The major shortcoming to studies researching causes of forced migration is not that they have failed to produce substantive estimates of poverty as an underlying source, but that they do not provide any theory linking poverty to forced migration. This dissertation has delivered theoretical context as to why and how poverty can influence forced migration by considering poverty as a form of persecution. Governments, by controlling the levers of socioeconomic rights and privileges, can systematically deny or limit access for individ- uals considered politically subservient while directing these same privileges towards their supporters as a reward for their political loyalty. By theoretically expounding upon poverty as a byproduct of economic warfare, I gain analytical leverage over different indicators of poverty that potentially act as push factors. Across three empirical chapters, I described various methods states can go about engaging in practices that lead to impoverishment and ultimately nudge people to flee.
Chapter 2 laid the theoretical groundwork, arguing poverty to be not necessarily a lack of income but a lack of purchasing power and an inability to consume. This chapter also described how poverty can be a form of persecution as states selectively target individuals
with economic rewards and punishments. As the majority of the global poor are reliant on agricultural industries for earning an economic livelihood, I detailed various methods describing how states can manipulate agricultural policies in favor of their preferred con- stituents, often to the detriment of others. I also discussed how agricultural output may provide a more accurate estimate of purchasing power than national-level income indi- cators given that people living in poverty often report consumption in excess of income.
In addition to selling their yield for money, agricultural workers can barter their product, pay taxes or wages in-kind, or directly consume their harvests. These activities would not necessarily be reflected in measures of GDP per capita yet they still act as a medium of ex- change, nonetheless. Thus, measures taken to depress agricultural output correspondingly depress purchasing power.
Lacking an ability to purchase may force people to flee as staying could result in a se- rious threat to their quality of life and ability to make ends meet. I proxied for purchasing power with the Crop Production Index from the World Bank’s World Development Indi- cators dataset. Estimates suggest that a one-standard-deviation decrease in crop production lead to a predicted increase of displacement rates north of 30 percentage points. As people are deprived of their ability to procure basic goods and services necessary for survival, they flee to places less hostile.
Chapter 2 also discussed how states use food as a weapon to subdue their political op- position. While starving political opponents may lead to a variety of outcomes, such as rebellion or submission into loyalty, it may also lead to forced migration as people flee chronic hunger and its associated ills. To proxy for access to food, I used data on daily caloric intake from the FAO. The benefit of this data is twofold. First, it is a measure of direct consumption and thus a better indicator of poverty and plausibly reflects government targeting as the average daily calorie supply will be severely depressed when states deprive segments of the population of sustenance. Second, there is an upper bound to the amount of food one can conceivably consume for themself - an upper bound that is not present with
regards to income. Thus, for states with higher levels of per capita food consumption, we can reasonably assume that most everyone is getting fed. In states with lower per capita food supplies, we can infer that only the elites are receiving enough to eat. Estimates in- dicate that a negative caloric shock of one standard deviation increase predicted rates of forced migration between 11 and 17 percentage points.
Chapter 3 examined socioeconomic rights and discussed why deprivation of employ- ment, health care, and education lead to forced migration by means of impoverishment. I also explored why increasing poverty gaps and poverty rates can make individuals more vulnerable to state harms and thus lead to rising rates of forced displacement. This chapter additionally provided real-world examples of individual seeking asylum for reasons of so- cioeconomic deprivations, thus supplementing the theoretical nuances provided to connect infringement on socioeconomic rights to forced migration. The inability to work, receive adequate medical care, and pursue an education place inordinately low ceilings on poten- tial income earnings and can ultimately result in chronic poverty. Results from this chapter suggest that, at least for women, increased enjoyment of socioeconomic rights lead to de- creased rates of forced migration. Perhaps the most interesting results indicate that as the ratio of women and girls enrolled in school relative to men and boys increases by 10 per- centage points, predicted rates of displacement fall by as much as 9 percentage points.
Recognizing the limits of what my data can tell me as I discuss further below, Chapter 4 provides a case study on North Korean refugees. North Korea is an ideal setting to subject my theory of economic warfare and forced migration as wealth and socioeconomic status in North Korea are purely functions of political loyalty to the ruling Kim family. The North Korean State assigns every family and individual a status in its political hierarchy through extensive social engineering. Those whose families are deemed to be most loyal to the Kim regime and North Korea are placed at the top and enjoy preferential access to food, housing, education, medicine, employment, and other material comforts. Those deemed disloyal are subject to a life of dismal socioeconomic prospects. Thus, the North Korean
context presents itself as a most-plausible case to investigate the mechanisms undergirding poverty and forced migration suggested by my theory.
I interviewed 20 North Korean refugees regarding their motivations for flight. Every single individual I talked to mentioned poverty or fear of future poverty at least in part determining their decision to flee. The individuals I spoke with fled from hunger, eco- nomic proscription, a lack of medicine, and other policies of economic warfare. The ma- jority of those I interviewed came from North Korea’s lower caste, providing evidence that poverty increases the likelihood of forced migration. Further providing evidence to this no- tion was that those who were relatively well off in North Korea’ssongbunsystem fled upon the realization that their South Korean counterparts enjoyed a more prosperous quality of life. Thus, feelings of relative deprivation triggered by the realization of their own poverty prompted flight in addition to other conditions of abject poverty. Importantly, restrictions to socioeconomic well-being individuals interviewed for this chapter experienced were en- tirely a result of economic warfare waged by North Korea against its citizens as a means of control and cooptation. Thus, not only did they flee from poverty, they fled from targeted economic coercion.