have not historically been had any choice regarding involvement. As I note in Chapter 3 and below, workers have persistently rebelled against government-led development through strikes and direct action. Passive revolution is not a completed project, because it has not completely stifled exploited groups’ voices. I argue that whilst passive revolution demon- strates a lack of hegemony in South Korea, it also demonstrates that hegemonic struggles between social forces have not resulted in a dispensation of consensual power favourable to all sections of society, but has remained at the level of government, civil society and the private sector.
The final sections of Chapter 3 look at South Korea’s transition to democracy that occurred simultaneous to advancing globalisation and increased government-led opening of Korea’s doors to deregulation and liberalisation of the market. Even this historical period did not occur at a time of national hegemony within Korea, and the chapter argues that political and economic transformation in South Korea has occurred within a passive revolution both historically and contemporarily. An avenue for further research begs the question of whether ‘democracy’ can be integrated within South Korea, or whether it is even possible to achieve economic growth and development within a democratic form of state in South Korea.
Despite Cox’s perceived hegemonic world orders, Korea as a nation has not been able to hegemonically adapt or integrate into what Cox believes were internationally accepted production norms, which I demon- strate further in the fourth chapter. Within Chapter 4, I look at the complete restructuring of South Korea’s economy after the economic crisis of 1997 at three levels of forces: material, institutional, and ideational (Cox 1981: 136; see Figure 1). I can conclude that previous elite-directed development did not accommodate each level of social interaction to the same extent and this can explain why it has not become hegemonically included into the international political economy. In short, there is no guarantee that Korea will become nationally hegemonic and universally accepting of changes in the contemporary neoliberal world order. This is particularly demonstrable because of ongoing uprisings and dissent, discussed in the next section.
the government thought that surface-level changes would quell this ongoing dissent, but frankly, it was wrong. Workers have not ceased to fight for a voice in contemporary times and this is evident through a number of more recent episodes.
Chalmers Johnson (1997) comments that the IMF’s ‘arrogant demands’
could instigate widespread; even ‘spectacular’ reactions after the 1997 crisis. The most obvious voice of dissent emerges from the severely underprivileged and excluded groups. But because economic restructuring occurred at such a wide range of levels, resistance movements themselves must avoid focusing on only one level of occupation, as ‘capital can always side-step such opposition’ (Amoore et al. 2000: 25). Korean resistance has emerged from a widened worker consciousness of oppression, and from many arenas of the population including all workers of all socio-economic backgrounds, students, government workers.
Restructuring following the economic crisis triggered thousands of uprisings and demonstrations by labour groups, particularly labour union activists, including the Korean People’s Action against Investment Treaties and the WTO (KoPA) on October 24, 1999. At that time, the People’s Rally Committee had planned to submit a plea at the Asia Europe Meeting in Seoul protesting neoliberal globalization and structural adjustment programmes. Over 30,000 policemen had been positioned near the building where the meeting was to be held and there was violent repression when civil society leaders from religious, labour, human rights, and student groups tried to speak.
On 8 November 2000, Daewoo had announced its intention to lay off 3,500 workers, simultaneous to announcing it had gone bankrupt.
Workers immediately retaliated in tens of thousands and blamed poor management and President Kim Dae Jung for the spread of neoliberal propaganda. Daewoo responded by stating that if workers did not back down, they would all suffer from job losses. The unions felt forced to accept the cuts. The next year, Daewoo workers staged one of the largest demonstrations and strikes against neoliberal globalisation in history.
Whilst workers had staged various protests over the previous nine months, on 16 February of 2001 management announced that 1,750 workers would be laid off of that year. Union leaders told workers to continue to work at the Bu-pyung plant, which management had closed down, and to organise education sessions for workers’ rights. Family members and other laid-off workers joined in this protest. 2,000 riot police were deployed to stop workers from working, and on 19
February, more riot police joined them to stop the direct action and injured many people in the ensuing struggle. In March, Daewoo announced that it would lay off 2,000 workers, creating more havoc, including the suicide of one dismissed worker. Workers blame ‘neoliberal economic globalisation’ for the disruption of their lives and continued the struggle (PICIS 2001).
In July 2001, the KCTU called a general strike against union oppression and to ‘end the neoliberal structural adjustment regime of the Kim Dae Jung government’ (Labournet 2001). The KCTU Central Committee invited all member unions and affiliated federations to stop work on 5 July, in response to ideological and physical attempts to disempower the KCTU. At the People’s Rally again on 2 December 2001, 2,000 university students from around the nation gathered in Dongguk University in oppo- sition to neoliberal education-related policies. The rally brought together people from various social sectors in solidarity, ‘all angered by the neoliberal policies of the Kim administration, which has brought lay-offs and instability of jobs for workers, threat to the livelihood of small farmers and urban poor, and privatisation and liberalisation of basic social services.’ (ibid.).
Despite speculation that the Korean economy was ‘recovering’ quickly from the worst effects of the economic crisis, dissent did not subside. In 2002, Korean government workers went on strike for the first time in history (PICIS 2002). They asked the government to legalise the Korean Government Employees Union (KGEU). At a pre-rally ceremony however, the police arrived, and violence broke out. Leaders were arrested and 600 members were apprehended at the incident. No resolution was reached. In 2004, KoPA staged a week of demonstrations before the American Chamber of Commerce, bringing together culture, environ- ment, women and workers’ groups who claim that neoliberal globalisation has ‘seeped through and destroyed all aspects of our lives … [We] call for the stop to all negotiations for investment treaties and free trade agreements’ (BASE21 2004). KoPA hosted debates and conferences to discuss globalisation’s effects on health, education, the environment, and women, and a film festival of films that ‘manifest the atrocities committed by transnational capital in various countries, and the struggles of the people’ (2004). On 21 April, laid-off Korea Telecom workers were part of a group of about 100 protestors to hold a ‘Global Day of Action’ in Seoul.
So dissent has not subsided. Workers in South Korea are not satisfied with the restructuring and reform that was instigated after the economic
crisis. This leaves me with several questions regarding the future of South Korea, particularly on issues of workers’ job stability and training. What direction will the government take? The Korean population expected Roh, Moo Hyun, the president elected after Kim, Dae Jung in February 2003, to be able to restore their confidence because of his credentials as a human rights lawyer and a strong activist during the movement toward democratisation in the 1980s. After just over one year of leadership however President Roh was impeached for introducing a new political party in the run up to elections, and was exposed for having accepted millions of dollars from companies in the electoral race in 2002. Roh claimed that it is getting increasingly difficult to govern in the con- temporary climate of international politics. Korean/US relations are becoming increasingly tense, the economy is eternally teetering on the edge, and the media and parliament are dominated with conservative viewpoints (BBC 2004). Even government leaders in the contemporary age of neoliberalism are bewildered with the future for South Korea.
The Chief Editor of the Labour Society Bulletin, Mr Yoon, discussed resistance to the growing trend of economic globalization in South Korea with me.1 Within the union movement there are debates about globaliz- ation. Some individuals within both umbrella unions completely deny the legitimacy of the government’s choice to globalize, while others are resigned to its inevitability. Responses must therefore be selective. How- ever, the majorities of unionists are not interested in the underlying issue of globalization; the fight for better wages and work conditions are the bulk of union activity. I mused that much of the disputes surrounding these very factors can be attributed ultimately to the internationally driven restructuring process of the Korean economy. Mr Yoon agreed, but reminded me that most enterprise unionists are not exposed to these issues. He said that the most important objective for unions now is to find ways to slow down the process of economic globalization even without full access to knowledge of the issues. The union density is only 10 or 11 per cent, or 1.5 to 1.6 million workers are members of unions. This leaves 10 million uninvolved workers.