So far in this chapter we have talked about the epistemology of testimony without saying anything about memory. Notice, however, that the same sort of problem faces the justification of our reliance on memory as we saw above facing our reliance on testimony. Just as we depend upon testimony in a great deal of the beliefs that
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Thomas Reid (1710–96)
It is evident that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgement is by nature inclined to the side of belief.
Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind Like his contemporary, David Hume (1711–76), Thomas Reid was one of the main figures in a period of Scottish history known as the Scottish Enlighten- ment, in which radical new ideas came to the fore. Unlike Hume, however, who was notoriously prone to take a sceptical attitude towards the beliefs held by most of those around him, Reid was a defender of what is known as a
‘common-sense’ philosophy, which put the claims of common sense above the conclusions of abstract philosophical reasoning.
Just as in his treatment of testimony, Reid favoured trusting our common-sense judgements, so in his treatment of perception he favoured a view known as direct realism, which maintains that we are able to experience the world directly.
testimony and memory 85 we form, we also depend upon memory. Think, for example, of your belief about where you live or what your name is. Furthermore, just as there seems no obvious reason why testimony should necessarily be thought trustworthy, so there seems no obvious reason why memory should necessarily be thought trustworthy. If that’s right, then whether or not we can trust our memory might be thought to depend on what independent grounds we can offer for thinking that memory is trustworthy (i.e. grounds which are not themselves dependent upon the use of one’s memory).
It seems, then, that in common with a reductionist view about the epistemology of testimony, we similarly ought to advance a parallel reductionist view about the epis- temology of memory. Such a proposal would contend that a memory-based belief is only justified, and thus a case of knowledge, if it can be given adequate independent (i.e. non-memorial) epistemic support.
The problem is, of course, that, just as with testimony-based beliefs, when one thinks of the grounds, one can offer in favour of one’s memory-based beliefs, one will usually think of further memory-based beliefs, and so the required independent epistemic support is lacking. For example, suppose I think I recall being told by a geography teacher that the Arctic is not in fact a land mass at all, but merely a block of ice, and so believe on this basis that the Arctic is a block of ice. If this recollection is true, then I would have grounds to trust this belief, since geography teachers are good sources of information about matters such as this. But what further grounds can I cite in support of this memory-based belief? Note that the obvious grounds that would naturally spring to mind in such a case would tend to be themselves memory-based beliefs. For example, I might say in support of this memory-based belief that I recall putting this answer down in a class test and having the answer marked correct, which would indeed support the original memory that I was told by a geography teacher that the Arctic is a block of ice. But this further belief is itself gained by memory, so unless I am already presupposing the epistemic legitimacy of using memory to gain knowledge, then this further belief wouldn’t obviously be of any use.
The reductionist demand as regards memorial justification and knowledge, just like the parallel demand as regards testimonial justification and knowledge, thus seems to lead to a kind of scepticism in that it turns out that we lack a lot of the knowledge that we would ordinarily attribute to ourselves. One way around this problem is to opt for a version of credulism as regards memorial justification and knowledge, and therefore argue that we should grant memory-based beliefs a default epistemic status, such that beliefs so formed are justified, and hence candidates for knowledge, just so long as we have no special grounds for doubt. As with the credulist position as regards testimony, however, the problem with the view is that it merely seems to make a vir- tue out of necessity. Absent a general ground for trusting memory, it is just not clear why we should be willing to grant such a default status to memory-based belief.
Just as we saw above that credulism as regards testimony can be understood along epistemic externalist lines, one could try running the same line here. Accordingly, one would hold that one’s memory-based beliefs for which one lacks adequate grounds can still be justified, and hence potential cases of knowledge, just so long as further relevant facts about the beliefs obtain, such as that the beliefs were reliably
formed (i.e. trusting one’s memory is a reliable way to form one’s beliefs). As with credulism about testimony that is cast along epistemic externalist lines, whether you find this sort of rendering of credulism about memory plausible will depend on whether you find epistemic externalism plausible (and even then you might not think that epistemic externalism is applicable in this case).
So just as there is no easy answer to the question of how one justifies one’s reliance on testimony, it is equally difficult to say what justifies one’s reliance on memory.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
• Testimonial knowledge is knowledge that we gain via the testimony of others. In the usual case, this will simply involve someone telling us what they know, but we can also gain testimonial knowledge in other more indirect ways, such as by reading the testimony of others (in a textbook like this one, say).
• A lot of what we believe is dependent upon the testimony of others. Moreover, it is hard to see how we could independently verify for ourselves much of what we are told via testimony since such verification would itself involve making appeal to further testimony-based beliefs that we hold, and so would simply be circular.
• One response to this problem is reductionism, which claims that we need to be able to offer non-testimonial support for our testimony-based beliefs if they are to be rightly held. In doing so, we would offer non-circular justification for our testimony-based beliefs. The problem is, however, that for a large number of our testimony-based beliefs, this is practically impossible, and so reductionism seems to entail that we know very little of what we usually think we know.
• We also looked at a very different response to the problem of testimonial knowl- edge, which is known as credulism. This view maintains that we can rightly hold a testimony-based belief even if we are unable to offer independent support (non-testimonial or otherwise) for it, at least provided there are no special rea- sons for doubt. Thus, since we don’t need to offer independent support for a testimony-based belief in order for it to be rightly held, we don’t need to worry about whether such independent support would be circular. The chief worry about credulism, however, is that it might be thought simply to license gullibility.
• We did consider, however, the possibility that credulism could be understood as an epistemic externalist thesis, such that while one could have justified testimony-based beliefs even while being unable to offer adequate supporting grounds for those beliefs, nevertheless one’s beliefs should meet a further relevant condition, such as that they were formed in a reliable way (i.e. that testimony should be in fact reliable, even if we lack good reason for thinking that it is).
Such an epistemic externalist rendering of credulism inherits the problems of epistemic externalism more generally, however.
• Finally, we turned to the issue of the epistemology of memory, and found that it raises many of the same issues that testimony does. In particular, there seems no obvious reason to think that our memory is trustworthy by its nature. Absent such a reason, it seems that for a memory-based belief to be justified, and hence a case of knowledge, is for that belief to be given adequate epistemic support from
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testimony and memory 87 independent grounds (i.e. non-memorial grounds). We thus seem led to a form of reductionism about memorial justification and knowledge. The trouble is, as with testimony, such independent grounds are usually lacking. Accordingly, again as with testimony, there is a similar move in the debate concerning the epistemol- ogy of memory towards a kind of credulism about memory-based beliefs which accords them a default epistemic standing (with the credulist thesis possibly sup- plemented by an appeal to some version of epistemic externalism). Such a view (even in its epistemic externalist guise) faces the same kinds of problems that afflict the parallel credulist position regarding testimony.
STUDY QUESTIONS
1 Try to briefly state in your own words what testimony is. Classify the following cases in terms of whether they are examples of testimony:
• someone telling you that your car has been stolen;
• seeing your car being stolen;
• reading a note from a friend telling you that your car has been stolen;
• remembering that your car has been stolen; and
• seeing that your car is no longer in front of your house and inferring that it has been stolen.
2 Try to briefly state in your own words what reductionism about testimony holds, and why someone might endorse this view. Think of four beliefs that you hold which you are certain of but which would not meet the requirements laid down by reductionism.
3 Try to briefly state in your own words what credulism about testimony holds, and why someone might endorse this view. Is this view preferable to reductionism?
4 Why might one supplement one’s credulism by appealing to some form of epis- temic externalism? Describe what such a rendering of credulism would look like, and critically evaluate it. (Along the way, try to state clearly what the epistemic externalism/internalist amounts to.)
5 Explain, in your own words, why the problem facing memorial knowledge and justification is broadly analogous to the problem we have seen facing testimonial knowledge and justification. State what a reductionist and a credulist view would be as regards memory, and specify, where applicable, which view you find to be most plausible. (If you find neither view plausible, say why.)
INTRODUCTORY FURTHER READING
Bernecker, Sven (2010) ‘Memory Knowledge’, Routledge Companion to Epistemology, S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard (eds), Ch. 30, pp. 326–34 (London: Routledge).
A comprehensive overview of the main epistemological issues as regards memory.
Lackey, Jennifer (2010) ‘Testimonial Knowledge’, Routledge Companion to Epistemol- ogy, S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard (eds), Ch. 29, pp. 316–25 (London: Routledge).
A detailed survey of the main epistemological issues as regards testimony.
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ADVANCED FURTHER READING
Coady, C. A. J. (1992) Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
This is the classic text on the epistemology of testimony, which defends a credu- list approach. Very readable, with sections that apply the account of testimony offered to specific domains, such as legal testimony.
Coady, David (2012) What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell). A provocative contemporary treatment of the epistemology of testimony, which focuses on the relevance of the epistemology of testimony to issues in contemporary debate (e.g. the debate about climate change).
Lackey, Jennifer & Sosa, Ernest (eds) (2005) The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford:
Oxford University Press). A contemporary collection of papers on the subject, containing articles from most of the leading figures in the field. Not for the nov- ice, but essential reading if you want to develop your grasp of the epistemology of testimony and are already familiar with much of the background of the area.
Martin, Charles Burton & Deutscher, Max (1966) ‘Remembering’, The Philosophical Review, 75, 61–196. This is the classic article on the epistemology of memory, and can be found in many anthologies of epistemology articles. Note, however, that it is really quite difficult, and hence is not the sort of thing that you are likely to be able to follow on the first reading.
FREE INTERNET RESOURCES
Leonard, Nick (2021) ‘Testimony, Epistemological Problems of’, Stanford Encyclo- pedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/. This is an outstanding and state-of-the-art entry on the epistemology of testimony. It includes lots of detail about the debates in this area and a comprehensive list of references to other articles that might be of use.
Michaelian, Kourken & Sutton, John (2017), ‘Memory’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/. Although perhaps of less use to those new to epistemology, this is a fine overview of recent work on memory.
Morris, William Edward & Brown, Charlotte R. (2019) ‘David Hume’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/. An excellent, and recently updated, overview of the work of Hume.
Nichols, Ryan & Yaffe, Gideon (2014) ‘Thomas Reid’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid/. A very helpful overview of the work of Reid.
Senor, Thomas D. (2009) ‘Epistemological Problems of Memory’, Stanford Ency- clopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory-episprob/. An excellent overview of the epistemological issues as regards memory by one of the leading figures working on this area.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003356110-11