1 § 37. Ithasbeenpointed outthat,
when
Sir RobertPeelwas calledfromRome
toLondon
inDecember
1834to preside over anexceedinglyshort-lived ministry,hetravelledno
quicker than one of Agricola's couriers might have travelled,when
taking back toRome news
ofhis master's British victories. Peelhad aneasierjourney,becausetheroadsalltheway
in histime were, as the Frenchsay, "coachable."They
hadjust beenmade
so,thoughprobablyhehad
some
bad stretcheson
theItalian side.At
that time, in Peel's country, the Stockton and Darlington andthe Manchester and Liverpoolrailwayshad been openforsome
years,and progress had beenmade
with theLondon
andBirmingham
and other trunk Hnes.On
the continent, two or three short but rather unimportant lines were open, and one shortbutimportantlinewas nearing completion. Thislinewas notonPeel'sroute. Itranfrom
Brussels toMalines.Opened
inMay
1835, it carried over halfa million passengers in its firstyear
—
actuallymore
thanwere carried on all theEnglish linesin 1835.
The
fact is significant. Insome
ways Belgium led Europeinrailway building. Shewas
aheadofallthecontinent inordered construction, and ahead ofEnglandinthatshehad arailway policy,when
England was fumblingfora policywhich
she never found.The
beginningsofthecoal-minetramway,which
precededthe railwayproperon
the continent as inEngland, are ofno great interest.There
was one at Anzin early in the century, and othersamong
the Belgian mines, besides thetramway
at the Li^ge cannon foundry mentioned in a previous chapter.No
sooner was Belgium a nation
—
shebecame
a nation, it will berecalled,intheyear theManchester andLiverpoolwas opened
—
than her press began to fill vnth railway schemes.
The
firstsuggestionwas a direct line from
Antwerp
to Cologne,which,CH.vii]
BELGIAN RAILWAYS
141 in theform
then proposed,was
never built.Next
year the Minister of theInteriorbeganto haveplansmade.At
oncethe question arose of state versus private railways.There
were no precedents, so Belgium had tomake
her own. Shewas
one of the few countries, at that time, inwhich
private capital and private enterprise might not unreasonably have been expected to create a railway system; so thatit really was anopenissue.But
after discussion inParliament, duringtheautumn
of 1833,it
was
decided, partly for the glory of theyoung
state, partly becausethegovernment was
resolute thatthewholework must
becarriedoutsystematically, thatthe projected Belgianrailways should be anationalundertaking.The
scheme was voted with acclamation (istMay,
1834), and put inhand
without delay.There
isno
doubt that"this magnificent project," as the firstand greatest English scientific writer^
on
railways called it,raised the prestige of Belgium, as the Belgians had
hoped
itwould.
Belgium
meant
to exploit the advantages of her position as aland ofpassage.Her
railwaysystemshould begin witha cross, linking, northand
south, Antwerp, Malines, Brussels,Mons and
France; eastand
west, Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, Malines, Louvain, Liegeand Germany.
Malineswas thepoint ofinter- section.There
were to be branches,on
the western arm,from Ghent
towards Lille via Courtrai,andfrom Ghent
northwards toAntwerp; on
theeasternarm,from
Tirlemontto StTrond;
and on
the southernfrom
Braine-le-Com^te to Charleroi and eventually toNamur. So
Belgiumwould
linkup
England, France,Germany
andHolland,by
347miles ofrailway,anddraw
across her territory the trade of all.
Lebeau
and Rogier, thetwo men
mainly responsible for the policy, deserved well of theircountry. Itwas
asimple butbrilliantplan.Part of itwas executedquickly.
By May
1836,thelinewas
openfrom
BrusselstoAntwerp
.By
Januaryofthenext year,the western.main
linewas
workingfrom
Malines toTermonde.
Forty-fivemore
miles of thesystem were opened in 1837,andseventy-one miles in 1838.By
1844 the original plan was approximately^ Dionysius Lardner, Railway Economy: a Treatise on the
New
Art of Transport, 1850,p. 416. Thischapterowesagreat deal to Lardner.142
BELGIAN RAILWAYS
[cH.complete. Engineering difficulties, very formidable for those days, had been successfully overcome
on
the eastern arm, in- cluding a tunnelmore
than halfa mile long and the crossing of a watershed five hundred feet high."The
extraordinary expedition withwhich
the Belgianrail roadswerecompleted,"wrote Lardner in 1850, "has been mainly caused
by
the cir-cumstance of their havingbeen executed
by
the state,and
the execution being conducted under the superintendence of a special railwaycommittee, investedwith adequate powers.By
this expedient innumerable official formalities were avoided."
Lardnerno doubt hadin
mind
theprivatebillprocedure of the BritishParliament,andthevacillationsofBritishrailwaypolicy, in theforties.The
Belgian state system proved farmore
expensive than was originally contemplated.When
all the original lines were opentotraffic,the statehadspent £5,373,000 onthem
or,say, ,£16,500 a mile.The
expenditurebeyondestimate was natural, asthewholestandard ofrailwayconstructionaltered while thework
was in progress.The
light rails,wooden
bridges,and
10h.p.locomotives ofthe original project,wereout ofdatelong beforetheeasternlinehad been pushedoverthedifficultcountry betweenLouvain and Liege. Yetsome
profit could always be shown. Ifitwasnot always acommercialprofit,notenough
to cover the interest on the railway loans, the government could pointto theindirectgain tothecountryresultingfrom
a long- sighted and rapidly applied policy—
^the 50 per cent, rise in Belgian imports between 1836 and 1845; the 100 percent, rise in coal production between 1835 and 1845; themore
than 800 per cent, rise in the export of cast iron during thesame
period. Moreover,
by
1853, the state lines couldshow
a profit of 5percent.,enoughtocoverinterest.By
that time,however, therailwayadministrationwas showingsignsofossification.No
fresh state enterprisewas undertaken inthe twenty years from 1850 to 1870; and
by
the latter date the government linesmeasurednot
much more
thana quarter of the Belgianrailway system (800-900 kilometresoutof 3000).^There hadneverbeenofficialoppositionto private enterprise.
Concessions were being sought as early as 1832. But, except
VII]