VII] BELGIAN RAILWAYS 143 for a number of short private coal-field lines, none of the early

VII]

BELGIAN RAILWAYS

143

144

FRENCH RAILWAYS

^[cH.

transportbylocomotive,

which

wasonlyovercome withdifficulty in England, extended in France to leading statesmen.

When

public opinion, and the pertinacity of the promoter,

E

mile Pereire, extortedfromParliamentaconcessionforthelinefrom Paris to St

Germain

in 1835, Thiers is creditedwith a remark wEIchhas

become

^classical: "II fautdonner9a a Paris,

comme un

joujou; mais 9a ne transporterajamais

un

voyageur ni

un

colis."

Next

year the lineto Versailleswas given, on the

same

principle apparently.

Then

Parliament settled

down

to dis- cussions of

immense

length and great interest on

what would now

be called the question of nationalisation. Various far reaching projects were quashed, because the Houses were not satisfied withthe principles onwhich theywere based. There was, for instance, a scheme putforward officially, in 1835, for alinefromParis to

Rouen

and Havre. Private companies were to do the work, but the statewas to give assistance

by

taking shares inthem.

The

scheme wasrejected. In 1837

came

a

more

ambitiousproposal, forlinesfromParis toHavre,totheBelgian frontier beyond Valenciennes, and to Tours; and for a line

from Lyons

to Marseilles. It was over this proposal that the greatest discussions of principle took place. Lamartine, the most eloquent advocate of construction

by

the state, spoke of the dangers, political, economic and strategic, of placing in privatehandscontroloverthe

unknown

powersofthe

new

age.

He

revived the battle cries of 1789.

He

denounced the

new

feudalism and the railway barons

who would

impudently levy tollonthe trade ofFrance. Echoing a speech ofMirabeau, he picturedthe deadly agiotage (stock-jobbing) that

would

surely follow the creation of a mass of privately-owned securities.

"Que

rfitat fasse seul, que I'fitat possede seul...car,

un

jour, au moins, vous pouvez donner vos lignes au peuple pour qui tout doit etre fait^,"

Thus

he

summed up

his position, a few years later. Against

him

were the professed economists, ad- vocating private enterprise and laissez faire, and suspicious of the delays and poHtical dangers of state construction, under a Parliament not too pure.

And

with

them

were the promoters and

men

^ofaffairs.

*QuotedinGuillaumot,

V

organisation deschemins deferenFrance_{(1899), p.}7.

vii]

FRENCH RAILWAYS

₁₄₅

It

was

generallyagreed,however,that,withoutaconsiderable

measure

of state control and

some

state assistance, France could not

hope

to create a railway system appropriate to her economic and political requirements. Gradually discussion narroweditself

down

tothe

form

and

amount

ofstateassistance.

No government was

preparedto carrythefinancialresponsibility of a complete state system; though

some

of the schemes

assumed

state construction of

main

lines.

No

result

was

reached in 1837, nor yet in 1838, in spite of commissions

and

fresh projects.

Meanwhile

a certain

number

of concessions were given for short lines of obvious local utility, the state assisting invariousways. It

made

a loan to,

the

company which was

to builda line fromAlais to Beaucaire in 1837. It guaranteed interest for the Paris-Orleans line in 1840. Ithelped

young

^companies,

when

they got into trouble;

and

itself undertook the construction of the line from the Belgian frontier to Valenciennes,

when

it

became

obvious that Valenciennes

must

be linked to the

new

Belgian system.

As

aresult ofall this,there were

from

₃₅₀ to 360 miles ofrailway of various sorts

open

inFrance in 1841.

At

length,

by

thelawofJune1842,an agreement onprinciple

was

reached.

A

^national railway

programme

was

drawn

up.

With

Paris as centre, lineswereto radiate to theChannel ports

and Belgium

;to

Nancy

andStrasbourg;to

Lyons

andMarseilles

;

to the Spanish ^frontier at the east end of the Pyrenees via Bourges

and

Toulouse^;tothe

same

frontieratthewestend via

Tours and

Bordeaux; to

Rouen

and Havre; to Nantes and so to Brest.

There

were also to be lines

from

Marseilles to Bor- deaux

and from

Dijon to Mulhouse.

Government

was to find theland,local authorities furnishing two-thirds of thecost,and toconstruct theroad-bed(theinfra-structure),including bridges

and

tunnels.

Companies

were to furnish the super-structure, i.e. rails

and

ballast and station equipment, rolling stock and working capital.

The

local authorities disliked their share of the burden,

which was removed

^{in 1845.}

There

remainedthe state

and

the companies.

For some

lines companies wereeasily found, companies

which

in several cases werereadyto do

more

than ^their

minimum

share of the work.

The

^state, being short

146

FRENCH RAILWAYS

^[cH.

offunds, intimeacquiesced. Forotherlinesit

was

hardto find a

company

at all.

On

^{these the state} began operationsⁱⁿ

hope

of finding one later.

So

thelong debatedprinciplesofthelaw of 1842 werenever appliedas designed.

What

remained, through these and other changes,wasfirst

—

^thegeneral principle of state cooperation, carrying with it a reserved right of ownership

by

the state;

second

—

^the principle of state control over the geographical plan of the system; third—the full recognition

from

the first of the state's right to supervise rates, insist

on

safeguards for travellers, and have its representatives in the counsels of the companies.

/ The

Revolution of 1848foundtheposition thus.

There

were fromthirtyto fortycompaniesin existence,dealingwithvarious sections ofthe national programme.

Many

of

them

were

now

under obligation to do the whole

work

themselves, the state retaining merely a right to

buy

back the lines.

The

financial troubleswhichoccurredinFrance,as inEngland, during 1847

had

leftseveralof thesecompaniesingravedistress.

The

Paris- Orleans andParis-Lyons companies werepractically insolvent.

'Consequently, the

new

National

Assembly

proposed to revert to the policy of Lamartine; close

on

the insolvent companies

which

could notfulfiltheircontracts;

buy

out therest^;andstart acompletestatesystem. But government

was

not strongenough evento

make

abeginning.

The

onlypiece ofrailway legislation of the years 1848-52 was the concession to a

company

ofthe line from Paris to Rennes.

The

state gave the

company

what was comingtobe recognisedas themost useful formofassist- ance, aguarantee ofinterest.

By

that time over 2000 miles of railwaywere open; but for lack ofwilling companies, 360 miles werebeing

worked by

the state.

The

whole position was confused and unsatisfactory.

The

companies were too

numerous

for efficiency.

The

trunk lines projected in 1842 were far from complete.

The

western

line, intended for Brest, was not open

much beyond

Chartres.

South of

Tours

the south-western line was incomplete; south ofBordeaux it was not begun.

The

line intended for the east

endof thePyreneeshadnot yetgotinto the difficultcountryof

vn]

FRENCH RAILWAYS H7

Auvergne.

What

is

now

theP.-L.-M.

was

inavery complicated situation. It

was open from

Paris to Dijon and Chalons-sur- Saone, thoughtheoriginalParis-Lyons

company

hadcollapsed.

At

the other

end

there

was

a line

from

Marseilles to Avignon, of

which

the state had borne

most

of the cost.

The

^section Chalons-Lyons

was making

progress; but little had been done

on

the section Lyons-Avignon. Further north the Strasbourg line

was more

forward.

The

first section to Chalons-sur-

Marne,

built

by

the state andleased to a

company

as originally contemplated,

was

open before _1848.

The

Chalons-Nancy section

came

into operation in 1851-2, and the final Vosges section

was

atthat time well forward. Nothing had been done

on

the cross country lines

from

Marseilles to Bordeaux and Dijon to

Mulhouse;

_but in the north, under an efficient

com-

pany, travel to both Calais and Belgium

was

possible, and a

few

important branch lines

had

been constructed.

The Second Empire saw

the completion of the original

French

railway network.

A

first step towards completionwasr the amalgamation of the companies controlling successive sections ofone

main

route.

The

success ofthe northern

com-

pany, the first developed of the existing great companies, furnished an object lesson. In 1852-3 fusions were going

on

fast,with the approval and encouragement ofthe state. It

was now

anxious to have strong companies, because it wished to, bargain for the construction

by them

of subsidiary ^lines, in return forthe concessions of the trunk routes and anygovern-

ment

^assistance

which

might go with those concessions.

By

1857the process of concentration

was

complete.

The

^state

^{had^}

no

longer any lines in hand. All the trunk lines throughout France were controlled

by

six great companies, each with its

recognised area, likethat of the North-Eastern

which

had jus^

come

into existence in England.

They

were the North, East, West, P.-L.-M., Orleans and Southern. Inside the areas there

was no

competition. Except the Southern, they were, roughly ^{speaking,triangles with} apex at Paris and base

on

the frontiers.

As

part of the bargainbetweenthese great

new com-

panies

and

the Imperial

Government,

the concessions were extended; but ^a point of time ⁱⁿ the future

was

always con-

148

FRENCH RAILWAYS

^[ch.

templated at which the whole property

would

fall in to the state.

The

stronger companies,like that ofthe North, needed

no

financial help^; but

some

ofthe others secured a guarantee ofinterest. In return foritsvarious favours,thestate not only required the companies to build a subsidiary network of Unes

at their

own

charges, butalsooverhauledrates andfaresinthe .interests ofthepublicand ofits

own

traffic.

Unfortunately the world-wide commercial crisis of 1857-8

came

just

when

these agreements had been entered into.

The

companies

demanded

reconsideration. Either they

must

be relieved ofthe burden of

new

construction,

now beyond

their strength, or

some

further assistance

must

be given.

The

state, unwilling to abandon the hope of national development by means, of subsidiary lines, accepted the second alternative.

It fell back ona general policy ofguaranteed interest, plusthe right to a shareinprofits

when

profits reachedanagreedlevel.

A

series of agreements, called the Franqueville conventions, after their author, were completed in 1859.

Under

these all lineswereclassed intotwogroups, theoldandthe

new

networks.

The

guarantee applied onlyto linesofthe

new

network, ofwhich each

company

had its appropriate share. But if the profits of the oldnetworkgotbeyondafixedlevel,theyweretoflowover, as from a full cistern, into the accounts of the

new

network, thus reducing the liability of the state

on

the latter. Then,

when

profits on old and

new

networks had reached otherfixed levels

—

^{6 per cent, on the new, 8 per cent,}

^on

the old

—

^the statewas to share inthem. It was also entitled to repayment ofany

sums

advancedundertheguarantee,withinterest

on

the advances at4^{per cent.}

Butthe rightof thestateto shareinprofits was not to begin until 1872; and before 1872 things had

happened which

dis- located all this ingenious financial machinery. Ingenuity was perhaps

more

conspicuous than

wisdom

^;foritiseasytoimagine the accounting difficulties

which

resulted

from

the system of the two "networks," _{each with} its budget, difficulties which were a standing temptation to fraud on the part of the

com-

panies,

who

naturally

—

^{to take} but one illustration

—

^wished to increase the content of the "old network" cistern before