In the Australian case, Aboriginal children's cognitive and motivational 'shortcomings' with regard to education, and the 'incompetence' of Aboriginal parents, were identified by western researchers, and gave suc- cour to arguments for the removal of Aboriginal children from their par- ents. Evidence from Aboriginal people and others that many children (predominantly those of mixed ancestry) were indeed removed from their communities and placed in white families, leading to intergenerational social and psychological problems, was presented in a Royal Commission report Bringing them Home (HREOC, 1997) and dramatized in the film Rabbitproof Fence. Yet, at the turn of the millennium some (white) influential Australian voices were continuing to question the existence of stolen gen- erations of indigenous children. In this regard, the issue of the privileging by the dominant culture of written evidence over oral history has further marginalized the histories of indigenous peoples.
Researchers working with indigenous peoples have been challenged by the constructivist movement away from a universalist approach to indi- genous psychology (Davidson et a/., 2000). These writers observe a disillu- sionment with mainstream psychological approaches to indigenous issues, born of concern that traditional approaches were not delivering benefits to indigenous communities together with a growing awareness of ethical obligations to give research participants greater involvement in research aims, processes and outcomes. They take up the issue that psychology's position as a value-neutral science is being challenged by the view that psy- chology cannot be apolitical and value-free because it is itself a cultural phenomenon.
Despite the assertion referenced in Chapter 2 that developmental psy- chologists often have melioristic aims, Davidson et al. cite examples from the USA, Australia and South Africa to support the argument that it can- not be assumed that psychology will automatically work towards social jus- tice (indeed, South Africa's leading advocate of apartheid, Verwoerd, was a psychologist). Members of the dominant culture tend to see that culture as being the national culture, ignoring the perspectives of other groups within it (Davidson et a/., 2000). How well this is illustrated as we write this chap- ter, on Australia Day weekend: the Weekend Australian newspaper incorp- orates a major feature on the British explorer Matthew Flinders (for whom our university is named) who undertook the first circumnavigation of Australia 200 years ago. The paper headlines this as 'our greatest voyage' (WeekendAustralian, 26-27 January 2002). How might an indigenous read- er, with a history of dispossession by the British of land, language, culture and family, respond to this?
Nsamenang (1999) has suggested that it is necessary to integrate tradi- tional psychology with indigenous psychologies and to take account of the subjectivity of the researcher. An article by Clark (2000) is an example of a study by an Aboriginal person, with Aboriginal participants, using a
constructivist framework but also drawing upon mainstream social psych- ological theory. The politicohistorical context of the participants' experi- ence (e.g. government policies concerning Aboriginal people) is outlined.
Participants were asked about their experiences with regard to being taken away from their families as children. The dominant theme to emerge con- cerned confusion over identity while growing up, with all participants seek- ing, recovering and/or maintaining their Aboriginal identities, while also experiencing other identities. This can be viewed in terms of self- categorization theory, which 'emphasises the dynamic and contextual nature of self and identity that are always the outcome of a particular social relational context' (2000: 152). See also Box 9.1.
Drummond (personal communication) has described three models of human development derived from different cultures. It is interesting that she takes Bronfenbrenner's ecological theory as an example of a western model, since it is clearly not typical in that it explicitly sets out to encom- pass a broad range of developmental environments - in other words, to be
Figure 9.1 Maori model of human development
cross-culturally applicable. The systemic nature of Bronfenbrenner's model, with its dynamically interacting levels of analysis, can be seen to have parallels in another model of development described by Drummond (personal communication), specific to the Maori people of New Zealand and developed by Pere (Figure 9.1). This is based on Te Wheke, or the octopus, with tentacles representing various aspects of Maori life such as spirituality, material and bodily needs, and Mauri (life principle), which includes respect for the environment. The intertwining tentacles represent connections between these various aspects, and the interconnectedness and mutual reliance of the parts on one another is very reminiscent of sys- tems theory (see Chapter 11).
A major difference can be identified, however, between the Bronfenbrenner and the Maori model: Bronfenbrenner's scheme of nested levels of the environment places the individual at the centre, whereas the head of the octopus represents not the individual, but the family unit.
Factors unique to the individual are placed within a single tentacle; while inseparable from the whole, giving sustenance to the whole and receiving it, the individual is not at the centre. By comparison, we can see how the individual-centred ecological systems model still bears the hallmarks of the western thinking that influenced its development.
Drummond also describes a Philippine model of development, centring around church, family and broader community, and reflecting aspects of both Asian identity and western influence resulting from colonization and, to western eyes, containing many paradoxes, such as the coexistence of strong women and machismo, and Christianity and belief in spirits.