PART V: LEARNING TO DEAL WITH DEMANDS FOR PARTICIPATION
III. EU POLICY TRANSFER
Levi-Faur (2002,p. 2) has made the very telling point about telecoms liberalization that,given the global and technological pressures for change,
‘‘the major features of liberalization would have been diffused to practically all member states even if the European Commission and other agents of supranationalism had not existed.’’Indeed,by 1999 (1 year after the EU’s full liberalization deadline),no fewer than 83 countries,of the 188 surveyed by the International Telecommunications Union,had privatized or part-privatized their incumbent telecoms operator and more or less the same number had introduced competition (Schneider,2002,p. 28). However,this chapter does not claim that Europeanizationcausesliberalization; rather,it sees the EU action as an intervening variable,coordinating,synchronizing,andmediatinga joint European response to the independent variables—globalization pres- sures,international regulatory arbitrage and competition,technological change,and hegemonic ideological pressures (the Washington consensus)—
that are actually driving regulatory change in the wider,global political economy. Moreover,the EU has facilitated policy transfer by providing proreform national policy makers,facing domestic opposition,with an
‘‘alibi’’(‘‘Europe demands it’’) (He´ritier,1999,p. 21).
As a concept,policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh,1996) itself can be defined broadly as‘‘the process by which knowledge about policies,admin- istrative arrangements,institutions,and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies,administrative arrangements, institutions,and ideas in another political system’’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000,p. 5). Policy transfer can occur through policy emulation (involving some‘‘imitating action’’),or through policy learning,involving‘‘a redefini- tion of one’s interests on the basis of newly acquired knowledge’’(Jordana et al.,2002,p. 3). Lesson drawing can befacilitatedby policy networks and,in particular,by‘‘epistemic communities,’’which can be defined as‘‘networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’’ (Haas, 1992,p. 3). Policy can transfer at any point along a continuum from
‘‘obligated’’(i.e.,coercive) transfer to‘‘voluntary’’transfer,with a consider- able amount occurring somewhere in between these poles. Voluntary transfer clearly involves policy learning,whereas coercive transfer occurs where a government is forced (for instance by a supranational institution) to adopt a policy (Dolowitz and Marsh,1996,pp. 344–345).
International and intergovernmental organizations [such as the United Nations,the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),the World Trade Organization (WTO),and,indeed,the EU] can serve as important policy transfer institutions. Thus,Radaelli (2000) has referred to the‘‘proto-federal’’or ‘‘quasi-federal’’system of the EU as‘‘a massive transfer platform,’’with transfer coming from dominant countries or from winning advocacy coalitions. Radaelli notes the role that transnational epistemic communities can play as a transfer medium. Also,in the transfer process,Radaelli notes,the European Commission has played the role of a
‘‘very active policy entrepreneur.’’The commission,‘‘[o]ften in tandem with other policy transfer activists (pressure groups,consultancy firms,think tanks,and policy experts). . . suggests best practices,models,and original solutions.’’Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) represents a ‘‘striking case of policy transfer.’’The institutions of the EU actually provide scope for various different kinds of transfer. As Bomberg and Peterson (2000) have noted,the EU‘‘employs a diverse mix of coercive and voluntary methods for Europeanizing policy.’’In some policy domains,the EU is‘‘schoolmaster,’’
and policy transfer can be directed (e.g.,the Europeanization of competition policy). In many other policy domains,however,it is a‘‘classroom’’where member states learn from each other and the EU simply serves as‘‘a sort of supranational idea hopper.’’In fact,the EU offers a range of institutional possibilities (Bulmer and Padgett,2001). Coercive,‘‘obligated transfer’’can result from rulings of the European Court of Justice,Commission competi- tion rulings and regulations,and the implementation of EU Directives.
Voluntary transfer can be mediated by the EU’s facilitating role,where the EU helps diffuse‘‘best practice’’through EU-fostered policy networks and epistemic communities,through the setting of targets and benchmarking,and through soft EU law—the kind of methods recently formalized as the‘‘open method of coordination’’(OMC). In between,there is scope for‘‘negotiated’’
obligated transfer,which itself varies according to whether decisions are taken on the basis of qualified majority in the intergovernmental CoM or whether unanimity is required,the latter possibility being obviously closer to the voluntary pole of the continuum (Table 1).
Herein it is argued that globalization pressures strengthen the potential of the EU institutions for using or threatening to use‘‘coercive’’instruments
Table 1 EU Policy Transfer: The Continuum Between Coercive and Voluntary Transfer
Coercive, obligated transfer
Negotiated, obligated transfer
Voluntary transfer ECJ ruling; Commission
competition ruling;
Article 86 (ex 90) Commission Directive;
Commission Regulation;
infringement proceedings against noncompliance
Council Directive by qualified majority vote (QMV)
Council Directive requiring unanimity
Open Method of Coordination (OMC); transfer facilitated by EU policy networks and
‘‘epistemic communities’’
of liberalization to force the pace of liberalization. Thus,the commission may point to,and even exaggerate,the high economic stakes in a sector and the urgency of the need for a European-level regulatory response in order to employ distinctly coercive delegated powers even when certain member states may feel strongly that this is inappropriate. Globalization pressures will also have an important bearing on EU-level negotiated transfer. Where global- ization pressures are strong,and particularly where technological change is involved as in the communications sector,there is more likely to be strong pressure on the member states to adopt a pragmatic,technocratic problem solving rather than a politicized bargaining approach to negotiation,and consensual decisions become more probable. However,this also depends on the political salience of the sector and of the particular issue; the political salience of broadcasting or of a controversial issue such as media concentra- tion is much higher,and therefore much less amenable to technocratic problem solving,than are most issues in the telecoms sector,which are generally more technical in quality.