disagreement 163 The key question for us is thus whether intellectual humility, as the intellectual virtue opposed to the intellectual vice of dogmatism, would insist that you should always adopt a conciliatory stance in response to peer disagreement. It’s actually not clear that it does. For while adopting that stance seems generally appropriate in such cases, it’s not obvious why it should be required in the specific kind of peer disa- greement where the dispute is over your considered judgement (i.e. where you have reflected on the matter in hand, as in the tax calculation scenario described above).
Since it is your considered judgement, it seems rather premature to downgrade your confidence in this regard at the first sign that an epistemic peer disagrees with you.
Imagine, for example, that you respond to the tax calculation disagreement not by treating yourself as lacking knowledge but rather by simply engaging with your adversary and trying to find out more about how they calculated their different figure. Why wouldn’t this suffice to show that you are not being dogmatic? You are willing to listen to another person’s viewpoint, after all, and if it turns out that they say something convincing in support of their viewpoint, then you will change your mind, so it is not as if you’re being closed-minded. The crux of the matter is that it seems that you can display the intellectual virtue of being intellectually humble without having to always take the conciliatory stance in response to peer disagreement.
This would thus be one way of motivating a response to peer disagreement that is importantly different to conciliationism. Whereas conciliationism claims that one should always treat peer disagreement as knowledge-undermining, this proposal maintains instead that this needn’t always be the case. In particular, so long as the matter concerns one’s considered judgement, and provided one goes about it in the right kind of way, then one can legitimately ‘stick to one’s guns’ without thereby being dogmatic. As we’ve seen, a person who has the intellectual virtue of being intellectually humble – and hence who lacks the corresponding intellectual vice of being dogmatic – might respond to an epistemic peer disagreement about a consid- ered judgement in just this fashion.
After all, if the experts disagree, then one cannot simply defer to the experts, as they are offering contradictory advice.
Some of these cases of expert disagreement are easier to deal with than others.
To begin with, we need to recall our point from earlier that some topics allow for faultless disagreement. With that in mind, aesthetic expert disagreement is going to be very different from, say, scientific expert disagreement, as in the former case, but not the latter case, one can disagree about these matters without either party being at fault. Of course, as we noted earlier, this is one reason why one might be sceptical about whether there can be genuine experts regarding a subject matter like aesthet- ics. In any case, henceforth when we consider cases of expert disagreement, we will confine our attention to domains where there is a fact of the matter at issue, as is the case, for instance, in scientific disputes.
Experts and the COVID-19 Crisis
In 2020, a COVID-19 pandemic beset the whole world, leading to lockdowns in most countries, with heavy restrictions on travel and social interactions.
Wholesale lockdowns of this kind bring with them extremely high costs, both of an economic and a personal nature. As regards the former, businesses close down for lack of trade, employees can no longer work and are dependent upon government support (which in turn increases state debt), and once vibrant markets become atrophied. The personal costs of lockdown, however, are even higher, with people unable to see their loved ones (in some cases unable to see them even on their death bed), sick people unable to get operations, children missing out on social interaction at a crucial stage in their development, and so on. What was especially interesting about this pandemic from an epistemo- logical point of view was the role that experts, and would-be experts, played in this event. Although there was broad consensus among the experts about the seriousness of the pandemic, there was divergence among them about how best to deal with it. This meant that some countries had very different lockdown strategies (indeed, some countries hardly locked down at all). Relat- edly, since the decision to lockdown a country is ultimately a political decision (the scientists merely advise the politicians what to do), there was divergence among politicians about how best to respond to the scientific conclusions being presented to them. Inevitably, there were also people who lacked the relevant expertise presenting themselves on social media as experts and giving advice, often in ways that were unhelpful to the ongoing public debate. The result of all these factors was that the public were often unsure who to trust, with many sceptical about the need for state interference in their day-to-day lives. Now that the lockdown is over, many countries are conducting inquiries about what happened, in order to better prepare for future crises of this kind.
One key issue in this regard is to find improved ways to marshal expert opin- ion and communicate this to the public in a manner that sets it apart from the inevitable flurry of fake expert opinion.
disagreement 165 A further point we need to remember when we discuss expert disagreement is that not everyone who presents themselves as an expert really is one. In this social media age, there are lots of people who present their opinions as expertise when in fact it is nothing of the kind. Clearly, however, if a non-expert who falsely presents themselves as an expert disagrees with an expert, then we should defer to the gen- uine expert. Relatedly, we should also remember that expertise is domain-specific.
Accordingly, that someone is an expert in one domain doesn’t mean that they are thereby an expert in a different domain. For example, that someone is a respected biologist means that their expertise in biology should be respected and given due epistemic weight. But if the biologist disagrees with a climate scientist about cli- mate change, then only the latter is the expert with regard to the topic in hand. As a result, only the climate scientist is the expert in the relevant sense in this particular disagreement and hence they are the only expert that we should defer to in this regard.
Even with these points in mind, however, there clearly are genuine cases where bona fide experts within a factual domain disagree. So how should we, as non-experts, respond to these cases? There are two points to consider in this regard that can help one form a rational opinion in the light of this kind of expert disagreement.
The first is to be aware of the scope of the disagreement. Even though the experts in that domain are not in complete disagreement, it might nonetheless be the case that there is a broad consensus in play, with some experts adopting a stance that is an outlier relative to the other experts in that field. Clearly some of these experts are wrong, given that this is a factual matter that they are disagreeing about. Even so, sci- ence is not infallible – in fact, no discipline offers an infallible route to knowledge – and hence even first-rate scientists might end up forming different viewpoints about scientific questions. Put another way, that there is disagreement in this field needn’t mean that there is something inherently problematic about this particular scien- tific domain (much less that science in general is inherently problematic), as there is no essential reason why well-conducted scientific inquiry should always lead to consensus. In any case, insofar as there is broad consensus in this regard, then one would be rational, as a non-expert, to defer to the consensus expert view over the non-consensus expert view.
The second point to bear in mind is the depth of the disagreement. This is often a tricky thing for a layperson to judge, so it can depend a great deal on the skill of the experts concerned to explain what really is at issue here. The crux of the matter is that even where the experts disagree, it could be that the disagreement is over details and not over broader issues. If that’s right, then one can be rational in deferring to the experts over the main questions in that domain, even if one should remain agnostic about the details due to the expert disagreement.
We can illustrate both points by considering the contemporary debate about human- caused climate change. This is clearly a factual matter where some people such as climate scientists and those in related disciplines (geology, oceanography, meteorol- ogy, and so on) have genuine expertise to impart. There is clearly some expert disa- greement in this domain. Notice, however, that there is also a broad consensus too,
especially over the main points. For example, there is almost universal consensus that human-caused climate change is real. Indeed, where there is disagreement, it tends to be about details, such as the exact extent of the human-caused climate change, or the effectiveness of particular treatments of climate change. With these points in mind, the presence of expert disagreement doesn’t prevent us from form- ing a rational viewpoint as a layperson about lots of core issues that might concern us, such as that human-caused climate change is real, that certain kinds of measures would be at least particularly effective at responding to this problem, and so on.
Where we should be less confident in our opinions is where it comes to the detailed questions over which there is some dispute, such as which particular kind of meas- ure would be the most effective at responding to specific aspects of climate change.
This is a good juncture to return to our discussion of conciliationism, since what is expert disagreement for us as non-experts is a case of peer disagreement for the experts themselves. Accordingly, if conciliationism were true, then the experts might be obliged to downgrade their confidence in their own expertise. As we have noted above, however, this seems too strong. In fact, it is not altogether surprising that there should be some expert disagreement even about a factual scientific matter like climate change. Moreover, since expert opinion is usually opinion that is formed in a careful and considered fashion, it seems that one could retain one’s beliefs while nonetheless avoiding the charge of dogmatism by openly engaging with those other experts who disagree with you. Looking at actual cases of expert disagreement thus gives us further reasons to be suspicious of conciliationism.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
• Our topic is the social dynamics of knowledge, an area of epistemology known as social epistemology. We explored one core topic in social epistemology, which is the epistemology of disagreement. This is concerned with how the presence of disagreements can have implications for what we know.
• One way in which the presence of disagreements can have implications for what we know is when our awareness that a (seemingly) reasonable person disagrees with us about something that we believe can lead us to no longer have this belief.
Another way that disagreement can undermine our knowledge is by being a defeater. A defeater is a consideration that prevents you from having knowledge either by indicating that your reasons for your belief don’t sufficiently support the truth of that belief or else by providing you with independent reasons for thinking that the belief is false.
• Not every disagreement is a defeater for our knowledge. For example, that some- one who is clearly less knowledgeable about the topic at hand disagrees with us is not a reason to be less confident about what we believe. We also noted that some topics seem to allow for faultless disagreement, in the sense that both parties to the disagreement can legitimately stick to their positions. Domains where fault- less disagreement seems plausible tend to involve expressions of taste or pref- erence, such as aesthetics. In contrast, where a topic is concerned with a factual
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disagreement 167 matter concerning the world, such as a scientific domain, it seems that one of the disagreeing parties must be in the wrong. We noted that domains where faultless disagreement is allowed might be thought to be such that there is ultimately no fact of the matter to disagree about (and hence nothing to know either, much less be an expert about).
• One particularly interesting kind of disagreement from an epistemological point of view is peer disagreement. This is a variety of disagreement that takes place between two agents who are epistemic peers – that is, people who have roughly the same levels of intelligence and are in possession of roughly the same evidence with regard to the issue at hand.
• On the face of it, you are obliged to treat peer disagreement as a defeater for your knowledge. To do otherwise seems to be dogmatic in that it appears you are privileging your own opinion over your adversary’s opposing viewpoint simply because it is your opinion.
• The view that one should always treat peer disagreement as a defeater for one’s knowledge is called conciliationism, in that it entails adopting a conciliatory stance with regard to one’s adversary. While this proposal avoids the charge of dogma- tism, it does face a severe difficulty in that it appears to be self-undermining. This is because there is also peer disagreement among philosophers about whether conciliationism is true, and hence a consistent proponent of conciliationism shouldn’t regard themselves as having knowledge of this proposal.
• An alternative to conciliationism is to argue that we are not always obliged to treat peer disagreement as a defeater. In particular, so long as the issue in hand is one that we have given proper thought and attention to, then one can legitimately retain one’s conviction even in the presence of peer disagreement. We noted that this stance needn’t lead to the intellectual vice of dogmatism. This is because the opposing intellectual virtue of intellectual humility is compatible with sticking to one’s opinions in the right conditions. What is important to intellectual humility is that one is willing to openly engage with those who disagree with you, and be willing to change your mind if the evidence demands it. But one can do that while sticking to one’s opinions.
• Finally, we looked at the topic of expert disagreement, which is what to do when the experts disagree. This is a problem because it is generally rational to defer to the experts, but if the experts disagree, then it isn’t clear what such deferral would involve. We noted that it is important to expert disagreement that the subject matter is not one where there is faultless disagreement, and also that the experts who are disagreeing really are experts about that specific domain.
• Two further points that are relevant to expert disagreement are the scope and depth of the disagreement. As regards scope, if there is broad consensus among the experts, with only a minority disagreeing, then that is a reason to defer to the consensus expert opinion. As regards depth, if the experts tend to be in agreement about core claims, and only in dispute about the details, then this is a reason to defer to them about the core claims at least. We illustrated both points by considering the kind of expert disagreement that we find in climate change science.
STUDY QUESTIONS
1 How might being aware that there is a disagreement about something that you believe lead you to stop believing it? Try to think of a concrete example for illustration.
2 What is a defeater? Give some examples that are independent of the problem of disagreement. How might the fact that there is a disagreement act as a defeater for your knowledge?
3 What is a faultless disagreement? Why might certain domains, like aesthetics, be compatible with faultless disagreements? Would this entail that such domains are not concerned with a genuine fact of the matter, such that there is ultimately nothing to know in these domains? If so, would that mean that, for example, there cannot be aesthetic experts?
4 What is a peer disagreement? (Make sure that you carefully explain what is involved in the notion of an epistemic peer.) Why are peer disagreements such plausible cases in which disagreement constitutes a defeater for our knowledge?
5 What is conciliationism? What are the main motivations for conciliationism?
6 Why might conciliationism be self-undermining?
7 How might one respond to a peer disagreement in a non-conciliatory fashion without thereby being dogmatic? How might the intellectual virtues be relevant in this respect? Why might it matter that the topic at hand is one that one has properly considered rather than something that one has formed a snap judgement about?
8 Why should we generally defer to experts? What is expert disagreement? Why does expert disagreement make such deferrals problematic?
9 Why does it matter to expert disagreement what the scope and depth of the expert disagreement is? Try to explain what is meant by both of these terms with refer- ence to the kind of expert disagreement we find in climate change science.
INTRODUCTORY FURTHER READING
Frances, Bryan (2010) ‘Disagreement’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard (eds), Ch. 7, pp. 68–74 (London: Routledge).
A helpful overview of the contemporary debate about the epistemology of disa- greement. See also this author’s Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry listed below.
Kusch, Martin (2010) ‘Social Epistemology’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard (eds), Ch. 77, pp. 873–84 (London: Routledge).
Offers a distinctive account of social epistemology, reflecting the author’s own specific (and highly interesting) take on these issues.
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disagreement 169
ADVANCED FURTHER READING
Alfano, Mark, Klein, Colin & de Ridder, Jeroen (eds) (2022) Social Virtue Epistemol- ogy (London: Routledge). A very recent anthology of papers that explores the main topics of social epistemology through the lens of virtue epistemology.
Christensen, David & Lackey, Jennifer (eds) (2013) The Epistemology of Disagree- ment: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press). An important recent collec- tion that brings together many of the leading contemporary figures working on the epistemology of disagreement.
Pritchard, Duncan (2021) ‘Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagree- ment’, Synthese, 98, 1711–23. A recent discussion of how the intellectual virtues (and vices) are relevant to the epistemology of disagreement.
FREE INTERNET RESOURCES
Frances, Bryan (2018) ‘Disagreement’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement/. An encyclopedic discussion of the contemporary epistemology of disagreement.
Goldman, Alvin & O’Connor, Cailin (2019) ‘Social Epistemology’, Stanford Ency- clopaedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/. A comprehensive overview of the subject, written by two leading figures working in the field.