The first chapter bestows a theoretical backbone to the argument of further chapters, highlighting Gramscian inspired ideas. A history of IR theory is thus traced, and I claim that the orthodox literature is embroiled in positivist epistemology and is thus inadequate for an analysis of global political economics. Positivist reasoning relies on the immutability and predictability of events and cases, but I pay credence to transnational historical materialism, noting that humankind plays a specific role in the formation of history. Others should further explore the place of historical materialism in IPE and integrate this school of thought, working to overcome the limitations that positivism poses.
Gramsci’s theories emphasise superstructural elements of the con- solidation and prolongation of hegemony, which are useful for a look into one nation’s struggle to adjust and adapt to international political economic norms in terms of ‘necessary’ cultural and traditional changes.
Hegemony itself is an important concept because it provides an explanation for whether or not particular power relations during and after
social change according to internationally prescribed development norms are sustainable, or whether subordinated groups will arise and seek leadership or at least hunt for representation in an exploitative environ- ment. The development literature typically does not address the idea of hegemony from a Gramscian perspective, and the IPE literature often isolates examination to industrialised and developed nations with the assumption that convergence is the only option left (Taylor 2005).
Without consensus, according to the Gramscian understanding, economic development will not become hegemonic and may or may not be sustainable in the long run. Without hegemony, populations will either overthrow the elites who control their destinies, or will remain at odds with their leaders. If development is authored by elite groups and is not fully accepted by the larger population, as I have shown to be the case in South Korea, it is still possible that a grass-roots revolution and overthrow of the elite classes could occur.
In the first chapter I also discussed the concepts of intellectuals, because the Gramscian depiction of these individuals is appropriate to grasp how hegemony is formed and disseminated at the local level.
Because intellectuals have traditionally had privileged access to the
‘curriculum’ of ideological education, the message they portray in both the institution of education and in the workplace is paramount for the consolidation of superstructural co-option and consent, which Gramsci emphasises for the sustenance of hegemony. Further research could investigate cases wherein hegemony of liberal economic development has perhaps been hegemonic, such as within Western Europe, and contrast cultural norms that have allowed this consensus to occur.
The elite-led government strategy of passive revolution occurs in place of hegemony during a struggle for hegemony, or during a crisis of hegemony. I reason that passive revolution occurs in cases demonstrating two fundamental conditions. First, passive revolution requires elite leadership of a nation, and secondly, requires evidence of trasformismo that is a political strategy to co-opt and pre-empt successful uprisings from oppressed groups. After setting up the framework for the argument of the work, I present two chapters of rich historical analysis, to give a background for the empirical study of the economic crisis and the affect this has had on economic and social developments according to restructuring requirements in South Korea.
The second chapter sets a stage for a global history of ‘hegemonies’, as reasoned by Cox (1987), who modifies Gramsci’s perception of hegemony
to analyse the international expansion of production. His analysis is inspirational as it provides a discussion of several aspects of the growth of hegemonies, including institutional, material, and ideational, that have in some cases led to consolidated world orders. Chapter 2 organises this analysis into a historical analysis of forms of state and production relations during each phase of global history, in order to understand the appearance of hegemonic struggles from this angle.
The second chapter ends with an introduction to a proposed historical bloc of neoliberalism and the knowledge economy, or the most recent economic model that the government perceives to be the most competitive in the contemporary global economy. Production relations have changed, and workers are expected to catch up, and to maintain their own ‘employability’ within this historical period. Workers are increasingly given the responsibility to adapt and to ‘own’ their state of employability and to pursue the best kinds of knowledge and skills, in preparation for an increasingly unstable job market. Future research should look at how knowledge itself is used in the management literature to promote workers’
responsibility for their own employability, such as is found in Moore (2006).
In the third chapter, I operationalise the concept of passive revolution that occurs in various forms during the absence of hegemony. The chapter revisits the concept of passive revolution and claims that elite-engineered accumulation strategies, plus the signs of trasformismo, are the codes of operative passive revolution rather than hegemony. Providing an analysis of worker/state relations in South Korea, the chapter begins to associate struggles for global hegemony with ongoing struggles at the local level in this small and historically secluded nation. I delve into the history of Korean worker/state relations over time, from Japanese colonisation, to the periods of developmental dictatorship that followed the exit of Japan, and finally look at the struggles leading to democratisation in the late 1980s. To develop my perception of passive revolution, I look at certain events throughout each time period that demonstrate conditions for passive revolution: elite-led development, and the push for trasformismo.
From Japanese colonisation to the periods of developmental dictatorships and into the present, VET has existed as a tool of trasformismo and co- optation, in that it has been offered to workers as a way forward for their own personal development and as a substitution for labour empower- ment. ‘Empowerment’ has only been provided according to the demands of what are perceived to be internationally hegemonic norms, but workers
have not historically been had any choice regarding involvement. As I note in Chapter 3 and below, workers have persistently rebelled against government-led development through strikes and direct action. Passive revolution is not a completed project, because it has not completely stifled exploited groups’ voices. I argue that whilst passive revolution demon- strates a lack of hegemony in South Korea, it also demonstrates that hegemonic struggles between social forces have not resulted in a dispensation of consensual power favourable to all sections of society, but has remained at the level of government, civil society and the private sector.
The final sections of Chapter 3 look at South Korea’s transition to democracy that occurred simultaneous to advancing globalisation and increased government-led opening of Korea’s doors to deregulation and liberalisation of the market. Even this historical period did not occur at a time of national hegemony within Korea, and the chapter argues that political and economic transformation in South Korea has occurred within a passive revolution both historically and contemporarily. An avenue for further research begs the question of whether ‘democracy’ can be integrated within South Korea, or whether it is even possible to achieve economic growth and development within a democratic form of state in South Korea.
Despite Cox’s perceived hegemonic world orders, Korea as a nation has not been able to hegemonically adapt or integrate into what Cox believes were internationally accepted production norms, which I demon- strate further in the fourth chapter. Within Chapter 4, I look at the complete restructuring of South Korea’s economy after the economic crisis of 1997 at three levels of forces: material, institutional, and ideational (Cox 1981: 136; see Figure 1). I can conclude that previous elite-directed development did not accommodate each level of social interaction to the same extent and this can explain why it has not become hegemonically included into the international political economy. In short, there is no guarantee that Korea will become nationally hegemonic and universally accepting of changes in the contemporary neoliberal world order. This is particularly demonstrable because of ongoing uprisings and dissent, discussed in the next section.