researched than those without them; there has thus been a privileging, in research, of carnivory and hunting over other nutritional strategies such as gathering plant materials or trapping small animals. One might therefore question just how much evolutionary pressure really came from hunting. It has also been proposed that where hunting of large animals did occur, it served the purpose of achieving and validating male status. If so, a hunting-based explanation of male spatial rotation superiority would have to posit a cultural rather than a nutritional selection pressure.
If the overall position that evolutionary theory acts as a metatheory is accepted, this adds philosophical weight to the argument that it has the potential to act as a unifying force across many diverse areas of psychology.
We began this book with the suggestion (not entirely unchallenged) that Darwinian theory can be taken as the starting point for the various schools of developmental theory that have arisen. It is fascinating, therefore, that the wheel has turned full circle and the evolutionary approach is now being proposed as a novel means of reunifying the field.
Box 11.2 Twenty-first-century challenges for developmental psychology
The following extract comes from a section of a textbook headed 'The emerging challenge to causal thinking'.
All the sciences of Western industrialized society are based on a traditional mode of thought that can be traced back to Aristotle, at least, but was codified and established within the scientific enterprises of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth cen- turies. ... This mode of thinking, amounting to a world-view, an article of faith in the way the world works, assumes direct linear- ity in causation. ... Whether from the perspective of 'normal' science or the new sciences of complexity, the advantages of multidisciplinary studies of complex systems are impressive. The compartmentalized disciplines of modern science have each special strengths for investigating a circumscribed range of phe- nomena. None can exhaust the complexities of any aspect of the world, but each can specify the likely states of some variables, and the relationships between variables within parts of a given system.
(Dincauze, 2000: 35) After reading the present chapter, these ideas should sound familiar.
However, this passsage comes not from a developmental psychology text, but from a book on environmental archaeology. Issues concern- ing systems, complexity and the value of multidisciplinary collabora- tion have come to the forefront in many sciences concerned with change, such as meteorology, geology and epidemiology. In these respects, developmental psychology may find that it has more in common with these sciences than with other fields of psychology.
that these laws might not also apply to aspects of the developing individ- ual, their family or community. Indeed, if we take a broad systemic view of development, which includes cultural, historical and even evolutionary change, we can say that there is already strong evidence that development is subject to these influences. The challenge that this new approach presents is addressed in Box 11.2.
Can postmodern and scientific approaches be reconciled?
At first sight, the answer to this question might seem to be an obvious no.
Throughout this book we have contrasted positivist and postmodern
notions of inquiry, and observed that they have arisen from different philo- sophical approaches. A postmodern perspective such as that articulated by Gergen (2001) holds that all knowledge is relative, and there is no such thing as reality, but only individuals' constructions of reality. Thus, any perspective on child development, including ones derived from scientific inquiry, would be no better than any other. The result would appear to be an unhelpful anarchy and nihilism. Indeed, as Martin and Sugarman (2000) have observed, if one takes such views of postmodernism literally, 'psychology and education are not only problematized, they are liquidat- ed!' Yet it is hard to ignore the fact that, without the critique offered by postmodernism, developmental psychology would be even more ethnocen- tric, androcentric, ignorant of its history and disempowering to research participants than it already is.
In an earlier chapter we described ourselves as 'fence-sitters' on the science/postmodernism issue, for example, acknowledging the value of both quantitative and qualitative research methods, and suggesting that a reconciliation between the two might be possible. It seems that we are not alone in seeking such a solution. Martin and Sugarman (2000: 398) have observed that some psychologists
... resonate to postmodern themes of difference, plurality, peculiarity and irregularity as refreshing changes from past adherence to same- ness, regularity and strict rationalism ... in effect, having labored within the straitjacket of modernity, they enjoy the full ludic romp of postmodernism's radical problematizing without really believing its full social constructionist and deconstructive implications for them- selves and their everyday and professional practices.
They suggest that attempting to have the best of both these worlds is a rather sensible approach. It is helpful to note that the term 'postmod- ernism' does not cover a single approach, and that there are philosophical debates within the field. Gergen's version, which seems so irreconcilable with a scientific approach to child development, is an extreme one. Martin and Sugarman resist a forced choice between 'the unsustainable myths of modernity on the one hand and some of the more excessively radical medi- cine of postmodernism on the other'. They propose a middle-ground philosophical perspective that draws upon the work of Vygotsky and Mead as well as other scholars.
In this view, the non-human world of physical and biological objects ('natural kinds') really exists, independently of the humans who study it.
'Human kinds' also exist, but they are themselves heavily implicated in this reality: as humans are aware and reflective, their actions and ways of being are affected by the classification of societies and cultures, and by their own reactions to these classifications. Thus their actions are influenced not only by the culture of which they are a part, but by their own unique
experiences within it. Their reflections and actions may in turn change the available societal classifications. An example of this provided by Martin and Sugarman is changes to DSM classifications resulting from the activ- ities of advocacy groups, as we discussed in Chapters 2 and 10. Another example of the mutual co-creation of the cultural and the psychological was provided by the example in Chapter 9 of the five worlds of Aboriginal adolescents. The implications of Martin and Sugarman's position for a rap- prochement between reality-based science and postmodern constructionism
is captured in the following extract (2000: 403):
In the dynamic, developmental scenario we have painted, the possi- bility of reflexive subjectivity is developmentally emergent within human embeddedness in real and preexisiting physical, biological and sociocultural contexts. Although precise forms of emergent sub- jectivity are necessarily historically and contextually contingent and thus variable, some such emergence (given the physical, biological, and sociocultural conditions of human existence) is existentially inevitable.
In deciding how to respond to postmodern critiques, readers may find Box 11.3 helpful.
Box 11.3 How should we respond to non-traditional theoretical approaches?
Teo has performed a valuable service in bringing to our attention the diversity of theoretical traditions that address the contexts, phenomena and issues that are central to develop- mental psychology. In particular, Teo has identified the three extended theoretical families that include the critical-theoretical approaches, the postmodern, post-structuralist, deconstruction- ist approaches, and the feminist and multicultural approaches ... there are several alternative visions of the relationships among families of theoretical traditions that might guide us in our reading, understanding, and evaluation of Teo's article.
From the exclusivist perspective, we would finish reading the article and ask, 'What can I do to demonstrate how these alter- native theoretical perspectives are wrong?' From the inclusivist perspective, we would ask, 'What can I borrow from these alternative theoretical traditions to strengthen my own?' From a detached perspective, we would merely dismiss the article and not return to it again. And from a caring perspective, we would now be asking, 'What can traditional developmental psychology offer to strengthen these alternative theoretical traditions?'
(Meacham, 1997: 211-15)
Conclusions
In previous chapters, we outlined some historical and current trends with- in a range of different theoretical approaches to child and adolescent devel- opment, each of which tells a partial story. In the current chapter, we have observed some dissatisfaction with fragmentary approaches, with some strong moves apparent in the direction of more integrative and holistic approaches. The implication is that developmental theories at a purely psychological (or any other) level of analysis will necessarily be incomplete.
As Lerner (1998: 1) has observed,
... in contemporary developmental theories, the person is not biolo- gized, psychologized or sociologized. Rather the individual is 'system- ized' - that is his or her development is embedded within an integrated matrix of variables derived from multiple levels of organi- zation, and development is conceptualized as deriving from the dynamic relations among the variables in this multi-tiered matrix.
We wonder whether a future path might lie in even further integration of the approaches outlined here. Evolutionary theory provides a basis for understanding some of the biological imperatives for and limits to human development, while the bioecological approach encompasses the inter- actions between the person and environment over both micro and macro levels and timescales (thus, potentially covering even the evolutionary timescale). Dialectical theory helps to provide crucial links between indi- vidual cognition and the social/cultural world, while general (and dynamic) systems theory provides an overall framework for understanding inter- actions between systems at different levels of analysis, and provides for the existence of emergent properties and a reconciliation between stage theories and continuity theories of development. Finally, and most specu- latively, we wonder whether approaching developmental psychology from the perspective of critical state theory might indicate that aspects of devel- opment also follow ubiquitous principles that defy prediction.
However, we regularly hear psychologist colleagues claiming to be unimpressed when holistic models are presented, and to be much more impressed by small models that are directly testable by standard experi- mental methods - in line with the mini-theory approach. While we believe that this approach has an important place, as practitioners we are actually much more excited by the current thrust towards holism and integration, and are appreciative of the enormous intellectual effort that goes into developing such approaches, which can provide the big picture into which the smaller models fit. As with postmodernism, these newer approaches certainly present significant challenges for traditional scientific methods.
Nevertheless, we recognize that many colleagues will remain as unmoved by integrative approaches as by postmodernism; and surely many of us will
feel some alarm about the prospect of a theory that will not permit us to predict significant (including catastrophic) events! We leave it to our read- ers to determine which of the possible paths they believe are most worthy of pursuit. Finally, we would do well to recall George Kelly's view that each theory not only has its own limited 'range of convenience', but that all theories are ultimately expendable.
Introduction
Throughout this book, we have made reference to real-life applications of child development theory. For example, children's behavioural, emo- tional and social problems have been approached from perspectives such as medical diagnosis, family systems and social information pro- cessing; theories such as those of Dewey, Piaget and Vygotsky have been applied educationally; and attachment and learning theories have been implicated in debates about the best way to raise children.
Practice informed by theory is sometimes referred to as 'praxis'. Equally, we have seen that policy decisions concerning children can fly in the face of what theory and research suggest will promote positive development, as in the case of Australian Aboriginal children removed from their attach- ment figures. Alternatively, practice that promotes positive development can occur in the absence of a theoretical basis, as in the case of the nine- teenth-century South Australian infants who were fostered rather than institutionalized.
In this final chapter we turn to a more in-depth discussion of the links between child development theory and real-world practice. A broad con- sideration of the contribution of the philosophy of science to psychology will provide a backdrop for a discussion of the manner in which theories of child development impact on practice. To facilitate this discussion we briefly address a number of terms that have been emerging in the psych- ology and educational literature in recent years including 'scientist- practitioner', 'applied developmental psychology' and 'developmentally appropriate practice'. These ideas issue some interesting challenges to researchers and writers enmeshed in the world of theory. As stated in vari- ous chapters throughout this book, and as witnessed by a considerable body of literature, developmental psychology is almost embarrassed by an excess of riches in relation to theoretical development. The application of this body of knowledge to practice and as a means of informing policy development is, to some extent, uncharted territory. In a reciprocal fash- ion, there is a challenge to better understand how practice in the field can inform theory development.