm’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/. A well-written over- view of the work of this important twentieth-century epistemologist. See espe- cially §§3–4.
Gettier, Edmund L. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 23, 121–23 [freely available online here: www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html]. The article which started the contemporary debate about how best to define knowl- edge and which contains, by definition, the first official Gettier cases.
Hetherington, Stephen (2005) ‘Gettier Problems’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philoso- phy, www.iep.utm.edu/g/gettier.htm. An overview of the Gettier problem, and the main responses to it, by a leading epistemologist.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins & Steup, Matthias (2017) ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ knowledge- analysis/. An excellent and comprehensive overview of the issues regarding the project of defining knowledge.
Truncellito, David (2007) ‘Epistemology’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.
iep.utm.edu/e/epistemo.htm. Read up to the end of §2.b for more on the basic requirements for knowledge.