PART V: LEARNING TO DEAL WITH DEMANDS FOR PARTICIPATION
VIII. WHAT IS TRANSFERRED?
Given the above discussion on what can be transferred from one political system (even the‘‘global’’political system) to another,it is interesting to note that to date,few authors engaging in the globalization debate have analyzed the contradiction between the primary function of any state the development and implementation of effective and efficient public policies across the range of issues which seems to be continuing unabated,and the assertions that such functions are beyond the effective control of any state,aside from relatively minor issues. This neglect becomes even more problematic when it is realized that not only have states continued to successfully govern within areas deemed to be beyond their control,but states have retained enough authority and capacity to continue to perform the very functions necessary for the proliferation of the processes associated with globalization. In other words, without bringing the state back into the globalization debate,how can the forces of globalization survive? Without the state and its powers of policy making and enforcement,there is no nation for globalization to impact upon or operate within.
One explanation as to why and how states continue to survive despite the
‘‘debilitating’’impact of globalization is that they are engaged in learning how Figure 3 What to do with lessons.
to survive. They are doing this by looking at how other political systems have succeeded. Thus,by examining the political processes involved in the spread of ideas and policies among political systems,it should be possible to begin integrating the role of the state in the processes underpinning globalization. A key to understanding this has been provided by Hobson (1997,p. 4),who argues that‘‘states shape the economy and society for domestic (as well as international) reasons and that state action can be reduced neither to the interstate system nor to the domestic social structure.’’To link this directly to policy transfer,it can be argued that rather than being passive in the face of globalization and accepting the loss of their sovereignty and capacity to govern,states can and do engage in policy learning,designed to take advantage of both domestic and international situations,to enhance their domestic and global position. Thus,instead of seeing the state as forced out of politics,by attaching policy transfer to globalization,academics can begin bringing the state back into the governing process by analyzing why,what, and how ideas,policies,and processes are being globalized,and what impact this has on states in the global environment. Clearly,at the interface between the international and the local,the state is ideally positioned to learn from both and,as such,act as the creator and mediator of the processes governing globalization.
In the process of learning,the most important lessons states can transfer from other political systems are‘‘successful’’public policies,particularly the policies operating in areas where the state has‘‘lost’’its ability to govern. A clear example of this has been the spread and use of new forms of welfare, which depend on the tax system to provide benefits that were once handed out though a semi-independent benefit system. Thus,although many of the proponents of globalization argue that globalization has eliminated the ability of states to engage in welfare politics,it is clear that over the past 10 years, states have not only retained their welfare states,but they have looked at each other to meet the challenges posed by changes in the international system. In the United States and the UK,the most direct example of this can be seen in the development and spread of programs designed to help unemployed individuals back into work. Although this might seem to support the arguments of globalizers,this fails to address the wider implications of these programs: the extension and deepening of tax credits,minimum wage policies,and redevelopment programs. Instead of simply forcing unemployed people to accept low-paying jobs while reducing their job protections and wages,which was apparently required by globalization,these policies have been designed to ensure that those‘‘forced’’back into the labor market are better off than they would have been on benefits and that they are provided with‘‘real opportunities’’to enhance their skills and advance up the labor ladder when they enter the labor market (Buckler and Dolowitz,2004).
On the other side,it is clear that when ideologues enter office,they often look for the rhetorics necessary to justify policy preferences and/or pro- grams—particularly when arguing that the only way to survive in the global era is to engage neoliberal,open market,deregulatory,policies,regardless of the realities of the global situation. In this vein,the Thatcher and Major Governments often justified free market programs and the prolonged attacks upon the welfare state by framing them in terms of global economic competitiveness. Yet,it is arguable that many of these policy decisions had more to do with Thatcher’s particular ideology than any ‘‘global’’ forces impinging on the state’s ability to govern as it chooses. Or as a former Permanent Secretary in the Department of Employment noted:‘‘the ideology bit was I don’t believe all those people are unemployed. I think there is a lot of work in the black economy. . . probably more than you think. That’s the ideological approach. . .Let’s smoke them out.’’*
Similarly,although used in exactly the opposite way,the Blair Govern- ment has utilized the rhetorics of globalization to justify its efforts to transfer substantial resources toward training and education. To engage in resource redistribution (based on a mixture of U.S. and Scandinavian models),New Labor has turned the traditional globalization arguments on their head.
Instead of arguing that globalization eliminates the state,New Labor argues that because of the forces of globalization,the state has a core role in actively investing in human and technological capital and in encouraging and establishing the conditions necessary for private capital to undertake similar investments.
Thus,just as states can engage in positive policy transfer to adapt their existing political regime to the tenants of globalization,they can just as easily engage in policy transfer to resist these pressures and processes. Equally, states can also draw negative lessons (i.e.,what not to do based on what is being done elsewhere) for similar purposes. Thus,if a nation notices other political systems reforming in ways that open them up to the forces of globalization,they can see what not to do so as to protect themselves from the very same pressures. Similarly,if there is a model that appears to make a nation more vulnerable to capital or financial flight,a nation not wanting to follow a similar route can borrow models to counter the pressures acting on the initial nation. In the same way,if the EU is perceived as a microcosm of the international order,members can learn how to reform (or how not to reform) in light of the actions of‘‘first mover’’nations. A clear example of this was the EU’s rejection of the British model of electricity regulation. Although the UK model was the early frontrunner guiding the work of the commission,it
* Interview conducted in November 4,1996.
quickly became apparent that most members were opposed to this model and took active steps to that ensure the EU develops an alternative system—one that left a considerable amount of room for individual national discretion.*
Similarly,acting as units of shared sovereignty,nations can use IGBs to deflect and/or shape the processes of globalization. By developing unified policies based on models drawn from a mix of member states,these institu- tions can ensure that no member state will be worse off than it was before the IGB acted. For example,it is clear that (despite their weak status) many of the European Union’s social regulations and benchmarking exercises have allowed member states to develop policies that would not have been possible if these states were attempting to fight the forces of globalization on their own.
IX. WHAT RESTRICTS (OR FACILITATES) POLICY