CHAPTER 4
The Man Behind the Curtain:
Kim Il Sung’s economic warfare and the people who flee
I focus on North Korea - formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) - because it is a place where the enjoyment of material comfort and socioeconomic rights are tied directly to one’s political value to the state. Individuals thought to be politi- cally wayward are subjected to, among other disciplinary actions, severe economic penal- ties. This includes confiscation of wealth, reduction in quality and quantity of food, forced relocation to substandard living arrangements, and limited or complete denial of access to socioeconomic rights discussed in Chapter 3. Economic persecution is so formalized in North Korea that if my theory does not hold in this setting, then it likely does not hold in any setting. Thus, North Korea presents itself as a most-plausible case to subject my theory to falsification.
Though physical harms are a very real threat to many North Koreans, interviews with North Korean defectors reveal a host of patterns connecting the decision to flee due to so- cioeconomic motivations. These range from prolonged hunger and starvation; a deficit of medicine and quality health facilities; the pursuit of education in one’s field of choice, the inability to find work and achieve occupational promotions; limitations on wage earnings;
and, what was most surprising to this author, restrictions on travel, fashion, haircuts, and love. Importantly, interviewees fled not only the absence of the aforementioned socioeco- nomic benefits - these instruments to economic well-being were made unavailable to them through North Korea’s extensive social engineering. That is, hardships faced by these in- dividuals were results of state-imposed obstacles designed to forcibly impoverish people deemed disloyal to North Korea’s ruling regime.
Apart from what motivates individuals to flee in the context of North Korea, this chap- ter explores three other important questions related to forced migration. First, what would motivate more people to flee? Second, what motivates people to stay? And finally, what would motivate those who fled to return? I posed these questions to interview participants and while responses invariably included fear of the severe punishments associated with exiting North Korea without permission - such as imprisonment in labor camps, forced
disappearance of one’s entire family, and even death - material comfort or lack thereof re- sulting from one’s standing in North Korea’s socially engineered hierarchy was a common theme to answers as well. Further, respondents also claimed that individuals may not have enough of an incentive to flee if they already have a relative abroad or a relative who de- fected as these family members living outside of North Korea frequently send money to their relatives still living in North Korea, providing an arm of financial security. Thus, not only does poverty encourage forced migration, when individuals are able to find means of circumventing policies designed to impoverish them, they are less likely to flee.
This chapter connects both poverty and targeted poverty to forced migration. The the- ory of economic warfare that I have propounded throughout this dissertation calls for data that reflects targeted access to socioeconomic rights. The absence of such data risks this research only establishing that indicators of poverty are correlated with forced migration.
While this in and of itself is a substantial step forward in understanding sources of forced migration, it is not enough to adequately suggest poverty as a result of economic pun- ishment motivates flight. While these chapters strongly suggest a statistical relationship between poverty and forced migration, the empirical analyses fall short in connecting state- sanctioned economic deprivation to forced migration. The qualitative work in this chapter takes the additional step and links poverty as a result of economic persecution to forced migration.
If we are to believe the stories of forced migrants who understand for themselves their reasons for departure to be expectations and circumstances of forced impoverishment - and I can think of no reason why we should not as such testimony works against their interests given that migrating for purely economic reasons is well-established as not constituting justifiable grounds for asylum - then it becomes clear that people flee to escape economic persecution. Below, I demonstrate why this is the case particularly as it pertains to those fleeing North Korea. First, I discuss how social engineering conducted by the North Korean State has resulted in a social hierarchy that dictates who is eligible for socioeconomic ben-
efits and who is not. By classifying the entirety of its citizenry into three broad categories on the basis of political loyalty, the North Korean State is able to limit the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights to those deemed most loyal. Using semi-structured interviews with North Korean defectors, I then highlight how targeted restrictions on socioeconomic rights heterogeneously influence motivations for flight. By speaking directly with North Korean defectors, I am able to uncover the micro-mechanisms undergirding poverty to forced mi- gration.
Two distinctive patterns emerge depending on an person’s status within North Korea’s socially engineered political hierarchy. For those deemed as disloyal, their flight is more likely to be from conditions of generalized poverty prohibiting them from living in dignity as a result of restrictions placed on their quality and quantity of employment, food, educa- tion, and medicine. For more privileged North Koreans, revelations about the prosperity of the southern kin trigger feelings of relative deprivation that diminish their own economic expectations. This prompts them to flee to escape the political barriers limiting their own socioeconomic potential.
After synthesizing across interviewees’ reasons for flight, I follow with a discussion that explores what would motivate more people to flee, why people stay, and what would motivate people to return. While visceral anger towards the Kim regime and North Korea’s political institutions are quite palpable, worsening conditions of impoverishment for the former and enhanced financial security for the latter two prevailed as the most common answers to these questions. The final section concludes.