Although these common themes are identifiable, there are nevertheless important differences between various feminist standpoints. Rosser and Miller (2000) have discussed these and examined their relationship to developmental psychology, although it should be noted that only one of the theories (psychoanalytic feminism) is specifically developmental.
Liberal feminism is the variation that developmental psychologists have been most open to, presumably because it does not question the tradition- al, positivist approach to developmental inquiry, but rather seeks to make it more inclusive. An example is the extension of Kohlberg's research on moral development by Carol Gilligan to include notions of care and responsibility (Gilligan, 1982). Gilligan's groundbreaking work in this area was triggered by dissatisfaction with Kohlberg's male-based model of moral development, which was derived from a longitudinal study of Chicago boys. Indeed, Kohlberg proposed that women's moral develop- ment was limited by their inability to see beyond personal relationships (Kohlberg, 1971).
Gilligan observed that women were dropping out of Kohlberg's univer- sity classes on moral development because the perspective he presented was not relevant to their own experiences. Gilligan's research indicated that women's view of moral dilemmas lay in a consideration of conflicting responsibilities rather than rights, although more recent research suggests that care and justice perspectives are not the exclusive preserve of either gender. Gilligan's contribution in broadening perspectives on moral
development is well accepted in mainstream developmental psychology and her work regularly gains a prominent place in developmental texts.
Her broader importance lies in the fact that she has alerted psychologists to the neglect of female experiences in developmental psychology.
Types of feminism other than liberal feminism question positivism and the possibility of scientific objectivity. Developmentalists appear to be either less familiar with, or less receptive to, these more radical ideas (Rosser and Miller, 2000). Feminism's concern with social justice takes on different emphases in different approaches. Marxist and socialist feminism are concerned with the oppression of women on the grounds of both class and gender. This approach draws attention to a covert value system that privileges certain topics and interpretations in developmental psychology over others. For example, the negatively toned finding that sons of single mothers were 'less masculine' than those raised with fathers actually reflected the fact that they were less aggressive, which can be seen as posi- tive (Rosser and Miller, 2000). They also suggest that socialist feminism is consistent with Vygotskian concepts of development - indeed, Vygotsky's very interest in the social, rather than individual, origins of cognitive devel- opment reflected his Soviet background.
Other forms of feminism, such as African-American feminism, place more emphasis on race and ethnic issues, while postcolonial feminism maintains that patriarchy continues to influence countries that were previ- ously colonized by western oppressors. Developmental psychology has given little consideration to such cultural changes, however, as we dis- cussed in the previous chapter, with specific reference to the experience of indigenous Australians.
Essential feminism does not appear to have a strong place in develop- mental psychology. It emphasizes biological differences between men and women, something which most feminists have fought against - for ex- ample, viewing sociobiology as providing a rationale for female inferiority/
keeping women in their place. Existentialist feminists, by contrast, argue for the social contruction of gender - that it is not biological differences, but societies' interpretations of them, that lead to women being defined as 'the Other' in contrast to male norms. Many examples of this exist in the developmental literature, such as in the concept of 'mastery' and in andro- centric definitions of aggression (Rosser and Miller, 2000). There is also the example of Freud's Oedipal theory. Feminists often fought against Freudian notions of biology as destiny, but there has been some interest in object relations (see Chapter 5) with regard to the construction of gender and sexuality. Rosser and Miller make a link with another issue raised in that chapter: the recent notion of infants' 'working models' of the self, others and relationships developed through interactions with their caregivers.
Radical feminists maintain that women's oppression is the deepest and most widespread kind, with men dominating most institutions, including
science. The historical privileging of male baby biographers such as Darwin over mothers' accounts is an example of this; we might also note that, despite the pre-eminent role of mothers in bearing and rearing chil- dren, the field of developmental psychology has identified a father, rather than a mother, figure as its originator. Radical feminists reject existing sci- entific and theoretical frameworks and focus upon women's experiences in women-only groups, and support education in all-female environments.
Little developmental research has taken female experiences as a starting point, Gilligan's work being a notable exception (Rosser and Miller, 2000).
On the contrary, Piaget paid very limited attention to girls in his research on moral reasoning, as he could not understand the relational nature of their games; he focused instead upon boys' games of marbles and their understanding of rules. Thus, Piaget's theoretical framework privileged masculine, as well as rational and western, forms of reasoning (Burman, 1994). Box 10.1 addresses another suggested link between Piaget's research and masculine values.
Postmodern feminism rejects the universality of the female in favour of diversity of experiences. It also challenges the assumption of 'progress' towards a defined end-point (e.g. adult standards of functioning) and emphasizes instead discontinuities, regressions and diverse pathways and end-points. Coming from a very different perspective, we will see these ideas also reflected in dynamic systems theory, in Chapter 11.
Box 10.1 Did the space race influence developmental psychology?
The socialist-feminist focus on the power of the dominant group raises the question of why, in developmental psychology, certain topics, subject groups and interpretations of data are privileged over others. ... Does this privileging reflect the inter- ests and values of a dominant class of middle-class white males?
In the 1960s and 1970s, developmental psychologists' receptiv- ity to Piaget's focus on children's scientific concepts may in part have reflected anxieties about the position of the United States in the cold war, including the space race with the Soviet Union.
Concerns about the effects of working mothers (but not work- ing fathers) and 'cocaine mothers' (but not 'cocaine fathers') on development imply blame on only part of the population. Day care and latchkey children are seen as a problem of working mothers but not working fathers. ... These examples suggest that a covert social value system steers developmental psychology.
(Rosser and Miller, 2000: 16-7)
Of these varieties of feminism, Rosser and Miller say that liberal femi- nism provides the weakest challenge to traditional developmental psych- ology, and postmodern and radical feminism the strongest. They also suggest that feminist theories could well take a more developmental per- spective, an idea we expand on later. For example, radical feminism could take the experiences of girls as well as women as their starting point. An example of such an approach is our own qualitative work with Larry Owens in exploring teenage girls' experiences of social aggression (e.g.
Owens et a/., 2000). While we have succeeded in publishing this work in mainstream psychology journals, it has not been without receiving along the way occasional referees' comments to the effect that this research would be excellent if only it were quantitative.
Methodology
This brings us to the issue of methodology. As we have seen, most versions of feminism challenge the epistemological underpinnings of traditional scientific inquiry. For example, the dichotomy between the objective observer and the research subject breaks down into a concern with inter- subjectivity between researcher and participant (Griffin, 1995). What has been called feminist-standpoint research is concerned with reducing any power differential that favours the researcher. It acknowledges that no research is value-free and explicitly considers the effect of the researcher on the participant. In ensuring that participants' voices are heard, qualita- tive methods such as interviews, focus groups and discourse analysis have particularly been favoured, as they provide the opportunity for more open- ended gathering and interpretation of data than do quantitative methods.
Griffin suggests that it would be beneficial to focus more on the political aims of research in empowering women, rather than expending too much energy debating the nuances of various qualitative methods.
In any case, feminism in general has focused on women rather than children and, clearly, such methods have their limitations when working with children. Try holding a focus group with one year olds! Obviously, other methods, such as observation, must be used in some circumstances.
The concern with intersubjectivity still holds true, however, and the researcher must be conscious of her or his own impact upon the child. As we discussed in Chapter 4, this lesson was learned through Margaret Donaldson and her colleagues' now-classical demonstrations (such as the 'Naughty Teddy' study) that how a young child performs on cognitive (Piagetian) tasks depends upon the child's understanding of the social con- text surrounding the task (Donaldson, 1978). Ways in which interviewers in various contexts (including research) can take account of children's per- spectives and linguistic skills have been discussed in a useful book edited by Garbarino and Stott (1989).
While not arguing with the general feminist push in favour of qualitative methods, Hyde (1994) has pointed out that no research method is, of itself, sexist or feminist, and that quantitative methods can also serve femi- nism. What matters is the theoretical framework for the research, the ques- tions posed, the interpretations made and the application of the findings.
She and others have undertaken meta-analyses of results of studies in a number of areas to debunk some popular myths about gender differences.
For example, she examined the textbook 'fact' that boys perform better than girls at maths, meta-analysing results from studies with over three million people in total. The result showed a small difference dropping to a non-existent one in the more recent research, with the magnitude of differ- ence varying by ethnicity. This is consonant with the concern of many feminist psychologists, that issues of race/ethnicity and social class need to be considered along with gender. The 'fact' that females are biologically predisposed to outscore males in verbal ability has also been challenged by meta-analysis; again, the gender differences found have shifted historically from small to non-existent. Hyde raises the question of how such shifts could occur over time if the differences were biologically determined. This kind of analysis is extremely valuable for demonstrating biased synthesis and reporting of research findings but, of course, it cannot address bias in other issues such as selection of research questions, selection of studies for publication or, as we discuss below, the metaphors used in publications.
Psychologists in the quantitative tradition are often highly suspicious of qualitative methods, seeing them as providing an undisciplined approach to research. It is possible, however, to adopt qualitative methods which meet standards of rigour that are analogous to those applied to quantita- tive research, such as reliability and validity, although such an approach would be rejected by many postmodernists. Readers are referred to a use- ful paper by Sandelowski (1986), which outlines this approach, and to our papers with Owens on girls' aggression, which exemplifies it.