In this chapter I have presented work exploring the heterogeneous effects of economic war- fare on forced migration in the context of North Korea. While data limitations in previous chapters prevent me from fully exploring this dynamic, the semi-structured interviews I conducted with North Korean refugees and defectors served as a rich source of data en- abling me to subject my theory of people fleeing poverty resulting from targeted economic warfare to more rigorous falsification. Here, I provide a summary of my findings as well as thoughts on avenues for future research regarding causes of forced migration beyond immediate threats to physical security.
What is unique about poverty in North Korea is that it is entirely a product of Kim Il Sung’s social engineering project that assigned each North Korean citizen a hierarchical status on the basis of perceived political loyalty. Responses given in interviews indicate socioeconomic ceilings severely limit the ability of the North Korean masses to survive.
By controlling the levers of economic distribution, North Korean authorities are able to economically punish those at the bottom of the songbun totem pole by withholding em- ployment opportunities, food, education, health care, and other socioeconomic essentials.
The decision to flee one’s home and abandon all that is known and familiar is never easy nor simple. This is no different for North Koreans. Their motivations to flee are com- plex and very few make the decision to leave without putting forth a painstaking amount of thought. Though it would be myopic to say the least that the poverty from which the indi-
viduals I spoke with fled was not a function of politics, the people I spoke with rarely fled out of lofty political ideals.17 They fled hunger, homelessness, unemployment, and other socioeconomic discriminations on the basis of their perceived loyalties to the North Korean State.
This research has also illustrated the differentiating outcomes of economic warfare across political identity with regards to an individual’ssongbun. In other words, those out- side of North Korea’s core class are more likely to be targeted with discriminatory eco- nomic policies such as smaller rations and corn instead of rice if they are lucky enough to receive any food at all. While a handful of those interviewed considered themselves to be from a songbun in the core class, the majority did not. This is congruent with interview responses that members of the core class are less likely to flee as they receive preferen- tial treatment from the state regarding food, education, employment, housing, medicine, and other material comforts. It also reflects Yoon Gi’s statement that “most North Korean refugees have a poorsongbun. They have to leave because they are discriminated against due to their songbun.” Ji Hye informed me that “In Noth Korea, children are taught to be wholeheartedly faithful to the Kim family and to the country at all times. And if any citizen betrays the Kim family, children learn that the Earth will collapse.” For those outside of Kim’s inner circle and the upper echelons of the North Korean State and Korean Workers’
Party, it seems they are born into a world where the Earth has already collapsed.
I make the point of North Korea’s targeted economic warfare on members of lower songbun because it speaks to the heterogeneous effects of poverty on forced migration.
Prior studies on the causes of forced migration have assumed homogeneous effects within and across populations. While this may be an appropriate assumption for particular causal mechanisms such as war, it is hardly an appropriate assumption to be made regarding poverty as averaging across entire populations can mask its effects when used as a po- litical weapon against certain sub-populations. Particularly in the context of forced migra-
17Indeed, it is the very fact that their poverty was the result of politics that makes them refugees and inspired this research.
tion, poverty emanating from forced dispossession entails economically hindering particu- lar groups of people while enhancing the economic well-being of others. Thus, we should expect to see those on the receiving end of discriminatory economic policies to have a higher propensity for flight relative to those on the receiving end of economic favoritism.
Responses given by interview participants regarding their songbun, motivations for leav- ing North Korea, and reasons others choose to stay provide affirmative evidence for this hypothesis.
While obstacles to socioeconomic rights played a large part in motivating flight for those I interviewed, many stated they would consider returning to North Korea in the ab- sence of such barriers. When asked if they had or would ever consider returning to North Korea, democratization and political reform were non-starters for most; several, however, explicitly stated that market reforms such as those carried out by China and the former Soviet Union would be enough of an incentive for them to entertain such thoughts. These responses only provide further evidence that, at least for the case of North Korea, interfer- ence from the state in the pursuit of economic prosperity plays a strong role in the decision- making process of those who flee and those who do not.
In addition to speaking to socioeconomic shortcomings motivating their decision to leave, respondents revealed other interesting motivations under-researched in the forced migration literature such as access to information and the right to love. Baek (2016) ex- plores how access to illicit foreign media is slowly fomenting what she calls a “digital revolution.” While only a few individuals I spoke with for this research cited foreign me- dia such as radio broadcasts and South Korean television shows as motivating them to flee North Korea by exposing the enormous wealth gap between the Korea, several believe fur- ther exposure to outside information would increase the number of North Koreans exiting the state. Many also cited North Korea’s lack of internet access when discussing how their lives are different now versus when they lived in North Korea as well as a reason why they may not wish to return.
Individuals flee North Korea as a means of escape from targeted restrictions on their socioeconomic well-being. In most cases, flight was viewed as the only option for survival with many suggesting they would be dead, in prison, or begging on the streets had they stayed in North Korea. This research speaks to a need for scholars of forced migration to look beyond immediate threats to physical security and consider non-immediate threats as well. By focusing primarily on physical security issues such as war, we overlook more nuanced causes of flight such as those explored here. The qualitative research conducted for this chapter strongly suggests that poverty in general and weaponized poverty in particular contribute to forced migration as well, contrary to the consensus in the political science literature.