An important development is the emergence of a friction-free boundless global economy where the largest corporations operate and coordinate supply chains and distribution networks with precision and efficiency, and smaller organisations have had to revise their strategies likewise in order to survive. As global trade becomes the norm rather than that enjoyed by multinational organisations, governments are forced to review their stance on border control, trade levy, taxation, merger and acquisition regulation, and other trade-related policies. Fur- ther, increasing access by citizens of different nations to various levels of the media society also makes it impossible for individual governments to ignore the globalisation effects of technology and to continue to govern and legislate in isolation. There is no longer a terrorist problem in any specific country; terrorism is a global feature faced by a growing number of countries regardless of religion, colour, or creed. As demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 and July 7,2005 incidents, individuals or groups with terrorist or criminal intent, as part of the panoptic-synoptican society, have been able to use technology to hatch their plots, survey the targets, and coordinate actual attacks. To protect their peoples, there is a need for greater coordination across nations. Aside from cultural and sovereign issues, there is the challenge of managing international relationships and providing governance on a vast scale.
0 Lee-Kelley & Kolsaker
We envisage that governments will have little choice but to continue investing in the latest technology for surveillance and control. A possible application is radio frequency identifica- tion (RFID), which can improve the government’s ability to conduct surveillance activities en mass. It is possible to track individuals or groups of individuals using passive RFID tags.
Small and portable, these tags are armed with a tiny antenna that does not require an internal energy source. When a surveilled target passes a reader (say an individual attempting to enter or leave a designated secure area), it will send a pulse of electromagnetic energy or radio wave that briefly activates the tag, which can be set to raise either a silent or audible alarm while relaying data on the individual to the relevant authorities. Commercial applica- tions began by embedding a RFID tag in a product or a pet’s collar for location purposes, although more innovative uses of the technology are emerging. Recent examples of RFID use include tagging deceased victims post Hurricane Katrina. The bodies are tagged and their medical records loaded on a RFID chip. Sister nightclubs in Barcelona, Spain, and Rotterdam, Holland apparently use temporary RFID implants as automated passes to their VIP lounges. Customers with the implants can order food and drinks with a wave of their arm. As an effective surveillance system, RFID can be deployed in almost any public or high-security area such as prison establishments, government buildings, military bases, airports, railway stations, and border controls.
Other digital advances include emerging ubiquitous technologies such as Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (DMB) and High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) which underpin the development of 21st century mobile televisions (TVs). DMB service is already available in Korea, and its hardware market is expected to grow quickly. Other developments include Internet protocol TVs which have recently been launched in Hong Kong, Japan, and Italy.
Wibro technology is another form of mobile Internet offering merged communication, broadcasting, and data services. These developments are amongst the most recent moves towards ubiquitous computing (ubi-comp). Ubi-comp can overcome traditional problems of citizen access and computer efficacy since the central precept of ubi-comp is that computer chips can be embedded into the structural fabric of our lives — whether at home, at the office, on lampposts, park benches, doorways, shopping malls, bank counters, and in cars or other forms of public transport. That is, mass broadcasting is not only possible, it can provide the government with the ability to reach and keep its citizens “informed” anytime and anyplace. In turn, individuals can interrogate the system for further information on anything of particular interest or concern. If installed with the latest microcamera technol- ogy, these ubi-comp systems will allow the government to watch its citizens in numbers and from across locations, something that is not feasible currently.
In e-governance terms, therefore, new and emergent technologies such as RFID and ubi- comp possess significant panoptic capabilities. They have the potential to curtail and reverse current synoptic practices of private viewers and society watchers, thus reverting to the few watching the many. For any government keen to use technology to perform its role as protector or to impose its political ideology and retain power over the people, these new advances offer almost limitless possibilities. And when conducted in partnership with large, global corporations, it can easily be interpreted as the rebirth of Orwellian draconism — the difference is that 21st century e-surveillance has the potential to be even more intrusive and extensive, operating as a global network. Imagine a world where unseen eyes are watching our every activity (or inactivity), and where the term “ubiquitous” refers to the possibility of entire populations being watched by the omnipresent few. This rather pessimistic projec-
Electronc Survellance for the Publc Good tion does ignore parallel technological developments which individuals can use to preserve their synoptic abilities. Besides, raised on a diet of liberty and fair play, and having enjoyed the freedom of citizen broadcasting, it is unlikely that the UK public will want or allow the return of a purely panoptic society.
Conclusion.
The UK government has put in place electronic systems which have the potential both to serve citizens and inhibit their freedoms. The government in reacting to recent terrorist events, has seen it necessary to forego the freedom of the masses in the pursuit of a small number of transgressors. For their part, citizens have demonstrated a high level of tolerance of potentially panoptic surveillance as they go about their daily business. That tolerance is based upon the consensual notion of state and citizens working as partners in our present panoptic-synoptican society. Technology has enabled the watched to turn their lens on the watchers, and increasing cooperation between the media and members of the public has given rise to a new generation of viewers, many of whom have taken upon themselves to act as self-appointed guardians of “truth,” putting pressure on the accountability and transpar- ency of government policies. There is little room for secrecy in our modern media-hungry society — the latest news, gossip, exposés, and public debate are instantaneously uploaded onto various media platforms for public consumption, making it difficult to distinguish what is in “the public interest” or who is protecting it and why. We caution that in the light of recent tendencies by certain disaffected factions towards anarchy and violence, failure by the government to understand the reasons behind public acceptance of some but not all of its e-governance efforts, and make explicit their objectives and scope of any new initiative, will only fuel any discord.
Regardless of the surveillant power of new technologies, the possession of power does not automatically legitimise it. Not all surveillance is considered unequivocally intrusive and we have demonstrated by our examples, when inappropriate assumptions of compliance have evoked vocal and active resistance. For Western democracies such as the UK, what is required is the employment of technology to enhance the credibility of the government as a
“steward of society.” The government should be careful not to use technology as a disciplin- ary instrument against the masses or to suppress dissenting views. From our discussion, it is clear that people are not overly disturbed by the type or even extent of surveillance, but they will not accept a government that is not open and convincing about the reasons and nature of surveillance. When the object for surveillance is transparent and evaluated as truly beneficial, then acceptance is likely. The central London congestion charge system is an apt example where all number plates are scanned and matched against a vehicle record and payment database. The logic for its implementation was made clear from its conception and as people begin to reap the benefits of a less congested London, it soon becomes another routine of daily life. We conclude that citizen compliance to e-surveillance is achieved only when there is a match between state and private interest.
Lee-Kelley & Kolsaker
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Endnotes
1 School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford , Surrey, UK (GU2 7XH), e-mail: [email protected]
2 School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford , Surrey, UK (GU2 7XH), e-mail: [email protected]
Murray & Habuln