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Electronc Survellance for the Publc Good 0 surveillance short of that exercised in the old communist regimes would be sufficient to deter transgressors. Besides, new software techniques such as facial recognition, although promising, are costly and have yet to prove themselves. Despite these obvious hurdles, the UK government appears determined to invest in even greater deployment of surveillance technologies. For example, aside from an agenda to double the number of CCTV cameras on the London Underground by 2010, there is also a plan to introduce airline-style checks on the rail-link between Paddington station and Heathrow airport and at certain points on the London Underground.
Other imminent installations include the much criticised proposal to introduce biometric identity cards (ID) by 2007. The ID cards are intended to have two key benefits: first, to prevent terrorism and, second, to ensure that those entitled to use public services are able to do so. Total estimated cost ranges between £10.6 to £19.2 billion (LSE, 2005), with no figure given for ongoing updates as people are born, marry, change names, move house, and eventually die. The scheme has been much criticised for a number of naïve assump- tions, such as that the cards will be impossible to forge; criminals and terrorists will be easily detected since they will not possess an ID card; ID cards will make crimes easier to solve, and it has been suggested by numerous groups that the ID card scheme is simply a smokescreen for establishing a national citizen database. The government’s unwaivering belief in the scheme is taken as evidence (by protest groups and factions of the media) that amongst politicians the panoptican mentality is in the ascendancy once again. Yet, despite media interest and civil liberty groups’ protestations, there has been little reaction from the public at large, either about ID cards or indeed concerning the increasing use of surveillance technology in general.
Public.Perception.of.E-Government:.A.Paradox
Although authors such as Haggerty and Ericson (2001) may argue that the object of contem- porary systems of surveillance is not punishment or control, we posit that e-governance in the Labour government context can be interpreted as the super-ability to observe, control, classify, and divide the population into categories of rich, poor, fraudster, bankrupt, crime risk, and so forth. That is, e-government or e-governance is a conduit with which our Labour government can deliver its Third Way ideology of state involvement and regulation. Public and private organisational policies of exclusion and inclusion may then be exercised based on the identified categorisations.
Possibilities for technology surveillance are numerous and extensive. Public intrusion into private lives is reinforced regularly by government broadcasts, such as a campaign by the DVLA advertising their ability to identify and fine late or overdue car-tax licences.
Technology enabled eavesdropping or snooping of the unsuspecting populace includes police officers, M15 agents, and even private investigators working for government (and commercial) agencies. Indeed, the high penetration of mobile communication devices and mobile personal organisers (collectively known as MDs) in the UK makes phone-tapping easy, effective, and cost-efficient. As individuals carry their MDs with them, their location can be pinpointed and their conversation monitored — safely at a distance and without the
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need for excessive manpower. Defence electronic manufacturers such as TRW regularly sell specialised MDs to the security forces. Although most people are unaware of, or affected by, the surveillance on them, the discovery of being “spied on” can be a traumatic experience especially when there appears to be little recourse since the police are not obliged to confirm one’s suspicion one way or the other. There is an independent watchdog — the Investiga- tory Powers Tribunal — but it would appear that neither it nor its predecessor have ever supported any complaint over phone tapping or electronic surveillance in the last 18 years (BBC News, November 12, 2003). In theory, any and every member of the population with a suitable mobile device is capable of being monitored; in practice, only a few are targeted
— and even fewer will ever know that they are being watched. There is no way of confirm- ing the extent of this kind of covert surveillance.
Despite the British public’s tendency to have a fairly cynical view of politicians and their government agencies, individuals who have to endure any form of private surveillance are still surprised and hurt by the inability or unwillingness of public institutions and the legal system to protect them against this intrusion. If queried, it is likely that an individual will admit to some idea of the capability of technology for use in personal surveillance, but has somehow elected not to think about it or to continue in the belief that existing judicial and legal frameworks are sufficient to protect against such blatant violations of personal privacy. To do otherwise, would rock the very foundations of consensual democracy and accountability.
Whilst the Freedom of Information Act, which came into full force in January 2005, amelio- rates the imbalance to some extent by allowing citizens to access categories of information previously held out with the public domain, unilateral exclusions and the need to pay for every request for disclosure diminishes its stated purpose of openness, transparency and ubiquitous access. The government’s reply to the Science and Technology Select Committee’s report on “the scientific responses to terrorism” (E-Envoy, 2003) provides a further hint of things to come and highlights the conflict between confidentiality and accountability. In the document the government reiterates its duty to ensure public safety and national security as well as its commitment to utilise “the best science and technology available” towards that goal. At the same time, the government considers it inappropriate and dangerous to release information that might be used by terrorists and the criminal fraternity. Resistance by those in public service to complete openness and free informational exchange highlights the difficult balance between respecting citizens’ right to know and keeping secret informa- tion that they have deemed necessary to protect the law-abiding public from internal and external threats. Indeed, there are already some rumours of increased shredding of govern- ment documents.
Another case in point is a classified report by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) agency proposing to require all communications service providers (CSPs) “to retain communications data originating or terminating in the UK, or routing through UK networks, including any such data that is stored offshore” for a period of seven years. The motive may be justified in terms of tackling cybercrime, but the wide-sweeping and indiscriminate retention methodology is open to question as it infringes the principles of the Data Protec- tion Act (1998) and the Human Rights Act (1998).
Similarly, in the name of fighting money laundering and other financial crimes, the whole of the UK financial services industry is required to keep comprehensive records of their customers, which they, as effective owners of the data, could also use for their own market-
Electronc Survellance for the Publc Good 0 ing efforts. Blau’s (1964) conception of human beings as value maximisers emerges here as those in official capacities or positions of trust are likely to desire some form of pay-off and as such, are inclined to selfish acts; the outcome of which could be the exploitation of the very public the surveillance mechanisms are allegedly designed to protect. Once again, it is unlikely that individuals would ever know how exactly and by whom the knowledge about their personal and financial data are being stored and used. It would seem that individuals are expected by the state and those in power to have faith and rely on the safety mechanisms of the larger “abstract systems” (Giddens, 1991). The question remains: who is watching the watchers? More to the point, what is the basis of our apparent lack of concern or apathy over the decisions and acts of others taken on our behalf? Of concern to the authors is the political reasoning that an apparently moral motive for public benefit is sufficient virtue in justifying such wide ranging power — to quote Martin Hollis (1998, p. 9), “it is not the sleep of reason which begets monsters.”
Anxiety over being watched is very real as reflected in a U.S. Gallup Poll pre-September 11 which reported that people found the loss of privacy more disturbing than the prospect of nuclear war. Presumably the belief or paranoia — founded or otherwise — that the likelihood of government intrusion is much higher than nuclear conflict. Moreover, the tension between public access and protection of civil liberties in other areas of e-government is evident:
public lethargy and marked reluctance to adopt government online services resulted in the discontinuation of the business section of the ukonline.gov.uk portal in April 2004. In the E-Envoy’s fourth UK Online report, it had to acknowledge that although public awareness of online government services registered 96% of Britain’s population, three quarters of them have never visited a government Web site. In a similar vein, public outcry against speed cameras has forced a review of the number and location of speed cameras across the UK.
The irony is that as society grows increasingly opaque, with individuals becoming more and more distant from their neighbours, more is known by the government about individuals.
The long-term implications of a simultaneous erosion of societal closeness and increase in state knowledge about citizens are significant in terms of the tacit, consensual agreement between government and citizens. Once the state knows more about citizens than the citizens themselves, the ability of citizens to question and call to account the government for actions done in their name is diminished significantly. It could be argued that the populace is to be blamed for its own acquiescence and submission to increasing public profiling practices
— perhaps the technology and media-led leisure pursuits in Western societies, as in the UK, have produced a generation that is largely ambivalent to the idea of being watched. That is, this apparent lack of public response is symptomatic of Foucault’s constitution of participa- tory, self-regulating subjects and therefore a feature of Mathieson’s synoptican society. But this explanation may be too superficial and the relatively subdued reaction to government surveillance practices, so far, may be attributable to good planning and communication (if one were generous) or simply, a fortuitous balance between peoples’ expectations of their right to privacy and their right to personal safety. Alternatively, this may be the population’s reaction to a perceived Orwellian approach to systematic governance and control manifested as a deliberate withdrawal and disengagement from the larger political and social domains.
Policy makers are reliant on their vision being implemented with competence, care, and good faith which, given the numerous failed citizens’ charters and withdrawal of the recent UK Computer Within Reach programme (owing to poor distribution, faulty hardware, and exorbitant help-line costs) would suggest a disconnection between the visionaries and the
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administrators or implementers. The European Court of Human Rights’ landmark judge- ment on the Geoff Peck case in 2003 highlights the problem of over-reliance on the “truth”
of CCTV footage and the lack of a code of conduct or regulatory framework in the UK for government agencies and regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Commission and Independent Television Commission, including the police. Mr. Peck, who was suffering from depression and attempting to commit suicide, was caught on camera with a knife. Without obtaining Mr. Peck’s permission, the council had released the unpixelled video footage to first the local media, and even more inappropriately, to the BBC’s special programme called
“Crime Beat.” Recent government’s embarrassment and furore over a recent spate of whistle- blowing by civil servants (e.g., Katherine Gun from GCHQ) and accusations by a former cabinet minister of spying on Kofi Annan the UN Secretary General, are further indications of the rift between conflicting public policies and private beliefs. Other incidents include the PM Blair’s office having to defend accusations of embellishing “evidence” to support the invasion of Iraq; Home Secretary Blunkett’s resignation over the possible misuse of his position to fast-track a visa application; and the implied involvement of the PM himself in events leading to the death of senior government scientist David Kelly. How will the interest of each be reconciled with the interest of all? Who is to decide what public interest is and how can that be best protected without encroaching on individual rights?
Government decisions and actions may be explained as poor political judgement, inadequate systems, and procedures or mere error, but any indiscriminate or inappropriate use of power (whether perceived or real) is a regression away from the basic tenet of “government of the people by the people” envisioned by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address (1863). An ICM poll which revealed that people are three times more likely to trust the BBC than the government (Daily Telegraph, 2004) is a telling indictment of public disillusionment and growing cynicism of the benevolence of the government. On one level this relates to the growing unease about personal privacy, tracking, data storage, and sharing. On another such concerns reflect failing participation rates in civic society from a lack of respect for politi- cians, increasing suspicion of their motives, and growing distance between the government and its people; creating a situation of the more the government knows about the citizens, the less people would relate and trust the government to act in their interest.
We use a recent example to illustrate this point. Government concern for public safety resulted in a UK-wide ban on using a mobile phone while driving. However, a RAC study reported that 4 out of 10 drivers were still ignoring the mobile rules (BBC News, 2004); leading road safety campaigners to lobby for tougher penalties and for a total ban on all hands-free devices.
This scenario offers an interesting insight into the kaleidoscope of modern UK society: in response to public opinion, health reports and in carrying out its role as state guardian, the government uses legislation to communicate the message that talking on the mobile phone while driving is dangerous to oneself and to others and must be stopped. Those affected are unconvinced and choose to show their distrust of this unwelcome interference through continuing use. Road safety campaigners (society’s self-appointed watchers) react by calling for even greater sanctions and control measures.
The public may be forgiven if their perception is one of an increasingly integrated, com- prehensive network of survey and control, in which those in power such as corporations, the government, and society’s viewers or watchers appear to “cooperate” and “pool” their surveillance resources to produce a panoptic-synoptican form of totalitarianism beyond the hierarchical Orwellian Big Brother state. The difference between the muted response to
Electronc Survellance for the Publc Good 0 growing and intrusive e-surveillance and the refusal to accept and participate in the more mundane services of online government and other e-government initiatives and legislatures is the basis of our thesis that the UK citizenry can and does distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable use of technology by the government, and that acceptability is anchored on a careful match between self interest and state interest. The government needs to under- stand this basic concept before assuming that in the panoptic-synoptican era, initiatives will automatically be accepted simply by claims that they provide for the greater good.