PART V: LEARNING TO DEAL WITH DEMANDS FOR PARTICIPATION
V. WHERE IS THE MOTIVATION?
A crucial component of policy transfer and globalization is the factors motivating actors (broadly defined) to undertake an examination of a
‘‘foreign’’model(s). To understand the importance of motivation,it is first necessary to acknowledge that it is often the reason driving actors to engage in policy transfer that shapes where they look for lessons,what lessons they find, and how they use the information. By way of illustration,any state wishing to manage its own decisions relating to welfare policy can utilize information gathered from political systems and regimes where the commitment and structure of the welfare state have changed little in the face of global pressures.
These states provide counterfactuals to arguments that extensive and/or generous welfare state policies are impossible given the imperatives of the global market. Because these countries exist,proponents of state services can use them to provide the evidence needed to support their arguments that states can retain power to govern the politics and policies of their welfare systems. Similarly,the models adopted and used by these states can (and are) used as alternatives to the models of welfare state retrenchment being forwarded by proponents of the globalization thesis. These points were made by a number of EU officials who acknowledged that during the 1980s and early 1990s,to counter neoliberal arguments (and models) being forwarded by the UK,many community officials turned to Nordic block nations for policy inspiration and ideas. In fact,this also held true among the Nordic states,which tended to look at each other for ideas and inspirations,rather than more liberal or corporatist nations.*
Schematically (Figure 1),motivations can range from attempts to justify an action or decision that has already been made (voluntarily by the actor or
* Information gathered during interviews conducted in Brussels and Sweden between January 1,2002 to July 13,2002.
institution in question,or coercively by those acting above the actor or institution in question),to utilizing a foreign model or idea to solve a perceived or‘‘real’’policy problem or failure.*
As illustrated in Figure 1,policy transfer can be motivated by a range of reasons and,in any single instance,there may be more than one reason driving actors to engage in the process. Similarly,once a lesson has been drawn,it can be used in more than one way,including ways in which the original model was not being used or was not designed for. For example,although policy makers can learn from the experience of others to help direct their policy-making decisions,they can also use the same information to politicize the policy- making arena to ensure that their model is the‘‘preferred model’’(or that at a minimum it is capable of wrecking the ‘‘preferred’’ model). This can be illustrated most clearly during the heyday of the neoliberal movement of the 1980s and 1990s. At this time,many European and Australasian nations utilized Anglo-American economic and business models to reform their political and social systems.y At the same time,they used the rhetorics of globalization (and the example that other nations were undertaking these very reforms) to justify their need to make similar alterations,regardless of the reality of the situation. In contrast,during the late 1990s to early 21st century,those opposed to the changes being made in the name of globaliza- tion began using policy transfer to help counter many of these changes, borrowing and spreading ideas loosely contained in the programs and rhetorics associated with the‘‘third way.’’In time,it is theoretically possible that this approach could alter the path of market deregulation in much the same way that the Clinton and Blair Administrations began undoing the worst policies and programs developed during the 1980s to early 1990s (Dolowitz,2004).
* This continuum is for analytical purposes. As such,there are more reasons motivating policy transfer than listed,the distance between any two points is not equidistant,and the categories listed can be moved about and overlap in any single instance of policy transfer. This applies to the information presented in Figure 2.
y These transfers were multidirectional–particularly in relation to New Zealand,Australia,and the UK.
Figure 1 What motivates policy transfer?
Discussing perceptual imperatives as being the driving force behind policy transfer—particularly when the perception is that transfer must be engaged in to ensure one’s political or situational position of influence—does not however indicate that the perception has anything to do with the reality of an existing situation. All that has to occur is for political actors to believe that transfer is in their best interests. Similarly,when considering motivations lying toward the coercive end of the continuum,it is often the case that the power‘‘requiring’’the actor(s) to engage in policy transfer does not exist within the indigenous political system. Rather,pressures to engage in transfer often result from the decisions made in other states,at the international level, or from obligations undertaken when a nation accepts the rules governing treaties and memberships within larger organizations. For instance,any member state of the European Union can be‘‘obligated’’to enter a policy transfer mode of decision making when a new directive or court ruling is passed. Similarly,positive and negative externalities emerging out of the decisions made by one state can force another state to look around for ways to take advantage of,or block,the worst effects of these externalities.
Relating this back to globalization,it can be argued that one of the reasons that international organizations develop and publish benchmarks and league tables is to place political leaders and national political systems under pressure to engage in policy transfer. In this regard,it could be argued that rather than weakening the state,benchmarking exercises and league tables offer states the means of strengthening their internal and international position (even if this relates to nothing more than international prestige). The argument is that states can borrow from the political systems or areas listed at the top of the table in any area where they want to compete with the leaders.
Similarly,if they want to promote their own paradigm,they can work at developing benchmarks based on their existing practices.
This discussion highlights an important aspect of motivations: they lie on a continuum running from those that are mostly (or entirely) voluntary in nature,to those of a more (or entirely) coercive character. This distinction can help correct a failure of the globalization literature,which tends to imply that globalization forces lie almost exclusively at the coercive end of the contin- uum,when in reality,empirical research has likely shown (and is likely to show) that a much greater mix of motivations and causes exists.
When discussing motivations,it is also important to stress that defi- nitions of problems and solutions are not uncontentious. Because of this,it is vitally important to ensure that the definitions being used to investigate the phenomena associated with globalization and policy transfer actually match those used by agents of change,particularly given that in politics:‘‘Evidence is used in. . .highly selective ways. . .and [often] information about the effects of programs elsewhere enters debate. . .to justify prior positions’’rather than to
inform the debate with new knowledge (Bennett,1991b,p. 38). In this context, it is hard to deny that many western leaders have used the ‘‘logic’’ of globalization to justify restrictions on labor rights and trade unions even when the reality of the situation might have suggested other solutions or actions (Hirst and Thompson,1996). Once the justification for the curtail- ment of labor rights was established through the logic of globalization,it was an easy next step to borrow the ‘‘best practices’’ of competitor systems, arguing that this was the only way to improve one’s global economic position.
In the same vain,how a lesson is used or portrayed often depends on the audience being addressed. For example,although the Thatcher and Major Governments admitted on many occasions that they drew lessons from the United States during parliamentary debates,they rarely admitted to the influence the American welfare-to-work system was casting on their thinking in public statements or press releases. Taking the opposite approach,the Blair Government has had no qualms about publicly admitting its links to the Clinton Administration to justify and shape some of its key alterations to Britain’s economic and social policy domains. The key has been to use the rhetorics and policies advocated (although often not implemented) by the Clinton Administration (based on endogenous growth) to curtail the most negative effects of globalization,while using globalization’s more positive aspects to improve Britain’s position in international political,economic,and idea markets.
Proponents of globalization go beyond its direct influence on states to argue that,although states might not be directly affected by the forces of globalization, ‘‘the potential for international movements of capital,in response to shifts in interest rates orchanging expectationsabout exchange rates,can exert profound effects on national economic conditions and policies even if no capital movement actually takes place’’ (Keohane and Milner, 1996,p. 196). As discussed above,the perception (or threat) of capital and/or financial movements may have as profound an effect upon policy decisions as any actual globalization force. However,it is only by examining the processes and individuals involved in the transfer of ideas and policies around the globe will it be possible to distinguish the myth of globalization from the reality of specific types and processes of global convergence. By examining the motives of actors engaging in policy transfer,it should be possible to begin testing how important various elements of the globalization process are in the develop- ment of national policies.